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6 Ark. App. 216

Osterhout v. Everett

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

Decided October 6, 1982

Court of Appeals of Arkansas · decided 1982-10-06

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Although the Arkansas Employment Security Law is remedial in nature and must be liberally constmed, Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603 , 393 S.W.2d 273 (1964), the Act must be given an interpretation in keeping with the declaration of state policy, Little Rock Furniture Mfg Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 291 , 298 S.W.2d 56 (1947). Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1101 (Repl. 1976) sets forth the State’s public policy of setting unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. We cannot say that appellant has become unemployed through no fault of his own since it was appellant’s own action of resignation which set in motion the chain of events which ultimately resulted in his unemployment.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 83 Ark. App. 332 - Bradford v. Director, Employment Security Department

“when attempting to hire a replacement or otherwise adjust his work force in response to an employee's notice to quit. [2] The majority also cites Middleton, supra , in which the Arkansas Supreme Court held that where an employee initiates the separation, the employer may accelerate the termination without liability for an involuntary discharge. See Middleton, supra (affirming the employer's acceleration of employee's termination date after she informed the employer that she would be looking for another job, reasoning that the Board could have found the employee said,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 83 Ark. App. 332 - Bradford v. Director, Employment Security Department

Relies on Harris v. Daniels · Little Rock Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Commr. of Labor · Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Maine Employment Security Commission

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1982-10-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently February 2016

17 state decisions

801982199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Donald L. Corbin, Judge.

¶1This is an unemployment compensation case in which appellant has appealed from the denial of benefits by the Board of Review. Appellant was denied benefits under the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106 (a) for the reason that he voluntarily quit his last job without good cause connected with the work. We affirm.

¶2The record reveals no dispute as to the controlling facts as found by the Board of Review. On January 13, 1982, the appellant gave his notice that he would resign as of January 22, 1982. Appellant stated that he submitted his resignation because he had been convicted of a felony and needed $750.00 to continue his defense. He was attempting to obtain the money by resigning in order to receive payment for accrued vacation time. On January 18, 1982, the court hearing his criminal case found claimant to be an indigent and ordered that state funds be used to continue appellant’s appeal thereby removing appellant’s necessity to resign. Appellant informed his employer that he wanted to withdraw his resignation but the employer refused. The employer informed claimant that his resignation had been accepted.

¶3“In appellate review under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1107 (d) (7) making the findings of the Board of Review, as to the facts, conclusive, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, and confining judicial review to questions of law, we must give the successful party the benefit of every inference that can be drawn from the testimony. We are required to view the testimony in the light most favorable to the successful party, if there is any rational basis for the board’s findings based upon substantial evidence.” Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978), Rose v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 679, 599 S.W.2d 762 (1980).

¶4The sole question to be addressed here is one of first impression in this state. The issue is whether an employee who voluntarily resigns his employment without good cause connected with the work is entitled to unemployment benefits if he attempts to withdraw his resignation prior to his last day of employment with that employer.

¶5Our research has disclosed that this issue has been addressed in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Guy Gannett Publishing Co. v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 317 A.2d 183 (1974), summarized the decisions in the states of Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Louisiana on this issue. Additionally, we note that New Jersey has also decided this question in Nicholas v. Board of Review, 171 N.J. Super. 36, 407 A.2d 1254 (1979).

¶6Although the Arkansas Employment Security Law is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed, Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603, 393 S.W.2d 273 (1964), the Act must be given an interpretation in keeping with the declaration of state policy, Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 291, 298 S.W.2d 56 (1947). Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1101 (Repl. 1976) sets forth the State’s public policy of setting aside unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. We cannot say that appellant has become unemployed through no fault of his own since it was appellant’s own action of resignation which set in motion the chain of events which ultimately resulted in his unemployment.

¶7We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Guy Gannett Pub. Co. v. Maine Employment Security Commission, supra, which stated:

A resignation, when voluntary, is essentially an unconditional event the legal significance and finality of which cannot be altered by the measure of time between the employee’s notice and the actual date of departure from the job. An employer who accepts an unequivocal notice of resignation from an employee is entitled to rely upon it, to the extent of preparing in one manner or another for the employee’s absence, unless, of course, the employer chooses to return to status quo by rehiring the employee, or accepting a retraction of the notice.
Absent such action by the employer, however, we are unable to say that a resignation matures only upon the final, physical exit of the worker from the job site. Were this the case, the employer would be unable to hire a replacement or otherwise adjust his work force except at his peril, subject to the wishes of an indecisive employee.

¶8We affirm the decision of the Board of Review.

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