¶2Thomas H. Hight, Sr., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
¶3Ronald E. Deutsch, Asst. City Atty., Lee E. Holt, City Atty., Dallas, Tex., for defendants-appellees.
¶7William Albert McDonald, a former Dallas fireman, filed suit in district court challenging the constitutionality of department and city regulations under which he was fired. Following a nonjury trial, judgment was entered for defendant. We affirm.
¶8In addition' to his job as fireman McDonald was the proprietor of .a business prophetically called the Dallas Fence Company. His troubles began when a confessed burglar identified McDonald as the purchaser of $3,400.00 worth of stolen merchandise which the burglar said he sold to McDonald for $370.00. According to the burglar, when McDonald purchased the merchandise it still had tags on it from the burgled store. He said that he sold the property to McDonald at the burglar’s apartment and that he saw McDonald attempting to obliterate identifying numbers from it.
¶9Dallas police went to McDonald’s store where they found the stolen merchandise. McDonald claimed, however, that he did not know that the merchandise was stolen. He was given a polygraph examination which indicated that his claim of innocence was untrue. He was discharged by the Fire Chief, and after a hearing his discharge was upheld by the city’s Civil Service Trial Board.
¶10McDonald contends in this court as in the court below that the regulations under which he was discharged are unconstitutionally vague. The provisions in question are Articles 7.3(2) and 7.5(A)4, 5 and 9 of the Fire Department Rules, Regulations and Procedures and the City of Dallas Personnel Rule 7.4, set out in the margin.1
¶11The district court rejected McDonald's contention on the basis of the rule of Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) that “One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” McDonald was accused of purchasing and/or possessing stolen property. The evidence supports a finding that he did so knowing that the property was stolen. Such conduct constitutes a clear violation of the explicit provisions of the regulations in question. We conclude that Parker v. Levy was correctly applied.
¶12AFFIRMED.