Volume 63 — New Hampshire Reports

Tbover, for two car-loads of lumber. In the winter of 1881-2 the plaintiff was engaged hauling lumber for Thompson & Ricker from their mill in Pinkham’s Grant to Glen Station on the P. & O. Railroad, a distance of about twelve miles, and loading it on the ears. For hauling, loading, and binding on the cars, he was to receive §1 per thousand, to be paid upon the return of sales.

Assumpsit, for services and labor in making repairs on a highway in Andover in 1880. Facts found by the court. The plaintiff in 1880 was highway surveyor in district No. 15 in Andover. The tax list committed to him was all worked out in June, except-about $2.25. In September, a road in the district being out of repair, the selectmen directed the plaintiff to make repairs thereon, but not to exceed $15 in expense.

Indictment for obstructing Main street, in Nashua, by erecting a porch and fences and setting trees in front of the Vale Mills. The defendants claimed that the alleged obstructions were upon their own land, and not within the limits of the highway. The place of the alleged obstructions is on the westerly side of the street, between Salmon brook and the Nashua river, within the limits of the old town of Dunstable.

Replevin for a horse. Plea, the general issue, and a brief statement that the horse was attached as the property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the horse was exempt from attachment, under Gen. Lawrs, c. 224, s. 2, and this was the only question in dispute. Facts found by the court. The horse was attached November 28, 1882. Previous to the attachment the plaintiff owned a grocery store, and used the horse in that business and as his family driving horse.

<p>Indictment, for publishing in the Manchester Union an advertisement of the Louisiana Lottery Company. The Manchester Union is owned and published by the Union Publishing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of this state, with its principal place of business at Manchester. Its affairs are managed by a board of five directors, of which the defendant is one. He is also the managing editor of the paper.</p> <p>The Louisiana Lottery Company was chartered in 1868, and, under the constitution and laws of that state, is in every respect a legal institution and lawfully conducted, so far as the business is carried on within the state of Louisiana.</p> <p>The statute on which the indictment is based is as follows : “ If any person shall sell, dispose of, or offer or keep for sale, any tickets or part thereof in any lottery or pretended lottery, or anything intended as a token or evidence that the purchaser will be entitled to any share or chance therein, or shall print or publish any account thereof, or of the place where or by 'whom any such ticket or part or share or chance may be obtained, he shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.” G. L., c. 272, s. 2.</p>

Debt, by school-district No. 9 in Swanzey, against the selectmen of Richmond to recover school-money. Facts found by the court. Certain inhabitants of Richmond were annexed to district No. 9’in Swanzey for school purposes. At the annual meeting, 1888, the town of Richmond voted to raise $500 for school purposes in excess of the amount required by law.

<p>In a bill in equity to compel the application upon the plaintiff’s debt of moneys conveyed fraudulently and without consideration, by his debtor to the defendant, it need not be alleged that the plaintiff has suffered damage, excepting such as results from the fraud; or that, but for the fraud, he would have secured the debt; or that he has obtained, or attempted to obtain, a lien upon the moneys ; or that there was a conspiracy to delay and hinder creditors.</p> <p>A bill may be maintained in such case, although the plaintiff has a remedy at law.</p>

Probate appeal, from a settlement of the account of the plaintiff as guardian of the defendants, Ella Brand and Charles Brand. In 1868 the plaintiff married Mrs. Brand, the widowed mother of the defendants, who were then about nine and seven years old respectively. During her widowhood she had a pension, to which, from the date of her remarriage, the defendants became entitled until they were sixteen years of age. U. S. Rev. St., s. 4702.

Petition, addressed to a justice and by him adjourned into the law term for a temporary injunction pending a bill'in equity for a perpetual injunction against the removal of the remains of the plaintiff’s father, mother, and brother from a public cemetery in the town of Lisbon.

Assumpsit, to recover the price of intoxicating liquors sold at private sale and at different times by the plaintiff, acting as assignee in insolvency of one Downs, to the defendant. Facts agreed by the parties. The liquors were of a class the sale of which is prohibited by law in this state.

Case, for burning the plaintiff’s barn and other buildings and their contents by fire from the defendants’ locomotive.

<p>An administrator’s petition for a license to sell real estate for the pay- • ment of debts may be denied, if the delay of the creditors in applying for the appointment of the administrator has rendered a sale inequita- ■ ble.</p>

Bill in Equity, for the support of the plaintiff from the income of a farm in Hampton Falls, under the will of Nehemiah P. Cram, deceased. The defendant Frank P. Cram is residuary legatee, and the executor of said will. The defendants Mason and Robinson hold mortgages of the farm in question, given them by Frank P. Cram after the death of the testator.

Two actions between the same parties tried together. One is a writ of entry, and the other trespass qu. cl. upon the same land. Verdict for the plaintiff in both. Exceptions by the defendant.

Bill in Equity, for the payment of a legacy. In a codicil to the will named in the preceding case, the testator gave his wife, Martha T. Cram, four hundred dollars, to be paid to her “ at such times and at such amounts as she may seem to need.

Habeas Corpus. The plaintiffs were arrested on a complaint charging an assault with intent to kill, and brought before William A. Sbaekford, a justice of the peace for the county of Rocking-ham, for examination, and were by bim ordered to furnish bonds for their appearance at the supreme court, and stand committed till said order be performed. The question is, whether said justice was disqualified to make such order by reason of his age, he being seventy-six years old.

Assumpsit on a note. Plea, discharge in bankruptcy. At the trial of the cause before a referee, the plaintiff offered to show a promise of the defendant to pay the note made after the filing of his petition in bankruptcy and before his discharge. The referee excluded the evidence.

<p>Under Gen. Laws, c. 49, s. 2, authorizing a town to take land for a public cemetery without the owner’s consent, when “ land necessary therefor cannot be obtained in any suitable place at a reasonable price by contract with the owner,” the most suitable land may be taken when it cannot be obtained at a reasonable price by contract.</p> <p>The statutory provision, that no cemetery shall be laid out within twenty rods of a dwelling-house, does not prohibit the taking of a dwelling-house and the land on which it stands.</p> <p>At a trial before a board of selectmen on a petition for laying out a public cemetery, the objection that a member of the board is disqualified by his relationship to one of the petitioners is waved by a land-owner having knowledge of the fact, and going to trial on the merits of the petition without presenting the objection to the board.</p> <p>The objection that notice of the trial was not given to the town-clerk is waived by a land-owner who has had notice, and does not present the objection to the board.</p> <p>A public cemetery, legally laid out by a town exercising the power of eminent domain, cannot be discontinued by major vote of the town.</p>

Foreign Attachment. Facts found by the court. The defendant is sued as surviving partner of W. Downs & Son. The firm was composed of W. Downs and his son, the defendant.

Probate Appeal. The plaintiff is an aunt of an infant daughter of the defendant. The probate court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition for the appointment of a guardian of the child. The plaintiff appealed, and the facts were found by the court at the trial term.

<p>An oral agreement of two land-owners for the division and maintenance of a partition fence for the season, executed by one of them and not rescinded, is valid.</p> <p>Case. In 1883 the parties owned and occupied adjoining pastures, and by a parol agreement divided their partition fence for the season. The plaintiff performed his part of the agreement; but, in consequence of the defendants’ neglect to repair their part of the fence, the plaintiff’s horse escaped-into the defendants’ pasture, fell into a ditch, and died. The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants excepted.</p>

Bill in Equity. The defendant Lougee owned a tract of woodland in Rochester, and verbally employed one McDaniel, an auctioneer, residing in Dover, to sell • it for her at public auction. McDaniel duly advertised, and sold the land for $3T0. The defendant directed McDaniel to get out the auction bills for her. One of the bills was sent to her by McDaniel before the sale, and she expressed her entire satisfaction with it.

Assumpsit, for money had and received. Facts agreed. Before 1850 Reuben Johnson set hay-scales on his land in the usual manner, in an excavation made and stoned for the purpose, a part of it being in the highway. He died March 16,1852, having devised the land to Mary N. Johnson for life, or so long as she should remain unmarried: and she married before 1856. In the inventory of his estate, returned in June, 1852, the scales were classed as personal property.

<p>A person entitled to a part of the damages for which judgment should be rendered may be joined as plaintiff by amendment at any time before judgment, and may have judgment for his part, if justice will be done by such procedure.</p> <p>Case, against a town, for causing water to be discharged upon the plaintiff’s land from a street drain. Facts found by a referee. The defendants’ act, causing the discharge of the water, was not a reasonable use of their proprietary rights in the highway, and they are liable for the damage done. ■ One White had the use of the land on condition of paying the taxes, and the crops belonged to him. His damages are $25, and the plaintiff’s damages are $1.</p>

<p>A specific performance of an oral promise to convoy land to which the. promisee (by reason of his possession and improvements) is entitled as against the promisor, may be decreed against the objection of thepromisor’s attaching creditors who had knowledge of the possession and improvements, the promise being neither actually nor constructively fraudulent; and the levy of their execution may be prevented by injunction.</p>

Case, for selling the plaintiff’s pews in the defendants’ meetinghouse, and depriving him of the use of them. Facts found by the court. April 30, 1881, the plaintiff was the owner of two pews, numbered 7 and 21, by deeds from the defendant society, in which the entire control of the house was reserved to the society.

Bill in Equity, to restrain the further prosecution of two suits at law against the plaintiff, one in the name of Asa Fowler, administrator, and the other in the name of Jeremiah Clough against him, in both of which the defendant Carpenter is the plaintiff in interest. In March, 1852, Fowler, administrator, and Clough recovered each a judgment against the plaintiff and one Archelaus Moore in Merrimack county.

Writ ok Entry. Facts found by the coui’t. November 19, 1881, the demanded premises were the property and family homestead of the defendant Wm. II. H. Rollins, atid the defendant Mary J. Rollins was his wife. On that day said premises were attached on a writ in favor of the Belknap Savings Bank, and two days afterwards the same were attached on a writ in favor of the plaintiffs.

Bill in Equity, to set aside the levy of an execution in favor of the Farmington Savings Bank against one Savage.

Bile in Equity, alleging that the plaintiff is seized, for the life of William C. Mudgett, of a tract of land in Tilton, on which are situated a dwelling-house, shed, and barn, and also a store and store shed, and that the defendant is entitled to a homestead in five hundred dollars’ worth of said dwelling-house, or of said dwelling-house, shed, and barn, during her minority, and praying that a homestead in five hundred dollars’ worth thereof may be assigned to her to hold…

Assumpsit, for labor. Writ dated April 12, 1883. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement of a prior arbitrament and award. The cause was tried by a referee, whose report is for the plaintiff in the sum of $349.40. January 29,1883, the parties submitted all matters in difference to arbitrators under the statute, stipulating that the award should be filed with a motion for judgment thereon at the coming April term for this county.

<p>Assumpsit, for the recovery of fence-viewers’ fees, &c., under c. 142, Gen. Laws. Facts found by the court.</p> <p>In 1850, lleuben Wyman and Merrill Wyman, on the one part, and Edwin N. Chubbuck, on the other part, made division of the fence between their farms in Bartlett in proper form, and caused, the same to be recorded by the clerk of said town in the records thereof. The defendant owns the Chubbuck farm, which now embraces substantially the same lands as when the division of fence was made, and the successive owners of that farm have kept up their part of the fence according to the division. The Wyman farm has since been divided into several parcels, one of which is now owned by the plaintiff. Her parcel adjoins the defendant’s farm, and the fence between them is part of that belonging to the Wymans to build and maintain under the division of 1850.</p> <p>In 1882 the plaintiff caused a division of the fence between the defendant and herself to be made by the fence-viewers, and if they had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the prior division, the plaintiff is to have judgment; otherwise, a nonsuit is to be entered.</p>

Assumpsit, to recover $250 and interest from January 1, 1872. Plea, the general issue, and statute of limitations. Verdict for the plaintiff. At the trial, April term, 1884, the plaintiff testified that in November, 1871, he lost his pocket-book, containing about $300, and that he had no information that either of the defendants had the money until March, 1883.

Indictment, charging that the defendant, on the 12th day of May, 1868, being then treasurer of the county of Carroll, did embezzle and fraudulently convert to his own use $850 of the money of said county, &c.; also, in another count, that, on the first day of April, 1884, the defendant did fraudulently have in his possession, and did fraudulently conceal, $850, which, on the 12th day of May, 1868, he had, by virtue of his office as treasurer of said county, taken into his…

In Equity. A demurrer to the bill having been overruled, the facts were found by the court. Personal property of Kayes was attached by Haynes, a deputy sheriff, on a writ in favor of Shaw, the defendant, and on a writ in favor of Smith; and each creditor claimed that his own attachment was made before the other’s. Each creditor obtained judgment, and each gave his execution to Haynes, and directed him to apply the attached property thereon.

Complaint, for unlawfully keeping for sale fermented cider in. less quantities than ten gallons. The complaint was entered in the police court of Pittsfield, and from the judgment of that court the respondent appealed. Plea, not guilty.

Assumpsit, to recover $25 for building a sidewalk. Facts found by the court. The defendant admitted that he promised to pay $25 towards building tbe walk, but upon condition that a crossing should be put in from his front door-steps to the north side of Elm street; and whether such a condition was annexed to the promise was the principal question in controversy.

Foreign Attachment. Facts found by the court. The trustee is executor of the will of Lucretia M. Currier, who died February 15, 1883. Her will was proved and allowed, and the trustee appointed executor February 27, 1883. Service of the writ was made upon the trustee February 28, 1883. The defendant was husband of the testatrix, and the trustee was their son. All the affairs of the estate were settled prior to February 28,1883, except the legacy to the defendant.

<p>Under Gen. Laws, c. 132, s. 2, the board of censors cannot refuse to grant a license to practise medicine on any other ground than the applicant’s lack of medical knowledge, without a trial.</p>

<p>A defendant’s failure to present his defence, caused by the negligence of himself or his counsel, is not a cause for a new trial.</p> <p>For good cause, the time of redeeming land from the levy of an execution can be extended.</p>

Case, for deceit in the sale of a stock of goods. Facts found by a referee.

Assumpstt, for the use and occupation of a bowling-alley, part of the Fabyan House premises, in 1879, 1880, and 1881. The plaintiff, to show his title, introduced a lease of the Fabyan House premises from the Mt. Washington Hotel Co. to himself and Oscar F. Barron, deceased, for five years, commencing April 1, 1879.

Bill in Equity, to foreclose a mortgage, dated December 14, 1870, given to tlie plaintiffs by the defendant Francis B. Berry, and his wife, Martha O. Berry, to secure a note of Francis B. Berry’s for $4,250. In addition to the usual covenants of title, the mortgage contained a clause in which Martha O. Berry relinquished “ all and every interest, right, and title 1 have ” in the premises conveyed.

Motion, by the defendant, to bring forward the above actions from the docket of the October term, 1869, to vacate the judg-ments recovered at that term, and for a new trial. The defendant introduced the case in Moore v. Carpenter, reserved in Belknap at the March term, 1884, and Carpenter, plaintiff in interest, excepted. Further testimony was introduced by both parties.

1. Indictment, for unlawfully keeping for sale five gallons of lager beer.

Fobeign Attachment. Facts found by the court. The plaintiff gave to an officer a trustee writ not having the names of any trustees written in it, and at the same time a list of names on a separate paper, with direction to serve the writ on the persons in the list as trustees. The officer served the writ on those persons by reading it to them, reading the name of each from the list. Afterwards their names were inserted as trustees in the writ.

The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the plaintiff left the state immediately upon the fact becoming known that an indictment had been found, and had since resided in New York city, and had concealed her residence from the defendant until December, 1883, when it was with difficulty discovered by him.

Trespass. Both actions were tried by the court. The plaintiff, in opening, stated that the first action is brought to recover $41.83, paid under protest to the collector of Pittsfield, and by him paid over to the treasurer of Pittsfield, for a school-house tax assessed upon the plaintiff in a special assessment, May 29, 1876, upon the annual invoice in that jmar; and that the second action is against the selectmen of Pittsfield and Epsom and the collector of Pittsfield, for…

Trover, for a lot of timber. Plea, the general issue. Facts found by the court. In the fall of 1880 the plaintiff bargained with the defendant for certain timber then standing on her land, with the right to remove the same as fast as it was cut, yarded, surveyed, and paid for. Under the contract, timber was cut and yarded by the plaintiff, amounting to about $490, which was surveyed and paid for in full, and was nearly but not quite all taken away in the winter of 1880-’81.

Assumpsit, for the use and occupation of a blacksmith shop, built by the plaintiff in 1874 upon land of the defendant’s wife, and with her assent. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement of the statute of limitations, also of title to the shop in the defendant and in his wife. Writ dated February 21, 1883. Facts found by the court. The plaintiff occupied the shop until January, 1875, when he rented it to the defendant, who paid the rent for the first quarter.

Trespass, for taking and carrying away six and one half tons leather board, nineteen barrels alum, ten barrels red, eight barrels resin, one barrel machine oil, the property of the plaintiff. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement of justification under process. Facts found by the court.

Trover. The plaintiffs were called as witnesses by the defendants, who, in examining them, were permitted to put leading questions, to which the plaintiffs excepted. The plaintiffs’ counsel claimed the right to put leading questions in his examination of the plaintiffs as witnesses, because they had been put upon the witness stand by the defendants. The court declined to permit him to do so, and the plaintiffs excepted.

Bill in Equity, by the executor of Moses Titcomb, asking for a construction of the will and codicil of the testator, and direction from the court whether to pay $2,000 to William H. Titcomb, in trust for Benjamin Titcomb, by virtue of the codicil in addition to the legacy mentioned in the first item of the will. Facts found by the court.

Bills in Equity, for the removal of a cloud from the plaintiffs’ title to their respective lots of land, &e. Facts found by the court. In 1866 the defendants, at the solicitation of one Quimby and his wife, advanced to them $250 with which to buy a tract of land called the Yail tract, upon a verbal agreement that the Quimbys would pay the defendants one half the proceeds of the land when they should sell it, above the purchase-money, interest, and taxes.

Scire F actas, by the executors of Herman Foster, on a judgment of foreclosure, for a writ of possession of land at Goffe’s Falls.

Case, for wrongfully maintaining a sewer discharging offensive matter upon the plaintiffs’ land, and into their mill-pond, polluting the water, and rendering it unfit for use. Facts found by the court. The plaintiffs are a corporation engaged in the manufacture of cotton goods, owning and operating two mills in Nashua, located on Salmon brook.

Insolvency Proceedings, for winding up tbe bank as to scaled deposits. February 5, 1877, tbe deposit accounts of the savings-bank were reduced twenty per cent., under Laws of 1874, o. 71, s. 10. There was then due depositors $115,561.73, and the assets of the bank at their par value, as they stood on the books of the bank, amounted to $114,795.99.

Petition, by the administrator with the will annexed, of John Breed, for direction as to the payment of legacies under the following residuary clause: “As to all the rest, residue and remainder of all my estate, real, personal, and mixed of every name and description, wherever found and however situate, I give, bequeath, and devise the same to my four grandchildren, Edward T. Breed, Edgar C. Breed, Ilyrena T. Breed, and Marianna Breed, children of Asa Breed late of Weare,…

Assumpsit to recover for eight United States interest-bearing treasury notes of $50 each, alleged to have been delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants, April 26, 1862.

<p>A person contracting not to practise or do any dentistry on his own account or by any agent within certain limits, is not restrained by injunction from working for another at the business of dentistry within the specified limits.</p>

Case, “ for that tbe defendant on the seventh day of October, 1883, at said Manchester, hired of the plaintiff a phaeton buggy, horse, and harness, to drive about said Manchester, and it was the duty of the said defendant to drive said horse and use said buggy and harness in a careful and prudent manner.

Trover, for a church organ. The cause was tried by a referee, who made a general report in favor of the plaintiff, and stated facts for the opinion of the court as to whether there was competent evidence of title in the plaintiff to maintain the action.

Debt, on the official bond of the plaintiff’s treasurer. Facts found by a referee. Albee being annually elected treasurer of the plaintiff bank from 1865 to 1881, gave a bond each year. The bond in suit was given in 1877. A by-law required all deposits received by him to be forthwith deposited by him in the Winchester Bank in the plaintiffs’ name. Various sums of the plaintiffs’ money were embezzled by him each year, from 1866 or 1867 to 1881.

Pkobatb Appeals. The estate of William P. Wheeler, being solvent, but administered in the insolvent course, the administrator appealed from an order requiring him to retain $5,000 in his hands for the payment of the claim of Joslin and others, which had been contingent. The creditors appealed from a denial of their motion, that the judge of probate proceed to examine the same claim and determine what is due them, the claim being no longer contingent.

Foreign Attachment. The trustee is an attorney at law,, and at the time of the service of the writ upon him had in his. hands $116.65 which he had collected on a debt for the defendant in the course of his professional employment. The question whether he can be charged for that sum was reserved.

<p>Petition, for the abatement of a tax assessed by the state board of equalization, under the act of September 15, 1883.</p>

Assumpsit, for money paid. April 14, 1882, the defendant, by an ordinary quitclaim deed, conveyed land in Sunapee - to one Brown, who the next day, by a similar deed, conveyed the land to the plaintiff. The land was taxed, as of April 1, 1882, to the defendant, and the plaintiff paid the tax to prevent the collector’s enforcement of the tax lien by sale.

Debt, on a bond for tbe payment of $2,500 on the following con■ditions: “ Whereas the said obligor has agreed to buy of the said obligee :a certain parcel of real estate situated in said Westford [describing it], the same to be conveyed by a good and sufficient warranty ■deed of the said obligee conveying a good and clear title to the .same, subject to a mortgage of eighty-five hundred dollars, and interest thereon from the first day of January, 1882, which mortgage .•and…

Assumpsit. Facts found by the court. In the summer of 1854 the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to buy*land on joint account at tlie sale of the Fort Snelliug Reservation, then expected to take place in September of that year, each to furnish $10,000 for that purpose. In pursuance of this agreement, Metcalf delivered to Gilmore $10,000 ($7,000 in gold, $2,900 in Eastern exchange, and $200 in Eastern bank bills), for which Gilmore gave a receipt dated September 19, 1854.

Appeal, from a decree of the probate court, disallowing the plaintiff’s claim for the fees of counsel employed by him to defend a suit brought against him on the bond given by him as executor. Pacts found by the court. The defendant is the widow of the testator, and the mother of two daughters, one of whom has received her legacy. The other daughter, having arrived at the age of fourteen years, elected the defendant for guardian, and she was appointed.

Smith, late of Goshen, Conn., deceased. A suit now pending in the trial term in this county in favor of one Richardson against Smith, in which one Redington is the plaintiff in interest, was tried at the September term, 1882, and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff.

Writ ok Error, by Adeline Bergeron, wife of Frederick Bergeron, for the reversal of a judgment rendered against her and in favor of the defendant, at the September term, 1880, on a note signed in January, 1877, by her husband and herself, she being in fact his surety. The assignment of errors is,— 1.

<p>.Writ oe Entry, for the foreclosure of a mortgage. Cummings appeared as defendant in interest.</p>

Petition, upon Gen. Laws, c. 75, s. 9, for leave to file a claim against the defendants for damages caused by a defective highway -

<p>In Equity. Motion to modify a final decree.</p>

<p>One tenant in common of land holding his share under a deed from his co-tenant is not barred from having partition by a condition in the deed that the grantee shall not dispose of the premises, or permit them to he occupied by any person but himself, during the life of the grantor.</p>

Petition, by school-district No. 6, in Orford. for a mandamus to compel the defendants, who are selectmen of Orford, to assess certain taxes in accordance with votes of the district to raise money, passed at meetings held June 4, 1881, January 14, 1882, and January 27, 1883, which votes were duly certified by the clerk of the' district to the selectmen. The defendants claimed, and offered •evidence tending to show, that said votes were all illegal.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the commissioner on the estate of the defendant’s intestate, Albert J. Pushee. Facts found by a referee. The deceased and his brother, Alfred W. Pushee, had been partners in business up to the time of Albert’s death. The plaintiff’s claim consists of an account against the firm. The defendant filed a counter claim against the plaintiff consisting of an account in favor of the firm and a note for §75 belonging to the firm.

Bill in Equity, for an injunction. The bill alleges in substance as follows: December 10, 1879, school-districts Nos. 1 and 17 in Haverhill, in accordance with Gen. Laws, c. 90, s. 15, entered into an agreement with Haverhill Academy, a corporation established by law, wherein it was provided that the academy should furnish instruction to the scholars of the districts in the academic, intermediate, and primary departments, 'furnish a suitable building for the accommodation of…

Case. The declaration alleged that the defendant falsely and • fraudulently made a claim upon the town for damages to his horse while travelling on a highway in said town, and falsely stated to the officers of the town that his horse had been injured through the insufficiency of the highway, and falsely swore to an affidavit stating the particulars of said injury, which he filed with the town-clerk of said town, “ and said town, relying upon said false and fraudulent…

Trover, for six tons of straw-board. Facts found by the court. July 18,1881, the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, receipted to an officer for six tons of straw-board which had been attached on a writ against the defendant. He did not see the straw-board; and there was no agreement that he should have a lien on it as security for signing the receipt.

Replevin, for a yoke of oxen. Facts found by the court. May 5,1881, the plaintiff, being the owner of the cattle, delivered them to one Mitchell upon an agreement that they should remain the plaintiff’s property until Mitchell paid him $50 and interest annually, Mitchell to keep them without cost to the plaintiff, and return them to him in two years from date “ if he does not pay the above amount.” April 29, 1883, MitchelL sold his interest in the cattle to the defendant.

<p>The court has not authority to order an allowance for the support of the wife during the pendency of a libel for divorce against her by the husband.</p> <p>Libel fob Divoboe. Motion for tbe libellee for an allowance to be paid by tbe libellant for her support during the pendency of tbe libel.</p>

Assumpsit, for the price of a judgment in favor of one Boyce against one Sumner, which the plaintiff alleged that he sold to .the defendant in January, 1873. The cause was tried by a referee, who found generally for the plaintiff, and reported the following questions for the opinion of the court.

Assumpsit, to recover for hauling 124,150 feet of spruce logs in the winter of 1877-’8, at $1.50 per thousand. Facts found by a referee. The plaintiff contracted to haul to the Connecticut river, in the logging season of 1877-8, all the timber that J. should yard from lot 57 in Lemington, Vt., for $1.50 per thousand feet. He hauled 124,150 feet, and then abandoned the contract for reasons that did not excuse him from performance.

<p>P., having compromised with his creditors for forty-five cents on a dollar, made over all his property to H. on the consideration that H. should pay off his creditors at that rate. H. paid the plaintiff forty-five per cent, of his debt, and took an assignment of it to himself. The other creditors were settled with and satisfied in the same way by H. Afterwards P. gave the plaintiff his note for the remaining fifty-five per cent, of his original debt. Held, that there was no consideration for the note.</p>

Bill in Equity, set down for hearing on bill and answer. The bill alleges that on the 28th day of June, 1875, the plaintiff corporation was seized in fee of a certain piece of land in Carroll ; that on that day the defendant Marsh, acting as president, and Henry L: Tilton, acting as treasurer of the corporation, without lawful authority, executed to Marsh a lease for 199 years of said land, and Marsh, on the 7th day of April, 1880, executed and delivered to the defendant…

Assumpsit, to recover under the statute double the cost of building a division fence, and the fees of the fence-viewers. Facts found by the court. The division fence in question is on the line between Lancaster and Northumberland. The plaintiff living in Northumberland and the defendant in Lancaster, the fence-viewers of the latter town were called out; and they notified the defendant of hearings at the plaintiff’s house in Northumberland, about twenty rods from the fence.

<p>A deed duly acknowledged and recorded is not of itself evidence of seizin in either the grantor or grantee; and it makes no difference in this respect that the land described in the deed is a wild, unbroken forest.</p>

Petition by the plaintiffs, who are citizens of Pennsylvania, for the removal of the cause to the circuit court of the United States on the ground of prejudice and local influence. The petition, with a bond, and the affidavit of one of the plaintiffs in due forms, stating the facts necessary to bring the case within the terms of the third clause of s. 639, U. S. Rev. Sts., were filed at the April term, 1884.

Bilí, in Equity, for the construction of the will of Joseph .Fowler, late of Durham, in this county. The will gives,— 1. The income of the testator’s homestead in Durham to his brother, George Fowler, for life, then to his nephew, Clarence Fowler, for life, then to his nephew, Harry Fowler, for life, then the homestead to the Congregational church in Durham. 2. A granite monument and headstones to the graves in his family lot in the cemetery in Dover, not to exceed $225. 3.

<p>Petition for a new highway in the towns of Barnstead and Alton. Upon the petition of Alton, under Gen. Laws, c. 68, s. 10, and notice thereof, the town of Farmington appeared at the healing before the commissioners, who, in their report, assigned $500 of "the expense of making the highway to be paid by that town. Farmington objected at the hearing that the commissioners had no authority to make such assignment, because Farmington is not in the vicinity of the proposed highway and of the town of Alton, and now moves to set aside their report for that cause. The court overruled the objection and denied the motion, and Farmington excepted.</p>

<p>A mortgage given to secure a note made for a larger sum than the . amount actually due from the mortgagor is not invalid as against creditors of the mortgagor, if it appears that it was not made to hinder, delay, or defraud those creditors.</p>

Information, in the nature of a quo tvarranto filed by the attorney-general, at the relation of Edmund C. Cole and two others.

<p>Debt, for a penalty alleged to have been incurred by the defendants June 20, 1881, under c. 55, Laws of 1879, by charging a greater sum for transporting a car-load of corn from Concord to Suncook than was charged for transporting the same ¿from Concord to Hooksett, a greater distance. Facts found by the court.</p> <p>June 20, 1881, the defendants owned and operated a railroad from Concord to Nashua, located on the west bank of Merrimack river, between Concord and Hooksett. They also operated a railroad on the east side of the river between Concord and Hook-sett, having a station at Suncook for the delivery of freight. On that day they hauled from Concord to Suncook, and delivered to the plaintiff's, a car-load of com bought by the plaintiff's through Barron & Co., of Concord, in Ogdensburg, N. Y., and forwarded over several other roads to Concord, where the defendants received it. The roads between Ogdensburg and Boston, the defendants’ being one, formed a continuous line for the transportation of merchandise to billing points on the line, called the “ National Dispatch Line,” having a common agent at Ogdensburg, with authority from each road to make contracts for the transportation of merchandise from Ogdensburg to the several billing stations on the whole line, and to fix the rate therefor to be divided between the roads doing-the service;' also with authority to fix or establish billing stations on the line. In 1881 Hooksett was, and Suncook was not, a billing point on the defendants’ road for grain forwarded from Ogdensburg by this through line. Hooksett was made a billing point by the agent who represented the whole line from Ogdensburg to-Boston, and the rate for transportation from Ogdensburg to Hook-sett was fixed by him. Full car-loads of corn were forwarded from Ogdensburg through to billing points only on the line. When these trains reached Concord, cars for billing stations on the defendants’ road were detached and forwarded by a way train via, Suncook, while the through trains were forwarded by the main line on the west side of the river. The agent of the Dispatch Line at Ogdensburg refused to bill cars to Suncook, and a person having grain to be forwarded from Ogdensburg to Suncook was compelled to accept a contract for delivery at Concord or Hooksett. The distance from Concord to Hooksett via Suncook is nine and a half miles, and about the same over the main line. The distance from Concord to Suncook is seven miles. In June, 1881, the tariff on corn was four cents per 100 lbs. from Concord to Suncook and the same from Concord to Hooksett, and from Hooksett to Sun-cook two cents per 100 lbs.</p> <p>The car in question was detached from the through train at Concord, and forwarded by the way freight train to Suncook, where it was left, and was not taken to Hooksett at all.</p> <p>The charges for the carriage of the com from Ogdensburg toHooksett were $32.35, as fixed by the common agent of all the roads, which sum included the defendants’ share for the carriage of the corn from Concord to Hooksett. The freight bill forwarded from Hooksett to Suncook contained a charge of $5.60 for transportation of the same car-load of com from Hooksett to Suncook, and $32.25 charged as expense, making a total of $37.95 charged for the transportation of the car-load of com from Ogdensburg toSuncook, which sum the plaintiffs were required to pay and did pay to the defendants’ station-agent at Suncook. The charge was the same that the plaintiffs would have been required to pay, according to the tariff rates, if the corn had been carried to Hook-sett (to which place it was billed), and had then been forwarded toSuncook. The court held upon the foregoing facts that the ‘plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and the defendants excepted.</p>

Case, for refusing the plaintiffs reasonable and equal facilities as expressmen over tbe defendants’ road. The declaration contained six counts. To the first five the defendants pleaded the general issue. The sixth count set forth in detail facts showing an -alleged discrimination against the plaintiffs in the matter of rates and facilities for the transaction of their business over the defendants’ lines in this state and Massachusetts.

Writ ok Entry. Tbe plaintiff claimed under a deed describing tbe granted premises as part of lot 101. Tbe defendant owned a part of lot 92 adjoining that part of lot 101 conveyed to the plaintiff by the above deed, and claimed the disputed tract by virtue of a written agreement establishing the divisional line made by him with the plaintiff’s grantor, Elias E. Dickey, May 20, 1874.

Information filed by the attorney-general, alleging that the respondent, on the 22d day of May, 1888, at Goffstown, not being licensed to sell trees, shrubs, and vines not grown in the state of New Hampshire, did unlawfully sell certain trees and vines, to wit, &c., not groyn in said state, and not grown one year or more in lands or nurseries owned by him in said state on which taxes had been paid, to one Andrew J. Hazen, contrary to the form of the statute, &c. This…

<p>A provision in the charter of a railroad corporation, that the road shall be so constructed as not to obstruct the safe and convenient use of any private way which it crosses, imposes upon the corporation the duty of maintaining a safe and convenient crossing for such private way.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, by the executrix of the will 'of Eliza Wilson, to recover the defendants’ joint and several promissory note, payable to the testatrix. The second clause of the will is as follows: “ I give and bequeath to my sister Fidelia Wright the promissory note I hold signed by her and Moses Wright; also the sum of my deposit with interest in the Five Cents Savings Bank in Keene, and three hundred dollars of the sum of my deposit in the Cheshire Provident Institution in Keene, for her support for life, the residue from and after her decease to be divided equally between my nephews and nieces hereinafter named.”</p>

This agreed case presented the question whether the town of Grantham or the county of Sullivan is liable to pay justice, sheriff, and witness fees in the prosecution of persons for being common drunkards, on complaint of the selectmen of Grantham. The respondents were found guilty, and served out their sentences in the house of correction and jail respectively, but were discharged without paying the costs.

<p>Facts found by a referee.</p>

Petition, entered at the law term, by school-district No. 6 in Orford, against the selectmen of Orford, for a reassessment of a school-district tax, the assessment of which was ordered by a writ ■of mandamus in School-District v. Carr, ante, p. 201. The complaint is, that some of the persons on whom the defendants made the assessment are not taxable in the district.

Trespass, qu. el. Facts found by the court. At the September term, 1876, the cause was sent to a referee, with a commission instructing him that his report was to be final. At a hearing begun Jan. 29, 1877, the referee found and reported that the defendants were guilty, and assessed the plaintiff’s damages at $40. At the March term, 1878, upon suggestion that Calvin F. Cate, one of the defendants, was in bankruptcy, the action was entered dismissed as to him.

Bill in Equity, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff’s way. Facts found by the court. The plaintiff and the defendants own adjoining house-lots in Lebanon, the title of both being derived through mesne conveyances from Daniel Taylor, trustee of the Church Family of Shakers. The controversy is as to their respective rights in a passage-way over the defendants’ land along the division line.

<p>An assignment of wages to bo earned, with the acceptance of the employer written upon the face instead of upon the back of the instrument, being duly filed with the town-clerk, is good against a creditor of the laborer who seeks to reach the fund by trustee process.</p>

Bill in Equity, by William P. Benton, one of the executors of the will of ColbeoC. Benton, deceased, for tbe advice and direction of the court in regard to the following clauses in tbe will: “ 3.

Motion, by N. H. Weeks, and one hundred aud eighty others, petitioners for a new highway in Bridgewater and New Hampton, for leave to withdraw, and to amend the petition by striking out their names on the payment of costs. The other petitioners, seventy-three in number, oppose the motion.

Case, for making and opening a winter road by the defendants over their own land, and across the Connecticut river, from a highway in Lancaster to a highway in Lunenburg, Vt., within the limits of the plaintiffs’ charter, and putting up a sign whereby the public were invited to pass over,the road so opened instead of passing over the plaintiffs’ toll-bridge, with the intent to injure the plaintiffs by diverting travel from their bridge, and so depriving them of their just…

Assumpsit, on a policy of life insurance dated May 30, 1870. Facts found by tbe court., By the terms of the contract, the defendants were to receive ten annual premiums, each consisting of a note for $12.80, and a certain sum of money. At the end of twelve years, or the previous death of the insured, the defendants were to pay $1,000, “deducting therefrom all indebtedness to the said company on account of this policy, if any then existing-.

Assumpsit, for wood bargained and sold. The defendant bargained with the plaintiffs for the wood on a lot in Hampton at $2 a cord, and after removing- a part he refused to take the rest, claiming that the plaintiffs had induced him to make the bargain by false and fraudulent representations. In this action the plaintiffs attached the wood remaining on the lot as the property of the defendant, and caused it to be sold on the writ.

<p>Appeal from a decree of the judge of probate for the filing and recording of a copy of the'will of Manning Kennard, deceased, and of the probate of the same in Pennsylvania, upon the application of Virginia Kennard, widow and legatee under said will. Facts found by the court. Manning Kennard resided at Florence, Italy, at the time of his death in December, 1873. Fie left a Avill whereby he gave all his property, real and personal, to his wife, the appellee, to hold for her own use forever. The will was executed in Florence, and was attested by but two subscribing witnesses.</p> <p>To show the interest of the appellee under the will of Manning Kennard, a copy of the will of James Kennard was admitted in evidence, subject to exception. The will of James Kennai’d is as follows: “I James Kennard of Portsmouth in the county of Rockingham * * * do make, publish and declare this my last will and testament in manner and form following: First, I give and bequeath to my executors hereinafter named, to be held by them in trust for the following purpose all my Rockingham Bank stock, consisting of 226 shares, two hundred and twenty-five shares of which stand in the name of Manning Kennard of Philadelphia, the remaining one share in my own name. I also give and bequeath to my executors to be held by them in trust for the following purpose, all my land in Austin street together with my dwelling-house No. 9 thereon, with all the furniture therein, which is not to be separated from the house except by consent of all parties interested, all the dividends or interest that may accrue on the 226 shares of Rockingham Bank stock, after paying the taxes thereon to be paid over to my beloved wife Frances B. Kennard, during her natural life or widowhood, the house, furniture and land above named to be also for her only use and benefit, she paying the taxes thereon during her life, or while she remains my widow. At her decease or marriage the whole of the Rockingham Bank stock, house, furniture and land before named is to revert to my heirs as follows:</p> <p>“ To my son Manning Kennard, fifty shares Rockingham Bank stock. ‡ * *</p> <p>“ The house, furniture and land before named, together with all the rest and residue of my estate, personal, real or mixed, to be equally divided between my four children or their heirs.”</p> <p>The appellants contend that Manning Kennard took nothing under the will of James Kennard, because Frances B. Kennard survived him. Other exceptions are shown by the opinion of the court.</p>

Bill in Equity, to cancel fraudulent conveyances made by George Janvrin, the plaintiffs intestate, to the defendants. Facts found by the court. George Janvrin married Jane Janvrin in 1870. Before marriage they made an agreement that at his decease she should have $1,000 and all the household furhiture then belonging to him. Some troubles arose between them in 1874, when, April 8 of that year, she left him, and never' lived with him afterwards.

Writ of Entry, for land in Deerfield. Facts agreed. November 15, 1882, the demanded premises were set out to Sarah W. Lake, widow of John Lake, by the probate court, as her homestead, and she continued to occupy the same until October 8,1883, when she purchased another place in Deerfield, where she has lived from that time to the present. April 24,1884, she conveyed her interest in the demanded premises to the defendant, who has since been in possession.

Petition for. Mandamus, requiring the selectmen of North-wood to assess a tax upon the shoe manufacturing property of Pillsbury Brothers for the year 1884. Facts agreed for the judgment of the court.

In Equity. Demurrer tothe bill in which the following facts are alleged: March 25, 1876, the plaintiff Nathan, by deed conveyed a farm in Durham to himself for life, and to the defendant John, after the death of Nathan; and the same instrument conveyed to John all the personal property of which the grantor should die possessed The deed provided that it should be void if John should neglect suitably to support Nathan on the farm, and this condition John has not performed.

Writ of Entry. Trial by the court. The land in question was conve'yed in mortgage to the Gonic Five Cents Savings Bank, by one Nutter, February 4, 1869. February 28, 1874, Nutter’s assignee in bankruptcy quitclaimed it to the bank, and October 10, 1882, the assignee of the bank quitclaimed it to the plaintiff.

Petition, for leave to appeal from a decree of the probate court, allowing the settlement of the defendant’s account as administrator of the’ estate of John Briony, on the ground that the petitioners were prevented from appealing therefrom within ■ sixty days, through mistake, accident, or- misfortune. Facts found by a referee.

Trespass qu. cl. The title to real estate was not in question. Damages were assessed by tbe court at twelve dollars. The defendant moved that the costs be limited to twelve dollars, claiming it as matter of right. The court denied the motion, and the defendant excepted.

Bill in Equity to annul a mortgage, enjoin its foreclosure, and for an account. Facts found by a referee. December 27, 1871, the plaintiff owned an undivided half, in common with his brother Jeremiah, of 120 acres of land in Farmington, and on that day executed the mortgage in question to the defendant to secure the payment of certain promissory notes made by Jeremiah for money loaned to him by the defendant, and signed by the plaintiff as surety.

Trespass qu. el. The question was the locality of a boundary line on the west side of the plaintiff’s land, and the east side of the defendant’s. The plaintiff claimed the establishment of one line by agreement: a second he claimed to be the true line: a third was claimed by the defendant. The verdict was for the second. The plaintiff claimed under Rogers, who bought of Cross now deceased.

Assumpsit upon an account. Facts found by the court. The defendant was defaulted, and the defence was made by subsequent attaching creditors. . September 6, 1888, the defendant was indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of $822.37 upon account, for goods sold to him in Boston. On that day Burr, the plaintiffs’ traveller, called upon the defendant for money on account.

Trover, for machinery and other property attached in a mill, by the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, as the property of Beck & Mitchell, who had sold it to the defendants. The attaching creditors, who are the plaintiffs in interest, claim there was not a sufficient change of possession. A verdict was ordered for the defendants.

The only issue joined was, whether the. testator was of sound and disposing mind. Verdict for the appellees, which the appellant moved to set aside. Neither of the appellees testified.

Foreign Attachment. Facts found by the court. July 15, 1884. the Commercial Union Insurance Company of London adjusted a fire loss with the defendant, and gave him in payment therefor a negotiable sight draft on their office in New York, July 19, and before the draft reached New York this writ was served on the insurance company as trustee of the defendant, and payment of the draft was for that reason refused when it was afterwards in the usual course of business presented…

Writ of Entry. The plaintiff claimed the demanded premises under a deed from John B. Eaton to Elizabeth R. Eaton, dated January 2, 1878. The defendant claimed title under a deed from John B. Eaton to Abel E. Eaton, dated September 10, 1877.

Case, for the unskilful and improper construction of the defendants’ bridge at Hooksett falls, causing the river to overflow the plaintiff's land. Verdict for the defendants.

<p>Trover, for spirituous liquor and other saloon goods, by a sheriff against a receiptor of attached property. Facts found by the court. The goods were the property of Fife and the defendant, partners in the firm of Fife & Co. The plaintiff’s attachment of them was made in a suit brought by Hoyt against Fife on a debt due from Fife to IToyt, and contracted before the partnership of Fife & Co. was formed. The goods were left in the saloon of Fife & Co., where they were attached. Fife had given Adams mortgages of a large part of them as security for a note given for money loaned by Adams to Fife, and contributed by Fife as his share of their capital; and the mortgages were recorded. It was understood that Adams was to be a silent partner, and that his name was not to be disclosed; and the certificate required by Gen. Laws, c. 117, s. 1, was not filed with the town-clerk. On the day of the attachment, the plaintiff demanded of Adams an account on oath of the amount due on his mortgages, and an account has not been given.</p>

<p>Bill in Equity, to redeem land from a mortgage.</p>

<p>A judgment by default against one not an inhabitant of this state, where there is no service of the writ except by publication, is not a judgment in personam, and can be given no force or effect beyond an appropriation of the property attached on the writ.</p> <p>In an action on such a judgment, the validity of an attachment of the defendant’s property on the original writ cannot be questioned. Kendrick v. Kimball, 33 N. H. 482, qualified.</p> <p>Debt, on a judgment. Facts found by the court. July 3,1877, the plaintiff commenced a suit against the defendant, and a horse of the defendant, attached upon the writ, was sold by the officer July 9 for $43.15. The officer’s return stated that he made no service of the writ upon the defendant for the reason that he was not an inhabitant of the state. The defendant left the state in June, 1877, and did not return until some time in 1878, and during that time was not an inhabitant of the state. The suit was entered at the October term, 1877, and continued to the next term, with on order of notice to the defendant by publication, which was complied with. 'At the April term, 1878, judgment was recovered against the defendant upon default for $88.08 damages and $14.75 costs, and execution issued, upon which the money remaining in the hands of the officer was applied in part satisfaction. This suit is brought to recover the balance of the judgment. The defendant offered to show that the horse attached was his only horse, and exempt from attachment; also, that he did not know of the bringing of the suit, or of the pendency thereof, until long after the judgment was . recovered. The plaintiff offered to show that the defendant did know of the bringing of the suit, and of the attachment soon after the attachment was made. The court ruled that the evidence offered was immaterial, and rejected it; and the parties respectively excepted. The court also ruled that the judgment obtained by the plaintiff was valid only as against the property of the defendant attached, and ordered judgment for the defendant; and the plaintiff excepted.</p>

Debt, on a probate bond, brought at the request of the New Hampshire Savings Bank. Facts found by the court. The writ is dated July 15, 1884. The defendant Ellis was appointed administratrix of the estate of Joseph B. Ellis, March 27, 1878. The other defendants are sureties on her bond. The estate was not settled in the insolvent course. The note sought to be recovered by means of this suit was dated July 3, 1877, and signed by Joseph 1>. Ellis as surety for one John Ellis.

<p>An indictment, for keeping for sale fermented cider in less quantity than ten gallons, need not contain a denial that it was intended to be sold elsewhere than in this state.</p>

Complaint eor bastardy, returnable before the police court of Pembroke. The defendant moved there, and seasonably renewed the motion here to dismiss the complaint because it was served by a police officer, such an officer having no authority to serve the process. He also moved to dismiss the complaint because the police court exceeded its authority in taking the recognizance, it having been taken, as in criminal cases, to the state.

<p>Debt, on the statute (G. L., o. 115, s. 11), to recover double damages sustained by the plaintiff from being bitten by the defendant’s dog.</p> <p>It appeared that at the time of the injury the dog was in the plaintiff’s pasture barking by a hole in the wall, and the plaintiff went to drive it away; but as to what he did in his efforts to effect that purpose, and whether his conduct and treatment of the animal were proper and reasonably necessary to that end, or whether he brought the injury upon himself by his ill-treatment of the dog, and by want of due care to avoid the injury, the evidence was conflicting.</p> <p>The jury were instructed as follows: “ The plaintiff had the legal right to expel the dog from his premises, doing whatever was reasonably necessary to effect his expulsion, acting with due care to prevent being injured; and if in the attempt to expel the dog he acted with due care, using such means only as were reasonably necessary, and was bitten, he can recover. If the plaintiff was bitten in consequence of not using due care in his conduct towards the dog, or if he wilfully, recklessly, or needlessly irritated or aggravated the dog, and in consequence of such conduct was bitten, he cannot recover, because the injury he received would be the result of his own carelessness or recklessness.”</p> <p>The plaintiff excepted to that part of the above instruction which required proof of due care from him, and requested the court to charge that “ the burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish the fact that the plaintiff, at the time he was bitten, was in the commission of a trespass or other tort.” This instruction was refused, and the plaintiff excepted.</p> <p>The jury did not agree, and on motion of the plaintiff, the questions raised by the foregoing exceptions were reserved for the opinion of the court.</p>

Debt on a bond to take the poor debtor’s oath. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement that the principal, Thorne, took the oath witbin the year. Facts found by the court. July 1, 1882, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against Thorne for about $800.

<p>A judgment for the plaintiff in an action of trespass guare clausum fregit, rendered upon a plea of soil and freehold in the defendant, is conclusive of the title in a writ of entry for the same land afterwards brought by the former defendant against the former plaintiff</p> <p>Writ ok Entry for land in Concord. The defendant pleaded a judgment rendered in his favor in an action of trespass brought by him against the plaintiff for breaking and entering the demanded premises, and there pulling down a building, whereto this plaintiff pleaded soil and freehold in himself. To this plea the plaintiff demurred.</p>

Information in the nature of a quo warranto, filed by the attorney-general at the relation of James H. Libbey, to determine the right of the defendant to the office of prudential committee of school-district Np. 2 in Hooksett. Facts found by a referee. The record of the school-meeting held March 7, 1885, shows that the defendant had a plurality of votes, and was elected.

Petition, presented to the court at the October trial term, 1884, as follows: Respectfully represents John C. Pearson, of Boscawen, in said county of Merrimack, that on the first Tuesday of November, 1884, he was, and for a long time prior thereto had been, a resident of said Boscawen; that at the biennial election held on said Tuesday of November he was a candidate for the office of sheriff of said county of Merrimack, and as such received a large number of legal votes for…

Indictment, charging that the respondent, not being an agent of any town, place, or city for the purpose of selling intoxicating liquors, did sell one quart of intoxicating liquor to a certain person whose name is to the jurors aforesaid unknown.

<p>The necessity of a plenary remedy for the infringement of a legal right, accepted as a general rule of the common law, authorizes and requires the invention and use of convenient procedure for ascertaining and establishing the right and obtaining the remedy.</p> <p>When a single action of assumpsit is an adequate and convenient mode of recovering money which one of several common owners of a chattel expressly or impliedly promised to pay his cotenants for his exclusive use of it, the promisees may join in such action at common law, and ■ their several rights in the damages may be established and enforced by a necessary form of judgment and execution.</p> <p>When their shares of the value of his use of the common property are to be allowed as a payment to him by them as his co-sureties, and their claim and other related affairs are entitled to a joint and complete adjustment which cannot be made at law, the inadequacy of remedy at law is a ground of chancery jurisdiction.</p> <p>Justice may require the prosecution of an action at law and a hill in equity on the same cause of action at the same time.</p>

Case, for injuries to the plaintiff’s wife. The plaintiff claims to recover for a loss of service and society, caused by injuries received by her through the negligence of the defendants. In an action brought by her against them,, she has recovered damages for her injuries. The parties desired the opinion of the court on the question whether the plaintiff can recover for loss of her service, or for loss of her society.

Bill in Equity, for an injunction to restrain the city of Manchester, and the other defendants, who are trustees of the Amoslceag cemetery under a city ordinance, from using land for the burial of the dead, within twenty rods from the plaintiff’s dwelling-house. The bill showed that the land in question was bought of one Hans-com by the city in 1883, and run out into burial lots, and that it comes within four rods of the plaintiff’s dwelling-house.

<p>Petition for leave to appeal from a decree of distribution by the judge of probate. Facts found by the court. Blanchard Nichols died intestate, leaving as next of kin and heirs at law thirty-one nephews and nieces, children of seven deceased brothers and sisters, there being eight children of one brother, five of another, four each of three sisters and another brother, and two of another brother. The eight children are the plaintiffs, and reside in Massachusetts. The defendant is the administrator of the intestate’s estate, and resides in Amherst.</p> <p>By the decree from which this appeal is sought, the probate court ordered the personal estate in the bands of the administrator to be distributed and paid, one seventh to the children of each deceased brother and sister of the intestate per stirpes. The petitioners were prevented from taking an appeal through accident, mistake, and misfortune, and not by their own neglect.</p>

Facts found by a referee. November 27,1883, Dunn was at work for the Nashua Lock Company, the trustee, and on that day made an assignment of his wages, to Barry. Barry took the assignment to the counting-room of the company, and, finding one R. P. Moseley there, asked him if he was the party to accept assignments of wages made by persons in the employment of the company.

Bill in Equity, for an injunction to restrain the diversion of water from the plaintiff’s mill, for an assessment of damages for such diversion, and to define the respective water rights of the plaintiff and the defendant. Facts found by the court.

Assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered. Facts found by tbe court. September 18, 1883, the defendant, at Manchester, through the plaintiffs’ agent, verbally ordered a lot of crockery. The crockery was to be imported by the plaintiffs at Boston, and on arrival was to be sent to the defendant at Manchester. The plaintiffs ordered the crockery.

Case, against the defendant, a deputy sheriff, for neglecting to arrest on an execution in favor of the plaintiff one T. upon his surrender at the jail. The plaintiff recovered judgment against T. in an action of trover. The judgment record admitted in evidence showed that the property converted by T. consisted to a considerable extent of promissory notes.

Bill in Equity, to recover money verbally promised in support of a base-ball club. The defendant in bis answer alleges that there is no equity in the bill, that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, and sets up the statute of limitations. In 1877 the plaintiff was the manager of a base-ball club in Manchester. He, the defendant, and three others, verbally agreed to pay each one sixth part of the excess of the expenses over the receipts of the club.

At the March term, 1885, the defendant pleaded that since the commencement of that term he had settled his administration account in the probate court, and, it being thereupon found that the estate had been wholly expended in defraying the expenses of the last sickness and funeral of the deceased, and the expenses of administration, a decree was entered discharging’ the defendant from all claims of creditors against said estate.

Case, for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate by carelessly running upon him with an engine and train of cars while crossing the defendants’ track with a horse and wagon in the highway. The court ruled that nominal damages only could be recovered, and the plaintiff excepted.

<p>Foreign unwritten law, including the prevailing construction of a foreign statute, may he proved by competent witnesses, and is a matter of fact determinable at the trial term.</p>

<p>A statute which authorizes a justice of the peace to commit to the industrial school a minor under the age of seventeen years, upon a complaint charging a crime with respect to which the jurisdiction of the justice only extends to requiring the accused to recognize with sureties for his appearance at court, is in conflict with art. 15 of the bill of rights.</p>

.Replevin, for ten cases of merchandise. The plaintiffs are assignees of Clarence B. Frost, under the insolvent laws of Massachusetts. The defendants were defaulted, and William A. Stone, being admitted by the court to defend, pleaded that the goods were not the property of the plaintiffs, but were his goods.

Case, for unlawfully enticing away the plaintiff’s minor daughter, on the 29th day of March, 1879, and depriving him of her services from that time until the 8th day of September, 1882, when she became twenty-one years of age. The defendant pleaded that on said 29th day of March he was lawfully married to the daughter, and that the plaintiff was not thereafter entitled to her services. To this plea the plaintiff demurred.

Petition for partition. The committee found the value of the estate to be $5,985, q¿id, in accordance with the petition, set off the shares of the petitioners jointly.

Bill tn Equity, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding at law in the collection of .a note given by the plaintiff upon the purchase of a farm, which was mortgaged to the defendants to secure the same. The cause was heard on a demurrer to the bill

BiiJj in Equity, heard upon bill and answer. The material facts were, — June 30, 1883, one Wadleigh conveyed a farm in Sunapee to Carlos S. Bingham and Fred S. Hart, and for part of the purchase-money took a note signed by Bingham and Hart for $1,039, and a mortgage of the farm to secure its payment.

Assumpsit, upon the common counts. Facts found by the court. The defendant was defaulted. Subsequent attaching creditors appeared, and objected to the allowance of a bank note for |500, which the plaintiff had signed as surety for the defendant, but on which he had paid nothing at the time of the trial.

<p>The foreclosure of a mortgage according to the provisions of Gen. Laws, c. 122, s. 14, bars the redemption right of the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him, including minor heirs.</p>

Assumpsit, for water carried by an aqueduct to a house which the defendant bought of Jackson, the plaintiff in interest. Facts found by a referee.

Declaration (upon Gen. Laws, c. 138, s. 20) of the grounds of the defendants’ denial of a homestead right claimed by the plaintiff. Trial by the court. The plaintiff and her husband (who is the execution debtor) occupy a leased tenement. They own no real estate except the premises in question, upon which there is no building, and which are situated at some distance from their hired house. The court found the plaintiff entitled to a homestead if under the law she can be.

Writ of Entry for the Stevens place in Lisbon. The defendant pleaded’ the general issue, with a brief statement disclaiming title in himself, and alleging title in his wife. At the trial before a referee the question was, whether the demanded premises were bought with the defendant’s money and the deed taken to his wife to defraud his creditors.

Case, for injuries upon a highway. Trial by a referee, who returned a general finding for the defendants, with a statement of several exceptions taken by the plaintiff to his rulings at the trial, one of which was as follows : The defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s horse had the habit of stumbling, and that the accident was caused by his stumbling, and not by any defect in the highway.

<p>Assumj’SLT, on a warranty of a steam engine. The defendants in a brief statement pleaded a judgment recovered by them in Massachusetts in 1884, against the plaintiffs, upon default, and an agreement as to the amount of damages, in a suit to recover the price of the engine, in which suit these plaintiffs, before submitting to a default, appeared and filed an answer in which they alleged the same breach of warranty of the engine relied on here, and claimed to recoup the damages suffered by them on that account. The court ruled that the Massachusetts judgment is not a bar to this suit; and the defendants excepted.</p> <p>The evidence tended to show that Young, the member of the plaintiffs’ firm who bargained for the engine with the defendants in Boston, was not a practical machinist, and never run an engine; and it did not appear that he had any acquaintance with the mechanism or operating of steam engines. The defendants requested the following instructions :</p> <p>If the jury find that the engine was defective, and that the defects were not apparent to a person without some skill in the matter of engines and machinery of that nature; and further, that Mr. Young had sufficient skill to see such defects, and opportunity to examine the engine and did examine it; and that the defendants did not practise any concealment or deceit in reference to such defects, — the plaintiffs cannot recover. These instructions were refused, and the defendants excepted.</p> <p>The court instructed the jury that if Young had an opportunity to examine the engine and did examine it, and the defects complained of in this suit were apparent on simple inspection and requiring no skill to discover them, the plaintiffs cannot recover because they were not misled by the defendants’ representations. If the finding of the jury is against the defendants on this point, then the question is whether there has been a breach of the defendants’ warranty. If the engine was not what the defendants warranted it to be, the plaintiffs can recover the difference between the value of such an engine as the defendants promised the plaintiffs, and the value of the engine delivered. To the instructions given no exception was taken. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for 1397.91. The matter of interest was not considered by them.</p>

Writ oe Entry to foreclose a mortgage. Facts agreed for the opinion of the court. August 22, 1876, David Blaisdell conveyed the premises to William G. Brown, and on the same day Brown conveyed them to Mary A. Blaisdell, the wife of David Blaisdell. The consideration named in each of these deeds was $1,500, and they were duly recorded the day of their date.

Covenant, on a lease by which the defendants let to the plaintiffs a lot of land in Colebrook, to be used in the manufacture of potato starch, for twenty years from Feb. 9, 1874, at a yearly rent cf §125, “with the right to draw water from the grist-mill pond sufficient to carry and operate a starch-mill, said lessees to have the first use of the water after the grist-mill is supplied from said nond, * * * provided the said” lessees “ shall not draw the water out of the pond…

Petition for alimony, filed August 20,1880. Facts found by a referee. July 28,1875, the parties agreed that the plaintiff should have $900 as her share of the property, and on that day the defendant gave to one Moore, as trustee, his five promissory notes,— one for $100, payable September 30, 1875, and four of $200 each, payable September 30, 1876, 1877, 1878, and 1879, — with a mortgage of his farm to secure them.

<p>The interpretation of a will, being the ascertainment of the fact of the testator’s intention, is ordinarily determined by the natural weight of competent evidence proving that fact, and not by artificial and tech, nical rules.</p> <p>An interest in land does not pass, by resulting trust, from the owner to one whose money is expended in improving the la'nd.</p>

Appeau, by the plaintiff from a decree by the judge of probate disallowing the will of Rachel Sargent, deceased.

<p>A decree of the judge of probate on the settlement of an administration account concludes an infant whose guardian has notice and is present.</p> <p>If an appeal is not taken, a decree has the same effect as the judgment of a court of common law.</p> <p>Errors in the decree can be corrected only upon appeal: errors in the record of the decree may be corrected at any time.</p> <p>The appellant is confined to his reasons of appeal, but the whole record is open to the appellee.</p>

Bill in Equity, brought by Jane M. Vandewalker, guardian of Charles March Stephens, minor, and John S. H. Frink, administrator of the estate of Susan S. March St. Clair, against William H. Rollins, trustee, and the heirs of Frances Freeman, asking for an accounting by said trustee, and payment and delivery of the sums of money and securities, and the transfer of the estate in his hands, to the plaintiff's. Facts found by the court.

The main reason of appeal from the laying out was want of notice of the hearing to the plaintiff and other persons interested, such as is required by law. There was also a motion to quash the proceedings of the selectmen for the same cause. Facts found by the court.

Trover, for a stock of goods. Facts agreed. In December, 1884, one C. A. Copps, a resident of the state of New York, sold and delivered the goods in question to the plaintiff, who immediately removed them to Nottingham in this state, where he had them in his possession until February 4, 1885, when they were attached by the defendant, a deputy sheriff, on writs in favor of several Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine creditors of Copps.

<p>On a bill in equity for an accounting, brought by a tenant in common against his cotenant, who has been ’ in possession and received the entire rents and profits, the defendant may be allowed the expense of</p> <p>necessary repairs that have materially increased the value and income of the common property, but not the expense of insurance, if it does not appear that it was procured for the plaintiff, or with his knowledge, or on his interest, or that he has received or claimed any benefit from it.</p> <p>Bill in Equity, for an accounting between tenants in common. The defendant claimed to be allowed for necessary repairs made by him upon the premises without notice to the plaintiff.</p>

Bill in Equity, heard on bill and answer. The bill sets out the will of Moses Mann, late of Greenland, whereof the defendant is executor, in substance as follows:_ “I direct my executor hereinafter named to erect a suitable monument to my memory in.

Assumpsit, to recover the amount of two promissory notes, one for $662.69, the other for $6.63, both dated Boston, June 2, 1884, payable to the order of James M. Lovering, one year after date, signed by the defendant and indorsed by Lovering.

Alfred Hoitt, who died in Hover, November 9,1883. The will bears date February 12, 1864, and its due execution is admitted. The question involved is that of revocation. The material facts are as follows: At the date of the will the testator had a wife, the mother of his children, and six sons and seven daughters, ten of whom were of age. His estate at this time amounted to some $26,000, about two thirds of which was realty, comprising eight different parcels.

Bill in Equity, alleging that the flume whereby water is conducted across the Pitman Manufacturing Company’s premises to the plaintiffs’ mill is not of sufficient size to convey effectively the water to which the plaintiffs are entitled; that said Pitman company have obstructed it by placing in it posts, tie-rods, and braces; and praying that it may be enlarged and straightened, and for general relief. Facts found by the court.

Bill in Equity, to enjoin tbe keeping of a boarding-house. The Winnipesaukee Camp-Meeting Association was chartered by the legislature in 1874. The grantees organized under the charter, purchased a lot of land near Weirs station, and subsequently conveyed parts of it to various persons, among others to the defendants.

Issues, upon an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate allowing the will of Dr. S. A. Bemis, executed December 25, 1880. The first issue joined is, tbat the appellants are interested as legatees under a former will, dated April 26,1858, and codicils which have been filed in the probate court, hut not proved.

Case, for injuries from a defective highway. The highway was laid out by the selectmen, and a certificate thereof made and signed by them June 16,1873, which was returned to the town-clerk, and recorded July 14, 1874. The defendants objected that there was no legal laying out of a highway, because the certificate was not returned and recorded within thirty days, as required by Gen. St., e. 61, s. 14 (G. L., c. 67, s. 18).

Assumpsit, to recover the price of intoxicating liquor sold in Massachusetts by the plaintiffs to the defendant. Facts found by the court.

Petition, by a mill-owner under the flowage act (ss. 15-19, e. 141, Gen. Laws).

In Equity. The plaintiff complains, and says that he is a resident, tax-payer, and voter of said- district; that said district is a school-district in Concord in said county, and the other defendants are the board of education of said district; that by virtue of e. 43 of the Laws of 1885 said district will cease to have a corporate existence from and after March 1, 1886, and at the same time the other defendants will cease to be the board of education of said district, and…

This is the same case decided at the June term, 1883, reported in 62 N. H. In the original bill, it was alleged, among other things, that the directors of the Concord Railroad, one of the defendants, of whom some were directors also of the Northern and Concord & Claremont railroads, other defendants, had, collusively, agreed to allow and pay certain fraudulent claims of those corporations against the Concord Railroad; and the plaintiff, prosecuting the bill for himself and…

The first case is covenant broken, to recover $2,000 as a benefit payable upon the death of George G. Barton. The second is assumpsit to recover the same benefit. Facts agreed. August 16, 1881, George C. Barton made application to the defendants for membership.

Bill in Equity, to recover from the defendant Sargent, administrator with the will annexed of Eliza Bixby, the amount of a legacy to the plaintiff of $500 in her will. The facts, which were agreed by the parties, appear in the opinion of the court.

CASE, to recover costs under s. 10, e. 229, Gen. Laws. In the bill in equity pending between these parties, on application of the-defendants, and against the plaintiffs’ objection, one of the justices of the supreme court authorized a commission to issue to a consul or vice-consul of the United States, or, in the absence of both, to a notary public, to take the deposition of Henry C. Sherburne in behalf of the defendants, at either London, England, Paris, France, or…

Assumpsit, to recover money paid by the plaintiffs for the support of the minor children of John B. Carter. Facts found by the court. January 1, 1870, Carter had a settlement in Canterbury, in' Merrimack county, which was abolished by the act of September 11, 1888, and neither he nor his children have gained one anywhere since.

<p>Bill in Equity, under Gen. Laws, a. 209, s. 2, for discovery, and the restoration of a municipal bond for $1,000, alleged to belong to the estate of William Emery, the plaintiff’s intestate, unlawfully withheld by the defendant; also a suit at law to recover $280 of money claimed to be in the hands of the defendant belonging to the estate. Facts found by the court.</p> <p>The legal domicile of said William Emery during his whole life was at Loudon, in this state. May 21, 1882, being very sick while temporarily at Montpelier, Vt., he delivered to the defendant as a donatio causa mortis, the bond ■ in question, and six days after-wards also delivered to her, as like gifts to several persons residing in Loudon, the sum of $280, to be by her distributed to the parties by him designated, after his death. No one was present when the bond and money were delivered by William to the defendant, and the defendant offers no evidence to prove the same, except her own testimony, and a memorandum signed by William but not witnessed. The plaintiff objected to the evidence offered as incompetent and insufficient.' The memorandum may be referred to in argument. No attempt has been made by the defendant or any one else to prove the above gifts, according to the requirements of Gen. Laws, c. 193, s. 17.</p>

Bill in Equity, to reform a certificate of membership of George H. Gigar in the defendant association by inserting therein the name of the plaintiff as beneficiary. The questions arise upon a demurrer to the bill. The bill sets out portions of the charter and by-laws of the association, which sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

Appeal, by the plaintiff, filed May 17, 1882, under Gen. Laws, c. 160, ss. 29, 17-22, from an assessment of damages for land of the plaintiff taken for railroad depot purposes. The sum assessed was tendered to the plaintiff by the defendants before they entered upon the land, and before he took this appeal, and he refused to accept it.

Writ ok Entry, on a mortgage to the plaintiffs’ testate, executed October 19, 1868, to secure, besides certain notes that have been paid, one note for $447, dated April 1,1862, made payable in five years from its date with interest annually, which has not been paid. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. The court ruled that the plea was not sustained by the foregoing facts, and the defendant excepted.

Writ ok Entry. Facts found by the court. December 14, 1870, EYancis D. Berry mortgaged his farm, of which the demanded premises constitute a small part, to the Pittsfield Savings-Bank, to secure his note for $4,250. June 3, 1881, .he mortgaged the same farm to the plaintiff, subiect to the foregoing mortgage, to secure his note for $344.44.

Replevin, for goods bought of the plaintiffs in Boston, and by them shipped to one Sawyer at Penacook, at which place they were attached by a creditor of Sawyer’s while remaining in the freight-house of the railroad. The plaintiffs claimed to hold them by virtue of their right of stoppage in transitu. The facts, which were found by the court, are stated in the opinion.

Bills in Equity, to determine the order in which parcels of mortgaged land are applicable in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, reported ante 182. June 21,1866, Quimby, seized of land called the Vail tract, consisting of lots A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I, mortgaged the whole to the defendants Mead & Co., and May 7,1868, conveyed to them with warranty lot A. November 22, 1869, she conveyed the entire tract, including lot A, to Mclntire.

Facts agreed. The board of equalization valued the plaintiffs’ road in New Hampshire at $2,000,000, and assessed the tax accordingly, which-the plaintiffs paid, under protest, October 30, 1884. This appeal was immediately taken, on which the valuation was reduced $200,-000, the tax assessed, and reduced $2,473.40, and an order reducing ~the tax has been certified to the state treasurer, who gave credit for ■the sum of $2,473.40 on the plaintiffs’ tax due October 30,1885.

Petition, against the justice and clerk of the police court of Nashua, for a writ of mandamus commanding the issue of an execution by that court in favor of the plaintiff against the trustee in the action Mansfield v. Dunn and N. L. Co., Tr. Facts found by a referee. That action, and another brought by O’Neil against, the same defendant and the same trustee, were entered at the May-term of the police court, 1884. Both suits were brought by the same attorney.

<p>Legislative power cannot be delegated to the supreme court or to a commissioner appointed under tbe joint resolution, c. 144, Laws of 1885.</p> <p>A statutory provision that certain rules and forms of school-law procedure, prepared by a commissioner, shall be deemed valid and sufficient when approved by the supreme court, does not empower the court to decide the judicial questions of validity until those questions arise in cases brought for trial and judgment.</p> <p>A question of law is not judicially decided by opinions of the justices of the supreme court required under the 74th article of the constitution; and that article does not authorize such advisory opinions to be required on questions which the body asking advice has determined not to consider.</p> <p>Chapter 144, Laws of 1885, does not require legal advice of the justices under art. 74, and does not confer on them any power of approval or disapproval, legislative, judicial, or advisory. 0</p>

The two cases are bills in equity to remove a cloud from the title to land in Antrim. Facts found by the court. July 7, 1882, the defendant Putney, being the owner of the land in question, conveyed it to the defendant Elliott by a deed absolute on its face, but in reality to secure a loan of 82,000 about that time made by Elliott to him. The conveyance was not made to hinder or delay creditors, nor with any intent to defraud them.

Assumpsit, upon two promissory notes, given by the defendant to the plaintiff, dated May 12, 1872. The defence was, that the notes were fully paid in 1875 by sixty-two shares of stock in the Swaine Turbine and Manufacturing Company, which the plaintiff had before that time held as collateral security for the notes.

<p>Where several mutually agree to pay money to be expended for a lawful object of common interest to the parties, the promise of each is considered as made in consideration of the promise of the others; and after expenditures have been made in advancement of the enterprise, relying upon the subscriptions, it is no defence to an action against a delinquent subscriber, for the collection of his subscription, that the expenditures were made under the direction of a corporation, organ- ■ ized by the associates in conformity with the original plan,.of which he did not choose to become a member.</p> <p>Assumpsit, to recover the amount of the defendant’s subscription to a fund for the purpose of purchasing land, and erecting thereon shoe-factory buildings in Peterborough. The facts, which were found by a referee, are stated in the opinion of- the court.</p>

Assumpsit, to recover the amount of a note for $2,500, signed by the defendants, Joshua F. Whittle and Harry F. Whittle, dated March 6,1877 ,• and also three sums paid by the plaintiffs at different times for premiums on a policy for $5,000 in the Home Life Insurance Company on the life of J. F. Whittle, amounting to $276.90.

<p>In the absence of ancillary administration or statutory prohibition, the domiciliary administrator appointed in another state has authority to sell and assign stock of the decedent in a corporation in this state, and the corporation may voluntarily consent to its transfer by accepting the outstanding certificate and issuing a new one to the purchaser.</p> <p>Gen. Laws, c. 201, s. 16, does not take away or abridge this authority, but enables foreign executors and administrators to compel unwilling bailees and corporations, holding property of the deceased in this state, to recognize their title without the expense and inconvenience of administration here.</p>

Bill in Equity, asking direction as to the power and duty of the plaintiffs to repair a tomb in the Valley cemetery, under the will of Mary G. Gale.

<p>Under Gon. Laws, c. 161, s 3, a railroad may be required to build a bridge over a highway established by law, though not constructed.</p>

Writ of Entry, dated December 3, 1883, for lot No. 2 on D. and L.’s plan of lots in Nashua. I), and L. owned and were in possession of the lot in 1853, and the plaintiff has their title. Daggett & Cross were in possession of the lot from July 6, 1863, to July 8, 1869, when they conveyed the adjoining lot, No. 1, to James Whitney, who entered upon and held possession of lot No. 2 until his death in 1881.

Libel fob. Divorce. . The petition alleges the marriage of the parties in New Hampshire in 1870, and their residence together in New Hampshire until August, 1883, since which time the plaintiff has resided and now resides in Massachusetts. The defendant has continued to reside in this state. The libel was filed in February, 1885, and charges adultery committed in this state as the cause of divorce.

Case, against persons alleged to be the trustees of the Manchester & Keene Railroad, for an injury received by the plaintiff,' March 19, 1881, while riding as a passenger “ on the cars procured and run upon said railroad under the control and direction of said defendants as trustees as aforesaid.” The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the railroad corporation should be defendants instead of the trustees.

Trespass, for entering and removing “ a certain watch-house, or tramp-house, erected and owned by the plaintiffs, and standing wholly upon land legally taken and used by the public as a highway.” The defendant owned the land over which the highway in question passed, and both sides of it; and the plaintiff town had no title except that arising from the laying-out of the highway. It was in dispute whether the building was within the limits of the highway.

Covenant, for rent of premises in Keene upon a lease made by the plaintiff to one Cummings, March 14, 1878, for the term of five years. Facts found by the court. Cummings assigned the lease to one John W. Starkey, August 8,1874, by a writing in which Starkey covenanted with him to pay the rent. The plaintiff did not release Cummings, nor accept Starkey paymaster for the rent.

Bill in Equity, praying that the right of the plaintiff to take water from a cistern in the defendant’s house be defined, and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the exercise of that right. Facts found by a referee. Anson Cole formerly owned the premises of both the plaintiff and the defendant, which lie adjacent.

Case. Facts found by a referee. The plaintiff is a farmer, and at the time of the occurrences stated below was securing his annual hay crop. Harvey Page, his servant, by his direction, was driving his horses, attached to his mowing-machine, from his field to his house.

Debt, upon Gen. Laws, a. 144, s. 10, to recover twice the value of two sheep and two lambs of the plaintiff, alleged to have been found by the defendant and taken into his possession, whereof he neglected to give notice to the town-clerk of Roxbury, as required by law. Facts found by a referee, upon an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace.

Assumpsit, to recover the excess over ten dollars paid by the plaintiff out of his pension money to the defendant for his services as an attorney in procuring a pension. Facts found by the court. Upon the question whether the payment was exacted by the defendant, or was a voluntary gift, there was no preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendant.

Bill in Equity, for the cancellation of a deed of a farm from N. A. D., now deceased, widow of G. A. D., deceased. A part of tbe plaintiffs, heirs-at-law of N. A. D., claimed that the deed was obtained by fraud.

<p>Case, for deceit in the sale of a straw-board mill, comprising real estate, water rights, machinery, and stock.</p>

On the report of a referee, the only question was as to the sufficiency of demands made by the defendant upon the plaintiff for a deed of certain land and for a certain promissory note.

Assumpsit on an account annexed. Trial by the court. The dispute was, whether the plaintiff agreed to take the note of one Nichols in payment, provided Nichols said he would pay the note to him, or whether he took it as collateral security for the debt. The plaintiff excepted to the admission of a letter from Nichols to him, saying he would pay the note, and also moved to set aside the verdict, as against evidence.

<p>Assumpsit for labor.</p>

Assumpsit, for drawing logs, and to secure a lien under Gen. Laws, c. 139, s. 13. The defendant was defaulted, and the issue was between the plaintiffs and Gardner & a., claimants. Facts found by a referee.

Assumpsit, for money paid by a surety of tbe defendant. Judgment was ordered for tbe plaintiff, and a bill of exceptions was allowed.

<p>Probate Appeal.</p>

<p>■Case, for crim. con. Facts found by tbe court.</p>

<p>“Belknap ss. Supreme Court. June Law Term, 1885.</p> <p>“Atty. Gen. v. Johnson.</p>

Case, for injuries received in crossing the defendants’ track with a horse and wagon at a grade crossing of the highway, which was partially obstructed by the van car of a lumber train. It is the same case reported 58 N. H. 611, the questions being reserved upon the trial of that action in review.

<p>Legislative power cannot be suspended by a general statute requiring notice of petitions before the session at which they are to be presented.</p>