Volume 65 — Washington Reports

, entered August 1, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, for five thousand dollars, in an action for libel.

, entered January 28, 1911, in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

<p>Principal and Agent — Authority of Agent — Notice. An agreement by persons holding an option on lands to install a water system is not binding upon the owners of the land, as an agreement by agents, where the purchaser, before closing the deal, had notice that it was not authorized and would not be performed by the owners.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Option—Assignment op Equities — Effect. Where persons holding an option on land were compelled to default and assigned their equities to the owner, after making a contract of sale of certain lots with their personal agreement to install a water system, the acceptance of the assignment does not bind the owner to install the water system, the owner having refused to agree thereto when the sale was made by the holders of the option.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Contract — Breach — Damages — Evidence — Sufficiency. Damages to the purchaser of lots by reason of failure to install a water system within ninety days is not shown by evidence of values with and without water during the period before installation, where there was no evidence that the property could have been sold at an advance prior to the time when the water was installed.</p> <p>Same — Performance op Contract — Conveyance by. Successor. A contract by a vendor, “its successors or assigns” to convey land by a good and sufficient, deed of “special” warranty, is sufficiently performed by a conveyance from one to whom the land had been conveyed.</p> <p>Same — Contracts—Forfeiture—Payment of Price — Excuse for Delay — Title—Relief in Equity. A court of equity will grant to the vendees, whose contract was forfeited by reason of default in a payment, “a period of grace,” within which to make the payment, where it appears that the holder of the title when the sale was made was a trustee under an unrecorded and undisclosed trust, various transfers of interests and equities had been made without disclosing the real cestui que trust, and the vendees entertained a real fear that they could not safely rely on a certain deed of the trustee as terminating the trust.</p>

, entered November 10, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in falling from an unguarded platform.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior coiirt for" King county, Gay,'J., entered {January £8, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for breach of warranty.''</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court-for King county, Frater, J., entered October 20, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff,' after a' trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for equitable relief.

<p>Tenancy in Common- — Ouster—Disseizin—-Adverse Possession— Waters and Water Courses — Termination. Where one tenant in common of the right to use certain springs conveyed the whole title by warranty deed to a stranger, who immediately took exclusive, open, and notorious possession, and maintained the same for the statutory period without any adverse use of the springs being made or claimed by the other cotenants, the right of the cotenants to use the springs is terminated by disseizin, ouster, abandonment, nonuser, and adverse possession.</p> <p>Waters and Water Courses — Actions—Evidence. In an action to establish the right to use springs, claimed by defendant through adverse possession, plaintiff’s evidence of an intention not to abandon the springs is inadmissible where he did not succeed to his title until after defendant’s title had ripened.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Jefferson county, Still, J., entered March 13, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for trespass.</p>

, entered October 3, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a bridge carpenter through the falling of a plank.

<p>Appeal from a'judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Mitchell, J., entered November 22, 1910, upon sustaining orders of the railroad commission establishing a schedule of passenger rates upon appellant’s railway lines, after a hearing before the court.</p>

, entered March IT, 1910, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, in an action to recover real property, and for damages.

, entered October 31, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered September 3, 1910, dismissing consolidated actions to set aside conveyances in fraud of creditors, upon granting a nonsuit, after a trial before the court without a jury.

<p>Eminent Domain — Property Subject — Previous Public Use— Title in Trustee. One boom company cannot condemn tbe lands previously' devoted to a public use and necessary to another boom company, to be used for the same purposes, in the same locality, and in. the same manner as they are already being used in .competition with the relator; and it is immaterial that the record title to the land is in a trustee for the company, where such company is in the actual possession of the property and devoting it to the public use.</p>

<p>Master and Servant — Relation—Independent Contractor — Evidence — Question por Jury. Whether a mine was operated by one as an independent contractor, or as a servant of the owner of the mine, is for the jury and it is error to dismiss the suit, where it appears that, at the time he was engaged by defendant to take charge of the mine, under a contract to pay him $10 per foot, he was insolvent, that he purchased powder and supplies on the credit of the defendant and hired the men, that defendant paid the men and for supplies by bank drafts forwarded to the payees by its secretary, and also furnished all the tools and machinery, except steel, engaged to pay all the bills without limiting its liability, and agreed to reimburse the manager, if he went behind on his contract, to the extent of a miner’s or foreman’s wages.</p>

<p>Corporations — -Stockholders-—Advances to CoRPbRATioN — Liability- — Accounting. Where one of two incorporators of a company bad agreed to advance money to tbe corporation, but sold bis balf of tbe stock and interest in tbe assets and subsequently advanced money to tbe corporation in good faitb, in an action by bim for an accounting, be is entitled to recover from tbe corporation tbe amount of tbe advance; and it is error to allow bim but one-balf of tbe sum as a charge against bis coowner and bolder of the other balf of tbe stock.</p> <p>Corporations — Receivers—Wrongful Appointment — Costs—Liability of Plaintiff. Where a temporary receiver of a corporation has been procured upon tbe false allegations that tbe corporation was insolvent and that plaintiff was a stockholder and bad been wrongfully excluded from participation in corporate business, upon decreeing an accounting, the costs of the temporary receivership should be charged to the plaintiff, and not against the corporation.</p> <p>Corporations — Stockholders—Action eor Accounting — Assets— Bona Fide Purchasers. Where an incorporator sold his half interest in the assets and stock of the corporation, except and reserving his half interest in his coincorporator’s indebtedness to the corporation, in an action by him for an accounting he is entitled to a personal claim against his coincorporator; but he cannot complain that a bank is given a first lien upon assets of the corporation which i,t had subsequently acquired in good faith as security for a loan, there being no evidence to sustain a charge of fraud.</p>

, entered December 15, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action to recover purchase money paid on a land contract, after a trial on the merits- before the court without a jury.

Application filed in the supreme court June 17, 1911, for a writ of mandamus to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant authorized by the workmen’s compensation act.

<p>Public Lands ■ — ■ Tide Lands — Patent — Boundaries — Meander Line — Preference Risht to Purchase — Abutting Tide Lands. A patent from tbe government prior to tbe adoption of tbe state constitution passed title to tide lands included witbin tbe government meander line, where tbe line was run below bigb water mark, in view of tbe constitutional disclaimer of title to tide lands patented by tbe government, Const., art. 17, § 2; and bence tbe owner of sucb lands is entitled, regardless of tbe location of bigb water mark, to tbe preference right to purchase tide lands abutting thereon, conferred by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6750 upon tbe owner of lands abutting or fronting upon tide or shore lands of tbe first class, to tbe exclusion of one owning tbe uplands above or abutting on bigb water mark.</p>

, entered September 14, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a rigging slinger in a logging camp.

<p>Master and Servant — Negligence—Defective Appliances — Evidence — Question for Jury. The negligence of a logging company-in overloading a boat, so that it was overturned and two men drowned, is for the jury, where it appears that the boat was leaky, that it was put out into a swift stream with nine men in it, and not equipped with paddles or oars, so that it became unmanageable in the swift current.</p> <p>Same — Assumption of Risks — Obvious Dangers. In such a case, the boatman, an Indian, .in charge of the boat, assumes the risks, where it appears that he was skilled in the navigation of the river and knew the capacity of the boat better than any one else, and that it was leaky, and that he made no request for paddles or any complaint or protest.</p> <p>Same — Assumption „of Risks — Contributory Negligence — Obedience to Orders — Obvious Dangers — Evidence—Sufficiency. In such a case, a direction by the foreman to another man to get into the boat so that they could go on, does not amount to an order to tbe boatman that would relieve bim of tbe assumption of risks or tbe charge of contributory negligence, where it was not intended as an order and no order was necessary, and where tbe dangers were so obvious and imminent that a reasonably prudent man would not have undertaken tbe service.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for What-com county, Hardin, J., entered November 2, 1910, upon a trial and conviction of the crime of receiving deposits in a bank with knowledge of its insolvency.</p>

<p>Appeal — Decisions Reviewable — Final Orders — Vacating Judgment. An order vacating an order requiring a guardian to file a new account is not appealable, since it is not a final order.</p> <p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered January 11, 1911, vacating an order discharging a guardian. Dismissed:</p>

<p>Motions to dismiss appeals from the superior court for King county, Neal, J., entered May 4, 1911.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Easterday, J., entered August 24, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for equitable relief.</p>

, entered November 28, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to reform a written agreement for a broker’s commission.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered March 28, 1910, denying the vacation of a judgment enforcing a suspended sentence entered upon a plea of guilty, in a prosecution for attempting to commit burglary.</p>

, entered October 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian struck by a street car.

', entered May 4, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, dismissing consolidated actions on promissory notes.

Application filed in the supreme court September 21, 1911, for an order directing the allowance of suit money, attorney’s fees, and alimony, pending an appeal from orders of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered June 29, 1911, in an action for divorce.

, entered September 10, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>Corporations — Officers and Agents- — Contract of Employment —Discharge—Authority of Corporation — Statutes—Construction. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 3683, authorizing the trustees of a corporation to appoint such officers, agents and servants as the business of the corporation shall require, fix their compensation, and remove them at will, an attorney and general manager employed at a fixed salary for the term of three years may be removed by the trustees at any time, without rendering the corporation liable to him for compensation for the remainder of the unexpired term.</p>

<p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error. The exclusion of evidence is harmless, where it was admitted later, or where its subsequent admission was error favorable to the appellant.</p> <p>Jury — Quacipication op Juror — New Trial — Prejudice. It is not ground for a new trial in a criminal case that a challenge to a juror was sustained, on evidence as to his citizenship which left the matter in doubt, where no prejudice was shown and a fair and impartial jury was secured.</p> <p>Indictment and Inpormation — Amendment—Waiver op Objection — Appeal—Harmless Error. It is not prejudicial error that, after a trial for murder in the first degree, the information was amended to charge murder in the second degree without leave of court or entering a nolle prosequi of the first information, where the accused pleaded not guilty to the amended information without demurring, and first objected on the introduction of the evidence.</p> <p>Homicide — Trial—Instructions. On a trial for murder in the second degree, where the accused had shot and killed the deceased, claiming to act in self-defense, he was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter, or not at all, and it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury as to the lesser offenses of assaults in various degrees.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the'superior court for Whitman county, Canfield, J., entered July 2, 1910, upon a trial and conviction of the crime of larceny by embezzlement.</p>

, entered May 20, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, dissolving a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from removing the body of their father to another state for the purpose of burial.

, entered January 9, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained by falling upon a defective sidewalk.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurston county, Mitchell, J., entered January 19, 1911, upon sustaining a demurrer to the information, dismissing a prosecution for grand larceny.</p>

, entered December SI, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for rent.

, entered May 2, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a mortgage.

, entered October 24, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to enjoin the opening of a roadway for public use.

<p>Exemptions — Life Insurance — Statutes—Implied Repeal. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6158, declaring that the beneficiary shall be entitled to life insurance as against creditors, except that the amount of premiums paid in fraud of creditors shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy, does not impliedly repeal Id., § 569, providing that all life and accident insurance shall be exempt from all liability for debt, although the title of the later act is broad enough to cover the whole subject of insurance; since repeals by implication are not favored,' and exemption laws are favored, and the two acts are not inconsistent.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances' — Payment of Life Insurance Premiums — Proceeds of Policy — Statutes. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6158, providing that the amount of premiums paid in fraud of creditors shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy, has no application to insurance the premiums on which were not paid by the deceased.</p> <p>Exemptions — Life Insurance — Proceeds. The exemption of life insurance from the debts of the deceased, by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 569, is not affected by the insolvency of the deceased.</p>

, entered January 28, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill.

, entered April 7, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000, for personal injuries sustained by a stevedore engaged in loading a vessel.

, entered November 5, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for a writ of mandamus.

, entered November 19, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a hearing before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

, entered June 10, 1911, in favor of the plaintiff, upon sustaining a demurrer to the answer, in an action to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered December 22, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury awarding damages in condemnation proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal — -Record—Statement of Facts — Proposing and Certifying. Where, in making up a proposed statement of facts, the trial judge ordered appellant’s statement of his evidence in narrative form stricken out and the full stenographer’s report thereof added, the appellant is not entitled to have the statement certified by adding the stenographer’s report without striking out the objectionable part as ordered.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Card, J., entered April 3, 1911, denying the vacation of a default judgment, after a hearing before the court.</p>

, entered February 6, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the agreed statement of facts, in an action for a writ of mandamus.

, entered December 16, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian run down by an automobile.

, entered March 28, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $7,500, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in falling from a street car.

, entered December 24, 1910, in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

<p>Criminal Law — Evidence — Accomplices — Abortion. A conviction of abortion may be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices who testified directly to the defendant’s connection with the crime.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Evidence — Accomplices — Credibility. Accomplices in the crime of abortion are not unworthy of belief, as a matter of law, from the fact that they made inconsistent statements as to their knowledge of the miscarriage, prompted by fear of prosecution.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Review. A conviction of abortion need not be disturbed on appeal when supported by evidence of accomplices whose credibility was for the jury.</p> <p>Witnesses — Competency — Privile6ed Communications ■— Physicians — Statutes. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1214, providing that a regular physician shall not, without consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient, does not prevent the cross-examination of a physician charged with abortion requiring him to state the nature of a certain operation performed by him upon a woman, where the identity of the patient was not disclosed.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Misconduct oe Prosecuting Attorney. Upon a prosecution for abortion, it is not misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney, warranting a reversal, to ask the defendant on cross-examination whether a certain other operation for pelvic abscess performed by him was performed upon a pregnant woman, where the answer was excluded on objection, and no claim of prejudice was made at the time (Mount, J., dissenting).</p> <p>Appeal — Statement of Pacts — New Trial. The denial of a new trial will not be reviewed on appeal where the affidavits on which the motion was made are not brought up by bill of exceptions or statement of facts.</p> <p>Criminal Law- — -Evidence—Accomplices—Question for Jury — Instructions. Where the evidence does not conclusively establish that witnesses were accomplices, the question is properly left to the jury; and precautionary instructions as to the credibility of accomplices are not erroneous from the fact that the word “accessory” was used instead of “accomplice;” and further general instructions as to the credibility of the witnesses need not again refer to the accomplices.</p> <p>Same — Accomplices—Instructions. Where corroboration of accomplices is not required, it is not necessary to instruct the jury defining corroborating testimony of accomplices.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered November 22, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill.</p>

, entered November 9, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a sawyer in a sawmill.

, entered March 21, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for damages for ejecting a passenger from a railway train.

Application filed in the supreme court October 2, 1911, for a writ of prohibition directed to the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., prohibiting further proceedings in a cause.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chehalis county, Sheeks, J., entered April 13, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered March 18, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action upon a check.

, entered April 28, 1911, granting a new trial, after the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for wrongful death.

, entered April IT, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered December 28, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to vacate a deed.

, entered February 25, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered March 18, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of grand larceny.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Teme por Trial- — Habitual Criminals — Statutes. The act of 1903, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2178, requiring one accused of being an habitual criminal to be tried within five days after conviction of an offense, if not superseded by the act of 1909, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2286, covering the same subject and making no such provision, is an independent act; and one charged as an habitual criminal under § 2286 need not be tried in five days.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Time por Trial — Dismissal—Waiver op" Objection. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2312, providing that, if the accused is not brought to trial within sixty days after information filed, the court shall order it dismissed unless good cause shown, the objection is waived where motion to dismiss is not made until the trial is at hand; since such dismissal is not a bar under Id., § 2315, and would be denied for good cause shown.</p>

, entered March 14, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered October 21, 1910, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action for damages.</p>

, entered June 27, 1911, in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial before the court without a jury, in an action for breach of covenant.

Card, J., entered March 28, 1911, upon overruling demurrers to the answer, dismissing an action to recover over from a contractor the amount paid on a judgment for wrongful death.

, entered June 10, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, dismissing an action for damages.

, entered January 19, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee through the falling of a gin-pole.

, entered June 9, 1911, granting a writ of mandate to compel a county auditor to issue warrants in payment of a state examination and auditing of the public accounts of a city.

, entered February 23, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court, in an action for divorce.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for Pierce county, Easterday, J., entered April 8, 1911, denying the modification of a decree of divorce, after a hearing before the court.</p>

<p>Appeal — Time por Taking — Entry of Judgment-t-Clerk’s Journal Entry. Where the clerk entéred in the journal a judgment of dismissal on March 14, 1910, pursuant to Rem. & Bal. Code, § 77, and a motion for a new trial was denied March 19, the time for taking an appeal commenced to run from the latter date, and is not enlarged by the fact that a formal judgment was signed on November 9, and filed March 14, 1911.</p>

, entered February 18, 1911, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court, in an- action for injunctive relief.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Irwin, J., entered December 23, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on a promissory note.</p>

<p>Forgery —• Uttering — Presumption and Burden oe Proof — Instructions. The presumption from tbe uttering of a forged deed is one of fact for tbe jury and not of law, and it is error to instruct that the fact of uttering is presumptive proof of the defendant’s guilty knowledge of forgery; since the weight of the circumstances of uttering was for the jury, and it did not shift the burden of proof.</p> <p>Forgery — Evidence — Admissibility. Upon a prosecution for uttering a forged deed, with guilty knowledge of the forgery, it is admissible to introduce in evidence a purported corporate seal of a fictitious abstract company, which might have been used in fabricating titles in that county, which was found in an office occupied by the defendant two months previously (Parker, J., dissenting).</p> <p>Fobgeby — Evidence—Stjjteiciency. A conviction for uttering a forged deed is sufficiently sustained by proof of the forgery, where the grantor and his daughter testified that he was in another state at the time the deed purports to have been executed in this state, and that he did not sign it, although the state did not call the notary who certified to the acknowledgment, where the notary was jointly informed against with the defendant.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Easterday, J., entered July 12, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs upon one cause of action, and dismissing another cause of action, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for breach of covenant.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered May 13, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages.</p>

<p>Contracts — Mutuality — Rescission — Corporations — Sale op Stock. A memorandum agreement whereby one posted money in a bank, directing the payment for corporate stock if delivered within thirty days, may be rescinded at any time before delivery, where it is lacking in mutuality in that the other party was not bound to sell or deliver the stock.</p> <p>Escrows — Depository—Liability. A bank in which a deposit was made on a continuing offer lacking mutuality is not liable to the other party on revocation of the offer.</p>

, entered November 22,1910, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for specific performance.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered April 6, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages.</p>

, entered October 28, 1911, denying a writ of mandate to compel the calling of a special elec- tion under the provisions of the local option law..

<p>■ Corporations — Insolvency—Stock Subscriptions — Payment in Overvalued Property — Enforcement—Action by Receiver — -Fraud— Complaint — Sufficiency.- A complaint by a receiver of an insolvent corporation having liabilities of about $4,000, against a stockholder to recover $240,000 due on his subscription, by reason of the fact that he had attempted to pay for the same in property taken at an overvaluation, does not state a cause of action, where it merely alleges that the court directed the receiver to proceed against him as one of the stockholders, without any notice having been given to stockholders or any determination of the amount necessary to be paid by each stockholder, the court having no power to single out a single stockholder; and where it fails to allege that the creditors of the corporation had no knowledge that the stock was paid for in property of less value than the face value of stock and were misled in that connection.</p>

<p>Animals — Dogs—Viciousness — Evidence — Sufficiency — Joint Ownership — Knowledge — Husband and Wife — Notice to Wife. There is sufficient evidence of the vicious propensities of a dog and notice thereof to sustain a verdict against a husband and wife, as a community, for personal injuries inflicted upon a child, where it appears that it bit the child, that it had previously bitten two other children, and was cross when teased, and the wife had been warned as to its vicious propensities and told of its biting another child; notice to one joint owner being notice to all the owners (Gose, J., dissenting in part).</p>

, entered September 19, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a sawmill.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered September 23, 1911, upon sustaining a demurrer to an information for murder in the first degree.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Carey, J., entered December 22, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for damages.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered May 81, 1911, upon granting a nonsuit, in an action for personal injuries.</p>

, entered March 28, 1911, upon granting a nonsuit, after a trial before the court and a jury, in an action for wrongful death.

, entered May 16, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for malicious prosecution.

<p>Venue — Change'—Peejudice of Judge — Time foe Motion. A motion for a change of venne upon an affidavit of prejudice of the judge, under Laws 1911, p. 617, is timely, where the accused was not represented by counsel at the time of arraignment and plea when the cause was set for trial, and counsel made the motion at the time of their first appearance, shortly after learning that the trial had been set.</p> <p>Peohibition- — When Lies — Adequacy of Remedy by Appeal. Prohibition lies to prevent a judge from trying a cause after erroneously denying a motion for a change of venue on account of prejudice, where the relator is in jail on a charge of felony and unable to furnish bail; as the remedy by appeal is not speedy or adequate.</p>

<p>Chattel Mortgages — Foreclosure ■— Parties^-Deeenses — Paramount Title. In an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, brought against the mortgagor and a third person as claiming some interest in the property, the court has jurisdiction to determine a paramount title pleaded by the third person as superior to that of the mortgagor at the date of the execution of the mortgage; since possession follows the sale and the rule as to real estate mortgages does not apply.</p>

, entered March 11, 1911, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court, in an action to enjoin the sale of property under execution.

, entered March 14, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of unlawful detainer.

, entered February 14, 1911, reinstating a member of a police force, upon review of the proceedings of the civil service commission sustaining such removal.

, entered March W, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to recover possession of property held under a writ of attachment.

<p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Accomplices—Burglary. A conviction for burglary may be sustained upon tbe testimony of an accomplice uncorroborated by other evidence tending to implicate the defendant with the commission of the offense.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Accomplice. A witness is not an accomplice in a burglary where he had not participated in the crime and was asleep in bed when the guilty parties arrived in the room with the goods, although- he was then informed that the goods were stolen.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Review—Verdict. A verdict of guilty will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground that an alibi was established, where the evidence is conflicting and the verdict is sustained by substantial evidence.</p>

<p>Indictment and Information- — Amendment—Leave to File — Presumption. Upon granting a new trial because of a variance between tbe allegations and proofs, a new information may be filed to cure tbe defects, and leave of court therefor will be presumed where the court considered the information as filed.</p> <p>False Pretenses — Information—Certainty. An information for larceny, which could be readily understood as charging the defendant with unlawfully obtaining a check for $1,000 from B. by means of false and fraudulent representations and that he received the money thereon with intent to deprive and defraud the owner thereof, is sufficiently definite and certain without stating further details, under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2055, requiring it to contain a statement of the facts in ordinary language in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what was intended.</p> <p>False Pretenses- — Information—Description of Check. An information charging the obtaining of a check by false pretenses, sufficiently describes the check and ownership, where it alleges B. delivered to defendant a check for $1,000 and that defendant unlawfully received and obtained the money thereon.</p> <p>Criminal-Law- — Trial-—Plea of Guilty — Time of Trial — Objections — Waiver. Objections to evidence on the ground that a plea of guilty had not been entered or that the case had not been brought to trial within sixty days, are waived when not made at the time of entering upon the trial.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Best and Secondary Evidence. Upon a prosecution for larceny by false representations that a company was operating a line of steamships, which the law required to be registered, it is competent to establish the fact that it had no such steamships by oral evidence, since the records would not disclose it.</p> <p>. Larceny — Issues and Proof — Variance — Bills and Notes— Checks — Certificate of Deposit. A prosecution for larceny of a check is supported by proof of the larceny of an instrument which in its original form was a certificate of deposit, stated on its face as not subject to check, but providing that the money was payable on the order of the depositor, where it was indorsed by him to the defendant, since it thereby became in legal effect a check, under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 3575 defining a check as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand, and Id., § 3516, of similar effect.</p> <p>Appeal — Preservation oj? Grounds — Exceptions. In the absence of exceptions to instructions, they will not be reviewed on appeal.</p>

<p>Forgery — Evidence—Sufficiency—Weight op Notary’s Certifícate. A notary’s certificate showing that a mortgage was executed and acknowledged by the grantors is sufficiently overcome by their direct testimony that they did not execute it to make a question for the jury as to the fact of forgery.</p> <p>Forgery — Uttering — Presumption of Guilty Knowledge — Instructions. In a prosecution for uttering a forged mortgage, an instruction that the fact of forgery is a circumstance from which guilty knowledge is presumed, unless rebutted, invades the province of the jury and is reversible error.</p>

, entered June 9, 1911, in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

, entered May ££, 1911, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in' an action to foreclose a mortgage.

, entered November 9, 1910, in favor of the defendant, upon withdrawing the case from the consideration of the jury, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee engaged in grading a street.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main-, J., entered February 11, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Easterday, J., entered December 30, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for King county, Ronald, J„ entered February 25, 1911, upon findings in favor of tbe plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before tbe court without a jury, in an action on contract.</p>