Volume 66 — Washington Reports

, entered January 27, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action upon a promissory note.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered July SO, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of attempting to escape jail.</p>

, entered May 4, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered January 3, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action of ejectment.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered January 21, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of burglary in the second degree.</p>

<p>Fraud — Evidence—Sufficiency. Actionable fraud on the part of the vendee in the sale of a steamboat is sufficiently established, where there was evidence that the vendee induced the vendors to take in part payment an assignment of a fictitious land contract, guaranteeing that $4,000 of the purchase money had been paid thereon, making representations well calculated to deceive and upon which the vendors relied, inquiry being prevented by the vendee’s artifice.</p> <p>Appeal — Preservation of Grounds — Exceptions. In the absence of exceptions, error cannot be predicated upon the instructions.</p>

, entered June 16, 1911, granting a new trial, after the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the-defendant, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a section hand through the derailment of a car.

, entered February 3, 1911, in favor of the defendants, after a hearing before the court, dismissing an action for equitable relief.

<p>Master and Servant — Injury to Servant — Operation of Saw— Contributory Negligence — Evidence—Sufficiency. The operator of a ripsaw is not guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in attempting to remove a board after a pinch had stopped the saw, without first turning off the power at a switch eight feet away, or without calling some one to his assistance, where it appears that there was great danger in leaving the board in the saw to reach the switch, and where he firmly held the board and it would not be anticipated that the board firmly held would rebound upon the friction being removed in the manner that it did.</p> <p>Master and Servant — Guabding Dangerous Machinery — Question for Jury. Upon a conflict of the evidence, it is for the jury to determine whether a combination ripsaw could be effectively guarded under the factory act.</p> <p>Witnesses — Cross-Examination— Discretion — Appeal — Exceptions. Error cannot be predicated upon allowing cross-examination of a party’s own witness who was clearly hostile, nor where no exception was taken, the same being within the discretion of the trial court.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error — Instructions—Master and Servant — Factory Act — Evidence. It is not prejudicial error to refuse to give an instruction as to the prima facie effect of a certificate of the state labor commissioner on the inspection of machinery to he guarded, under the factory act, to which, the party was entitled, where by other instructions an equal burden was put on the party, the jury being told that the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish one or more of his allegations of negligence, that negligence was never presumed, and must be proven by the fair preponderance of the evidence, and the court read the first section of the factory act and otherwise fully covered the law of the case.</p> <p>Damages — Personal Injuries — Excessive Verdict — Injury to Hand. A verdict for $1,500 for the loss of a little finger, disfigurement and stiffening of the right hand, by the operator of a ripsaw, thirty-two years of age, is not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Dying Declarations — Declaration oe Co-conspirators. Upon a prosecution for tbe murder of a policeman, shot while attempting to arrest tbe accused and bis companion or co-conspirator, wbo was also killed in tbe melee, tbe dyingx declaration of tbe co-conspirator is not admissible in evidence, where tbe declaration was a mere narrative of past events; since it was not made during tbe existence or in furtherance of tbe conspiracy, and was hearsay.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error — Evidence—Curing Error — ■ Other Evidence. Tbe erroneous admission of evidence which might have affected tbe verdict will not be held harmless because tbe conviction was sustained by other evidence, unless it is clearly shown that it was nonprejudicial.</p>

, entered February 24, 1911, upon findings in- favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to establish a trust in real property.

<p>Sodomy — Evidence—Sueeiciency. The evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for sodomy, notwithstanding certain exaggerations in the testimony of the prosecuting witness, where he was corroborated as to the overt act by two other witnesses.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Excessive Sentence. A sentence of not less than nine and not more than ten years for sodomy will not be interfered with as excessive, there appearing no gross abuse of discretion.</p>

, entered March 10, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendant, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

<p>INDEMNITY — LIABILITY DISCHARGE PARTNERS AS PRINCIPALS Deposit as Limitation on Liability. Where a surety company guaranteed tbe construction of a building by a copartnership, taking as indemnity a deposit of $1,000 in money from one of tbe partners, bis liability is not limited to tbe deposit, as all tbe partners are liable as principals; bence use of tbe deposit to discharge claims does not release tbe partner making tbe deposit from further liability.</p> <p>Husband and Wife — Community Property — Title in Trust— Deed of Trustee. The title to land agreed to he conveyed to a builder in part consideration for his work, does not pass to the community consisting of himself and wife, before deed; and being held in trust, the deed of the trustee at request of the husband passes title without any conveyance by the wife.</p> <p>Mortgages — Indemnity Mortgage — Consideration. Where a surety company guaranteeing a building contract had already advanced money or subsequently advanced it, a deed of property given as indemnity is supported by a sufficient consideration, although it was volunteered.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure—Venue—Jurisdiction. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1016, providing that a mortgagee may foreclose in the superior court of the county where the land or some part of it lies, two trust deeds of lands in two counties may be foreclosed by an action in either county.</p> <p>Principal and Surety — Rights of Surety — Exhaustion of Remedy Against Principals. Where the principals gave indemnity to a surety company guaranteeing a building contract, the surety company has the right to exhaust the indemnity and liability of the principals before recourse to the liability of a volunteer surety for the principals.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered January 3, 1911, in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action to quiet title.</p>

, entered April 26, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a logger run over by a logging engine.

, entered July 5, 1911, confirming an assessment roll for a local improvement, after a hearing on the merits before the court.

<p>Municipal Corporations — Improvements—Assessment Districts —Fixing Boundaries — Apportionment of Expense — Review by Courts. The courts will not review the action of eminent domain commissioners in fixing the boundaries of improvement districts or in apportioning all the expenses to the property without charging the general fund of the city, where there is no showing of arbitrary action, fraud, or mistake.</p> <p>Same — Amount of Assessments — Accruing Interest. An assessment for a local improvement may include accumulated interest pending the making of the, assessment roll, where the authorities proceeded with diligence in preparing the roll.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered March 22, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, after a trial before the court without a jury.</p>

, entered December 21, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action to quiet title, after a trial on the merits.

<p>Pleadings — Demurrer—Waiver of Objections. Error in overruling a demurrer to a complaint is waived by answer and trial on tbe merits.</p> <p>Execution — Sale—Vacation—Fraud—Evidence — Sufficiency — Personal Notice. An execution sale will not be set aside two years after the sale on tbe allegations of want of personal notice and fraud, where it appears that tbe judgment debtor bad notice that tbe plaintiff intended to and would issue execution and sell tbe property if tbe judgment was not paid, and tbe altercation which took place shows that there could have been no deception; personal notice of tbe sale not being required by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 582.</p> <p>Execution — Sale—Vacation—Inadequacy of Price. An execution sale of property of tbe value of $1,000, to satisfy a judgment of $195.50, will not be set aside on tbe sole ground of inadequacy of price, tbe sale having been made at public auction on due notice and no fiduciary relation existing or circumstances proven snowing unfairness.</p> <p>Execution — Sale—Purchase by Attorney. Tbe attorney for tbe adversary may bid in property of tbe judgment debtor upon execution sale tbe same as though be were a stranger.</p>

<p>Master and Servant — Negligence—Contributory Negligence— Obedience to Orders — Evidence—Question eor Jury. In an action for personal injuries sustained by a loader of logs through the fall of a log from the load, the negligence of the master and contributory negligence are for the jury, where it appears that plaintiff loaded a car to its capacity, but the foreman ordered another log put on, to which the plaintiff at first objected because it would not stay on, but finally deferred to the foreman’s judgment, putting on another log in the presence of the foreman, which afterwards fell oil and struck the plaintiff while he was setting a brake in the discharge of his duties.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Easterday, J., entered March 21, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a mill.</p>

<p>Public Lands — State Lands — Sale—Contracts—Validitt—Mistake — Deeds—Statutes—Construction. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6680, providing that any sale or lease of state land made by mistake, or not in accordance with law, shall be void and the contract or lease assumed thereon shall be of no effect and the holder of the contract required to surrender the same, applies only to executory contracts, and not to sales that have been fully executed by delivery of the state deed and full payment of the price.</p> <p>Same — State Deed — Vacating—Character or Land — Mistake or Oreicers. In the absence of fraud or connivance of the purchaser, the state cannot maintain an action to set aside its deed of state lands on the ground of mistake of its officers in determining that the character of the lands is agricultural, when in fact it contained more than one million feet of merchantable timber, and under the law could not be sold as agricultural land-.</p>

<p>Bribery — Public Officer — Indictment — Sufficiency. An Indictment for bribing a police officer of the city of Seattle to influence him not to prohibit and prevent the accused from conducting a house of prostitution, is not demurrable as failing to allege that a policeman of a city is a “public officer” within Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2320, under which the indictment was drawn; since the description of the act which he was bribed to do sufficiently shows that he was an officer, and inferentially alleges his authority; and, also, for the reason that the court will take judicial notice of the city charter, from which it appears that a policeman is such a public officer.</p> <p>Bribery — Public Officers — Statutes—Construction — Ejusdem: Generis. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2320, defining bribery as to certain enumerated officers, and providing that it shall be a crime to give a reward “to a person executing any of the functions of a public officer other than those heretofore specified,” is not subject to the rule of ejusdem generis; but covers the bribery of all public officers.</p>

<p>Elections — Offenses — False Registration — Statutes — Construction. A voter is not guilty of false registration in incorrectly stating his place of residence, when he did not register in the wrong precinct, under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 4768, defining false registration as the taking of a false oath, falsely personating another and procuring registration of the person as personated, misrepresenting his name or causing any name to be registered “otherwise than in the manner provided by the act;” in view of the fact that the matter of-residence is not included in the oath nor among the acts specifically enumerated as constituting the criminal offense (Gose, Ellis, and Morris, JJ., dissenting).</p>

<p>Appeal — Bonds—Obligee—Adverse Party — Filing New Bond. An appeal will be dismissed where the judgment was in favor of one of the plaintiffs, and the bond on appeal was given to the other plaintiffs, as obligees, who had no interest in the judgment; and there being in effect no bond to the adverse party, the same cannot be amended by the filing of a new bond under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1734, allowing amendments of defects or informalities in a bond (Fullerton, J., dissenting).</p>

, entered April'll, 1911, in favor of the defendants, dismissing an action for damages, upon withdrawing the same from the consideration of the jury.

, entered May 23, 1911, upon granting a nonsuit in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in a logging camp.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Snohomish county, Black, J., entered June 17, 1911, in favor of the defendant, upon withdrawing from the consideration of the jury an action for personal injuries sustained in a fall upon a stairway.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered May 18, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of assault with intent to commit sodomy.</p>

<p>Homesteads — Exemptions—Execution—Time fob Filing Declaration. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 532, 533, exempting a homestead from execution sale, except for judgments obtained on debts secured by mechanics’ and vendor’s liens and mortgages executed by husband and wife, an execution sale cannot be had upon a judgment entered upon unsecured promissory notes, where prior to the issuance of the execution, a declaration of homestead had been filed, although the judgment was entered prior to the filing of the declaration and became a lien subject to be defeated by such filing (Fullerton, X, dissents).</p>

J., entered February 16, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, after a trial before the court without a jury.

, entered January 27, 1911, denying a motion to vacate a default judgment, after a hearing before the court on affidavits.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for What-com county, Hardin, J., entered January 17, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of assault.</p>

, entered June 2, 1911, upon findings in favor of the interveners, dismissing a proceeding to register the title to land under the Torrens law.

, entered April 15, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action to rescind a contract and recover money paid, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury.

, entered April M, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for. rescission and. cancellation, after a trial before the court without a jury.

, entered March 20, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action to foreclose a mechanics’ lien, after a trial on the merits before the court.

, entered December 21, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to cancel municipal assessments, after a trial on the merits before the court.

, entered April 13, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by an employee in the construction of a building.

, entered April 21, 1911, denying plaintiff’s motion to vacate a judgment, after a hearing on the merits before the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered March 11, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of assault.</p>

, entered October 10, 1911, denying a motion to quash a summons on the ground that the service was not made in the manner prescribed by law.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Chelan county, Grimshaw, J., entered May 18, 1911, upon findings and conclusions in favor of the defendant, dismissing an action for divorce.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Local Option ■ — • Offenses — Gifts in Street — Statutes'—Construction. The giving away of liquor on the streets of a town within a dry unit is a violation of the local option law of 1909, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6300, providing that it shall be unlawful to sell or give away any intoxicating liquor within the limits of the unit, provided the words “give away” shall not prohibit the giving of liquor to guests in a private house; notwithstanding the further provision of Id., § 6303, aimed at gifts by dealers for the obvious purpose of evading the penalties against sales.</p> <p>Statutes — Title and Subject of Acts — Intoxicating Liquors— Local Option. The local option law of 1909, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6292, entitled an act to provide for the submission of the question whether the “sale” of intoxicating liquors shall he licensed or prohibited, and providing for the enforcement of the result of elections and defining offenses thereunder, relates to but one subject sufficiently expressed in its title; and penalties for the “giving away” of liquor within a dry unit, except to guests in private houses, are germane to the subject; the word “sale” in the title not being determinative of the acts to be punished.</p>

, entered March 1, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained through the fall of a swing, after a trial on the merits.

, entered February 14, 1911, in favor of the defendants, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, dismissing an action on contract.

Appeal, by plaintiff from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered December 14, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered' in favor of the plaintiff for a portion of his claim, in an action upon a contract for services.

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Review—Verdict. A conviction for assault with a weapon likely to do bodily harm will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground that the assault was justified, where that depends upon the credibility of witnesses and the evidence was conflicting.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Reception op Evidence — Rebuttal. It is not an abuse of discretion to permit testimony on the part of the state in rebuttal which was cumulative of the state’s evidence in chief, where it went but little beyond direct contradiction of the defendant’s testimony of self-defense.</p> <p>Indictment and Information — Degrees op Oppense — Eirst and Second Degree Assaults — Statutes. A conviction of assault with a weapon likely to produce bodily harm, within Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2414, subd. 4, may be had under an information charging an assault with, a shot gun by shooting with intent to kill, under Id., §2413, subd. 1; as the former is necessarily included within the latter, within the requirements of Id. § 2168.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Instructions. Upon an information for assault with intent to kill, it is not error to refuse to instruct as to assault and battery, where the evidence conclusively shows that defendant was guilty of first or second degree assault or not at all.</p>

<p>Landlord and Tenant — Lease—Saloon Premises — Termination —Adoption oe Local Option. The adoption of local option prohibiting the sale of liquors in a town does not terminate a lease of premises used for á saloon, or relieve the lessee from the payment of rent, where the lease merely provided that the lessee may conduct a saloon on the premises in conformity to the ordinances of the town and the laws of the state then in force or thereafter enacted; since it is merely permissive and not restrictive as to the uses to which the property may be put.</p>

<p>Street Railways — Negligence — Collision with Pedestrian — Contributory Negligence — Question eor Jury. In an action for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian run down from behind by a street car, the negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of tbe plaintiff are for the jury, where it appears that plaintiff in the daytime was lawfully using the street car tracks, there being no sidewalks in the street, that he crossed to the east tracks upon meeting a car on the west tracks, and then looked back where he could see for a distance of nine hundred feet and saw no car approaching, and after going about thirty or forty feet, was struck by a car going at a high rate of speed which gave no alarm in time to enable him to escape; although on the evidence offered by the defendant, the jury might have found that the accident happened in an entirely different way without any fault of the defendant; since plaintiff was not a trespasser and the motorman would not be justified in running him down without warning.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—New Trial — Discretion. The trial court having exercised its discretion to refuse a new trial, the supreme court is not justified in granting a new trial upon conflicting evidence that made a ease for the jury.</p>

, entered May 1, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort, after a trial to the court without a jury.

■Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered May 29, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in a proceeding to determine the application of condemnation awards, after a trial before the court without a jury.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered June 18, 1910, in favor of the defendant, dismissing an action in tort, on granting a non-suit.</p>

, entered January 11, 1911, confirming an assessment roll for the improvement of streets, after a trial before the court without a jury.

<p>Rape — “Intercourse”—Evidence—Sufficiency. Á conviction of statutory rape is sustained by the testimony of the prosecutrix that the defendant had “intercourse” with her, where it appears that she meant sexual intercourse and fully comprehended her statements.</p> <p>Rape — Evidence—Corroboration—Sufficiency. In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence that the defendant had admitted a similar act with the prosecutrix is sufficient corroboration of her testimony, and any doubt as to the meaning of the language used in the admissions raises a question for the jury.</p> <p>Rape — Previous Chaste Character — Reputation—Evidence—Admissibility. In a prosecution for statutory rape under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2436, relating to carnal knowledge of a female of previous chaste character between fifteen and eighteen years of age, evidence is admissible on the part of the defense of the previous general reputation of the prosecutrix as to unchastity, as going to her credibility as a witness, but is not admissible to prove her unchaste condition (Chadwick, X, dissenting).</p> <p>Criminal Law — Trial—Several Offenses — Election—Necessity. In a prosecution for statutory rape upon a female of previous chaste character between fifteen and eighteen years of age, where the evidence tends to show three distinct offenses occurring at different times and places, it is reversible error for the court to deny defendant’s motion, after the testimony is in, to compel the prosecution to make an election as to the offense relied upon for conviction.</p>

, entered January 6, 1911, in favor of the defendants, dismissing an action to set aside a chattel mortgage foreclosure and sale, as a fraud upon creditors of an insolvent corporation, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

, entered April 11, 1911, dismissing an action for the appointment of a receiver of a life estate in lands, for insufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action.

, entered December 12, 1910, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action on contract.

, entered January 26, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action to determine riparian rights, after a trial on the merits.

, entered November 17, 1910, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action upon a claim against an estate, after a trial before the court without a jury.

, entered March 11, 1911, denying an application to modify a decree of divorce as to the custody of a child, after a hearing on the merits before the court without a j ury.

■Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered April 1, 1911, in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for rescission, after a trial on the merits.

, entered February 2, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an action on contract, after a trial on the merits.

Application filed in the supreme court November 14, 1911, for a writ of mandate to compel the state auditor to issue a warrant for school bonds sold to the state.

<p>Municipal Corporations — Improvements—Assessments—Review. An assessment of special benefits, while a subject for judicial inquiry, will not be set aside on appeal as excessive, unless the evidence so preponderates as to' indicate arbitrary action.</p> <p>Same — Property Liable — Special Benefits — Power of Court. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 7790, 7795, 7796, property can only be assessed if specially benefited, and it is not proper to include in an assessment district property that receives merely a general benefit.</p> <p>Same — Assessment Roll — Special Benefits •— Evidence — Presumptions. An assessment roll returned by commissioners is admissible as evidence of the benefits received, and that property outside the district was not specially benefited, and overcomes the prima facie showing made by a reassessment arbitrarily ordered by the court.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Sufficiency. The unanimous opinion of commissioners that property should be excluded from an assessment district because not specially benefited, is conclusive on the courts, where it appears that the improvement was to gain easier grades and divert travel from the property in question, which was on higher ground and beyond the influence of the special benefits contemplated.</p> <p>Same — Apportionment of Public and Private Benefits — Powers of Council and Commissioners — Appeal—Review. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 7786, 7787, authorizing the city council to determine whether an improvement shall be made wholly or partly at the expense of abutting property, and § 7790, authorizing commissioners to apportion benefits between the city and abutting owners by a comparison of the public and private benefits to be derived from the improvement, it is within the power of the council to make the apportionment, and for the commissioners to act only when the council fails to do so; and in any event, the benefit to the public must be a special and not a general benefit, and findings of the court or commissioners are conclusive on appeal.</p>

, entered May 2, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for $523.95 damages for the wrongful expulsion of a passenger from a railway car.

<p>Evidence — Parol—To Explain Writing — Admissibility. Parol evidence is admissible to explain the intent and purpose of the parties in making interlineations and material alterations in a written contract prior to its execution, even though it contradicts the written contract.</p> <p>Husband and Wipe- — Separation Agreement — Construction. A separation agreement, whereby the husband agreed to pay the wife $3,000 in monthly installments for the support, maintenance and education of their two children upon condition that the children be kept in school and continue their education during said period, and in the event of their failing to continue their attendance at school, the payments to cease, should be construed to require attendance at school only until their education, as contemplated by the parties at the time, is completed; and where they graduated from college before the end of the period, the wife is entitled to recover the whole sum, without further attendance in school by the children.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Hinkle, J., entered December 10, 1910, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an • action in tort.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Clifford, J., entered April 13, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff by direction of the court, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered November 1, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff in an action for alienation of affections, after a trial on the merits.

, entered December 22, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, after a trial before the court without a jury.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered February 15, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action to foreclose mechanics’ liens.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Snohomish county, Black, J., entered June 28, 1911, after a •trial on the merits, dismissing an action for equitable relief.</p>

<p>Eminent Domain — Evidence—Value of Property — Offers. In eminent domain proceedings, upon an issue as to the value of the property, it is not admissible for the defendant to show offers made for the land.</p> <p>Same. In eminent domain proceedings, evidence of offers for the land is not made admissible on redirect examination by the fact that on cross-examination a witness had volunteered a statement as to offers which was struck out as not responsive to the question.</p>

, entered November 21, 1910, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action upon a promissory note, after a trial before the court without a jury.

<p>Criminal Law — Trial — Presence of Accused — Necessity — Waiver of Right. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2145, providing that no person punishable by death or imprisonment shall be tried unless personally present, does not, in cases not capital, preclude the entry of judgment upon a verdict, received in the absence of the defendant, if the defendant, out on bail, voluntarily absents himself without leave, for he thereby waives his right.</p> <p>Same — Statutes—Construction. Upon the question of the necessity of the defendant’s presence when the .verdict is received, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2196, providing that a defendant punishable by imprisonment must be personally present for the purpose of judgment* and if for fine only, he must be present or some responsible person must undertake for him to secure the payment controls § 2145, providing that no person shall be tried unless personally present.</p> <p>Same — Pbesence of Accused — Necessity — Acquittal. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2196, providing that for the purpose of judgment, if the conviction be for an offense punishable by imprisonment, the defendant must be personally present, and if for a fine only, he must be personally present or some responsible person must, undertake for him to secure the payment, it is .not necessary that a defendant out on bail be present upon receipt of a verdict of acquittal.</p> <p>Mandamus — To Coubts — When Lies. Mandamus lies to compel the trial court to enter judgment upon a verdict of not guilty, after refusal so to do.</p> <p>Bail — Relief fbom Fokfeituee — Acquittal—Effect—Dischabse of Bond. A verdict of not guilty in the superior court, upon appeal from justice court, discharges the appeal bond, and judgment forfeiting the bond, even if entered a few minutes before the verdict was received, is error.</p> <p>Mandamus — To Coubts — When Lies — Adequacy of Remedy by Appeal. Where, notwithstanding a verdict of not guilty, the court, refused to enter judgment for the defendant, but forfeited her bond, and entered judgment against her and her sureties, the remedy by-appeal is not adequate, and mandamus lies to compel vacation of the judgment and entry of proper judgment on the verdict.</p>

<p>Appeal — Review—Grant of New Trial. An order granting a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where there was a substantial conflict in the testimony.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Yakey, J., entered June 18, 1910, upon a trial and conviction of selling liquor to an Indian.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered June 21, 1911, upon withdrawing the case from the consideration of the jury, dismissing an action for injuries sustained by a stoker employed in a gas plant.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Preble, J., entered May 1, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of manslaughter.</p>

, entered February 18, 1911, upon -the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an -action for the death of a laborer through the fall of a re-taining wall.

<p>Corporations — Sale oe Property- — Inadequate Price — Rights oe Minority Stockholders- — Injunction. A prospecting and speculating mining company, organized for the purpose of buying, selling, and trading in real and personal property, will not be enjoined from making a sale of all its property (a lease of coal lands) at an alleged inadequate price, where there was no evidence of fraud, the officers exercised their best judgment, and the sale was ratified by a vote of a majority of the stockholders, and the value of the land Was purely speculative; especially where the company was embarrassed financially and unable to prevent forfeiture of the land.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Offenses—Illegal Sales — Local Option —Election—Evidence—Clerk’s Certificate — Admissibility. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6297, providing that the result of a local option election may be proved by the clerk’s record of the official canvass or by the “official certificate” of the clerk, the clerk’s certificate reciting the final result is sufficient and admissible, without a certified copy of the details of the canvass.</p> <p>Same — Illegal Sales — Defenses—Instructions. In a prosecution for selling liquor in dry territory in violation of the local option laws, it is not error to refuse to give instructions as to defendant’s right to sell liquor as a physician, where there was no evidence of such right or any justification for the sale.</p> <p>Same — Illegal Sales — Evidence—Sufficiency. The clerk’s certificate required by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6297, is sufficient prima facie evidence that local option was in force in the precinct.</p> <p>Same — Illegal Sales — Evidence of Sales — Sufficiency. The uncontradicted statement of one witness that a sale of liquor was made in a town in dry territory, is sufficient to support a conviction of selling liquor in violation of the local option law, although the exact place or boundaries of the town were not shown.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered December 24, 1910, in favor of the defendants, in an action on contract, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

, entered April 26, 1911, dismissing an action for specific performance, upon sustaining a' demurrer to the amended complaint.

, entered March 14, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action for rent, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J,, entered March 4, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $4,495.95, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a carpenter engaged in the construction of defendant’s house.</p>

<p>Taxation — Foreclosure—Want oe Process. A tax foreclosure proceeding without the service of any process is without jurisdiction and void.</p> <p>Eminent Domain — Award oe Damages — Parties Entitled — Decree — Deeault oe True Owners. In condemnation proceedings, when all persons interested in or claiming title to the land were duly served, and the true owners defaulted, and a trial of the issues was had between the relator and certain claimants, the relator is not charged with errors in determining who were the parties entitled to the award, and an award to such claimants and a decree adjudging that they are the true owners of the land is not void as to the relator, who acquired title to the land upon payment of the award to the clerk of the court, as provided by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 929.</p> <p>Same — Parties Entitled — Grantee oe Owners Aeter Award. The final decree in condemnation proceedings effects an involuntary sale of the land, and a subsequent deed by the owner conveys nothing; since the title was divested by the payment of the award and the subsequent deed did not operate as an assignment of the award, where it contained no apt words of assignment.</p> <p>Quieting Title — Complaint—Sueeiciency. The complaint in an action seeking equitable relief to set aside certain proceedings is insufficient as a suit to quiet title to the land where it contains no proper description of the land.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, S. H. Steele, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered June 97, 1911, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action to obtain an award in condemnation proceedings.</p>

<p>Improvements — Liability—Breach oe Contract. Upon breach of an oral contract to convey lands to another placed in his possession, the owner of the lands is liable for the value of improvements placed thereon, over and above the value of the rents and profits while occupied.</p>

<p>Contracts — Fob Division of Profits — Construction by Parties. Where plaintiff subscribed for stock in an irrigation company under an agreement that the money paid was to be used to purchase certain land to be developed, the plaintiff to be paid one-half of the net profits derived from the company “only from the development of the one project,” and before development the land was by mutual consent sold at a profit and other land purchased and later also sold at a profit without development, the plaintiff is entitled to his profits only upon the first sale, especially where he at first demanded a share of profits only on that sale and the parties seemed to have construed the contract as confined to that tract of land.</p>

<p>Appeal — Record—Statement of Facts — Affidavits. Upon appeal from an order granting a new trial, affidavits not brought up by statement of facts cannot be considered, and it is not sufficient to have them attached as exhibits without identification by the judge’s certificate.</p> <p>Partnership — Firm Name — Filing Designation. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8372, exempting partnerships in which the firm name contains all the names of the partners from the necessity of filing with the county clerk; the designation of the firm with the true names of all the partners, plaintiffs, doing business under the name of “Hale-Tindall Co.,” which contains the names of all the partners, are exempt from the requirements of the statute.</p> <p>Partnership — Filing Designation — Actions—Capacity to Sue— Waiver. The objection that a partnership, doing business under an assumed name, cannot maintain an action because it had failed to file with the county clerk the designation of the firm with the names of all the partners, as required by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8369, goes only to the capacity to sue, and is waived if not raised by demurrer or answer.</p> <p>Appeal — Recobd—Obdeb. The supreme court will not consider an appeal from an order where the record on appeal does not disclose the order or any action of the court in that regard.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Evidence—Declarations of Codefendant. Upon a separate trial of one charged as an accessory to a 'homicide, confined to acts committed at the time and place of the killing, it is error to admit evidence of threats against the deceased and of declarations in the nature of confessions, made by the principal or codefendant both before and after the homicide at times when the accessory was not present.</p> <p>Homicide — Manslaughter—Definition—Evidence—Question for Jury. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2395, defining manslaughter in broad terms as including all homicides other than those specified in Id., §§ 2392, 2393 and 2394, the court cannot determine the degree and decide, as a matter of law, that the defendant was necessarily guilty of one of the higher degrees, where it appears that defendant was having a dispute with the deceased over a fence, called his attention to the gun carried by defendant’s daughter who evidently heard the remark and who had made threats against the deceased; since defendant’s guilt did not depend entirely on the presence or absence of design on her part, the same being a question for the jury.</p>

<p>Explosives — Negligent Sale — Evidence—Admissibility—Sufficiency. In an action for injuries sustained by one purchasing “Jexite,” a white powder containing no picric acid, alleged to be highly explosive and dangerous, a recovery cannot be sustained on the testimony of a chemist as to experiments made by him with a powder called “Jexite,” which it appears was a yellow powder containing picric acid and entirely different ingredients from the powder sold, and which had been used only in the experimental stage and was not on the market commercially.</p>

<p>Public Lands — School Lands — Federal Grant — Construction— Grant in Praesenti or Futuro. The Federal grant to tbe state of school sections 16 and 36, by 25 Stat. at L. 676, §§ 10 and 11, whereby the land was “hereby granted” to the state, was a grant in praesenti, vesting title in the state, although the land was unsurveyed, in view of the provision of § 11 that such land shall not be subject to preemption, homestead, or any other entry, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.</p> <p>Same — School Lands — Grants—Withdrawal from Entry — Statutes — Implied Repeal — General Act Repealed by Special Act. The amendment of the general act of 1859, 11 Stat. at L. 385, which provided that school sections 16 and 36 shall be subject to the homestead or preemption claims of settlers where settlements have been or shall hereafter be made before survey of the lands in the field, by the act of 1891, 26 Stat. at L. 796, which added the provision for lieu sections by the states or territories, of other lands of equal acreage when such settlements have been or shall hereafter be made before the survey in the field, did not have the effect of impliedly repealing the special act of 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 676, granting in praesenti to the states of North and South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, school sections 16 and 36, and providing that the same shall not be subject to any entry whether surveyed or unsurveyed; as repeals by implication are not favored, and a special act will not be held to be impliedly repealed by a general law on the same subject, unless the intent to repeal is clearly manifest.</p> <p>Public Lands — School Lands — Grant to State — Compact with States — Effect of Subsequent Act. The grant to the states of North and South Dakota, Montana and Washington, of school sections 16 and 36, with the special provision that the same shall not be subject to any entry whether surveyed or unsurveyed, was a compact with the states that could not be affected by a subsequent act amending the general law applicable to such grants in other states, whereby settlements prior to the survey in the field were given precedence and the states compelled to accept lieu selections of the lands.</p> <p>Estoppel — Against State — Pleading. In an action by the state to recover possession of part of a school section, homesteaded by the defendant, an answer alleging allowance of defendant’s homestead application and that he had made improvements on the land with the knowledge and consent of the state, is insufficient to support an estoppel against the state.</p>

<p>Corporations — Representations—Contract — Individual Liability oe Oeeicers. The evidence sufficiently shows that a contract was made by the plaintiff direct with a corporation, rather than with its officers individually, where negotiations were carried on in the name of the corporation and plaintiff’s offer and letters wbre addressed to it.</p> <p>Contracts — Regrade oe Lots — Waiver oe Damages — Construction. A contract waiving damages from a regrade about to be made, contemplates only future damages, where there was evidence that no substantial damages had theretofore been sustained and no claim had been made therefor.</p> <p>Contracts — Regrade of Lots — Breach—Measure of Damages. Under a contract waiving damages to property from a contemplated regrade, to be completed within a specified time, on breach of the contract upon its becoming impossible to complete the regrade within the time, the work being abandoned, measure of damages to be recovered by the property owners is the difference in the value of the lots before the commencing of the work and their value when work was suspended, eliminating changes in market values, together with damages to buildings and loss of rentals; and not the cost of completing the work irrespective of the value of the property.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered May 13, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of rape.</p>

'Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Stevens county, Carey, J., entered January 7, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for injuries sustained by a carpenter in the fall of a ladder.

, entered March SI, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages to property from blasting.

<p>Mechanics’ Liens — Notice to Owner — Duplicate Statements— Subsequent Mortgages — Priority. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1133, requiring duplicate statements to be furnished to tbe owner at tbe time material is delivered, notice must be given to tbe one wbo was known to bold tbe legal title to tbe lots, of lumber delivered to one in possession under a lease with an option to buy, notwithstanding that subsequently tbe owner gave a deed to tbe lessee and took back a mortgage, and that Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1132, makes a mechanics’ lien superior to mortgages subsequent to tbe commencement of tbe furnishing of tbe materials.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gay, J., entered June 10, 1911, dismissing an action to vacate a judgment, after a trial on the merits before the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Holcomb, J., entered February 25, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action upon account.</p>

<p>Municipal Corporations — Streets — Abutting Owners — Shade Trees. In improving a street, the city may revoke a license theretofore granted to abutting owners to plant shade trees in the street, and may destroy trees planted without liability therefor, where the action is not wanton or unreasonable.</p>

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the superior court for Douglas county, Steiner, J., entered December 8, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of one of the defendants,' in an action on a promissory note.

<p>New Tbial — Misconduct of Jury — Evidence—Review. The denial of a new trial for misconduct of a juror is warranted, although four witnesses testified that the juror stated that he would hang the defendant if called as a juror, where the juror and one witness contradicted their testimony, the juror claiming that the conversation related to another crime.</p> <p>Homicide — Justifiable Homicide — Defense of Duress — Instructions — Killing in Commission of Robbery. Upon the defense that accused participated in a robbery because of duress, it is not error to instruct that, on a resulting murder, there was no question of justifiable or excusable homicide, where the accused had participated in the robbery and the victim was murdered by a confederate in committing the robbery; in view of Rem. & Bal. Code, § 2392, subd. 3, defining murder in the first degree as a killing without design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of a robbery etc.</p>

, entered March 28, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for breach of contract, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury.

<p>Appeal — Preservation oe Grounds — Exceptions. One general exception to separate findings given some of which are correct, and to requests for separate findings refused, is insufficient to secure a review of the evidence; and the statement of facts will be considered only as to the rulings of the court on the admission and exclusion of the evidence.</p> <p>Witnesses — Examination—Leading Questions. It is discretionary to permit leading questions.</p> <p>Evidence — Letters—Copies. Copies of letters are inadmissible where there was no attempt to procure the production of the originals.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error. It is harmless to exclude the answer to a question which would not have changed the result.</p> <p>Payment — Conditions—Contracts—Construction. In an action to recover a balance due on account, there is sufficient evidence of payment in full, where it appears that the plaintiff traded to the defendant land for an automobile owned by him, in consideration of which it was agreed that the balance due on the account should not be paid “until and unless” the land was sold for at least $2,000, and if the land was not sold for said sum, that the exchange should be in full satisfaction of the claim; and there can be no recovery where the court finds that due diligence was used to sell the -land but it could not be sold for $2,000 or any other sum; since the payment was conditioned wholly and finally upon the sale of the land.</p>

, entered July 10, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, modifying an assessment for public improvements upon confirmation by the superior court.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the superior court for Benton county, Holcomb, J., entered March 21, 1911, upon granting defendant a divorce and awarding alimony, after a trial on the merits.

, entered May 17, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant by direction of the court, dismissing an action for personal injuries sustained by a visitor in leaving a theater.

, entered May 27, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, dismissing-an action on contract, upon granting a nonsuit, after a trial to the court.

F. Sturdevant, Esq., judge pro tempore, entered April 27, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for an accounting.

, entered March 38, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in actions involving a disputed boundary line, after a trial to the court.

<p>Trusts — Resulting Trust — Evidence—Sufficiency. A resulting trust in lands will not be declared where the evidence is not clear, certain and conclusive and so cogent as to leave no reasonable doubt, especially where nearly fifty years elapsed since the transaction occurred.</p> <p>Appeal — Review—Harmless Error. On a trial de novo, error in the exclusion of a deposition which is brought up on appeal is harmless.</p>

<p>Judgments — Conclusiveness—Finality. An order in probate setting aside a homestead to a widow is res adjudícala, if the court had jurisdiction and the administrator appeared or had sufficient notice to appear and try out the question.</p> <p>Husband and Wife — Community Property — Executors and Administrators — Homestead for Widow — Title Conferred — Statutes. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 1465, 1466, authorizing the probate court to set aside a homestead for the support of the widow and children, if none was selected by the deceased in his life, which homestead shall be exempt from debts and not treated as assets of the estate, an order setting aside to the widow a homestead from community property vests in her the title in fee, if the court had jurisdiction to make the order.</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Homestead for Widow — Appraisal and Order — Notice—Jurisdiction—Judgment — Conclusiveness. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§1465, 1466, making it the duty of the probate court when certain facts appear to set aside a homestead of a specified value for the care and support of the widow and children, which homestead shall not be assets in the hands of the administrator, an order appraising and setting aside a homestead upon the widow’s petition, filed in the probate case, is a proceeding within the administration of the estate requiring no personal service upon the administrator as in the case of an original proceeding; but notice to the attorney authorized to represent the administrator in the administration of the estate confers jurisdiction to make the appraisement and order, which is final and conclusive, if not resisted (Parker, J., dissenting).</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Main, J., entered May 1, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of the offense of injury to property.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Local Option — Importation—“Unbroken Packages.” A demijohn of whiskey, drawn from a barrel by a wholesale dealer within a wet district, and brought into, and delivered to a customer in, a dry district, is an “unbroken package,” within the meaning of the local option law, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 6309, which provides that the act shall not apply to deliveries of unbroken packages at residences which are not places of business or public resort, by wholesalers in their own conveyances or by common carrier.</p>

, entered June 10, 1911, upon sustaining a challenge to the evidence, dismissing an action- for personal injuries sustained by a rigging slinger in a logging camp.

, entered March 2, 1911, upon granting a new trial, after the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for wrongful death.

, entered April 1, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, foreclosing and determining the priority of mortgages on real estate.

, entered April 29, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger in an elevator.

, entered July 17, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for breach of covenants against incumbrances, after a trial to the court.

, entered March 30, 1911, upon a trial and conviction of placing a female in the charge of another for the purposes of prostitution.

<p>Municipal Corporations • — • Claims ■— Presentation — Charter— Statutes — Construction. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 7995, providing that claims for damages in tort against cities of the first class filed “in compliance with valid charter provisions,” shall state the actual residence of the claimant, hy street and number, has no application to claims as to which the city charter did not require any notice or demand.</p> <p>Same — Claims by Servant of City — Safe Place to Work. The charter of the city of Spokane providing that all claims for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the city or any officer, agent, or servant thereof, be presented to the city council, has no application to claims arising out of the relation of master and servant and the failure of the city to furnish a servant with a safe place to work.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Mitchell, J., entered January 24s, 1911, convicting the defendants of contempt of court, after a hearing on the merits.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Card, J., entered March 18, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action upon a bond of a contractor on public works.</p>

<p>Logs and Logging — Laborer’s Liens — Services oe Team — Statutes. Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1162, the owner of teams has a lien for their services in getting out logs without the rendition of any personal services by him.</p> <p>Appeal — Exceptions—Review—Findings—Presumptions. Findings not excepted to will be presumed to be supported by the evidence.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Checks—Presentation—-Want of Diligence— Excuse for Failure to Present. Failure to present checks is not excused because it was difficult and inconvenient to leave camp and present the checks in person, where the checks could have been presented in due course of mail, and would have been paid if so presented.</p> <p>Logs and Logging — Laborer’s Liens — Defenses—Payment. Loggers’ liens cannot be enforced against innocent third parties by laborers who were given checks for the amount of their claims, which, through their negligence and laches, were not presented until after the funds in hank for their payment had been withdrawn by the absconding contractor.</p> <p>Equity — Maxims—Loss by Innocent Pabty. The maxim that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss by the act of a third person, the loss must fall upon the one whose act made the loss possible, applies as between a person claiming a lien on logs, who neglected to cash his check, and an innocent holder of the logs.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for What-com county, Kellogg, J., entered March 24, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action upon the official bond of a sheriff, after a trial on the merits.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered June 30, 1911, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action to set aside a tax deed.</p>

<p>Escape — Elements op (Defense — Commitment. Where one is in custody under a judgment of conviction of a felony, the judgment is sufficient as a commitment upon which to base an information for an attempt to escape jail.</p>

<p>Limitation of Actions — Contracts—Guaranty. Where a debtor turned over a note in payment of his own debt, at the same time guaranteeing the note, the guaranty is not a promise to pay the debt of another which would be barred when the statute of limitations had run against the note; but it is a promise to pay his own debt, creating a liability during the period of limitations following its written acknowledgment.</p> <p>Guaranty — Promise to Pay Debt of Another — Consideration. An oral guaranty of a note turned over in payment of the guarantor’s indebtedness is a sufficient consideration for a subsequent written guaranty of its payment, as it is but an agreement to pay his own debt.</p> <p>Compromise and Settlement — Effect. Where defendant was bound to pay $7,250 for plaintiff’s interest in certain lots, a second contract whereby plaintiff agreed to sell defendant a part, if not all, of the property, for the sum of §4,500, was intended to discharge the first contract, and is in the nature of a compromise and settlement.</p>

<p>Appeal by plaintiff's from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered January 21, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for damages, in an action for injuries to property.</p>

<p>Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered June 17, 1911, upon findings in favor of certain lien claimants, in an action to foreclose mechanics’ liens.</p>

, entered December 28, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for wrongful death.

<p>Frauds, Statute of — Sale of Land — By Agent. Verbal authority to find a purchaser for land does not authorize the agent to execute a binding contract of sale.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser — Contract—By Agent — Ratification— Brokers. A broker’s contract to sell real estate, he only having authority to find a purchaser, is ratified where, with full knowledge of the contract and all the material facts, nothing was done to disavow the sale or question the broker’s authority to make it, and letters were written promising a deed as soon as it could be secured.</p> <p>.Same — Broker’s Contract Under Seal — Ratification. The fact that an unauthorized broker’s contract to sell real estate was executed under seal, does not prevent an implied ratification of the contract from silence and acquiescence therein, especially in view of Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8751, abolishing the use of private seals in contracts and deeds.</p> <p>Principal and Agent — Contracts of Agent — Ratification—Consideration. No new consideration is necessary for the ratification of the unauthorized contract of an agent, the consideration of the original contract being sufficient.</p> <p>Specific Performance — Tender—Waiver. In seeking specific performance, a tender of the last deferred payment on a land contract is excused by the positive statement that it would be useless.</p> <p>Specific Performance — Actions—Laches. There is no laches which will be a defense to specific performance where the vendee did all that he could to secure a deed, and the delay was at the solicitation of the vendor.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered March 15, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained in a collision of a street car with a wagon.</p>

, entered April 5, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial on the merits before the court without a jury, in an action for money lent.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered December 20, 1910.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe superior court for Spokane county, Huneke, J., entered May 3, 1911, upon tbe verdict of a jury rendered in favor of tbe plaintiff, in an action for tbe death of a laborer through tbe fall of a retaining wall.</p>

, entered October 31,1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for wrongful death of an employee engaged as a structural iron worker in the erection of a building.

, entered January 29, 1910, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action on a promissory note.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Neill, J., entered March 4, 1911, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Columbia county, Miller, J., entered April 28, 1911, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action on contract.</p>