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63 Pa. 152

Bigley v. Risher & Wilson

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided November 11, 1869

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1869-11-11

37, to October and November Term 1869. This was an action of assumpsit brought to July Term 1868 by Ithamar D. Risher and Joseph Wilson, partners as Risher & Wilson, against Nicholas J. Bigley. The plaintiffs declared in all the common counts. Their claim was for a boat and cargo of coal. The boat was lying at the plaintiffs’ works on the Monongahela river; and remained in the possession of the plaintiffs.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-11-11

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently June 1958

6 state decisions

201869187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered, November 11th 1869, by

Read, J. —

¶2The leading case, in Pennsylvania, as to what constitutes a complete sale of a chattel, as between the parties, is Scott v. Wells, 6 W. & S. 357, in which the law is clearly laid down, in the charge of Judge Jones to the jury, and in the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson. “I grant,” says Chief Justice Gibson, “that a sale may be fatally defective in its members; and that by the civil, as well as the common law, the specification of a price is necessary to constitute it.”

¶3In the case before us, there was no actual delivery to and possession of, the coal-boat taken by the defendant, and no specification of the price is to be found anywhere in the evidence. “We did not prove the price,” say the plaintiffs’ counsel, and the boat lying in the plaintiffs’ harbor, and in his custody, from which it had not been removed, was swept away and lost before this essential member, the price, was fixed or specified.

¶4It is clear from the judge’s charge, and his refusal of the defendant’s first point, that he considered there was a sale concluded, and that the only question was, was there a delivery ? “ It would seem to be conceded — but this is for you — there was a sale.” This was not conceded by the defendant, but denied, and yet the charge proceeds upon this hypothesis. There was a fatal defect in this so called sale, there was no price, and so the court should have informed the jury. They should have said if there is no price specified and proved, there is no sale.

¶5“ Sale,” said Mr. Justice Wayne in Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 544, “ is a word of precise legal import in law and in equity. It means at all times, a contract between parties to pass rights of property for money which the buyer pays or promises to pay to the seller, for the thing bought and sold.” Huthmacher v. Harris’ Administrator, 2 Wright 498; 1 Harris 148; Hilliard’s Law of Sales of Personal Property, p. 1230.

¶6The evidence does not show any such concluded bargain or contract between the parties, as passed the title to the boat and coal in controversy to the defendant.

¶7Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.

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