Robinson v. Cahill

¶1The exceptional character of this case and my strong disagreement with the majority impels me to take the extraordinary step of filing a formal dissenting opinion from the memorandum order of the Court insofar as that order denies all relief for the 1975-76 school year. I do so reluctantly and with full appreciation of the desirability of consensus among the members of the Court when it acts in matters of great public import.

¶2I disagree with paragraph 5 of the order of the Court in that it fails to set out with specificity the issues to which the parties' ought to address their arguments. Without intending to limit the freedom of said parties to present any issues they deem proper, I am listing those matters which I think should have been included in the order:

¶31. Should the Court seek by its remedial orders to implement the education clause directly or, alternatively, seek to induce the Legislature to do so?

¶4*412. Can the Court enjoin payment of some or all State funds appropriated as aid to education until the Legislature complies with the constitutional mandate ? If it can, should it do so?

¶53. Can the Court issue a specific mandatory injunction to the Legislature ordering compliance with the education clause? If it can, should it do so?

¶64. What does the constitutional mandate that the State maintain a thorough and efficient system of free public schools mean? What does it require as to the financing of said system?

¶75. If the Court decides to implement the education clause in the absence of legislative action, who should devise the working plan for allocation of revenues?

¶86. Can the Court redistribute some or all moneys appropriated as State aid for public schools? If it can, should it do so?

¶97. Can the Court impose a State-wide property tax? If it can, should it do so?

¶108. Can the Court require some or all taxes raised locally for educational purposes to be paid into the Court (or State Treasury) for redistribution? If it can, should it do so?

¶119. Can the Court require some or all school districts to increase local tax rates to provide additional funds to be redistributed to achieve a thorough and efficient system of education throughout the State? If it can, should it do so?

¶1210. Can the Court order consolidation of school districts to equalize assessed valuation per pupil in each district? If it can, should it do so?

¶1311. Who should administer the relief ordered by the Court ?

¶1412. The propriety of the Court allowing the State to achieve compliance with the education clause over a period of up to five years.

¶15*42The posing of these issues is, of course, not intended to indicate a prejudgment as to their ultimate resolution.

¶16On June 19, 1973, two months after our initial decision in this matter, we publicly declared our intention to obtain the implementation of a plan for compliance by the State with the requirements of the education clause of the Constitution of 1947, N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1, by July 1, 1975. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N. J. 196, 198 (1973). This period of time seemed more than ample in view of the magnitude of the injustice being suffered by the children of this State and their parents as the result of the inequities of the existing system of educational finance. It should be noted that the Legislature had already been on notice since January 1972, when Judge Botter announced his opinion in this matter, Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223 (L. Div. 1972),1 that the system of educational finance was probably unconstitutional as well as being unfair.

¶17Today we abandon that goal. I am unable to justify or excuse this decision, and I cannot join in it.

¶18The majority fears that the grant of any affirmative relief for this school year would create chaos in the budgetary process in local school districts. It is undeniable that a grant of affirmative relief by the Court for this school year would complicate the process of approval of local school budgets this spring. That process is governed by the various provisions of N. J. S. A. 18A:22, which sets out a timetable for formulation and adoption of these budgets. The Legislature, however, has already pushed the timetable back for this year. L. 1974, c. 191. Even this revised schedule is not so tight as to preclude further compression, either by *43the Legislature,2 or, in the absence of legislative action, by the Court itself. Oral arguments could be scheduled in midEebruary and- a decision announced shortly thereafter.

¶19A certain amount of confusion and a great deal of dissatisfaction -would undoubtedly result. The first can be ameliorated by diligence on the part of State and local officials. The second, the inevitable, discordant accompaniment to possible change, should play no part in our decision.

¶20The real question is: Can this Court, consistently with its obligations to uphold and to enforce the Constitution, trade the constitutionally guaranteed rights of hundreds of thousands of children3 to an equal educational opportunity for the possibility of avoiding some difficulties in meeting local budget-making deadlines. I do not see how this question can be answered in any way but in the negative.

¶21I am not proposing that the Court could or should attempt by its remedial orders to achieve a root and branch reform of the system of school finance by July 1, 1975. Rather, I am convinced that we can make some significant, well-considered remedial responses this year to the constitutional problems we have identified. We have an affirmative duty to do so.

¶22It is no ground for judical inaction that some measures proposed may be unpopular. Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Board of Taxation, 31 N. J. 420, 431 (1960). It is no ground that there may be resistance to the orders of the Court, whether in local government or in the halls of *44the Legislature. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1958). It is no ground that the fertile imagination can find or invent plausible excuses for delay. See Jackman v. Bodine, 44 N. J. 312 (1965). This Court has identified a profound violation of the Constitution. It has given the coordinate branch of government ample opportunity to take corrective action. It possesses the capacity to begin the process of remedying the violation. To fail to do so at this late date is to become a party to the' perpetuation of the very wrongs which the Court denounced two years ago.