Volume 59 — New Jersey Law Reports

<p>On error to the Essex General Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>In tort. On demurrer to declaration.</p>

<p>Where concurrent acts are to be done, the party who sues the other for non-performance must aver that he had performed or was ready to perform his part of the contract.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. In an action of tort for the conversion of chattels, an offer to show what such articles brought at a previous sheriff's sale was properly overruled.</p> <p>2. Such a sale has no tendency to show the real value of the property.</p>

<p>1. When a ease is tried by the court, a jury being waived, its finding on the blended law and facts cannot be reviewed on error.</p> <p>2. The proper method of proceeding pointed out.</p>

<p>1. An endorsement of .a note in the following form, “ J. W. Earrott, Eresident of Long Branch Hotel and Cottage Co.,” imports prima faaie the personal liability of J. W. Earrott.</p> <p>2. A summons and declaration naming “ John W. Parrott, President of the Long Branch Hotel and Cottage Company,” as the defendant, indicate John W. Parrott individually as the defendant, in the absence of evidence that the company is suable in the name of its president.</p>

<p>1. An agent sent by an insurance company to adjust a loss, has no implied power to delegate his authority to another.</p> <p>2. A policy issued by a Massachusetts corporation, insuring a building in Freehold, New Jersey, against damage by fire, required the assured to furnish proofs of loss to the company within thirty days after a fire, and also contained this clause: “No officer, agent or representative of the company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy.” Held, that the local agent of the company at Freehold, having a branch office there, could not absolve the assured from the duty of furnishing proofs of loss within the time limited. Carson v. Insurance Company, 14 Vroom 300, distinguished.</p>

On error, &c. Speicher, the defendant in error, while in the employ of Jersey City as a “ lineman,” climbed a telegraph pole to do some work upon wires of the city fire department, which were carried by the topmost of three cross-bars. The lower two cross-bars carried wires of the New York and New Jersey Telephone Company, the plaintiff in error. When Speicher descended the pole, he took hold of one of those cross-bars, which gave way and he fell.

<p>1. A motioR to nonsuit or direct a verdict on tlie ground of the lack of evidence on a certain point, which evidence the trial judge might, at his discretion, permit to be supplied, should bring to the attention of the judge the precise point relied on in support of the motion, or the ruling thereon will not in general be reviewed on a rule to show cause.</p> <p>2. While juries, in determining the pecuniary injury occasioned by the death of a person to his next of kin, under our statute, may be obliged, to some extent, to form their estimate of damages on conjectures and uncertainties, yet, when the evidence furnishes some standard for the calculation of damages, a verdict disregarding such standard and awarding damages in excess of any possible calculation based thereon will not be permitted to stand.</p>

<p>1. After a corporation is declared insolvent under the provisions of the Corporation act and an injunction has been issued and a receiver appointed, the corporate existence continues for four months with unimpaired corporate powers except as such powers are impliedly curtailed by the powers conferred upon the receiver; after the lapse of four months the corporation retains power to collect its property and assets and to sell the same and to distribute the proceeds among its creditors and stockholders.</p> <p>2. Pending the injunction and receiver, such corporation has power to take steps looking towards a reorganization and resumption of its property and business.</p> <p>3. In exercising such powers such corporation may employ agents and incur a liability to compensate them for their services.</p> <p>4. Whether the compensation of such agents is a liability which can be charged upon the assets of the insolvent corporation in case it fails to resdme its property and business, qucere; but for such compensation the corporation will be liable if the injunction is dissolved and the receiver removed.</p>

<p>On error to Essex Common Pleas.</p>

On rule to show cause. Plaintiff’s intestate was in the employ of the defendant, a ■company engaged in the manufacture of cement. On May 5th, 1892, defendant was using a machine for grinding broken rock called the Page milk The mill had an upper stone which was fixed in a frame of hard wood, and a lower stope which revolved. The upper stone had a hole of. about five inches in diameter in the centre, through which the rock to be ground was fed from a hopper.

<p>On demurrer to plea.</p> <p>The declaration contained a count upon a judgment recovered by plaintiff in the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p> <p>To this count, defendants, among others, filed the following plea:</p> <p>“And for a further plea in this behalf by leave of the court here for that purpose first had and obtained, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, as to the first count in said declaration mentioned, these defendants say that the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain its aforesaid action thereof against them, because they say that at the time of the commencement of said suit, and at the present time, there remains of record in this court a judgment recovered by the plaintiff herein against the Wallis Iron Works, which said judgment was founded upon a judgment entered in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in the county of Kings, against the Wallis Iron Works, Herman Steutzer and Michael Fleckenstein, and that the cause of action upon which said judgment in said Supreme Court in the State of New York was entered, was a certain promissory note or notes of the said Wallis Iron Works, and for its obligation made, executed and signed by these defendants, as the president and treasurer, respectively, of the said Wallis Iron Works, and not for their individual indebtedness, which said judgment entered in said Supreme Court of the State of New York against said Wallis Iron Works and others, and after entry of judgment aforesaid in this court against the Wallis IronWorks, was on motion of the plaintiff herein and therein vacated, and after execution had issued and been returned on -said New York judgment and set aside in the said Supreme Court of the State of New York, and thereafter suit was begun against these defendants and said Steutzer and Fleckenstein, in said State of New York, by the same plaintiff, upon the promissory note or notes, or some of them, which had been sued on and had formed the cause of action upon the judgment against the Wallis Iron Works, and others so vacated as aforesaid, against said iron works and others, and judgment recovered against them, and which said last-mentioned judgment forms the cause of this action and upon which this suit is founded.</p> <p>“And this the said defendants are ready to verify by the said records, wherefore they pray judgment if the said plaintiff ■ought to have or maintain their aforesaid action thereof against them.”</p> <p>A demurrer to this plea was interposed by plaintiff.</p>

<p>1. Under the Mechanics’ Lien law {Gen. Stat, p. 2063), when the building is erected under a contract with the owner of the land, it is erected by the owner and is not within the provisions of the fourth section of the act.</p> <p>2. In such case, if the contract be not filed, the fact that therein the builder has agreed that there shall be no liens does not affect others who, under section 1, have a right to a lien.</p> <p>3. Eor materials furnished under an entire contract there may be a recovery had upon a quantum valebat, if the unfulfilled contract was lawfully rescinded by the parties thereto.</p> <p>4. One of several sureties upon a bond conditioned that the builder shall keep the building free from all liens, does not, by the fact of such suretyship, forfeit his right' as a materialman to enforce a lien-against the building.</p>

<p>Where the plaintiff’s use of a way was, at its inception, permissive, its mere continuance for the statutory period will not ripen into a hostile right.</p>

<p>In an action of trespass to land, the plaintiff; who, as owner of the legal title, was in actual occupancy of part of the locus in quo, offered testimony competent to prove that the disputed part of the locus was within the boundaries of the same title-deed; he also testified to acts of entry upon and apparent dominion over this part of the locus. Held, that it was ^rror to withdraw from the jury the question of his disputed possession.</p>

<p>Negotiable paper, fraudulent at its inception, is not invalidated in the hands of one taking it for value before maturity, unless there be actual fraud upon his part.</p>

<p>On demurrer to information.</p>

On error to the Monmouth Common Pleas. Action on bond containing the following recital and condition : “ Whereas, the said William H. Pearsall is a party to the contract for building a dwelling-house for one Annie M. Vietor, wife of George Frederick Vietor, the same to be erected on her land situate on the southerly side of the Rumson road and adjoining the easterly side of land of Mrs. Theodore Moss, in the township of Shrewsbury, in the county of Monmouth and State of New…

On demurrer to declaration. The plaintiff brings her action, as administratrix of John ~W. Lower, deceased, alleging, by the first count, that on July 5th, 1894, the deceased was a bricklayer employed by defendant in the construction of a building in Philadelphia, and that the defendant did not provide a secure scaffold, and the same fell while deceased, was standing on. it, and he sustained injuries from which he died in a few minutes.

<p>On demurrer to declaration.</p>

<p>1. An application for an adjournment on account of the absence of a material witness is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, on the trial of an appeal, will not be reversed for the refusal of an adjournment, unless it be made to appear that injustice has been done by such refusal.</p> <p>2. Books of account are not competent evidence of damages arising from breaches of covenants and agreements contained in a lease. Nor are such books competent evidence of the damages sustained by the wrongful taking of personal property.</p> <p>3. The rules of practice and procedure relating to bills of exceptions that control .on writs of error do not apply to certiorari on proceedings in suits under the Justice’s Court act. This court, on certiorari, will not retry the ease upon the merits, but will examine the record to see whether the trial of the suit has not been so conducted as to do injustice.</p> <p>4. The court in its discretion may permit a case to be opened for the admission of additional testimony, or the jury may be permitted to return into court or be called back for further instructions or for information as to the evidence that has been regularly put in during the trial. But to permit the introduction of material evidence on a new subject after the case has been closed and submitted to the jury, is erroneous.</p>

<p>The acts of May 25th, 1894 (Pamph. L., p. 506), and of March 22d, 1895 (Pamph. L.-, p. 472), provide that where a number of sohool districts are consolidated, an assessment equal to one-fifth of the value of the school property in each of the old districts shall be levied upon all the taxpayers of the consolidated district, and there shall be remitted to the taxpayers of each school district as it existed on the 30th day of June, 1894, one-fifth of the appraised value of the school property belonging to said district, and yearly thereafter one-fifth shall be so assessed and remitted until the whole appraised value is remitted. Held, that this legislation is unconstitutional. It provides for no public necessity or exigency; the tax is not to be appropriated to the expenses of government; its sole end and design' is to benefit one class of citizens at the expense of another.</p>

<p>Where a lease provides that the leased premises shall be used only as a dwelling and boarding and lodging-house, and shall not be sublet, and also contains a provision that the lease shall be void if the tenant fails to perform on his part, a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to remove the tenant by summary proceedings for an alleged breach of said conditions.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari in matter of taxation.</p>

<p>Lands in the township of Verona, purchased and held by the city of Newark for the purposes of the “ Newark City Home,” being reasonably necessary for the proper seclusion and employment of the boys committed to it, are not taxable.</p>

<p>Under the act of 1891 (Gen. Slat., p. 1817, l 159), the board of excise, after a license has been granted and once renewed upon an application made in due form, cannot again renew the license without a new application, duly recommended.</p>

<p>1. There is sufficient averment of the pretence and its falsity, and that the complainants were induced to part with their money by relying on the false pretence.</p> <p>2. The indictment is good, although the false pretence charged may be such that a person of ordinary prudence and caution would not be deceived by it.</p>

<p>On application for certiorari.</p>

<p>Tlie power to review the proceedings of municipal corporations in matters affecting the rights and property of individuals, which is exercised by the Supreme Court by means of the writ of certiorari, cannot be conferred by (¡he legislature upon the Circuit Courts of this state.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>Where, by statute, a municipality is empowered to pass ordinances and to fix and prescribe penalties for their violation, the power to fix such penalties must be exercised by the municipality itself and cannot be delegated by it to the justice of the peace before whom a prosecution is had for an infraction of the provisions of one of such ordinances.</p>

<p>On ceHiorari to the Court of Common Pleas of Passaiccounty.</p>

<p>After the defendant named in a summons has been regularly brought into Gourt, the writ cannot be amended by substituting the name of another person as defendant, and altering the return day, for the purpose of procuring the reissuing thereof and its service upon the substituted defendant.</p>

<p>Eule for mandamus.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The bill of particulars of a demand upon which an action at law is-founded forms no part of the declaration to which it is annexed.</p> <p>2. A bill of particulars is not within the meaning of the term “ pleading” as used in section 132 of the Practice act. Gen. Stat.,p. 2555.</p> <p>3. The bill of particulars annexed to a declaration is designed to give notice to the defendant of the specific character of the demand whereof the declaration is general, and where the items thereof are uncertain or misleading, the proper practice is to demand a better bill of par-' ' ticulars, or by a special rule of the court, obtained upon notice, compel’ a more specific one to be furnished, rather than to move to Strike out-the-uncertain or misleading items.</p> <p>4. If the defendant, by the bill of particulars annexed to the declaration, or furnished on demand or in compliance with a rule of the court,.' fairly and substantially sets, forth the character of the services or' claim for which the action is brought, and the items and amo.unts for whiph recovery is sought, with the dates, it must be deemed sufficient. . It need not state the terms of the contract for such services or upon which the claim is founded, nor the evidence to be produced at the trial to sustain the action.</p> <p>5. Attorneys and solicitors may lawfully charge reasonable fees for services rendered without a contract for a specific sum, and counsel fees for advocacy are recoverable if an express contract therefor exists between counsel and client.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The city council of the city of Elizabeth is composed of thirteen members, and the city charter provides that in case any ordinance or' resolution involves the expenditure of money, the vote of three-fourths-of all the members of the city council shall be necessary to its passage. Held, that a resolution of the council awarding a contract for lighting' the streets, after advertisement for and the receipt of proposals from different bidders, must be adopted by a vote of at least ten members of the council in its favor.</p> <p>2. A custom at variance with the plain meaning of a statute cannot be-sustained as a construction of it. Long usage, contemporaneous construction and practical interpretation, can only be resorted to in construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of technical terms, to conform a construction deduced from the language, to explain doubtful or inconsistent phrases, or where the meaning is obscurely expressed.</p>

<p>1. After the members of a board of chosen freeholders have been judicially adjudged usurpers upon an information in the nature of .a quo warranto, and punishment inflicted for such usurpation, they no longer can conduct the business of the municipal affairs of the county as a. defacto board of chosen freeholders, and the county collector, is not bound to pay out the county moneys to counsel for his services in the defence of the title of the members of the board to their positions, upon an order or resolution of such board passed after the members thereof have been so adjudged usurpers.</p> <p>2. The board of chosen freeholders have no power to burden the public with the expenses of the defence of the personal title of the members-of the board to their positions. The expenses for counsel and attorneys’ fees in such an event do not become a public charge, and the-payment thereof is not comprehended within the powers and duties-of the board.</p> <p>3. Where the right is doubtful or another legal remedy exists, a writ of mandamus will not be granted to enforce the right, or take the place-of the other remedy. In order to invoke the power of the writ of mandamus the right must be clear.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause why mandamus should not issue.</p>

<p>The act of the legislature, entitled “An act authorizing municipalities governed by commissioners to pave and improve streets and avenues and provide payment thereof,” approved March 11th, 1892 (Gen. Stat., p. 2156), is in contravention of article 4, section 7, paragraphs 9 and 11 of the constitution of this state and void, and any assessments for special benefits imposed thereunder will be set aside.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>The act of June 1st, 1886, amending “An act to establish an excise department in cities of this state,” passed April 8th, 1884 (Gen. Stat., p. 1806), requires the board of excise commissioners to pass an appropriate ordinance or by-law for the licensing of inns and taverns before it can actually license such a house. Qucere. Is that act of June 1st, 1886, repealed, pro tanto, by the supplement of February 24th, 1892 ?</p>

<p>A certificate and affidavit filed for the puipose of forming a limited partnership, pursuant to the statute of the State of New York in such case provided, were 'dated and filed on the 5th of January, 1892. The former stated the sum contributed by M., the special partner, and the latter, that said sum had actually and in good faith been paid in cash. The partnership was to commence at the date above stated. The sum contributed by" M. was not, in fact, paid until the 12th of January, 1892. Held, that the statement of the affidavit as to the payment was false within the meaning of the statute, and that M. was liable as a general partner for the claim sued upon,</p>

<p>1. The refusal of the court to grant a mandamus is not reviewable on error.</p> <p>2. By filing a survey in the office of the secretary of state, of its contemplated route, a railroad or similar company obtains a pre-emption of the land embraced in it.</p> <p>3. Such a survey was made, and the land embraced was subsequently purchased by the railroad, the defendant in error. Application being made by the company that filed said survey for commissioners to condemn the land, and it appearing that the charter of such company forbade it to take land held by another corporation—Held, that whatever remedy the applicant had was in equity, and that it could not acquire the land by procedure in a court of law.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex Circuit.</p>

<p>1. It is the duty of the master to furnish proper implements to his servants for the performance of their work, and if he entrusts that duty to a co-servant, the master is liable for the negligence of the co-servant in performing it.</p> <p>2. But if safe and proper tools are supplied by the master, he is not liable for an injury which his servant receives by using, under the direction of the foreman over such servant, a tool not furnished for or adapted, safely to the Avork.</p>

<p>1. Private memoranda of the plaintiff’s business made by its bookkeeper, which were not the original statements of the transactions to which they referred, which were made by one who was not cognizant of the transactions, which were not contrary to the interest of the person who made them, and which did not relate to dealings with the defendant, were not legal evidence in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant to prove the transactions.</p> <p>2. Books of science are generally inadmissible as evidence to prove the opinions contained in them; but if a witness refers to them as an authority for his own opinions, they may be received for the purpose of contradicting him.</p> <p>3. Evidence showing that the plaintiff’s predecessor in title had, by his conduct while he held the title, disavowed the claim now set up by the plaintiff under the title, is competent against the plaintiff.</p> <p>4. The defendant offered in evidence the minute-book of the plaintiff’s proceedings, for the purpose of showing the action of the plaintiff in view of a certain agreement made between third parties and recited in the minutes. Held, that the evidence was competent, without producing the agreement itself or accounting for its non-production.</p> <p>5. Who is entitled to be considered as an expert in regard to any matter of science or skill, is a question which must be left very much to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision is conclusive unless-clearly shown to be erroneous in matter of law.</p> <p>6. The interest of an expert witness affects the weight not the legality of his testimony.</p> <p>7. A copy of an English patent is not legal evidence to prove the practicability of the process described in it.</p> <p>8. When the subscribing witnesses to the execution of a writing are shown to be out of the state, other proof of its execution-is competent.</p>

<p>1. Under'the act of March 12th, 1878 (Pamph. L., p. 80), the writ of error in cases punishable with death is a writ of right, but such writ must issue out of the Court of Errors and Appeals in the first instance.</p> <p>2. Qucere. Whether the authority of the Supreme Court to review convictions in cases punishable with death, on writ of error issued by order of the Chancellor, still remains.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 29 Vroom 545.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 29 Vroom 598.</p>

On error to Essex Circuit. The schedule annexed to the declaration contained in the record shows that plaintiff’s fiction was founded upon the following instrument: “THE GOLDEN STAB FBATEENITY. “Prudens Futuri. “ Beneficiary Certificate. “ This certificate issued by authority of the Supreme Council of the Golden Star Fraternity, witnesseth: That Lizzie P. Martin, a member of Excelsior Council, No. 3, of Newark, N. J., is entitled to all the rights and privileges guaranteed…

<p>1. When a corporation is engaged in publishing a newspaper, and from the evidence it may be inferred that a libellous article published therein has been edited and published by some person employed for that purpose, the corporation will be liable to the person libelled to the same extent that an individual would be who had personally made such a publication.</p> <p>2. Where the libellous article contained charges of dishonest, fraudulent •and criminal conduct, and, upon a retraction being demanded, a second article was published which might be construed as containing a covert and evasive reiteration of the original charges, it was not error to refuse to charge that no punitive damages could be awarded.</p>

<p>Whenever the question whether a pedestrian using a highway has used ordinary care to avoid a collision with a vehicle is one about which a difference of opinion may reasonably be entertained, the judgment of a jury thereon must, upon error, be a finality.</p>

<p>On error to the Passaic Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>The court is justified in controlling a jury in its verdict, by a binding instruction, only in those cases in which the testimony will not support any other verdict than that which is directed.</p>

On error. Action of ejectment tried in the Burlington Circuit, before Justice Garrison, without a jury. The plaintiff below, Mrs. Davis, recovered the undivided half part of the premises. The question of title depended on the legal effect of the will of Thomas Gaskill and that of his son, Job H. Gaskill. The former will, dated January 31st, 1841, disposed of the lands in dispute in the following terms, viz.: “Item.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 29 Vroom 314. ,</p>

<p>On error to the Gloucester Circuit.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 28 Vroom 42.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 28 Vroom, 517.</p>

The indictment in this cause was for murder in the first degree, and was found in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the county of Somerset. At the December Term, 1895, of said court the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death. A writ of error was subsequently allowed by the Chancellor.

On error to the Supreme Court. The case was tried at the Hudson Circuit before Justice .Lippincott and a jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff below for the sum of $1,200.

On error to the Monmouth Pleas. On August 14th, 1894, a writ of attachment issued out of the Monmouth Pleas in favor of Nicholas,J. Demarest against Morris Kraus and Benjamin Kraus, non-resident debtors.' which was placed in the hands of the plaintiff in error, whd was then sheriff of Monmouth county, and by virtue thereon the sheriff attached two wagons, which were then in the pos-' session of the defendants in attachment, Kraus Brothers.

On rule to show cause. This suit was brought by James S. Erwin to recover the salary alleged to be due him as the city attorney of Jersey City, for the months of January and February, 1894. The case was tried at the Hudson Circuit, before the judge, without a jury, and the finding was for the plaintiff.

<p>On error to the Monmouth Circuit.</p>

<p>The title of an officer of a municipal corporation cannot, on a quo warranto,. be put in question on the ground that the de facto body appointing him has no legal existence.</p>

On error to the Monmouth Common Pleas. The action was in tort, and the declaration contained three counts. It stated, by way of inducement, inter alia, that the plaintiff was “ a clergyman of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, duly ordained and in good and regular standing therein,” and that he was acquiring a livelihood in his profession at Asbury Park, in Monmouth county.

On error to the Essex Circuit. The record and bills of exception disclose that the action of Lambertson, the plaintiff below, was brought to recover damages for an injury sustained by him as the result of a collision between a car of the Consolidated Traction Company, the defendant below, and a wagon driven by Lambertson, which occurred in Broad street, in the city of Newark.

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>If there be degrees of reasonable doubt, the definition of such degrees is a matter of no moment in the administration of criminal justice, for if, after carefully weighing the evidence, the jury finds its judgment unconvinced of guilt, a state of reasonable doubt exists, the benefit of which must be given to the accused without reference to its degree. It was erroneous, therefore, to charge the jury in a criminal case that “ any reasonable doubt must be given to the defendant, but it must be a very reasonable one,” for such a direction permitted, if it did not require, the jury to refuse to the accused the benefit of such a doubt unless it was of the highest or at least of a very high degree.</p>

<p>1. The amendment to the Practice act, approved March 4th, 1890 (Pamph. L., p. 24), applies to judgments previously recovered.</p> <p>2. Where an action accrues to an executor upon a contract made with him as such, it should be brought in his proper name, describing himself to be such executor.</p>

<p>Upon the trial of an indictment that charged that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully and without license prescribed medicine for one John Craig, evidence that he had prescribed for other persons is illegal, its only effect being to show that he habitually did those things for the doing of which, in a particular instance, he had been indicted.</p>

<p>The Pleas have no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment in a mechanics’ lien case transferred to it from the Circuit, and such judgment will, on writ of error, be for this cause reversed.</p>

<p>The contract of a plaintiff, who is the mayor of a city, for personal services and expenses in negotiating a purchase of a mortgage on lands within the limits of the city, for the defendant, with whom the contract has been made, is not illegal and void, as contrary to public policy, for the reason that in the contract the plaintiff agrees not to interfere with the defendant in his efforts to obtain an adjustment or reduction of taxes on said lands from the proper municipal authority, where it appears that the mayor has no power over the remission of taxes, and did no act to secure that end, nor exercised any influence in that direction over or upon the municipal body or officers having jurisdiction in such matter.</p>

<p>1. The defendant in a suit by attachment against a non-resident or absconding debtor, it being a proceeding in rem, and inoperative beyond the bounds to which it is made a lien by the statute which authorizes the action, is not bound to enter any appearance or file a set-off if he has any claims, debts or demands against the plaintiff in such action. The defendant in such a case, even if he has knowledge or notice of the attachment, can, at his own election, appear and file his set-off, or bring his action thereon afterwards, to which action the judgment recovered in the proceedings in attachment cannot be pleaded in bar.</p> <p>2. A replication to such a plea is not a plea of mil tiel record, but a plea setting out the character of the record, which, under the law, presents no defence to the action.</p> <p>3. None of the provisions of the act entitled “An act concerning set- . off” (Gen. Stat., p. 3109), can have any application to the proceedings in attachment against non-resident or absconding debtors unless the defendant chooses to enter his appearance therein.</p>

<p>1. An appointment to and acceptance of an office is not a contract. Neither the office nor its emoluments are property, and it is competent for the legislative department of the government to remove the incumbent from his office before the expiration of the term for which he was appointed or elected, unless such legislation is interdicted by force of some constitutional prescription.</p> <p>2. Section 1 of article 6 of the constitution, under the title of “ Judiciary,” ordains that “ The judicial power shall be vested in a Court of Errors and Appeals in the last resort in all causes as heretofore, a Court for the Trial of Impeachments, a Court of Chancery, a Prerogative Court, a Supreme Court, Circuit Courts and such inferior courts as now exist and as may be hereafter ordained and established by law; which inferior courts the legislature may alter or abolish as the public good shall require.” Held—</p> <p>(1) That by this enumeration the courts mentioned became constitutional courts—that is, courts that could not be altered or abolished except by the alteration of the instrument that created them.</p> <p>(2) That the Inferior Courts of Common Pleas, not being mentioned in the enumeration of the courts in which the judicial power of the state was vested, are inferior courts within the meaning of this clause . of the constitution.</p> <p>3. The relator was commissioned a judge of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Hudson county on the 1st day of April, 1892, for the full term of five years. The act of March 26th, 1896 (Pamph. L., p. 149), provided that the law or president judges then in office should continue in office for the terms for which they were respectively appointed, and that the terms of office of all other judges of the said courts should end on the 31st day of March, 1896. The relator was one of that class of judges whose term of office was terminated within the purview of the act. Held, that this enactment was valid and constitutional.</p> <p>4. Schalh v. Wrightson, 29 Vroom 50, distinguished.</p>

<p>On contract. On rule to show cause why a summons and service should not be set aside.</p>

<p>On certiorari to remove an ordinance of the city of Orange.,.</p>

<p>1. An original assessment for grading a street in the city of Perth Amboy having been set aside as to the prosecutor of a certiorari only, the reassessment was to be made as to such prosecutor under the act of March 23d, 1883. Gen. Stat., p. 689.</p> <p>2. Although in the report of such reassessment the commissioners need not set out at length the amount of the benefits to any other property than that of the prosecutor, they must show in their report that they did, in fact, ascertain and determine the actual and peculiar benefit which each landowner received.</p> <p>3. If the report is defective in that respect, it should be referred back to the commissioners under the act of February 24th, 1876. Gen. Stat., p. 369, l 13.</p>

<p>1. An affidavit “that the tenant is in possession of the demised premises, and that he has held and occupied the same from on or about the first day of April, 1892, as tenant of deponent, and without any special-agreement for the termination of the said possession, the said tenant paying the deponent the rent of seventeen dollars therefor monthly up until the time of default,” does not show an agreement to pay the rent monthly, whereby the tenancy may become a monthly tenancy.</p> <p>2. A notice to quit at any period sooner or later than the conclusion of the tenancy will not avail the landlord.</p> <p>3. A statement that the monthly tenancy commenced on or about the 1st day of April, 1892, is indefinite, and therefore a notice to quit on the 1st day of April, 1896, is insufficient.</p>

<p>Advantage cannot be taken on demurrer of the fact that the declaration! is in covenant, and by the copy of the instrument sued on annexed to-the declaration it appears to be not under seal, unless in the body of the declaration the instrument sued on is referred to as so annexed- and forming part of the declaration.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Hudson Pleas.</p>

<p>Under the act of 1894 (Gen. Stat., p. 3320, § 200), the prosecutor is entitled to exemption from taxation for every building used for the purposes of its creation, and also for so much of the land upon which each building is erected as is necessary to its fair use and enjoyment, not in any ease exceeding five acres to a building.</p>

<p>On habeas corpus.</p>

<p>The act of February 23d, 1886 (Gen. Stat.,p. 1534, § 328), prohibits the transferring of a police officer from the position of sergeant to the inferior position of patrolman for any other cause than incapacity, misconduct, non-residence or disobedience of the rules and regulations of the police force of which he is a member.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari. In matter of road.</p>

<p>1. The tenth section of the act of March 20th, 1889 (Gen. Stat., p. 1813), regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, provides that if the holder of a license shall permit intoxicating liquors to be sold upon his premises contrary to law, his license shall thereby become forfeited ; and that upon complaint of any three persons, residents and legal voters of the municipality wherein such license is used and exercised, verified by the oaths of such complainants, being presented to the body which granted the license, alleging that such license has become forfeited, and specifying the acts complained of which shall be alleged to have worked such forfeiture, it shall be the duty of such body to proceed to an investigation, &c. Held, that this statutory provision is not in contravention of the constitutional provision preserving the right of trial by jury, and that the licensing body have a right to proceed under it without waiting until the holder of the license has been indicted and convicted by the criminal courts for his violation of the law. Held, further, that the affidavit verifying the complaint should set out the particulars of the alleged violations of law upon which the complaint is based, and should attest the truth thereof.</p> <p>2. A license to sell intoxicating liquor is a mere temporary permit to do what otherwise would be illegal, and is in no sense property.</p>

<p>1. When population is made the basis of classification, for the purpose of regulating the affairs of counties, the last official census is accepted as determining the amount of the population of the county to which the regulation is sought to be applied; and such census takes effect from the time of its promulgation by the secretary of state in accordance with the statutory provision relating thereto. Gen. Stat., p. 366, §10.</p> <p>2. By the act passed May 9th, 1894, members of the boards of freeholders in counties having a population of not less than seventy-five thousand nor more than two hundred thousand, are entitled to receive an annual salary of §150. By a supplement to the act, passed March 25th, 1895, the annual salaries of members of such boards in counties having a population of over one hundred thousand are increased to §300. At the time of the passage of the supplement of 1895, the county of C. had a population of less than one hundred thousand, but subsequently, and by the state census promulgated by the secretary of state, on January 15th, 1896, its population was ascertained to be in excess of that number. Held, that members of the board of freeholders of that county were not entitled to the larger salary, provided by the supplement of 1895, until after the expiration of the year during which the increased population was officially ascertained, notwithstanding the fact that certain installments of their salaries did not become payable until after such ascertainment.</p>

<p>On motion to quash certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>The county superintendent of public schools in apportioning the state school money among the school districts in his county, on the basis of the last published school census, under the amendment of the Public School act, approved March 31st, 1896, has no authority to inquire into the legality of the constitution of an existing school district designated as such in said census.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>A city council, under the charter of the city which confers power upon the council to make ordinances to regulate the public streets; to prevent immoderate driving or riding; to provide the manner in which corporations or persons shall exercise any privilege granted to them in the use of the streets; to regulate the running of locomotive engines and railroad ears therein, and to protect persons and property, is authorized to enact an ordinance that all passenger ears operated by trolley or electric power in the streets of the city shall have proper and suitable fenders on the front of such cars to prevent accident, and that it shall he unlawful to operate such cars in the streets of the city without such fenders.</p>

<p>A city having authority under its charter to regulate the use of the public streets and highways, can enact an ordinance to compel passenger cars, operated by trolley or electric power, to come to a full stop before crossing intersecting streets, and such an ordinance, if enacted in the manner prescribed by the charter of the city, is legislative in its character, and will not be set aside as unreasonable in its purpose or effect.</p>

<p>1. In 1825 an owner laid out his land in numbered lots and parcels, and set out and delineated various streets across and through it, among which was K. street, sixty-six feet in width. This map was filed and recorded in the county clerk’s office and thereafter recognized and adopted in the description of lots in conveyances made by the original owner and his grantees. K. street was not at once formally accepted by the public authorities of the town, but was from its dedication used as a street by the owners of land on the map and generally considered a street of the town. In 1895 an ordinance was passed which provided that K. street “be opened and extended sixty-six feet in width, to conform to the map and profile of the extension of said street according to the survey thereof,” and “that all lands and real estate embraced within the boundaries of said K. street be taken and-appropriated for the purpose of a public street” as dedicated. Held, that the ordinance does not take or appropriate any lands; it merely adopts as a public care and charge as a public street what was long ago dedicated to public use.</p> <p>2. K. street was not vacated by the acts of March 24th, 1859, and March 26th, 1874. Gen. Stat., p. 2821, § 78; Id, p. 2846, ? 200. These acts have relation to streets once regularly laid out and not opened or worked for more than twenty years. K. street did not become a “laid-out” street until the passage of the ordinance accepting the dedication.</p>

<p>Where a board of police commissioners has the power to try a member of the police force on a charge duly made against him, and the charge is sustained on a fair trial, this court will not, on certiorari, weigh the evidence on which the board acted. It is enough that there was evidence on which the prosecutor was found guilty, and which formed a rational basis for the judgment against him.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. On the night of the 15th of April, 1895, the plaintiff in error, with another man, attempted to drive a single horse, drawing a buggy in which they rode, from Elizabeth to Newark. After reaching North Elizabeth they turned westerly through Louisa street.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Passaic Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. A writ of error, not served upon the court to which it is addressed, but upon the opposite party, and in this condition filed in the ofiice of the clerk of the court, and in the place of a record properly certified, left with the clerk a statement of facts agreed upon by counsel, will be dismissed.</p> <p>2. Error will not lie to ah order of the Supreme Court directing a man-damns to issue.</p>

On error to the Hudson Circuit Court on forfeited recognizance. A defendant in a criminal proceeding being charged on an indictment pleaded not guilty, and the plaintiff in error entered with him into a recognizance in the usual form for his appearance, &c. This suit was brought on this recognizance, the alleged breach being the non-appearance of the defendant.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The finding of the trial court upon questions of fact involved in the trial of a challenge to jurors is not reviewable.</p> <p>2. In this case two jurors were summoned, by the name of John R. Mundy. Both appeared and answered to their names. The correct name of one was John R. Mundy; that of the other-, John F. Mundy. The court properly overruled the challenge to the array for this error-in the name.</p> <p>3. Under the eighty-ninth section of the Criminal Procedure act, no judgment given upon an indictment shall be reversed for any errar except such as shall or may have prejudiced the prisoner in maintaining his defence upon the merits. The prisoner was not prejudiced in this case.</p> <p>4. An expert witness on the question of sanity testified on behalf of the state that the prisoner was sane. He further said he would not be willing to express that opinion if the birthmark on the prisoner was the result of syphilitic taint. The court charged the jury that the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of evidence was upon the prisoner, and that the jury might take the statement of this expert witness as to the birthmark, in connection with the fact that the prisoner had produced no evidence of such syphilitic taint, and that the burden of proving such taint was upon him. There was no error in this instruction. It was, in substance, a charge that the burden of proving the taint was upon the prisoner before he could claim the benefit of it as an absolute fact. The court did not charge that the possibility of such taint could not be considered by the jury.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see ante p. 48.</p>

On error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment of the Hudson Circuit. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 28 Vroom 224. The Excelsior Electric Company, under lawful authority, maintained an electric light over the centre of Harrison avenue, in the town of Harrison.

<p>If, in a criminal case brought before this court, under the act of May 9th, 1894 (Crew. Stat., p. 1154), the evidence is of such a nature that, when fully and fairly examined, it will not satisfy a considerate mind, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused, a conviction thereon must be set aside and a new trial granted.</p>

<p>1. Under the circumstances of this case, it was for the jury to decide whether the machine, for the alteration of which a mechanics’ lien was claimed, was owned by the alleged owner when the alteration was made, and was then a. fixture for manufacturing purposes within the purview of the Mechanics’ Lien law.</p> <p>2. If the owner employs A to alter a building, and A employs B to do the work, the owner’s written consent is not necessary to entitle B to a lien.</p> <p>3. If a creditor accepts from his debtor the note of a third person for the pre-existing debt, the original debtor is not thereby discharged when such discharge was not intended by the parties.</p> <p>4. Under our statute a lien claim may be amended in any particulars which do not enlarge the claim, either in the amount of the debt, in the estate to be charged or in the persons to be affected, even though the time for filing a new claim has expired, provided judgment has not been entered on the claim.</p> <p>5. If the bill of particulars annexed to a lien claim is so defective that it would not warrant a judgment to enforce the lien, but does not contain any willful or fraudulent misstatement of the matters directed by the act to be inserted therein, it may be amended and made perfect under the statute.</p> <p>6. The proper extent of the curtilage to which a mechanics’ lien may attach is a matter to be determined by a justice of the Supreme Court, whose decision cannot be reviewed in this court, unless erroneous in point of law.</p>

<p>1. The statutory provision that no indictment shall be held insufficient for omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed, where time is not of the essence of the offence, is constitutional.</p> <p>2. Under that statute an indictment which does not state any time for the commission of the offence charged, may, nevertheless, be sustained.</p>

<p>1. If the plaintiff fails to prove the cause of action alleged in his declaration, but proves a different cause of action, a nonsuit is not erroneous, in the absence of a motion to change the narr.</p> <p>2. If horses break out of their owner’s pasture lot and stray upon a railroad track, without fault on the part of the railroad company, and there are killed through the negligence of the company’s servants, the negligence of the owner in permitting the horses to stray will bar him from recovering damages for their loss.</p>

<p>1. The occurrence of a “lurch” or “jerk” of a street car of sufficient violence to throw off the car a passenger who had notified the conductor of her desire to get off at Fifth street, and who, after the conductor called out Fifth street, had arisen and gone to the rear door in preparation for alighting, justifies an inference of some breach of the duty owed to her by the carrier, and falls within the maxim “res ipsa loquitur.”</p> <p>2. A passenger on a street car who, on being notified that the car is approaching the point where he desires to leave it, gets up and goes to the door of the car, while it is in motion, for the purpose of being ready to alight, is not necessarily guilty of negligence. Such conduct is not, per se, negligent. Whether it is so or not is for the jury to find under the circumstances.</p>

On error to the Union Circuit Court. Edith Behr, a girl of nineteen, accompanied her father to market on the night of September 9th, 1895. Behr left his farm at eleven o’clock with two wagons loaded with marketing; the one in advance, in charge of Behr’s son and two hired men, was followed by the one upon which the plaintiff rode, which was in charge of Behr himself.

<p>1. If a servant is acting in the execution of the orders of his master, and by his negligence causes injury to a third party, the master will be responsible, although the act of the servant was not necessary for the proper performance of his duty to his master or was even contrary to the orders of his master.</p> <p>2. Anyone who undez-takes to pz-opel a street railway car in a condition in which a reasonably prudent man would apprehend that it would frighten horses, is bound to' employ reasonable means to prevent injury to persons riding or driving along the street.</p> <p>3. Where black coats were hanging on a projection at the side of a street water sprinkler operated by electricity by, along and on the tracks of an electric street railway, and the coats, by waving to and fro in the' wind, or by opez-ation of the car sprinkler along the tracks, frightened a well-broken horse of gentle disposition, and caused injury to the plaintiff who was thrown from his carriage, the question whether the employes of the defendant, the street railway company, were in the exercise of reasonable care to prevent injury in operating such street car sprinkler, and the consequent liability of the company for the injuries to the plaintiff, is a question which the trial court must submit to the jury for their detez-mination, even though it be that the coats belonged to such employes and were by them hung upon the projection of the car. The car being in such a condition as to cause fright to the horse and consequent injury to the plaintiff, it became a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant company was negligent in the performance of its duty to exercise i-easonable care, by its servants, in the use of the public street, by operating the car whilst in this condition.</p> <p>4. Querré. Can the opei-ation of a street railway caz-, painted a conspicuously bright and attractive coloi-, along a public street, causing fright to a horse, with injury resulting therefrom, constitute negligence on the part of the street railway company and render it answerable for injuries z-esulting from such cause ?</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Camden Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see ante p. 320.</p>

<p>1. When the constitution prescribes the manner in which an officer shall be appointed or elected, the constitutional prescription is exclusive, and it is not competent for the legislature to provide any other mode of obtaining or holding the office.</p> <p>2. When the constitution has conferred upon the governor the prerogative of appointing, with the advice and consent of the senate, judges of the Court of Common Pleas, it is not competent for the legislature, by a subterfuge, to divert this prerogative to another source. Schalk v. Wrightson, 29 Vroom 50, approved.</p> <p>3. The same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and if the parts are-wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand and that which is unconstitutional will be rejected; but if the different parts of the act are so intimately connected with and dependent upon each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect the legislature would not have passed the residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are 'thus dependent upon each other must fail.</p> <p>4. From the title of the act of June 13th, 1895 [Pamph. L., p. 807), entitled “An act to abolish the Inferior Courts of Common Pleas, Courts of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery and Courts of General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, and to establish in their</p> <p>. place a County Court in each of the counties of this state, and to provide for and define the jurisdiction, powers and duties of such County Courts,” as well as the body of the act, it is obvious that it was the legislative purpose to abolish the old courts and substitute the new court in their place. The legislative' scheme, in its main feature— that is, the extinguishment of the old courts—having failed, the other part is not separable and must fail also.</p> <p>5. Upon the trial of a colored man, the absence of negroes from the panel of jurors is not error in the absence of proof that this exclusion was done designedly or that such persons were omitted except in the same way that white citizens not selected were omitted.</p> <p>6. The decision of the trial court approving the conduct of the sheriff in the selection of jurors is not subject to review. Patterson v. State, 19 Vroom 382, followed.</p> <p>7. Section 9 of the act concerning juries (Rev., p. 526) makes it the duty of the sheriff to deliver a list of the jurors by him summoned for service at such term, certified by him to be a true list, to the clerk of such court, who shall thereupon file the said list and forthwith lay the same before the said court, and provides that no person shall serve as a juror whose name is not contained in said list, if objection be made before such person is sworn or affirmed. Held—■</p> <p>1. That these provisions are directory merely and will not invalidate the selection and return of jurors, unless it affirmatively appears that injury was done.</p> <p>2. The sheriff was under no duty to deliver this list of jurors before the commencement of the term, the language of the section being “as soon as may be after the commencement of the term.”</p> <p>3. The sheriff’s failure to comply with this statutory requirement was a mere irregularity which could in no wise have prejudiced the defendant in maintaining his defence upon the merits ; and the statute forbids the reversal of a judgment upon an indictment for any imperfection, omission, defect in or lack of form, or for any error, except such as shall or may have prejudiced the defendant in maintaining his defence upon the merits. Gen. 8tat.,p. 1138, l 89.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. Eor opinion of the Supreme Court, see antep. 18.</p>

<p>1. In an indictment for libel, it is the office of an'innuendo to express and render certain the meaning of equivocal or uncertain language, or bring out some latent meaning in the words necessary to fix their defamatory character, or to explain to whom the defamatory language refers, where that is left uncertain; but where the words themselves are commonly enough understood, in a libelous sense, to warrant a jury in so applying them, no innuendoes need be inserted.</p> <p>2. Motions to quash and in arrest of judgment for want of innuendoes and on the ground that the language is not libelous without them, should not be granted where the words are such that an inference might reasonably be drawn therefrom by the jury that the same are libelous.</p> <p>3. A newspaper falsely charged a police officer with extortion in purposely swelling the amount of a prisoner’s fine, collecting the same of the prisoner’s family to procure his discharge and pocketing the difference. Held, that such publication was libelous, and that even though it was made without malice or improper motives, and for the dissemination of news and information to the citizens of the municipality, it did not thereby become privileged.</p> <p>4. In a legal sense, any unlawful act, done willfully, to the injury of another, is, as against that person, malicious, and it is not necessary that the perpetrator of such act should be influenced by ill-will towards such person, or that he should entertain or pursue any general bad design.</p> <p>5. Upon the trial of an indictment for such a libel, an instruction by the trial court that before a person published a libel he must take.care to investigate fully all the circumstances and satisfy himself of their truth, otherwise he will not be permitted to come into court and say, “I had no malice in this matter; I didn’t know who it was I was publishing this against,” while not precisely opportune, is upon the whole not unfavorable to a defendant upon such trial and is not reversible error.</p> <p>6. The trial court having in its charge defined to the jury the nature and essence of a defamatory libel, it was no error for it to say, in another part of the charge, that under the state constitution the jury were the judges of the law and the fact, and that there was no need for the court to express to them any opinion as to whether the publication in question was libelous or not—that it was for them alone to say.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. Far opinion of the Supreme Court, see ante, p. 35.</p>

<p>1. A husband may act as tbe agent of Ms wife, and the fact of his agency while not to be presumed from the marital relation alone, may be proved, as in other cases, by the acts and words of the wife which show previous authorization or subsequent ratification of his acts as her agent.</p> <p>2. Authority given to an agent to do a specified thing carries with it the power to do whatever may be necessary and proper to accomplish the object and purpose of his appointment.</p> <p>3. When credit is given to an agent, in ignorance of his agency, the creditor may, upon the disclosure of the principal, elect to hold liable either the agent or the principal.</p> <p>4. When suit has been commenced by writ of attachment executed upon the property of two defendants, and appearance, without bond, is entered by both, and issue is joined in subsequent pleadings, and no notice of misjoinder has been given, judgment at the trial may be entered against either or both of the defendants, as the proofs may warrant.</p>

<p>1. Upon a question of connivance in a guilty course of conduct arising on the trial of an indictment for keeping a disorderly house, where an offer is made by the defendant to show an oral complaint made against the house by himself to an officer of the law, it is error to refuse evidence of the nature and terms of the complaint.</p> <p>2. Upon the trial of such a cause, it is error to allow a series of questions concerning the trial of another case, in another state, against another - person, where the character of a house in that state, owned by the defendant, was in question, and where no relation of intercommunication or management is shown or alleged.</p>

<p>1. A trial judge, although requested by counsel, is not required to charge abstract legal principles not applicable to the facts appearing in evidence.</p> <p>2. In the case of a trolley car overtaking another vehicle directly in a line with its progress and a possible obstacle in its way, a proper regard for the rights of others requires that the car be reduced to such control that it may be brought to a standstill, if necessary, before reaching the obstructing vehicle.</p> <p>3. Such timely warning of the approach of a trolley car must be given as will enable others to avoid any danger from it.</p> <p>4. It is the duty of others not to obstruct the track, hut a violation of such duty does not necessarily constitute such contributory negligence as will relieve the trolley company from responsibility for an accident which might have been avoided by the exercise of proper care.</p> <p>5. It is not under all circumstances negligence per se not to look and listen-before crossing a trolley track.</p>

On error to the Essex Circuit Court. The defendant in error was the driver of a beer wagon. On the afternoon of the 26th of April, 1895, he drove his team and wagon slowly down Springfield avenue, in Newark,, on the left or northerly side of that street.

On error to the Supreme Court. This case was argued at the February Term, 3896, before •Justices Depue, Van Syckel and Gummere. Held: per curiam, that the Common Pleas had jurisdiction to grant The license, although 'the applicant was not at the time in occupancy of the house licensed. Barnegat Beach Association v. Busby, 15 Vroom 627; Amerman v. Hill, 23 Id. 328.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see 29 Vroom 423.</p>

<p>Ou error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see cmtep. 1.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.* For opinion of the Supreme Court, see ante p. 62.</p>

<p>On error to the Passaic Circuit Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, on case certified from Passaic Circuit, see 28> Vroom 490.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see antep. 86.</p>