Volume 590 — United States Reports

ment that Congress precluded state courts from hearing a category of cases in § 113(b) by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over those cases in § 113(h). Often the simplest explanation is the best: Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases “arising under” the Act—just as it says—while § 113(h) deprives federal courts of juris- diction over certain “challenges” to Superfund remedial actions—just as it says. Pp. 12–17. 3.

In 48 States and federal court, a single juror's vote to acquit is enough to prevent a conviction. But two States, Louisiana and Oregon, have long punished people based on 10-to-2 verdicts. Held: The judgment is reversed. 2016–1199 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17), 231 So. 3d 44, reversed.

Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires that guilty verdicts be unanimous in criminal trials. The decision also incorporated the Sixth Amendment requirement for unanimous jury criminal convictions against the states, and thereby overturned the Court's previous decision from the 1972 cases Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana. At the time of the decision, only Oregon and Louisiana allowed non-unanimous jury convictions, while all other states had incorporated the unanimous requirement.

from the scope of the permitting program, “even where pollutants are conveyed to jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater.” 84 Fed. Reg. 16810, 16811. That reading, which would open a loophole allowing easy evasion of the statutory provision's basic purposes, is neither per- suasive nor reasonable. EPA is correct that Congress did not require a permit for all discharges to groundwater, and it did authorize study and funding related to groundwater pollution.

When a lawful permanent resident commits certain serious crimes, the Government may initiate removal proceedings before an immigration judge. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a. If the lawful permanent resident is… Held: For purposes of cancellation-of-removal eligibility, a § 1182(a)(2) of- fense committed during the initial seven years of residence does not need to be one of the offenses of removal. Pp. 229–240.

Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222 (2020) is a Supreme Court of the United States ruling which upheld a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that permanent residents (green card holders) rendered "inadmissible" for some crimes committed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) within the initial seven years of continuous residence were ineligible for 8 U.S.C. § 1229b cancellation of removal relief.

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 18-1150, 590 U.S. 255 (2020), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding "whether the government edicts doctrine extends to—and thus renders uncopyrightable—works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated" (OCGA). On April 27, 2020, the Court ruled 5–4 that the OCGA cannot be copyrighted because the OCGA's annotations were "authored by an arm of the legislature in the course of its legislative duties"; thus the Court found that the annotations fall under the government edicts doctrine and are ineligible for copyright. Litigation began in 2013 after Carl Malamud published the OCGA on Public.Resource.Org (PRO). The state of Georgia filed a lawsuit in 2015.

Held: 1. The Risk Corridors statute created a Government obligation to pay insurers the full amount set out in § 1342's formula. Held: The Risk Corridors statute created a Government obligation to pay insurers the full amount set out in § 1342's formula. Pp. 307–314. (a) The Government may incur an obligation directly through statu- tory language, without also providing details about how the obligation must be satisfied. See United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, New York, 590 U.S. 336 (2020), abbreviated NYSRPA v. NYC and also known as NYSRPA I to distinguish it from the subsequent case, was a case addressing whether the gun ownership laws of New York City, which restrict the transport of a licensed firearm out of one's home, violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause, and the right to travel. It was the first major gun-related case that the Supreme Court had accepted for review in nearly ten years, after District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).

Respondent Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Held: The Ninth Circuit panel’s drastic departure from the principle of party presentation constituted an abuse of discretion. The Nation’s adversarial adjudication system follows the principle of party presentation.

Petitioners (collectively Lucky Brand) and respondent (Marcel) both use the word “Lucky” as part of their marks on jeans and other apparel. Held: Because Marcel's 2011 Action challenged different conduct—and raised different claims—from the 2005 Action, Marcel cannot preclude Lucky Brand from raising new defenses. Pp. 411–417. 406 LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC. v. MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC.

In 1998, al Qaeda operatives detonated truck bombs outside the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Held: Plaintiffs in a federal cause of action under § 1605A(c) may seek punitive damages for preenactment conduct.

Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act with its 2008 amendments, whether plaintiffs in federal lawsuits against foreign countries may seek punitive damages for cause of actions prior to enactment of the amended law, with the specific case dealing with victims and their families from the 1998 United States embassy bombings. The Court ruled unanimously in May 2020 that punitive damages can be sought from foreign nations in such cases for preenactment conduct.

agreements—Article II—and one provision of Article II addresses the enforcement of those agreements—Article II(3). Article II(3) provides that courts of a contracting state “shall . . . refer the parties to arbitra- tion” when the parties to an action entered into a written agreement to arbitrate and one of the parties requests such a referral. Chapter 2 of the FAA grants federal courts jurisdiction over actions governed by the Convention.

constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U.S. 321 , 337, 26 S.Ct. 282 , 50 L.Ed. 499 . In this case, however, I am skeptical that any domestic nonsignatory doctrines need come into play at all, because Outokumpu appears to have expressly agreed to arbitrate disputes under the relevant contract with subcontractors like GE Energy.

Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 590 U.S. 448 (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that appointments to the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico are not subject to the restrictions in the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that all officers of the United States are subject to the Appointments Clause even if their duties relate to Puerto Rico. However, the power they exercise must be primarily federal in nature for the Clause to apply. If the officer exercises powers primarily of a local nature, even if created by federal law, then the officer is not "of the United States" and is exempt from compliance with the Clause.

Held: "suspend[ed] the finality" of any judgment, including one in habeas-thus enabling a district court to address the matter again. Id., at 267 , 98 S.Ct. 556 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 *1707 The record of judicial decisions accords with Browder 's view of the use of Rule 59(e) in habeas practice.

U. S. 330, 341. Fourth, the plaintiffs contend that meaningful regula- tion of plan fduciaries is possible only if they may sue to target per- ceived fduciary misconduct. But this Court has long rejected that ar- gument for Article III standing, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 489, and defned-beneft plans are regulated and monitored in multi- ple ways.

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled on the question of what appeals courts can review when determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a crime in the United States can be deported. It reversed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic), sought to construct an approximately 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina… Held: Because the Department of the Interior's decision to assign respon- sibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit. Pp. 609–624.

Act (Trails Act) establishes national scenic and national historic trails, 16 U. S. C. § 1244(a), including the Appalachian Trail, § 1244(a)(1). It also empowers the Secretary of the Interior to establish the Trail's loca- tion and width by entering into “rights-of-way” agreements with other federal agencies, States, local governments, and private landowners. §§ 1246(a)(2), (d), (e).

Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), is a landmark United States Supreme Court civil rights decision in which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.