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647 F.2d 1080

Docket No. 80-1355.

Schoenhals v. Cockrum

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted March 20, 1981.

Decided May 8, 1981.

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1981-05-08

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[a]n employer who asserts he is exempt from the Act 'has the burden of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.'”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Linn v. Developmental Services of Tulsa, Inc., Donovan v. Williams Chemical Co.

“[a]n employer who asserts he is exempt from the Act “has the burden of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.” The Act constitutes humanitarian and remedial legislation. Exemptions must be narrowly construed and are limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within the terms and the spirt of the exemption invoked.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294 - Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., Welding v. Bios Corp.

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 29 U.S.C. § 213 · 29 U.S.C. § 216

Relies on Phillips v. Walling US · Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody · Legg v. Rock Products Manufacturing Corp.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-05-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently September 2019

8 federal appellate · 3 district ·

601981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1W. David Pardue, Jr., Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiffs-appellants.

¶2James E. Pence, Norman, Okl., for defendant-appellee.

¶3Before McWILLIAMS, McKAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

¶4SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

¶5This action was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201et seq. (the Act), by employees and former employees of defendant Don Cockrum, doing business as Sooner Inventory Service. Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and costs under section 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).1

¶6*1081Cockrum is in the business of providing an inventory service for wholesale and retail businesses in Oklahoma, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Texas, and New Mexico. The district court granted Cockrum’s motion to dismiss, finding that his business is exempt under section 13(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), as a retail or service establishment having gross receipts of less than $250,000 a year for the pertinent years. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that Cockrum failed to sustain his burden of proving that his business falls within the exemption for retail or service establishments. We agree.

¶7An employer who asserts he is exempt from the Act “has the burden of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.” Legg v. Rock Products Manufacturing Corp., 309 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir. 1962). The Act constitutes humanitarian and remedial legislation. Exemptions must be narrowly construed and are limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within the terms and the spirit of the exemption invoked. See Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 808, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945); Shultz v. Adair’s Cafeterias, Inc., 420 F.2d 390, 393 (10th Cir. 1969).

¶8The exemption at issue here covers a retail or service establishment if more than 50 percent of its annual dollar volume is made within the state in which the establishment is located, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2), and its gross annual volume is less than $250,000. Id.§ 203(s). “Retail or service establishment” is specifically defined in the Act as “an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sale of goods or services (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in-the particular industry.” Id.§ 213(a)(2). Conceding that his business must provide retail services to come within the meaning of the exemption, see Hodgson v. Duke University, 460 F.2d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 1972); Shultz v. Adair’s, 420 F.2d at 395, Cockrum argues that his business is within the exemption because none of his services are for resale.

¶9The initial inquiry in determining if this exemption applies to an establishment is whether the industry itself is one which Congress contemplated as falling within the “retail concept” of the Act. Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 1446, 43 L.Ed.2d 762 (1975); Homemakers Home Health Care Services v. Carden, 538 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1976). This question is a legal issue of statutory construction. Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d at 475; Hodgson, 460 F.2d at 174.

¶10The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act provide substantial guidance on the issue of what constitutes a retail service establishment. They describe it as selling “services to the general public.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.318(a). Such an establishment “provides the general public its repair services and other services for the comfort and convenience of such public in the course of its daily living.” Id.An establishment does not fall within the retail concept of the Act “if it is not ordinarily available to the general consuming public.” 29 C.F.R. § 779.-319.

¶11Cockrum’s business of providing an inventory service to other commercial wholesale and retail businesses is by its very nature one which the consuming public would never use in the course of its daily living. Businesses that serve only other commercial establishments are generally not within the “retail concept” of the exemption. See Homemakers, 538 F.2d at 104; Brennan v. Keyser, 507 F.2d at 476. Although there are no cases directly on point, we believe Cockrum’s inventory ser*1082vice is akin to accounting firms, credit rating agencies, title and abstract companies, and firms that provide telephone answering services, watchmen, or detectives for other industries. All of these establishments have been listed by the Secretary of Labor as lacking the retail concept required by the exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.317.

¶12We hold that Cockrum’s business does not fall within the retail concept of the Act and that it is not plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption. The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

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