¶2The appellant, Donnell McGee, was convicted of the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, cocaine, a violation of § 13A-12-211, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to seven years, which was enhanced by five additional years pursuant to § 13A-12-250, Code of Alabama 1975, because the sale occurred within three miles of a school.
¶3The state's evidence tended to show that on March 14, 1991, Officer James Taggart, Jr., of the Tuscaloosa Sheriff's Department, was working undercover as a narcotics agent in Dothan, Alabama. He was in a van with a confidential informant driving around West North Street when a man on a bicycle, later identified as Robert Gene Russaw, approached him about buying some crack cocaine. Taggart and Russaw agreed on a $30 purchase price for some cocaine and then Russaw crossed the street on his bicycle and approached a person, later identified as the appellant, on the other side of the road. The appellant handed Russaw some cocaine and Russaw then came back over to Taggart and handed him the cocaine. Taggart then gave Russaw the money for the cocaine and Russaw went back across the street and handed the money to the appellant.
¶5 "A person commits the crime of unlawful distribution of controlled substances if . . . he sells, furnishes, gives away, manufactures, delivers or distributes a controlled substance. . . ."
¶6If an individual participated in the sale of a controlled substance then he may be found guilty of distributing a controlled substance. Haywood v. State, 562 So.2d 297 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). To "furnish" as that term is used in the above-quoted statute means to "supply by any means, by sale or otherwise. . . ." Mathis v. State, 594 So.2d 695 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991).
¶7When this court reviews an issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Colvette v. State,568 So.2d 319 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). The evidence presented a jury question as to the appellant's guilt. Any evidence concerning the officer's ability to view the transaction as he stated at trial was a question concerning the credibility of the evidence and was correctly left to the jury's consideration.
¶9As the state correctly argues in its brief, this same issue was addressed by this court in Hyter v. State,545 So.2d 194 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988). Judge McMillan writing for this court in Hyter, stated:
¶10 "The appellant argues that the trial court erred by charging the jury on accomplice law because the appellant was allegedly denied due process as he was not notified of the 'separate' accomplice charge. Apparently, the appellant is alleging that the trial court charged him with an offense for which he had not been indicted, by charging the jury on the complicity statute, § 13-2-23, Code of Alabama (1975). However, 'one indicted as the actual perpetrator of a crime may be convicted of such upon proof of a conspiracy although not charged with such.' Kendrick v. State, 377 So.2d 1112, 1114 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), writ denied, 377 So.2d 1114 (Ala. 1979), citing Stoley v. State, 254 Ala. 534, 541, 49 So.2d 284 (1951); Watkins v. State, 357 So.2d 156 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 161 (Ala. 1978)."
¶11545 So.2d at 197. The appellant was not denied his due process rights by the court's instruction on complicity.
¶12The appellant also contends that it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury on the exceptions to the complicity statute. However, this specific objection was not brought to the attention of the trial court. The only objection concerning complicity was that the court should not have given the instruction. Nothing further was said. Specific grounds for objections waive all others not specified. Rika v.State, 587 So.2d 1054 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). Thus, this issue is not correctly preserved for appellate consideration.
¶14The record shows that the appellant was sentenced to seven years which was enhanced an additional five years because the sale occurred within three miles a school. § 13A-12-250, Code of Alabama 1975. The state maintains that because both §§ 13A-12-250 and -270 state that "[i]n addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter provided by law . . .," the appellant's sentence should have been enhanced an additional five years under each statute. We agree with the state's interpretation of these Code sections. Section 13A-12-250 states:
¶15 "In addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter provided by law for any person convicted of an unlawful sale of a controlled substance, there is hereby imposed a penalty of five years incarceration in a state corrections facility with no provision for probation if the situs of such unlawful sale was on the campus or within a three-mile radius of the campus boundaries of any public or private school, college, university or other educational institution in this state."
¶16(Emphasis added.)
¶17Section 13A-12-270 states:
¶18 "In addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter provided by law for any person convicted of an unlawful sale of a controlled substance, there is hereby imposed a penalty of five years incarceration in a state corrections facility with no provision for probation if the situs of such unlawful sale was within a three-mile *347 radius of a public housing project owned by a housing authority."
¶19(Emphasis added.)
¶20"[W]e believe that the legislature clearly intended to protect these areas . . . from the evils associated with drug activities," Qualls v. State, 555 So.2d 1158, 1165 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), and to provide for more severe sentences to those individuals who sell illegal drugs near schools and housing projects. This cause is therefore remanded to the Circuit Court for Houston County with directions that the court resentence the appellant, enhancing his sentence by an additional five years pursuant to § 13A-12-270, Code of Alabama 1975. Due return should be filed with this court no later than 30 days after the date of this opinion.
¶21REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
¶22All the Judges concur.