State v. Lattimer

¶1(concurring specially)

¶2I concur in the opinion of Judge Randall but with these additional statements on the case.

¶31. Governing law

¶4The majority agrees on the proposition at the root of this decision, that State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.1996) must not be unreasonably read and applied.

¶5At least in those cases where the defendant has been found guilty of a criminal *291act,2 the trial court has lawful authority to stay the ultimate adjudication of guilt in special circumstances demonstrating that this action is in the “furtherance of justice.” State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996).

¶6Krotzerrecognized the special circumstances confronted in that case and found it significant that the trial court strongly disagreed with the prosecution’s view on the disposition of the case. Id. at 254. The court said little more to suggest the appropriate level of deference the reviewing court should give to the trial court’s determination on the justice of the case. Fossratifies the notion, evident in Krotzer, that the reviewing court will upset a judgment reflecting “mere disagreement” of the trial court and the prosecutor. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541. The stay of adjudication should not be a routine practice but a remedy employed “sparingly.” Id.

¶7To these general but meaningful concepts, Fosssuggested another: the stay of adjudication should be employed only for injustices resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion “in the exercise of the charging function.” Id.In the aftermath of Foss, this statement has been read persistently as a reference to prosecutorial discretion in assessing whether the state had sufficient evidence to prove that an offense had occurred. But the weight of evidence supporting a charge is largely beside the point when considering the cause for staying an adjudication, as it no doubt was in Krotzerand the subsequent cases that address the same issue. ' What was at issue in those cases was whether the trial court had cause to strongly question whether the prosecution erred in its insistence that a conviction be recorded, perhaps when it brought the charges — as might be the case when a compelling, existing alternative was disregarded — but more commonly when the case advanced to the point where an adjudication and disposition might occur.

¶8The authority of Krotzer, never subsequently corrected, extends to cases where the prosecutor abuses its executive discretion by rigidly objecting to a disposition without adjudication of the offense, where the trial court is empowered to act differently if the .special circumstances of the case permit the court’s strong conviction that this is in the furtherance of justice. We should not employ a distorted reading of Fossto create instead an unbridled discretion of prosecutors. I concur with the conclusion of Judge Randall that an executive veto power seriously infringes on the judicial role of pursuing justice under the rule of law.

¶92. Standard of review

¶10Neither Krotzernor Foss, nor their progeny, make evident the appropriate standard of review for the appellate courts: the deference that should extend to the trial court in cases of this kind. The majority agrees that these are sentencing decisions, a classification that bears on the standard of review and on jurisdictional topics that have been addressed in earlier minority opinions. Perhaps this suggests, as Judge Randall concludes, a “limited” standard of review. Perhaps, when applied alongside the search for circumstances that are special that permit the trial court’s strong disagreement with the prosecutor and on practices that are not just routine, a more probing appellate review should be employed. An explicit identification of the standard of review is not necessary for purposes of this case, as it was not in Krotzer. The circumstances of this matter are unique and support the trial court’s strong conviction that an adjudication should not occur if respondent abides by stated conditions. The trial court has given what the law does not *292always guarantee, a just solution to a tragic problem. We would do otherwise if we did not affirm the trial court’s decision.

¶12(dissenting)

¶13I respectfully dissent. The law regarding stays of adjudication is clear. District courts should only rarely interpose on prosecutorial discretion. State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn.1996) (holding stays of adjudication should “be relied upon sparingly ” only when the prosecutor has clearly abused his or her discretion in charging and special circumstances exist). The legislature has also expressed its preference regarding stays. See Minn.Stat. § 609.095(b) (2000) (requiring a court to adjudicate a defendant’s guilt after he pleads guilty or is found guilty).

¶14There is no contention that the prosecutor abused her discretion in charging respondent. Moreover, the facts here do not meet the “special circumstances” referenced in Krotzer. See State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn.1996) (finding the situation “warranted unusual judicial measures” supported by “special circumstance”). A conviction in Krotzerwould have resulted in a permanent label of sexual predator. Id. at 253. Here, the charge and consequential loss of a driver’s license is not out of line with respondent’s conduct, which was a felony. Cf. State v. Prabhudail, 602 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn.App.1999) (finding even misdemeanor conduct resulting in deportation does not meet “special circumstances” requirement), review denied (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000).

¶15I would reverse the district court.