Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

615 So. 2d 679

Docket No. 76326.

Gaskin v. State

Louis B. GASKIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided March 18, 1993.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1993-03-18

Cited by 3 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 1999

2 state decisions

Relies on Doerr v. Doerr · Espinosa v. Florida · Beltran-Lopez v. Florida

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1993-03-18

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*680 James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Christopher S. Quarles, Asst. Public Defender, Chief, Capital Appeals, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

¶3BARKETT, Chief Justice.

¶4We have Gaskin v. State,591 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1991), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 3022, 120 L.Ed.2d 894 (1992), on remand from the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992).[1]

¶5The facts of this case are fully set forth in our previous opinion. The United States Supreme Court in Espinosa found insufficient our former jury instruction on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor.[2] We must determine what effect, if any, the reading of that same instruction had in Gaskin's case.

¶6We find that although Gaskin argued at trial against the instruction for the "cold, calculated and premeditated" aggravating circumstance,[3] he did not object to the vagueness of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance instruction at trial, nor did he request a special instruction for this circumstance. Thus, the issue of unconstitutional vagueness as to the jury instruction struck down in Espinosa has not been preserved for review. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. State,609 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1992).

¶7In addition, were we to address the issue, the reading of the insufficient heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance instruction as it relates to the sentence for the murder of Georgette Sturmfels would be harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, because the reading of this vague instruction could not have affected the jury's recommendation of death in this case. Therefore, for the reasons stated here and in our earlier decision, we again affirm the two death sentences.

¶8It is so ordered.

¶9OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶10[1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

¶11[2] See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (1987).

¶12[3] See § 921.141(5)(i), Fla. Stat. (1987).

/615/so2d/679 · .json · Public domain