Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm'n.

                   PRELIMINARY PRINT

              Volume 605 U. S. Part 1
                             Pages 238–279




       OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                     OF


   THE SUPREME COURT
                                June 5, 2025


Page Proof Pending Publication


                    REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions




    NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
  the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
  of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
  [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.
238                      OCTOBER TERM, 2024

                                  Syllabus


   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC., et al. v.
   WISCONSIN LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW
              COMMISSION et al.
      certiorari to the supreme court of wisconsin
       No. 24–154. Argued March 31, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025
Wisconsin law exempts certain religious organizations from paying unemployment compensation taxes. The relevant statute exempts nonproft
 organizations “operated primarily for religious purposes” and “operated,
 supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” 

(15)(h)(2). Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of its subentities, sought
 this exemption as organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the
 exemption, holding that petitioners were not “operated primarily for
 religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor
 limited their charitable services to Catholics.
Held: The Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) to
Page Proof Pending Publication
 petitioners violates the First Amendment. Pp. 247–254.
    (a) The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between
 religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference
 to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of
 § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposes a denominational preference by differentiating
 between religions based on theological lines. Petitioners' eligibility for
 the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely,
 whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists in the course of charitable work), not “ `secular criteria' ” that “happen to have a `disparate
 impact' upon different religious organizations.” Larson v. Valente, 

. Because that regime explicitly differentiates between religions based on theological practices, strict scrutiny applies.
 Pp. 247–250.
    (b) The State argues that, when it comes to religious accommodations
 afforded by the government, courts should ask whether the accommodation's eligibility criteria are the product of “invidious discrimination” to
 determine if strict scrutiny applies. In support of that rule, the State
 draws on Gillette v. United States, 

. Gillette, however, is
 inapposite. Unlike the conscientious objector status in Gillette, which
 was equally available to members of all religions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) facially differentiates
 among religions based on inherently theological choices. The State
 next disputes the premise that petitioners were denied coverage be-
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 (2025)                     239

                                  Syllabus

  cause they do not proselytize or serve only Catholics in the course of
  performing charitable work. The State instead claims that petitioners
  were excluded because they engaged in no “distinctively religious activity,” meaning “activities that express and inculcate religious doctrine.”
  Tr. of Oral Arg. 81. That understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme
  Court's ruling, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from
  strict scrutiny because decisions about whether to “express and inculcate religious doctrine” while performing charitable work are fundamentally theological choices driven by religious doctrine. Pp. 250–252.
     (c) Section 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied, cannot survive strict scrutiny
  because the State has not met its burden to show that the law's application is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
  Wisconsin contends that the exemption advances two principal interests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling state interest in
  ensuring unemployment coverage for its citizens. The State, however,
  has failed to demonstrate that the theological lines drawn by the statute
  are narrowly tailored to advance that interest, particularly as applied
  to petitioners. Indeed, petitioners operate their own unemployment
  compensation system, which provides benefts largely equivalent to the
  state system. The distinctions drawn by Wisconsin's regime, moreover,
  are underinclusive, exempting religious entities that provide similar
Page Proof Pending Publication
  services (i.e., without proselytizing or serving only co-religionists) when
  the work is done directly by a church. Second, the State asserts an
  interest in avoiding entanglement with employment decisions based
  on religious doctrine. Resolving misconduct disputes for employees
  tasked with inculcating religious faith, the State argues, may require it
  to decide whether those employees complied with religious doctrine.
  The lines drawn by the exemption, however, are overinclusive in relation to that interest, for they operate at the organizational level, covering employees that do and do not inculcate religious doctrine in equal
  measure. This poor ft between the State's asserted interests and the
  distinctions drawn cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. Pp. 252–254.

, 

, 3 N. W. 3d 666, reversed and remanded.

   Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas,
J., post, p. 255, and Jackson, J., post, p. 270, fled concurring opinions.

  Eric C. Rassbach argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Nicholas R. Reaves, Colten L. Stanberry, and Kyle H. Torvinen.
  Deputy Solicitor General Gannon argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
240   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
           LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM'N
                        Counsel

him on the brief were Deputy Assistant Attorney General
McArthur, Nicholas S. Crown, Michael S. Raab, and Lowell
V. Sturgill, Jr.
   Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin,
argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief
were Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, and Charlotte Gibson, Assistant Attorney General.*

   *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Ohio
et al. by Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor
General, and Katie Rose Talley and Jana M. Bosch, Deputy Solicitors
General, and by the Attorneys General and other offcials for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, John Guard, Acting Attorney General of Florida, Christopher M.
Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Russell
Coleman of Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi,
Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew H. Wrigley of North Dakota, Alan Wilson of South
Carolina, Marty Jackley of South Dakota, Derek E. Brown of Utah, Jason
Page Proof Pending Publication
Miyares of Virginia, and John B. McCuskey of West Virginia; for the Wisconsin State Legislature by Ryan J. Walsh; for the American Center for
Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth,
Walter M. Weber, and Laura B. Hernandez; for By The Hand by John J.
Bursch and Cody S. Barnett; for Catholic Charities USA by Keith R.
Styles and James H. Hulme; for the Catholic Conferences of Illinois et al.
by James N. Law; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Steven T. McFarland, Kimberlee Wood Colby, Laura D. Nammo, and Thomas C. Berg;
for City on a Hill Legal Ministry by Dino L. LaVerghetta; for Eleven
Major Religious Denominations by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, H.
Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, and R. Shawn Gunnarson;
for the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability et al. by Stuart J.
Lark; for the First Liberty Institute by Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C.
Mateer, Hiram S. Sasser III, David J. Hacker, Jeremiah G. Dys, and Ryan
N. Gardner; for the International Society for Krishna Consciousness by
Benjamin Hayes; for the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty by Yaakov M. Roth and Josh Blackman; for Maranatha Baptist University
et al. by Daniel R. Suhr and Caleb R. Gerbitz; for the National Legal
Foundation by Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Steven W. Fitschen, and
James A. Davids; for the New York State Catholic Conference by Michael
L. Costello; for Religious Liberty Scholars by Kevin T. Baine, Richard S.
Cleary, Jr., and Ian M. Swenson; for Religiously Affliated Universities
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                            Opinion of the Court

  Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Wisconsin, like many other States, exempts certain religious organizations from paying taxes into the State's unemployment compensation system. One such exemption covers nonprofts “operated primarily for religious purposes”
and controlled, supervised, or principally supported by a
church. 

(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024). Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of the entities
that it operates, claimed that they qualify for the exemption
as religious organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic
Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that petitioners are not “operated
primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engage in proselytization nor serve only Catholics in their charitable work.
   The question here is whether § 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied
to petitioners by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, violates the
Page Proof Pending Publication
First Amendment. The Court holds that it does. The First
Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's
application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposed a denominational
preference by differentiating between religions based on

et al. by Zachary G. Parks; for the Wisconsin Catholic Conference by
Bradley G. Hubbard and Elizabeth A. Kiernan; for World Faith Foundation by James L. Hirsen and Deborah J. Dewart; for Nathan S. Chapman
by Jeffrey R. Johnson; and for Christopher C. Lund, pro se.
   Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for American Atheists, Inc., by Geoffrey T. Blackwell; for the Economic Policy Institute et al.
by Laurence J. Dupuis, Brenda L. Lewison, and John Philo; for the Freedom From Religion Foundation by Samuel T. Grover; for Religious and
Civil-Rights Organizations by Alex J. Luchenitser, Daniel Mach, Heather
L. Weaver, and Cecillia D. Wang; and for Service Employees International
Union et al. by Scott A. Kronland.
   John M. Baker fled a brief for the International Municipal Lawyers
Association as amicus curiae.
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theological lines. Because the law's application does not
survive strict scrutiny, it cannot stand.
                                    I
                                    A
   Wisconsin has long operated an unemployment compensation program that seeks to mitigate and “more fairly” distribute the “economic burdens resulting from unemployment.”

(2); see § 108.01 et seq. To achieve that
goal, Wisconsin law requires most employers to make regular contributions to the State's unemployment fund through
payroll taxes. See §§ 108.17–108.18. Nonproft employers
may choose between contributing to that fund and reimbursing the State for benefts paid to their laid-off employees.
See § 108.151.
   Wisconsin's regime contains an exemption for religious
employers. See § 108.02(15)(h). The exemption applies to
Page Proof Pending Publication
any “church or convention or association of churches,” without further qualifcation, and to services provided “[b]y a
duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister of a church
in the exercise of his or her ministry or by a member of a
religious order in the exercise of duties required by such
order.” §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1), (3). As relevant here, the exemption also covers nonproft organizations “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or
convention or association of churches,” but only if they are “operated primarily for religious purposes.” § 108.02(15)(h)(2).
   Wisconsin is not alone in exempting religious organizations from unemployment compensation taxes. The Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, 

 et seq., contains
a textually parallel religious-employer exemption. See
§ 3309(b)(1)(B). Since Congress enacted that law in 1970,
over 40 States have adopted similar exemptions.1
  1
    Wisconsin does not cite any decisions interpreting these federal or
state laws to require proselytization or exclusively co-religionist service
for charitable organizations to qualify for the exemption, as the Wisconsin
Supreme Court did here. See infra, at 249–250.
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                       Opinion of the Court

                                 B
   Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. (Bureau), is a nonproft organization that serves as the social ministry arm of the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. 

, 

, 13, 3 N. W. 3d 666, 672. The Bureau's
stated mission is to “carry on the redeeming work of our
Lord.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 382a. In aid of that mission,
the Bureau “provid[es] services to the poor and disadvantaged” and seeks to “be an effective sign of the charity of
Christ.” 

 at 383a. It does not distinguish on the basis
of “race, sex, or religion in reference to clients served, staff
employed and board members appointed.” 

   The Bureau oversees several separately incorporated entities, including four that, together with the Bureau, are the
petitioners here: Barron County Development Services, Inc.,
Black River Industries, Inc., Diversifed Services, Inc., and
Headwaters, Inc. 411 Wis. 2d, at 14–16, 3 N. W. 3d, at 672–
Page Proof Pending Publication
673. These entities provide a range of charitable services
to local communities across Wisconsin. Barron County Development Services, for instance, helps individuals with disabilities secure employment. See 

, 3 N. W. 3d, at
673. Black River Industries provides daily living services
to Wisconsinites with developmental or mental health disabilities, among other charitable services. 

, 3 N. W.
3d, at 673.
   The Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior exercises control
over both the Bureau and its subentities. 

, 3 N. W.
3d, at 672. The bishop of the Diocese serves as the Bureau's
president and appoints its membership, which in turn oversees the Bureau “ `to ensure' ” that it fulflls its mission “ `in
compliance with the Principles of Catholic social teaching.' ”

 The Bureau's executive director, who need not be a
Catholic priest, supervises the operations of each subentity.

, 3 N. W. 3d, at 673; see also 

,

, 

.
   Employees of the Bureau and its subentities are not required to adhere to any particular religious faith, and the
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same is true for the recipients of their charitable services.
411 Wis. 2d, at 16, 3 N. W. 3d, at 673; see also App. to Pet.
for Cert. 383a. Participants in petitioners' charitable programs do not receive religious training or orientation, and
neither the Bureau nor its subentities “tr[ies] to `inculcate' ”
participants with the Catholic faith. 411 Wis. 2d, at 16, 3
N. W. 3d, at 673. That rule, petitioners explain, refects religious doctrine prohibiting Catholic bodies from “ `misus[ing]
works of charity for purposes of proselytism.' ” Brief for
Petitioners 10 (quoting Directory for the Pastoral Ministry
of Bishops “Apostolorum Successores” ¶196 (2004)). According to petitioners, Catholic teachings distinguish between “evangelization,” which involves “sharing one's faith,”
and “proselytization,” which seeks to “infuence” or “coerc[e]” others into accepting one's religious views. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 22–23. The former is permitted, and the latter is
not, petitioners say. Id., at 22; see Brief for Petitioners 10.

Page Proof Pending
              C    Publication
   In 2016, petitioners sought from the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development a determination that they
qualifed for the religious-employer exemption set forth in

(15)(h)(2). The department denied their
request. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 351a. It acknowledged
that petitioners are “supervised and controlled by the Roman
Catholic Church,” thereby satisfying one of the two criteria
for the exemption. 

 at 352a, 356a, 360a, 364a, 368a. The
department determined, however, that petitioners are not
“operated primarily for religious purposes” within the meaning of the statute. 

 Petitioners appealed, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed the department's
ruling. 

 at 291a–350a.
   In the years that followed, petitioners received a series of
alternating wins and losses as the parties appealed up
through the state administrative and judicial systems. The
Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission reversed
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                       Opinion of the Court

the ALJ's decision and reinstated the department's denials
of petitioners' exemption requests. See id., at 212a–290a.
After petitioners sought judicial review in state court, the
state trial court overrode the commission, holding that petitioners are entitled to the exemption. See id., at 190a. The
State Court of Appeals, however, subsequently reversed.

, 

. It reasoned that petitioners are not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because petitioners' “provision of charitable social services . . .
are neither inherently or primarily religious activities.”
Id., at 627, 629, 

.
   The Wisconsin Supreme Court affrmed. The court began
by recognizing, as the lower courts had, that petitioners are
“without question `operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported' by the Diocese of Superior.” 411 Wis. 2d,
at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676 (quoting § 108.02(15)(h)(2)). The
dispositive question, then, was whether petitioners are “opPage Proof Pending Publication
erated primarily for religious purposes.” Id., at 22, 3 N. W.
3d, at 676. The court interpreted that statutory phrase to
require judicial inquiry into not only an organization's “motivations” but also its “activities.” Id., at 33, 3 N. W. 3d, at
682. To determine whether an organization's activities are
“ `primarily' religious in nature,” the court held, courts
should “focu[s] on whether an organization participated in
worship services, religious outreach, ceremony, or religious
education.” Id., at 34–35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682 (citing United
States v. Dykema, 

 (CA7 1981)). According to the court, that analysis would identify “ `[t]ypical activities of an organization operated for religious purposes,' ”
while avoiding “ `any subjective inquiry with respect to religious truth.' ” 411 Wis. 2d, at 32, 3 N. W. 3d, at 681 (quoting
Dykema, 

; alteration in original).
   Applying that standard, the court held that petitioners'
activities are “secular in nature,” not religious. 411 Wis. 2d,
at 38, 3 N. W. 3d, at 684. Petitioners “neither attempt to
imbue program participants with the Catholic faith nor sup-
246   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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ply any religious materials to program participants or employees,” the court observed. Id., at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682.
“Both employment with the organizations and services offered by the organizations are open to all participants regardless of religion,” and the charitable services offered by
the subentities could “be provided by organizations of either
religious or secular motivations.” Id., at 35–36, 3 N. W. 3d,
at 683. Based on that record, the court held that petitioners
“are not operated primarily for religious purposes within the
meaning of 

(15)(h)(2).” 

, 3 N. W.
3d, at 684.
   The court then addressed petitioners' argument that its
interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) violated the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. The court frst held that its interpretation did not transgress church autonomy principles
because the exemption “neither regulates internal church
governance nor mandates any activity.” Id., at 50, 3 N. W.
3d, at 690. The court also determined that there was no risk
Page Proof Pending Publication
of excessive government entanglement with religion because
Wisconsin's exemption does not ask whether petitioners' “activities are consistent or inconsistent with Catholic doctrine.” Id., at 45, 3 N. W. 3d, at 687. Finally, the court
rejected petitioners' argument that its interpretation contravened First Amendment principles of “ `neutrality among religions' ” by “ `favor[ing] religious groups that require those
they serve to adhere to the faith of that group or be subject
to proselytization.' ” Id., at 52–53, 3 N. W. 3d, at 691. This
argument failed, the court said, because petitioners had not
“demonstrate[d] that the statute imposes a constitutionally
signifcant burden on their religious practice” in the frst
place. Id., at 55, 3 N. W. 3d, at 692.2
   Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley authored a dissent, which
Chief Justice Ziegler joined and Justice Hagedorn joined in
  2
    The Court today addresses only the denominational neutrality challenge raised by petitioners and does not reach the further two constitutional arguments considered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             247

                      Opinion of the Court

part. Justice Bradley would have held that a nonproft is
“operated primarily for religious purposes,” § 108.02(15)
(h)(2), when its motivations are religious, irrespective of the
nature of its activities. The majority's contrary approach,
the dissent warned, “engages in religious discrimination and
entangles the state with religion in violation of the First
Amendment.” Id., at 92–93, 3 N. W. 3d, at 710–711. While
Justice Bradley recognized that “the application of secular
criteria that leads to disparate treatment of religions is not
religious discrimination,” she reasoned that the majority's
approach “necessarily and explicitly discriminates among
certain religious faiths and religious practices.” Id., at 105,
3 N. W. 3d, at 717. It did so as applied to petitioners, Justice
Bradley explained, by declaring them ineligible for the exemption based on explicitly religious criteria, including their
adherence to Catholic teachings forbidding “proselytiz[ation]
when conducting charitable acts.” Id., at 106, 3 N. W. 3d, at
Page Proof Pending Publication
717. That denominational discrimination, according to Justice Bradley, triggered strict scrutiny, which the State could
not satisfy. See id., at 108–110, 3 N. W. 3d, at 718–719. Justice Hagedorn dissented separately, noting his agreement
with Justice Bradley's construction of the statute. Id., at
122, 3 N. W. 3d, at 725.
   We granted certiorari to decide whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied
to petitioners, violates the First Amendment. 

 (2024).
                               II
                                A
  “The clearest command of the Establishment Clause” is
that the government may not “offcially prefe[r]” one religious denomination over another. Larson v. Valente, 

 (1982). This principle of denominational neutrality bars States from passing laws that “ `aid or oppose' ”
particular religions, Epperson v. Arkansas, 

, 106
248   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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(1968), or interfere in the “competition between sects,” Zorach v. Clauson, 

 (1952). The Establishment Clause's “prohibition of denominational preferences is
inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the
Free Exercise Clause,” too. Larson, 

.
That is because the “ `fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government' ” refrain from “ `favoritism
among sects.' ” 

 at 246 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 

 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Government actions that favor certain religions, the Court has warned, convey to members of
other faiths that “ `they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community.' ” Santa Fe Independent School
Dist. v. Doe, 

 (2000).
   To guard against that serious harm, this Court in Larson
v. Valente, 

, set a demanding standard for the
government to justify differential treatment across religions
Page Proof Pending Publication
on denominational lines. See 

 at 244–246. When a state
law establishes a denominational preference, courts must
“treat the law as suspect” and apply “strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” 

. The government
bears the burden to show that the relevant law, or application thereof, is “closely ftted to further a compelling governmental interest.” 

 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
   A law that differentiates between religions along theological lines is textbook denominational discrimination. Take,
for instance, a law that treats “a religious service of Jehovah's Witnesses . . . differently than a religious service of
other sects” because the former is “less ritualistic, more unorthodox, [and] less formal.” Fowler v. Rhode Island, 

 (1953). Or consider an exemption that applies
only to religious organizations that perform baptisms, engage in monotheistic worship, or hold services on Sunday.
Such laws establish a preference for certain religions based
on the content of their religious doctrine, namely, how they
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 (2025)            249

                      Opinion of the Court

worship, hold services, or initiate members and whether they
engage in those practices at all. Such offcial differentiation
on theological lines is fundamentally foreign to our constitutional order, for “[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma.” Watson v. Jones, 

 (1872).
   This case involves that paradigmatic form of denominational discrimination. In determining whether petitioners
qualifed for the tax exemption under § 108.02(15)(h)(2), the
Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that petitioners are
controlled by a church, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, thereby satisfying one of the exemption's two criteria.
411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. The court's inquiry
instead turned on whether petitioners are “operated primarily for religious purposes.” 

(15)(h)(2); see
411 Wis. 2d, at 22, 3 N. W. 3d, at 676. On that criterion,
the court recognized that petitioners' charitable works are
Page Proof Pending Publication
religiously motivated. Id., at 34, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682. The
court nevertheless deemed petitioners ineligible for the exemption under § 108.02(15)(h)(2) because they do not “attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic
faith,” “supply any religious materials to program participants or employees,” or limit their charitable services to
members of the Catholic Church. Id., at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at
682–683. Put simply, petitioners could qualify for the exemption while providing their current charitable services if
they engaged in proselytization or limited their services to
fellow Catholics.
   Petitioners' Catholic faith, however, bars them from satisfying those criteria. Catholic teaching, petitioners say,
forbids “ `misus[ing] works of charity for purposes of proselytism.' ” Brief for Petitioners 10 (quoting Directory for the
Pastoral Ministry of Bishops “Apostolorum Successores”
¶196). It also requires provision of charitable services
“without making distinctions `by race, sex, or religion.' ”
Brief for Petitioners 7 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 431a).
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Many religions apparently impose similar rules prohibiting
proselytization or religious differentiation in the provision of
charitable services. See Brief for Religious Liberty Scholars as Amici Curiae 12–13 (discussing beliefs in Judaism,
Islam, Sikhism, and Hinduism). Others seemingly have
adopted a contrary approach. See id., at 12 (discussing practices of some Protestant denominations).
   Wisconsin's exemption, as interpreted by its Supreme
Court, thus grants a denominational preference by explicitly
differentiating between religions based on theological practices. Indeed, petitioners' eligibility for the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely,
whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists), not
“ `secular criteria' ” that “happen to have a `disparate impact'
upon different religious organizations.” Larson, 

. Much like a law exempting only those religious organizations that perform baptisms or worship on
Sundays, an exemption that requires proselytization or exPage Proof Pending Publication
clusive service of co-religionists establishes a preference for
certain religions based on the commands of their religious
doctrine.
   In short, as applied to petitioners by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 

(15)(h)(2) imposes a denominational preference by differentiating between religions
based on theological choices.

                               B
  The State does not dispute that the government may not
prefer one religion over another. See Brief for Respondents
35. Instead, the State argues that, when it comes to “[r]eligious accommodations” afforded by the government, courts
should ask whether the accommodation's eligibility criteria
are the product of “invidious discrimination” to determine if
strict scrutiny applies. 

; see 

 at 42–43. This
Court's decision in Gillette v. United States, 

(1971), the State contends, lends support to this rule. See
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 (2025)              251

                       Opinion of the Court

Brief for Respondents 36. As the State would have it, Gillette stands for the premise that whenever a religious “accommodation's line serves `considerations of a pragmatic nature' having `nothing to do with a design to foster or favor
any sect, religion, or cluster of religions,' the Establishment
Clause is not offended.” Brief for Respondents 36 (quoting
Gillette, 401 U. S., at 452–453).
   The inquiry set forth in Gillette, however, is inapposite.
There, this Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a provision of the Military Selective Service Act of
1967, which afforded a “conscientious objector” status to any
person who, “ `by reason of religious training and belief,' ”
was “ `conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.' ” Gillette, 

. Importantly, that exemption “focused on individual conscientious belief, not on
sectarian affliation.” 

. Conscientious objector
status was thus “available on an equal basis” to members of
Page Proof Pending Publication
all religions under the Military Selective Service Act, as this
Court later explained in Larson. 

 (discussing Gillette). “[O]n its face,” the statute “simply d[id]
not discriminate on the basis of religious affliation.” Gillette, 

.
   The same is not true here. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court's interpretation of § 108.02(h)(15)(2) facially differentiates among religions based on theological choices. After all,
an exemption provided only to organizations that engage in
proselytization or serve only co-religionists is not, on its face,
“available on an equal basis” to all denominations. Larson,

. That type of “explicit” distinction
between religious practices is what this Court has deemed
subject to strict scrutiny, including in the context of religious
exemptions. Ibid.; see 

 at 246–251.
   Next, the State disputes the premise that petitioners were
denied coverage “because they do not proselytize or serve
only Catholics” in the course of performing charitable work.
Brief for Respondents 37. The State insists that, instead,
252   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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                    Opinion of the Court

the Wisconsin Supreme Court excluded petitioners because
they had “identifed no distinctively religious activity that
would create diffculty in resolving unemployment disputes.”

 When pressed at argument as to what would qualify
as such “distinctively religious activity” in the context of
providing charitable services, however, the State clarifed
that it meant “activities that express and inculcate religious
doctrine: worship, proselytization, religious education.” Tr.
of Oral Arg. 81; see also id., at 84 (“What it comes down to
is whether the employees of the organization are expressing
and inculcating religious doctrine”).
   That understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from
strict scrutiny. Decisions about whether to “express and inculcate religious doctrine” through worship, proselytization,
or religious education when performing charitable work are,
again, fundamentally theological choices driven by the content of different religious doctrines. Id., at 81. A statute
Page Proof Pending Publication
that excludes religious organizations from an accommodation
on such grounds facially favors some denominations over
others.
                              III
   Because § 108.02(15)(h)(2) “grants denominational preferences of the sort consistently and frmly deprecated in our
precedents,” it “must be invalidated unless it is justifed by
a compelling governmental interest” and is “closely ftted to
further that interest.” Larson, 456 U. S., at 246–247. The
State bears the burden of clearing that high bar, and it has
failed to do so here.
   Wisconsin justifes its law by reference to two principal
interests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling
state interest in “ensuring unemployment coverage for its
citizens.” Brief for Respondents 44. Yet the State fails to
explain how the theological lines drawn by § 108.02(15)(h)(2)
are narrowly tailored to advance that asserted interest, particularly as applied to petitioners. Indeed, petitioners oper-
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             253

                      Opinion of the Court

ate their own unemployment compensation system for employees, which provides benefts largely “ `equivalent' ” to the
state system. 

, 

.
Furthermore, Wisconsin does not suggest that organizations
like Catholic Charities, which decline to proselytize and
choose to serve all-comers, are more likely to leave their employees without unemployment benefts. Nor could it: The
record is devoid of such evidence.
   The distinctions drawn by Wisconsin's regime, moreover,
are vastly underinclusive when it comes to ensuring unemployment coverage for its citizens. Wisconsin exempts over
40 forms of “employment” from its unemployment compensation program. See §§ 108.02(15)(f)–(kt). Notably, those exemptions cover religious entities that provide charitable
services in a similar manner to petitioners (that is, without
proselytizing or denominational differentiation), but are exempt because the work is done directly by the church itself
Page Proof Pending Publication
or its ministers, rather than by a separate nonproft organization controlled by the church. See §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1), (3).
That underinclusiveness leaves “ `appreciable damage to [the
State's] supposedly vital interest unprohibited' ” and therefore belies the State's claim of narrow tailoring. Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 

 (2015).
   Second, the State argues that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's interpretation of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) is “narrowly tailored to avoid entangling the state with employment decisions touching on religious faith and doctrine.” Brief for
Respondents 44. When an organization's employees “express an[d] inculcate religious doctrine through worship,
proselytization, and religious education,” the State explains,
“misconduct disputes could often force the state to decide
whether employees complied with religious doctrine.” Tr.
of Oral Arg. 72. Yet the State again fails to demonstrate
that § 108.02(15)(h)(2) is “closely ftted to further” that anti-entanglement interest. Larson, 

. To the
extent the State seeks to avoid opining on employee compli-
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                    Opinion of the Court

ance with religious teachings, it does not explain why it declined to craft an exemption limited to employees who are
in fact tasked with inculcating religious doctrine. Instead,
the exemption here functions at an organizational level, covering both the janitor and the priest in equal measure. See
§ 108.02(15)(h)(2).
   That overinclusiveness pervades Wisconsin's exemption
regime more broadly, too. Recall that Wisconsin exempts
from its unemployment compensation system all “church[es]
or convention[s] or association[s] of churches” without differentiating between employees actually involved in religious
works, for whom the anti-entanglement concern is relevant,
and other staff. § 108.02(15)(h)(1). The State itself concedes, as it must, that this regime contains “an element of
over-inclusivity.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 87. At bottom, then, the
poor ft between the State's asserted anti-entanglement concern and the line it has drawn among religious organizations
cannot be described as narrow tailoring. The State has thus
Page Proof Pending Publication
failed to carry its burden under strict scrutiny.

                         …
  It is fundamental to our constitutional order that the government maintain “neutrality between religion and religion.” Epperson, 

. There may be hard
calls to make in policing that rule, but this is not one. When
the government distinguishes among religions based on
theological differences in their provision of services, it imposes a denominational preference that must satisfy the
highest level of judicial scrutiny. Because Wisconsin has
transgressed that principle without the tailoring necessary
to survive such scrutiny, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                                              It is so ordered.
                   Cite as: 

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                     Thomas, J., concurring

  Justice Thomas, concurring.
   A nonproft organization is entitled to an exemption from
Wisconsin's unemployment-insurance tax on employers if it
is controlled by a church and “operated primarily for religious purposes.” 

(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Catholic
Charities Bureau (Catholic Charities) and its subentities are
not such organizations, reasoning in two steps. First, the
court held that the relevant “organization” is Catholic Charities and each of its subentities, not the broader Catholic Diocese of Superior of which it is a part. Second, it held that
the purposes of Catholic Charities and its subentities are primarily secular, not religious. The Court concludes that the
latter holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court unconstitutionally discriminates against Catholic Charities and its sub-entities. I agree and join the Court's opinion in full. I
write separately because, in my view, the Wisconsin SuPage Proof Pending Publication
preme Court's frst holding was also wrong.
   The First Amendment's guarantee of church autonomy
gives religious institutions the right to defne their internal
governance structures without state interference. Religious institutions may create different corporate entities to
help manage their temporal affairs, but those entities do not
defne the broader religious institution's internal structure.
Here, although Catholic Charities and its subentities are separately incorporated from the Diocese of Superior, they are,
as a matter of church law, simply an arm of the Diocese.

                                I
  The First Amendment guarantees to religious institutions
broad autonomy to conduct their internal affairs and govern
themselves. This guarantee, which we have called the
“church autonomy doctrine,” provides that a religious institution is not defned by the corporate entities it chooses to
form.
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                                   A
  The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment proscribe
laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” Among other protections, these
Clauses guarantee the “right to organize voluntary religious
associations,” Watson v. Jones, 

 (1872), and
to allow these associations to “decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine,” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North
America, 

 (1952).1 For instance, “courts are
bound to stay out of employment disputes involving those
holding certain important positions with churches and other
religious institutions.” Our Lady of Guadalupe School v.
Morrissey-Berru, 

, 746 (2020). And, where
resolution of a property dispute turns on the internal law of a
hierarchically structured church, such as who is the properly
Page Proof Pending Publication
appointed pastor of a congregation, courts must defer to “the
decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within [the]
church.” Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United
States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 

 (1976).
  The Religion Clauses' special protection for the autonomy
of religious institutions derives from at least three sources.

  1
    I have long questioned whether the Establishment Clause, as “a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state
establishments,” applies to the States. Elk Grove Unifed School Dist.
v. Newdow, 

 (2004) (opinion concurring in judgment). Although our decisions have grounded the church autonomy doctrine in both
Religion Clauses, they have also made clear that the Free Exercise Clause
is an independently suffcient basis for the doctrine. See, e.g., Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 

, 746 (2020) (framing interference with church autonomy as independent violations of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Kedroff, 344 U. S., at 107–108,
115–116, 120–121 (basing the doctrine on the Free Exercise Clause alone).
My skepticism toward the incorporation of the Establishment Clause
therefore does not lead me to doubt the correctness of our precedents in
this area.
                    Cite as: 

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                      Thomas, J., concurring

   First is the right of association. This Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 

 (1984). As with other voluntary associations,
those “who unite themselves to [a religious] body do so with
an implied consent to” its internal system of “government,
and are bound to submit to it.” Watson, 

.
And, since “the text of the First Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,” they
must enjoy a greater right to control their own affairs than
that enjoyed by other groups. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 

(2012).
   Second is the reality that matters of religious “faith and
doctrine” are “closely linked to . . . matters of church government.” Our Lady, 591 U. S., at 746 (internal quotation
Page Proof Pending Publication
marks omitted). Who serves as a church's minister, for instance, determines whether the “preaching, teaching, and
counseling” a congregation receives conforms to the faith
that it professes. Id., at 747. And, the polity of a religious
institution is often itself a matter of faith. In the Catholic
Church, for instance, the leadership of the Pope over the
Church is essential, because it is an article of faith that Jesus
Christ personally established the offce of Pope. See First
Vatican Council, Pastor Aeternus, chs. 1–2 (1870) (citing Matthew 16:16–19), in 2 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 811,
812–813 (N. Tanner ed. 1990) (Tanner). The free exercise
rights of individuals thus cannot be adequately protected unless the autonomy of religious institutions is also protected.
   Third is the understanding that church and state are “two
rightful authorities,” each supreme in its own sphere. M.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 

, 1496–1497
(1990) (McConnell). This concept has deep roots in the history of Western civilization. Jesus famously said to render
258   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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“unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God
the things that are God's.” Matthew 22:21. From antiquity
onward, many Christians have interpreted this statement to
mean that church and state are distinct, and that each has a
legitimate claim to authority within its sphere. See Huntsman v. Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, 

, 803–804 (CA9 2025) (en
banc) (Bumatay, J., concurring); R. Renaud & L. Weinberger,
Spheres of Sovereignty: Church Autonomy Doctrine and the
Theological Heritage of the Separation of Church and State,

, 68–84 (2008) (tracing the historical development of “[t]he doctrine of separate spheres of authority
for church and state”). Pre-founding English law accordingly distinguished between temporal matters subject to
civil courts' jurisdiction and spiritual matters subject to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. See McRaney v. North Am.
Mission Bd. of Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 980
Page Proof Pending Publication
F. 3d 1066, 1076–1078 (CA5 2020) (Oldham, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
   The First Amendment was adopted “against this background” of distinct spheres for secular and religious authorities. Hosanna-Tabor, 

. In arguing for religious freedom for Baptists, for example, James Madison
appealed to the notion of “independent” “spiritual and
earthly authorities.” McConnell 1497. According to Madison, man's “duty towards the Creator . . . is precedent, both
in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society.” Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 Papers of James Madison 295,
299 (R. Rutland, W. Rachal, B. Ripel, & F. Teute eds. 1973).
Thus, “Religion is wholly exempt from [Civil Society's] cognizance.” 

 In a similar vein, early American decisions
justifed protections for church autonomy in part based on
the need to respect religious institutions' legitimate and distinct sphere of authority. See, e.g., Watson, 

(holding that “the civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” over
                   Cite as: 

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                     Thomas, J., concurring

matters of “ecclesiastical government” because doing so
“would deprive [religious] bodies of the right of construing
their own church laws”); Chase v. Cheney, 

(1871) (“ `Causes spiritual must be judged by judges of the
spirituality, and causes temporal by temporal judges' ”); Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S. C. Eq. 87, 120 (1843) (“It belongs not to
the civil power to enter into or review the proceedings of a
Spiritual Court”); see also K. Funk, Church Corporations and
the Confict of Laws in Antebellum America, 32 J. Law &
Religion 263, 281 (2017) (Funk) (observing that 19th century
decisions developing the church autonomy doctrine “essentially treated these church tribunals as competent foreign
courts”).
                               B
  The church autonomy doctrine has important ramifcations
for the incorporation of religious institutions. Establishing
corporate entities is essential for religious institutions to
Page Proof Pending Publication
manage their temporal affairs. But, the doctrine forbids
treating religious institutions as nothing more than the corporate entities that they form.

                                1
   Religious institutions do not exist apart from the secular
world. They need to buy and sell property. They need to
hire and pay staff. They need to form contracts and fle
lawsuits. They need their property arrangements to persist
when personnel changes, and they need their property to
remain secure when individual members of the institution
become insolvent. These and other considerations make the
formation of corporate entities essential for many religious
institutions.
   At the same time, the church autonomy doctrine forbids
treating religious institutions as nothing more than the corporate entities they have formed. A corporation is a “mere
creature of law” that generally “possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”
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Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 

 (1819); see also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc., 

, 98–99 (1991) (“Corporations . . . are creatures of state law, and it is state law which is the font of
corporate directors' powers” (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted)). And, state law has a great deal to say
about how a corporation must be structured. See, e. g., Del.
Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 141 (2019) (generally requiring Delaware
corporations to be overseen by a board of directors). But,
under the church autonomy doctrine, religious institutions
are a parallel authority to the State, not a creature of state
law. Supra, at 257–259. And, the State has no legitimate
role in defning the structure of its polity. To conclude that
a religious institution has no existence outside its corporate
form “would be in effect to decide that our religious liberties
[are] dependent on the will of the legislature, and not guaranteed by the constitution.” Burr's Ex'rs v. Smith, 

,
Page Proof Pending Publication
282 (1835).
   Instead, courts and commentators have long recognized
that “while a legal entity may represent the church or other
body of believers, the entity alone is not the church; it is only
a part of the entire religious organization.” 1 W. Bassett,
W. Durham, R. Smith, & M. Goldfeder, Religious Organizations and the Law § 8:2, p. 8–7 (2022). “The entity is merely
used by the organization rather than being identical to
the organization itself.” Ibid. A religious corporation thus
possesses a “dual personality”: It is at once a corporation
defned by state law and a part of a broader, “unincorporated” religious institution. Id., at 8–6 to 8–7; accord, Classis of Central Cal. v. Miraloma Community Church,

, 

 (2009);
Crissman v. Board of Trustees of Cathedral of Tomorrow
of Akron, Inc., 

, *2 (Ohio Ct. App., Mar.
21, 1990); Folwell v. Bernard, 

 (Fla.
App. 1985); Trinity Presbyterian Church of Montgomery
v. Tankersley, 

 (Ala. 1979); Willis v.
                  Cite as: 

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                     Thomas, J., concurring

Davis, 

 (Ky. 1959); Wheelock v. First
Presbyterian Church, 

, 

, 843–844
(1897).
  For instance, in Watson, the “nominal title-holders and
custodians of the church property” at issue were “a body
corporate” created by an “act of the Kentucky legislature.”

. That corporation, this Court recognized,
was not itself the church, but merely an entity “under the
control of the church session,” an ecclesiastical “governing
body . . . composed of the ruling elders and pastor.” 

Thus, “the constitution, usages, and laws of the Presbyterian
[Church],” not Kentucky corporate law, controlled the outcome of the dispute. 

                              2
   We have recognized that the original “understanding” of
the Religion Clauses' protection of church autonomy is “refected” in early postratifcation practice. Hosanna-Tabor,
Page Proof Pending Publication
565 U. S., at 184–185; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 

, 787–790 (1983) (looking to early federal and state practice to determine the scope of the Establishment Clause).
Here, that history confrms that religious institutions are
more than the corporate entities that they form—and that
confating the two undermines the First Amendment rights
of religious institutions.
   Before Independence, corporate law provided the civil
government with a mechanism to interfere in ecclesiastical
affairs. Religious institutions had a particularly acute need
to incorporate during that period, because “an unincorporated association could not hold property in its own right.”
P. Kauper & S. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law,

, 1505 (1973). But, incorporating was
not easy. In most Colonies, a religious group had to petition
the government for a special charter of incorporation. 

. And, the government frequently denied the requests of disfavored religious denominations. Ibid.; see M.
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
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Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 

, 2134–2135 (2003).
   Following the Revolution, New York took a different path,
enacting a statute to allow churches to incorporate without
a special charter. 1784 N. Y. Laws ch. 18, p. 613 (1784 Act).
The State grounded its new approach in respect for church
autonomy. Invoking the free exercise clause of the State's
1777 constitution, the preamble to the 1784 Act condemned
the legislature's former practice of providing for “illiberal
and partial distributions of charters of incorporation to religious societies.” 

 The 1784 Act liberalized the incorporation process “to enable every religious denomination to
provide for the decent and honorable support of divine worship.” 

.
   The 1784 Act authorized members of a church to elect
trustees who, upon registering with a court, would become
a body corporate able to hold property, exist perpetually, and
Page Proof Pending Publication
sue in court. 

 at 614–615. But, although this body
could be “intrusted with the management, care and disposition of the temporalities of [the] church,” the Act made clear
that the corporate body was not the church itself. 

. The Act did not purport to name the trustees the leaders of the church, but took for granted that each church
would be headed by a “minister.” 

. And, the Act
specifcally warranted that its provisions did not “in the least
. . . alter or change the religious constitutions or governments” of any “churches.” 

.
   The 1784 Act soon became a model for the Nation at large.
With a handful of exceptions, analogous statutes were
“adopted in every American state during the antebellum
era.” Funk 268, and n. 20 (collecting statutes). This Court
approved this trend, holding that it neither established religion nor restrained free exercise for a legislature to “enact
laws more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the
great objects of religion by giving them corporate rights for
                   Cite as: 

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                     Thomas, J., concurring

the management of their property.” Terrett v. Taylor, 

, 48–49 (1815). Thus, like New York and the
States following its approach, this Court too framed incorporation as a way to empower religious institutions, not to defne them or alter their polity.
   In contrast, when Congress in 1811 attempted to use the
corporate form to defne a church's internal form of government, President James Madison raised a decisive constitutional objection. “Congress had passed a bill incorporating
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria
in what was then the District of Columbia.” Hosanna-Tabor, 

. President Madison vetoed the bill,
fnding that it violated the First Amendment because it did
not respect “the essential distinction between civil and religious functions.” 22 Annals of Cong. 982–983 (1811). Madison further explained:
    “The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry
Page     Proof
  rules and         Pending
            proceedings               Publication
                        relative purely to the organization
    and polity of the church incorporated, and comprehending even the election and removal of the Minister of the
    same; so that no change could be made therein by the
    particular society, or by the general church of which it
    is a member, and whose authority it recognises.” Id.,
    at 983.

See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S., at 184–185 (recounting
this episode and citing it as an early invocation of the church
autonomy doctrine).
  In short, the corporation is made for the church, not the
church for the corporation. Both the basic principles of
church autonomy and the history of religious corporations
establish that religious institutions are more than the corporate entities that they form. It follows that the government
may not use such entities as a means of regulating the internal governance of religious institutions.
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                              II
  As a matter of church law, Catholic Charities and its sub-entities are an arm of the Diocese of Superior, and thus, for
religious purposes, are not distinct organizations. But,
when determining whether Catholic Charities was a religious organization entitled to a tax exemption, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court nevertheless relied on Catholic Charities'
separate corporate charter to treat it as an entity entirely
distinct and separate from the Diocese. That holding contravened the church autonomy doctrine.

                               A
   The Catholic Church is a single worldwide religious institution. The Church is headed by the Pope. Code of Canon
Law, Canon 331 (Latin-English ed. 1998). Catholics believe
that the Pope is the successor of St. Peter, the Apostle chosen by Jesus to lead the Church. Ibid.; supra, at 257. The
Page Proof Pending Publication
Church is divided into dioceses. A diocese generally consists of “all the faithful living” within “a defnite territory,”
who together constitute “a particular church” within the universal church. Code of Canon Law, Canons 369, 372, § 1.
Each diocese is “entrusted to a bishop for him to shepherd.”
Canon 369. The bishop exercises “legislative, executive,
and judicial power” over his diocese. Canon 391, § 1.
   This structure of the Church is a matter of faith, not mere
administrative convenience. Catholics believe that in naming the Apostles, Jesus personally established the offce of
bishop and willed that “the bishops . . . should be shepherds
in his church right to the end of the world.” Second Vatican
Council, Lumen Gentium § 18 (1964) (citing John 20:21), in 2
Tanner 849, 863; see Code of Canon Law, Canon 375, § 1
(“Bishops . . . by divine institution succeed to the place of
the Apostles through the Holy Spirit who has been given
to them”).
   The Church understands itself to have a “three-fold” religious mission: “proclaiming the word of God,” “celebrating
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                         Thomas, J., concurring

the sacraments,” and “exercising the ministry of charity.”
Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est ¶25(a) (2005). “These
duties presuppose each other and are inseparable.” Ibid.
“The Church” therefore “cannot neglect the service of charity”—that is, care “for widows and orphans, prisoners, and
the sick and needy of every kind”—“any more than she can
neglect the Sacraments and the Word.” Id., ¶22.
   In keeping with the Church's hierarchical structure, “the
Bishops” have “primary responsibility for carrying out . . .
the service of charity” at the local level. Pope Benedict
XVI, On the Service of Charity, Introduction (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In particular, bishops are bound
under canon law to establish within their territories organizations to carry out charitable works in the name of the
Church subject to their supervision and control. Brief for
Catholic Charities USA as Amicus Curiae 18; see generally
On the Service of Charity. “In the United States, these organizations are known as Catholic Charities.” Brief for
Page Proof Pending Publication
Catholic Charities USA as Amicus Curiae 15. The works
of these organizations are considered acts of the Church itself. Deus Caritas Est ¶29.
   The Diocese of Superior covers the northwest corner of
Wisconsin. Catholic Charities is the “social ministry arm”
of the Diocese. App. to Pet. for Cert. 371a.2 In keeping
with Catholic principles, the Bishop of Superior serves as
the head of Catholic Charities and exercises plenary authority over it.
   Catholic Charities is organized under state law as a nonproft corporation governed by three members. The frst
member is the Bishop, who serves as the organization's president. The second member is the Diocese's vicar general,
who is the vice president. Under canon law, the vicar general is a priest chosen by the bishop to “assist him in the
  2
   Although there are other organizations called Catholic Charities affliated with other dioceses, the Catholic Charities involved in this suit is
limited to the Diocese of Superior.
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governance of the whole diocese.” Code of Canon Law, Canons 475, § 1, 478, § 1. The third member is the organization's
executive director, who need not be a priest. The bishop
appoints both the vicar general and the executive director,
who serve at his pleasure. This structure gives the Bishop
control over both Catholic Charities and its separately incorporated subentities, up to and including the power to dissolve
them at will. See App. 193.

                               B
   The Wisconsin Supreme Court disregarded this structure
of Catholic Charities and its subentities in adjudicating the
case below. The court acknowledged Catholic Charities'
status as an “arm” of the Diocese of Superior subject to the
bishop's “control.” 

, 

, 13–14,
3 N. W. 3d 666, 672. It nonetheless viewed Catholic Charities and its subentities as distinct, nonreligious organizations
Page Proof Pending Publication
merely because they are separately incorporated.
   Wisconsin imposes a tax on employers to cover the cost
of state-provided unemployment benefits. 

.17–108.18. The tax covers most employers in the
State, but an exception applies if the employer is “a church”
or “an organization” controlled by a church that is “operated
primarily for religious purposes.” §§ 108.02(15)(h)(1)–(2);
see ante, at 242. Catholic Charities and four of its subentities sought an exemption under the latter category. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the organizations were
not operated for religious purposes, and thus that excluding
Catholic Charities and its subentities from the exemption did
not violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
See ante, at 245–246.
   In construing the scope of the exemption, the court began
with “the threshold question of whose purposes we must examine in our analysis—those of the Diocese or those of
[Catholic Charities] and its sub-entities.” 411 Wis. 2d, at 23,
3 N. W. 3d, at 676. The court treated this question as one
of ordinary statutory interpretation, determining that the
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                       Thomas, J., concurring

“plain language” of the statute required looking to the individual corporate entity's purpose, not the purpose of the
church that operates or controls it. Ibid., 3 N. W. 3d, at
676–677.
   Catholic Charities objected that examining “itself and its
sub-entities as corporations separate from” the Diocese violates the First Amendment's guarantee of church autonomy
by “ `divid[ing] up religious bodies according to secular principles.' ” Id., at 49, 3 N. W. 3d, at 689 (alteration in original).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. It acknowledged
that, under the First Amendment, matters of ecclesiastical
governance “belong to the church alone.” Id., at 50, 3 N. W.
3d, at 690. But, it insisted that the exemption simply “defnes what employment is for purposes of unemployment
insurance without reference to any religious principles or
any attempt to control internal church operations.” Ibid.;
see ante, at 246.
   The Wisconsin Supreme Court's resolution of this threshPage Proof Pending Publication
old question was outcome determinative. The court recognized that the Diocese's “purpose is religious by nature.”
411 Wis. 2d, at 24, 3 N. W. 3d, at 677. In contrast, the court
found that Catholic Charities' and its subentities' purposes
“are primarily charitable and secular.” Id., at 35, 3 N. W.
3d, at 683; see ante, at 245–246. As Wisconsin concedes, had
the court resolved the threshold question of whose purpose
controls the other way, it would have found that Catholic
Charities and its subentities “would qualify for the church
exemption.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 73–74.

                                 C
   By failing to defer to the Bishop of Superior's religious
view that Catholic Charities and its subentities are an arm
of the Diocese, the Wisconsin Supreme Court violated the
church autonomy doctrine.
   Wisconsin's unemployment tax implicates the church autonomy doctrine. The statute on its face treats religious institutions differently from secular institutions: If an em-
268   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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ployer is “a church” or “an organization” controlled by a
church that is “operated primarily for religious purposes,” it
is exempt from the tax; if not, the tax applies. 

(15)(h)(1)–(2). The statute makes this distinction
precisely “to preserve the religious autonomy of [the exempted] organizations.” Brief for Respondents 32; see ante,
at 253. The statute thus does not simply impose neutral
and generally applicable burdens that do not affect internal
governance; it requires civil courts to classify employers as
religious or not, and to treat them differently based on that
classifcation.
   But, the church autonomy doctrine leaves it to religious
institutions to defne their internal structure for themselves.
Kedroff, 

. When deciding whether an employer qualifes as a religious institution, a civil court must
accept the employer's understanding of its internal structure, just as it must accept the employer's understanding of
Page Proof Pending Publication
its religious beliefs generally. See Milivojevich, 

 (“To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into
the allocation of power within a hierarchical church so as to
decide religious law governing church polity would violate
the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine” (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted)).
   Here, there is no dispute that, as a matter of church governance, the Bishop of Superior—the head of both the Diocese
of Superior and Catholic Charities—considers Catholic
Charities and its subentities to be an “arm” of the Diocese
rather than a distinct organization. Supra, at 265. In other
words, Catholic Charities and its subentities are corporate
entities that the Diocese has created to carry out its religious
mission. It is therefore dispositive that, as the State concedes, the Diocese qualifes for the religious employer exemption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 73–74. As an arm of the Diocese
from the Bishop's perspective, Catholic Charities and its sub-
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                      Thomas, J., concurring

entities must qualify as well, regardless of whether their activities, considered in isolation, would qualify as religious.
   In holding otherwise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court entirely disregarded the Bishop's religious judgment, relying
instead on the fact that Catholic Charities and its subentities
“are organized as separate corporations apart from the
church itself.” 411 Wis. 2d, at 35, 3 N. W. 3d, at 682. The
court thus made the error of treating a religious institution
as nothing more than its corporate entities.
   Wisconsin defends its Supreme Court's judgment, arguing
that the church autonomy doctrine is inapposite because the
State has not compelled the Diocese to alter its structure.
In Wisconsin's view, the State has only imposed a minor tax
to which the Diocese has no conscience objection. But, “the
First Amendment protects against `indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.' ” Carson v. Makin, 

 (2022). The
exclusion of “religious observers from otherwise available
Page Proof Pending Publication
public benefts” is a cognizable free exercise burden. 

This principle applies with full force to the church autonomy
doctrine. The doctrine rests on the premise that “civil
courts” must “exercise no jurisdiction” over “subjectmatter[s]” that are “ecclesiastical in its character.” Watson, 

 (emphasis added). Regardless of
whether the religious institution's injury is direct coercion
or the withholding of a beneft, “essentially religious controversies” are an inappropriate subject matter for civil courts
to decide. Milivojevich, 

.

                          …
  The Court correctly holds that Catholic Charities and its
subentities have suffered unconstitutional religious discrimination even on the assumption that those entities should be
considered in isolation. See ante, at 249–250. I would reverse for an additional reason—that the Wisconsin Supreme
270   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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Court violated the church autonomy doctrine. However incorporated, Catholic Charities and its subentities are, from a
religious perspective, a mere arm of the Diocese of Superior.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court should have deferred to that
understanding, and its failure to do so amounted to an unlawful attempt by the State to redefne the Diocese's internal
governance.

  Justice Jackson, concurring.
   The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) allows a
State to exempt from its unemployment-coverage mandate
any “organization which is operated primarily for religious
purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or
principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” 

(b)(1)(B). Like many
States, Wisconsin enacted a religious-purposes exemption
that tracks § 3309(b)(1)(B). As the Court explains, the WisPage Proof Pending Publication
consin Supreme Court's application of that exemption has
created a constitutional problem: The State treats church-affliated charities that proselytize and serve co-religionists
exclusively differently from those that do not. Ante, at 241–
242. Because I agree that this distinction violates the neutrality principle of the Constitution's Religion Clauses, I join
the Court's opinion in full.
   I write separately because, in my view, FUTA's religious-purposes exemption does not distinguish between charitable
organizations based on their engagement in proselytization
or their service to religious adherents. Nor does that exemption differentiate based on religious motivation, as the
Government (as amicus) insists. Rather, both the text and
legislative history of FUTA's religious-purposes exemption
confrm that Congress used the phrase “operated primarily
for religious purposes” to refer to the organization's function,
not its inspiration. Put differently, § 3309(b)(1)(B) turns on
what an entity does, not how or why it does it.
                  Cite as: 

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                    Jackson, J., concurring

                               I
   America constructed its unemployment-insurance system
during the Great Depression to mitigate the disruptive effects of sudden job loss on workers. Wisconsin led the way
in 1932, after identifying unemployment as “an urgent public
problem.” 

(1). Congress followed suit
later that same decade by enacting FUTA, which “called for
a cooperative federal-state program of benefts to unemployed workers.” St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. South Dakota, 

 (1981).
   FUTA operates by setting a federal minimum level of
unemployment coverage that state programs must provide
to remain eligible for certain grants and tax incentives.
§§ 3302, 3304. To obtain federal approval, States must mandate participation by at least those categories of employers
that federal law requires to be covered. § 3304. FUTA
also allows—but does not compel—States to exempt specifc
Page Proof Pending Publication
categories of employers from mandatory participation.
   Before 1970, FUTA allowed States to exempt nearly
all nonproft employers from unemployment coverage. See
§ 3306(c)(8) (1964 ed.). But in 1970, Congress reversed
course and required the opposite: that state unemployment-insurance programs cover most nonproft workers. See Employment Security Amendments of 1970, § 104, 

.
Addressing this raising of the unemployment-coverage foor,
the House Ways and Means Committee found that, with respect to nonproft organizations, “unemployment affects a
substantial number of their employees, particularly people
working in nonprofessional occupations.” H. R. Rep. No.
91–612, p. 11 (1969) (H. R. Rep.). FUTA's inclusion of nonprofts addressed Congress's concerns “about the need of
their employees for protection against wage loss resulting
from unemployment.” 

   The 1970 amendments further specifed certain “new and
narrower” categories of permissible nonproft exemptions.
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St. Martin, 

; see also § 3309(b). One was the
religious-purposes provision at issue here. Per the statute's
language (which Wisconsin subsequently adopted), a State
can choose to exempt from its unemployment-insurance mandate “an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled,
or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” § 3309(b)(1)(B).1

                                  II
   This case arises out of a dispute about the meaning of the
phrase “operated primarily for religious purposes” in 

(15)(h)(2), which tracks § 3309(b)(1)(B). When
the Wisconsin Supreme Court affrmed the denial of petitioners' exemption request, it concluded that this clause requires
judicial inquiry into “both the motivations and the activities
of the organization.” 

, 33 (2024). With respect to activities, the court examined how Catholic ChariPage Proof Pending Publication
ties and its subentities provided their charitable services,
and in particular, whether they did so while “attempt[ing]
to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith [o]r
supply[ing] any religious materials to program participants
or employees.” 

. (They did not.) It also observed that “[b]oth employment with the organizations and
services offered by the organizations are open to all participants regardless of religion.” 

 The court further suggested that a church-affliated charity would likely obtain the
exemption if it engaged in “ `teaching, evangelism, and worship,' ” but not otherwise. 

   The Government urges us to hold that FUTA's use of the
phrase “operated primarily for religious purposes” refers
only to why the organization is engaging in the charitable
  1
    Wisconsin extended its unemployment-insurance program to cover
nonprofts, consistent with the 1970 FUTA amendments, in 1971. See
1971 Wis. Laws ch. 53. It also added a religious-purposes exemption that
mirrors § 3309(b)(1)(B). See 

(15)(h)(2).
                   Cite as: 

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                     Jackson, J., concurring

work at issue—i. e., “the motivations that drive the organization to conduct its activities.” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 2. It argues that, in the context of an individual, the word “purposes” most naturally refers to “the
mental state” accompanying their activities. Id., at 22. So,
the Government contends, a charity's eligibility for the exemption must turn on its underlying motives. Ibid.
   In my view, however, neither Wisconsin's motivationsplus-activities reading (the how) nor the Government's
motivations-only interpretation (the why) accurately captures what Congress intended when it devised § 3309(b)(1)(B)
to allow an exemption for church-affliated entities that are
“operated primarily for religious purposes.” I think, instead, that § 3309(b)(1)(B) relates solely to what the entity
does. I reach that conclusion frst by examining the text of
the provision and then by consulting the statute's established
enactment history. These sources clarify that the religious-purposes exemption is not applicable to general charitable
Page Proof Pending Publication
organizations—e. g., soup kitchens, hospitals, or orphanages.
Rather, Congress designed the exemption to capture a much
narrower category of employers: church-affliated entities
that exist to perform religious functions.

                                A
   Start with the text. To fall within § 3309(b)(1)(B)'s exemption, an employer must satisfy two requirements. First,
it must be “operated primarily for religious purposes.”
§ 3309(b)(1)(B). Second, it must be “operated, supervised,
controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” Ibid. Here, no one disputes that the Catholic Church operates, supervises, controls, or principally supports the charities at issue. The
fght is over whether church-affliated charitable organizations—subentities that primarily provide job training, mental health, and other services to those with developmental
disabilities, along with the entity that oversees these and
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other charities—satisfy the first requirement; that is,
whether they “operat[e] primarily for religious purposes”
within the meaning of this provision. Ibid.
   Notably, the language of the provision only goes so far,
because § 3309(b)(1)(B) does not defne the term “religious
purposes. ” And “purposes” admits of several possible
meanings. When used in certain contexts, such as “on purpose,” the term can refer to one's “intent.” Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1847 (1971). But it can also
mean “an end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure,
exertion, or operation.” Ibid. Another way of conceptualizing this second defnition is: “[T]he object which one has in
view” or “[t]he object for which anything is done or made, or
for which it exists.” 12 Oxford English Dictionary 878 (2d
ed. 1989). This accords with common usage of the term. If
something is put “to no good purpose,” then it is not performing any effective function.
   The Government does not dispute that “purposes” can
Page Proof Pending Publication
refer to ends. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 15.
But it views “ends” as relating solely to “an organization's
fundamental motivation for its affairs,” not “the nature of
[its] activities.” Id., at 15–16. The Government does not
explain how it makes this logical leap—from the entity's end
(i.e., the object it exists to achieve) to the entity's motivation
(i. e., its inspiration for seeking that achievement). In my
view, the only way to close the gap is to try to ascertain
Congress's intent. That is, because “religious purposes” is
susceptible to more than one reading in this context (it could
mean either what an entity does or why it does it), an interpreter of this provision must ask: Which reading did Congress intend when it inserted that phrase into this statute?
   The text of § 3309(b)(1)(B) itself provides a clue. If one
reads “operated primarily for religious purposes” to track an
organization's motivation, rather than its function, the provision becomes almost entirely superfuous.
   Recall that, to be exempt under § 3309(b)(1)(B), the organization must be “operated, supervised, controlled, or princi-
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             275

                     Jackson, J., concurring

pally supported by a church or convention or association of
churches.” And, of course, every church has religious motives for its activities. Thus, prong two of § 3309(b)(1)(B)
already establishes religious motivation (the charitable entity is, after all, run by or otherwise closely affliated with a
church)—leaving prong one with no additional work to do if
it, too, is interpreted as a religious-motive element. While
not dispositive, this superfuity problem weighs in favor of a
construction of “operated primarily for religious purposes”
that looks to what an entity does rather than its motives.
See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 

 (2001) (“ `[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can
be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfuous, void, or insignifcant' ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 

 (2001))).
   The functional understanding of “operated primarily
for religious purposes” also makes perfect sense. So interpreted, it addresses a different factor than prong two bePage Proof Pending Publication
cause it gets at what the church-run entity actually does.
Workforce programs train workers. Hospitals care for the
sick. Soup kitchens feed the hungry. Shelters house the
homeless.
   That said, I admit that § 3309(b)(1)(B)'s text alone may not
provide a dispositive answer, and thus requires further exploration. For that reason, I look to the provision's enactment history. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo,
Inc., 

, 438–439 (2014) (turning to legislative history when text is ambiguous); cf. Delaware v. Pennsylvania,

, 138–139 (2023) (“ `[C]lear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text' ”). In this
case, that history provides illuminating answers.

                                B
   In the House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1970
FUTA amendments, Congress signaled that it designed the
§ 3309(b)(1)(B) exemption to distinguish between church-related organizations performing ministerial functions
276   CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN
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(which it wanted to allow States to exempt) and those performing general charitable functions (which it wanted to require States to cover). This makes clear that what the entity does matters for purposes of applying the exemption.
   To explain this, Congress included a series of examples
distinguishing the kinds of church-run entities it thought
were exemptible. On the exempt side of the line, the Reports list (1) a “college devoted primarily to preparing students for the ministry,” (2) “a novitiate,” and (3) “a house of
study training candidates to become members of religious
orders.” H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep. No. 91–752, pp. 48–49
(1970) (S. Rep.). On the nonexempt side of the line, the Reports state that “a church related (separately incorporated)
charitable organization (such as, for example, an orphanage
or a home for the aged) would not be considered under this
paragraph to be operated primarily for religious purposes.”
H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep., at 49. Nowhere does Congress
Page Proof Pending Publication
mention how, much less why, these paradigmatic entities go
about their work.
   These examples are instructive. The exempt category as
the Reports defned it lists solely church-run nonprofts that
have service to the church itself as their main objective. A
novitiate, for instance, is an entity that trains and houses
novices who are deciding whether to pursue a life in a religious order or priesthood. Indeed, what unites all three
“exempt” entities is what they do: preparing people for religious life and for service to the church, i. e., they all serve
religious functions. By contrast, the nonexempt category
consists of general charitable organizations affliated with a
church. A church-related “orphanage” or “home for the
aged” is not “operated primarily for religious purposes”—at
least within the meaning Congress intended that phrase to
carry. H. R. Rep., at 44; S. Rep., at 49.
   Through the Reports' examples, Congress thus clarifed
that it does not matter how or why the entity goes about its
work. All that matters is what it does. As such, orphan-
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 (2025)             277

                      Jackson, J., concurring

ages, nursing homes, and charities like them—i. e., entities
whose “purpose” is to care for children or tend to the elderly—do not exhibit what Congress considered to be “religious purposes” under this exemption. And that is true regardless of whether religion motivates the entity's work.

                                III
   This function-based reading of “operated primarily for religious purposes” not only follows from the text and legislative history of § 3309(b)(1)(B). It also best accords with the
anti-entanglement justifcation for the religious-purposes
exemption. Wisconsin maintains that it adopted its state
version of § 3309(b)(1)(B) to keep the government out of
unemployment-eligibility adjudications that implicate questions of church doctrine. See Brief for Respondents 21–24.
But a reading of the exemption that requires assessment of
the entity's motivations, instead of its actual work, does little
Page Proof Pending Publication
to further that anti-entanglement objective.
   Consider the state unemployment-insurance scheme at
issue here. Unemployed workers are not automatically eligible to receive unemployment benefts; those who have been
terminated for “misconduct,” for example, may be ineligible.

(5). Employers can therefore object to
any worker's unemployment claim on misconduct grounds.
See § 108.09(1). When that happens, the State's unemployment agency must then decide whether to deny benefts by
considering the circumstances of the unemployment-beneft
applicant's discharge.
   For certain church-related employers—e. g., novitiates,
houses of study, and colleges that train ministers—that assessment might “entangl[e] the state in employment disputes
that turn on religious faith and doctrine.” Brief for Respondents 12. Imagine, for example, the adjudication of disputes over the suffciency of a fred employee's prayers or the
accuracy of their scriptural teaching. Indeed, it is precisely
because of what novitiates, houses of religious study, and
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ministerial training colleges do (prepare individuals for religious life) that potential entanglement problems occur. By
contrast, when a church-run entity provides general charitable services to the public, the same kinds of entanglement
issues are far less likely to arise.2
   What is more, a motive-focused exemption inquiry presents potential entanglement problems of its own. If taken
seriously as an eligibility requirement (as opposed to a rubberstamp for any organization that professes religious motives), it would require assessing whether an entity is really
motivated primarily by religion—an intrusive exploration
into the hearts and minds of those who run it. See Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19–21 (listing evidence
courts might examine to assess a nonproft's “true motivations”). Requiring courts to engage in the business of evaluating religious motivation is a sensitive endeavor. And
here, it is unnecessary, because the church-affliation prong
already does that work. It actually serves no rational objecPage Proof Pending Publication
tive, as the sincerity of an entity's religious motives has little
if anything to do with the problem Congress sought to
address.
                           …
  Church-related nonproft employers care for the sick, feed
the hungry, and improve the world in countless ways. Most
do this—no doubt—for religious reasons. All do this thanks
to their employees' labor. As I read § 3309(b)(1)(B), evaluat-
  2
   Consider a church-related hospital that employs hundreds of workers—
“janitors, cooks, dining assistants, housekeepers, van drivers, technicians,
maintenance workers, secretaries, x-ray technologists, groundskeepers,
receptionists, orderlies, nurses, anesthesia aides, sonographers, medical
aides, occupational therapy assistants, security offcers”—the list goes on.
Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amici Curiae
6–7 (listing jobs that amici's members perform at religiously affliated
nonprofits). While the hospital may have a wholly sincere, Christcentered mission, its religious motivation has little if anything to do with
whether adjudicating unemployment claims from this hospital's laid-off
workers will entangle church and state.
                   Cite as: 

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                     Jackson, J., concurring

ing whether a church-affliated nonproft “operate[s] primarily for religious purposes” is not a matter of assessing the
sincerity or primacy of its religious motives. Instead, as
with so many other interpretive issues, determining what
the religious-purposes exemption means involves attempting
to discern what Congress was trying to achieve. Here, Congress sought to extend to most nonproft workers the stability that unemployment insurance offers, while exempting a
narrow category of church-affliated entities most likely to
cause signifcant entanglement problems for the unemployment system—precisely because their work involves preparing individuals for religious life. It is perfectly consistent
with the opinion the Court hands down today for States to
align their § 3309(b)(1)(B)-based religious-purposes exemptions with Congress's true focus.



Page Proof Pending Publication
                            Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
Page Proof Pending Publication
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

p. 243, last line: “ascribe” is changed to “adhere”
p. 267, line 16: “church” is inserted before “operations”
p. 275, line 8: “superfuidity” is changed to “superfuity”