Volume 68 — Iowa Reports

Action for specific performance of an oral contract for the conveyance of real estate. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

This action was brought on a written contract whereby the defendants bound themselves to pay plaintiff for certain books, maps and charts, which they ordered him to deliver to the defendant, George Stewart.

Action at law to recover upon a written instrument executed by defendant and others. There was a judgment upon a verdict for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.

Action to recover compensation for care, nursing and - service rendered by plaintiff to certain persons sick of the small-pox. There was a judgment for plaintiff, upon a verdict, for a sum less than her claim. She now appeals to this court.

Appeal f rom Seott Ovreuit Gourt. .Action to recover damages for a personal injury. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. The plaintiff appeals.

Action in equity to recover of tbe defendant, Elizabeth F. Oakley, for payments made of certain, taxes upon land in Webster county, and to establish a lien for the same on tbe land. There was a decree for tbe plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Tiie plaintiffs are owners of a mil!-dam and mill on Skunk river, and tlie defendants are the owners of a similar dam and mill on the same stream about six miles beiow the plaintiffs7 mill. The latter brought this action to recover damages caused by backwater caused by the defendants’ dam, and also for the abatement of the dam.

Action for a personal injury. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

<p>1. Execution: exempt property: owner about to leave the state: evidence: estoppel. 'Where property which is ordinarily exempt is levied upon on the ground that the owner is about to leave the state, the owner, in an action against the officer for the wrongful conversion of the property, is not estopped by declarations previously made by him of his intention to leave the state, for he has a right to change his intention; and evidence of such declarations are not admissible against him unless made at, after or so near the time of starting as to be a part of the res gestee. Declarations made two or three days before held not to be of that character.</p> <p>2. -: -: -: -. Nor is it competent in sucli a case for the officer to show that he -was informed before making the levy that the plaintiff had left the state; nor to show that after plaintiff had left his place of residence his goods were found in a condition indicating an intention to remove them from the town.</p> <p>3. -: -: -: instruction. An instruction asked by defendant (see opinion) held to have been properly refused, because it was not warranted by the evidence, and because it was not in harmony with the doctrine above set forth.</p> <p>4. Evidence: value of household goods: competency of owners to testify to. A husband and wife who are the owners of ordinary household goods may testify as to their value without proof of their knowledge of the value of such goods. Such knowledge will be presumed.</p>

<p> Appeal from Linn District Gov/rt. </p> <p>Ti-ie plaintiff, who is the wife of the defendant, brought this action to recover alimony upon the ground that the defendant had driven plaintiff away from her home. The defendant moved that the place of trial be changed to Johnson county, the place of his residence. The motion was overruled, and defendant aj>peals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Ringgold District Oourt. </p> <p>The defendant was convicted of the crime of larceny, and judgment was rendered upon the verdict. He now appeals to this court.</p>

This action was brought by the plaintiff, Kate Hooks, against the defendant Evans, as her former guardian, and against the defendants Grow and Stocker, as sureties upon the guardian’s bond. There was a trial without a jury, and judgment was rendered against Evans only. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced for the crime of larceny in the night-time in a private building, and he appeals.

Action to recover upon a contract for building a bridge. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Defendant was indicted with another for an assault with an intent to commit murder, and upon a separate trial was convicted. He now appeals to this court.

Action to recover the costs and expenses accruing upon the trial of an indictment found in Linn county, the venue of the case having been changed to Jones county. There was a trial to the court without a jury, and a judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This is a proceeding under the statute by which the plaintiffs seek to permanently establish the lines and corners of certain lands, which corners are alleged to be lost, destroyed and in dispute. The defendants resisted the proceeding, and objected to the appointment of' a commissioner. The district court appointed three commissioners, and they made a majority and a minority report, which were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the same commissioners.

The plaintiff appeals from an order sustaining a motion filed by the defendants to strike out a second amended petition filed by the plaintiff

Harrison District Court. Action to set aside a conveyance of real estate made by the plaintiff, on tne ground that lie was insane. The relief asked was denied, and the plaintiff appeals.

The defendant was accused of murder of the second degree, committed, as charged in the indictment, in the killing of one Wade Campbell. On the trial of the indictment he was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and from this judgment he appeals.

Plaintiff brought this action in equity to quiet the title to about 2,500 acres of land, which inured to it under the swamp-land grant.

This is an action upon a promissory note, which, was executed by defendant to the plaintiff for part of the purchase price of a threshing-machine.

Action to recover for attendance on and boarding a prisoner charged with crime. Trial by jury. Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

This cause was submitted to the district court upon an agreed statement of facts. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals. 1

The orphans’ court of Philadelphia county, Pennsylvania, on the twenty-third day of August, 1876, appointed an administrator of the estate of Elijah T. Slack, deceased, late of that county.

The defendants were indicted for the crime of rape upon one Mary Stranahan. Yerdict was rendered against them, and each was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. They appeal to tliis court.

This is an appeal from an order of tlie court overruling a demurrer to the petition, and from a judgment afterwards rendered against the defendant. The facts appear in the opinion.

The plaintiff by this action seeks to recover damages of tbe defendant John Kirt for the unlawful sales of intoxicating liquors to plaintiff’s husband, by which, as it is alleged, she bad been damaged in her means of support. She also demands tbe establishment of a lien for her damages as against tbe saloon property where said liquor was sold; said property being owned by tbe defendant Reckermire, as is alleged.

On the twenty-second day of February, 1884-, an instrument in writing purporting to be the last will of Rosa J. Donnely was filed with the clerk of the circuit court. By this instrument the whole of the estate of the testatrix, except a trifling bequest to each of her three brothers, was devised to James Donnely, her husband.

Proceedings to establish a road had before the supervisors. Upon an appeal to the circuit court, judgment was entered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the defendant' Cyrus Wright, and, as such, brings this action to set aside certain conveyances alleged to have been made by him to his wife, the defendant Annie A. Wright, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition, and it appeals.

Action of mandamus to compel tbe defendant to construct and maintain a crossing at a place where its road is crossed by a highway. The relief ashed by the plaintiff was granted, and tlie defendant appeals.

While walking on a sidewalk in one of the streets of the defendant town, plaintiff fell and sustained certain injuries. She alleges that the fall and inju»y were occasioned by a defect which defendant negligently permitted to exist in said sidewalk, and she prosecutes this action to recover damages therefor. She recovered a verdict and judgment in the circuit court. Defendant appeals.

Plaintiff brought this action to quiet her title to a lot in the city of Marion. Defendant answered that lie was the owner of a mortgage on said lot, which was a lien thereon superior and senior to the interest therein of plaintiff, and he prayed judgment for the amount of the debt secured by said mortgage, and for a foreclosure thereof. The judgment of the circqit court determines that defendant’s mortgage is superior to the interest of plaintiff in the premises.

This is a proceeding under the statute to condemn certain land for the purposes of a street. The cause was referred to arbitrators, and upon their report a judgment condemning the land was entered. Defendant Susan Breneman alone appeals.

Action in chancery to quiet the title to certain real estate,' and for an accounting for rents. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Appeal f rom Mitchell District Gourt. r This is an action in equity in the nature of a creditor’s bill by which the plaintiff seeks to subject certain real estate, the legal title to which is in the defendant Josephine O. Warner, to the payment of a judgment against the defendant Geo. W. Warner. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court. Action in replevin. There was a trial to the court, and judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiffs appeal.

Action to recover for the care and support of an insane person. There was a trial without a jury, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Action to recover specific personal property. Trial by the court, and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Action in chancery to set aside a sheriff’s deed to defendant, and to require the sheriff to make a deed to plaintiff as a redemptioner from the sale and judgment under which the deed was made. Upon a trial on the merits, plaintiff’s petition was dismissed. He now appeals to this court.

Action for a writ of mandamus to compel tbe defendants, as directors of the district township of Marshall, in Pocahontas county, to move a sckool-liouse. in sub-district No. 2, from section ten in said township to section fifteen. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal.

Appeals from Mills Circuit and, District Courts. These cases are submitted together as growing out of the same facts, although involving somewhat different questions of law. The plaintiff is the owner of certain land in Mills county, across which the defendant the Council Bluffs & St. Louis Railway Company has located its line of railroad, and its lessee, the defendant the Wabash; St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company is operating the same.

Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Mary E. Jeffries, brought this action on a promissory note executed by the defendants to her intestate. The note at present appears to be dated April 6, 1878, and is for $500, and is payable twelve months after date, and bears interest at ten per cent. The defendants paid on the note $551.75, before the suit was instituted, and the amount was duly credited on it.

Action in equity to cancel a tax deed to forty acres of land, and quiet plaintiff’s title thereto. There was a judgment for plaintiff, granting the relief demanded in the petition. Defendant appeals.

The defendant is an incorporated town, and is charged with the duty of keeping the streets and highways within its boundaries in proper repair. Plaintiff, while walking on a sidewalk in one of the streets of said town, fell and sustained a severe personal injury. lie brought this action to recover damages for such injury, alleging that the same was caused by the negligence of defendant in failing to keep said walk in proper repair.

In December, 1883, tbe defendant, Dr. E. D. Cross, was indicted by tbe grand jury of Pottawattamie county for the crime of murder in tbe first degree. A change of venue was taken to Mills county, and a trial bad, wbicb resulted in a conviction and sentence of death. The defendant appeals.

Appeal from Buchanan District Oourt. Action at law. Trial before a jury. The court directed ■ the jury to find for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff brings this action as the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Mallett’s intestate, W. D. Koon, and for the purpose of establishing her heirship to his estate.

Action for an injunction to restrain the defendant city from exercising jurisdiction over certain territory. There was a demurrer to the petition, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiffs elected to stand upon their petition, and judgment was rendered against them, dismissing their petition and for costs. They appeal.

Action before a justice of the peace. A writ of error was sued out, and the judgment of the justice was affirmed by the circuit court. The defendant appeals.

<p> Appeal frorn Bremer District Court. </p> <p>The object of this action is to determine whether the defendant is entitled to hold the office of school director. Trial by jury, and judgment for the defendant. The relators appeal.</p>

Action in attachment. The plaintiffs caused a stock of. goods to be attached, belonging to the defendant Shejdierd, and, after the lapse of 310 days, the attachment was dissolved., The court, upon a motion by the sheriff to retax costs in his favor, allowed him $136 for care of goods, — 310 days at forty cents per day. From the order of allowance the plaintiffs appeal.

The defendant was convicted of the larceny of a horse, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, and from that judgment he appeals.

Action to recover the value of certain household goods. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff for $1,700. The defendant appeals.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages on account of an assault and battery committed by defendant on him, and on account of certain slanderous words spoken by defendant of and concerning him. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant ajipeals.

Action before a justice of the peace. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant sued out a writ of error. The circuit court rendered judgment as stated in tlie opinion. The plaintiff appeals.

Action in equity. The defendant is the holder of a sheriff’s certificate of sale of certain real estate in Linn county.

<p>1. Judgment for Costs: motion to set aside after term: when not allowed. Certain parties were brought into this ease upon a notice which stated that no personal judgment was asked against them unless they defended. They appeared, denied knowledge or information, and disclaimed any interest in the subject of the action, but the court rendered judgment against them for the costs of the case, and the record was signed and approved by the judge. At the next term these parties filed a motion to retax costs, the object of which really was to have the judgment wholly set aside as being unwarranted. Held that the court had no power to vacate such judgment on motion filed after the term at which it was rendered, the ground of the motion not being one of the grounds named in § 3154 of the Code.</p>

<p>1. Priority of Liens: mortgage and mechanic’s lien: facts considered. S. had contracted for the conveyance to him of certain real estate, but it was not conveyed to him, and he did not take possession, till February 4, 1882, but he was about the premises, and to some extent had control of a portion thereof, prior to that time, and he had contracted for lumber to repair the premises, but the lumber for which the lien was claimed had not been delivered. S.,on the day when the conveyance was made to him, mortgaged the premises to C., and the conveyance and mortgage were duly recorded. C. had no actual notice of the contract for the lumber, and there was nothing- about the place to indicate that repairs were about to be commenced; neither did 0. know anything of S.’s interest in the premises prior to the date of the deed. Held that the mortgage was the prior lien.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgage: attachment op mortgaged property: second MORTGAGE SUBSEQUENT TO ATTACHMENT: WHICH PREVAILS. The interest retained by tlie mortgagor of personal property in the property mortgaged, where the mortgagee has the right at any time to take possession, cannot be levied on and sold under execution or attachment against the mortgagor, but he may incumber it with a second mortgage. (See cases cited.) Accordingly, where the property was seized under a writ of attachment against the mortgagor and he, while it was in the custody of the officer under such seizure, executed a second mortgage upon it, held that the second mortgagee was entitled to the property, or its proceeds, as against the attaching creditors.</p>

<p>1. Sale of Corporation Stock: false representations: presumption of innocence. In a common-law action for damages on account of false representations inducing the purchase of corporation stoclr, where the defendants are alleged to be officers of the corporation, held that the presumption of innocence which obtains in criminal and penal eases does not obtain in defendants’ favor, and that a preponderance of the evidence is all that is required to justify a recovery.</p> <p>2. Jury: disqualification of juror: waiver by failure to examine. “Where a party in a civil case, in the absence of concealment or fraud on the part of his adversary, accepts a juror, without examination as to his qualifications, he waives objections on account of want of qualifications-discovered afterwards. The rule in criminal cases is different. See (uses cited in opinion.</p> <p>3. Practice in Supreme Court: errors not assigned not considered.</p>

<p>1. Original Notice: service by publication: the initials of defendant’s NAME TRANSPOSED: OTHER DESIGNATION OF DEFENDANT: averments of petition to aid. In an original notice served "by publication the initial letters of defendant’s name were transposed, but she was also designated in the notice as the wife of J. C. H., and it was held in a former appeal in this action (to set aside a sheriff’s deed based upon such notice) that the notice did not give the court jurisdiction of the defendant. See 61 Iowa, 417. After the cause was remanded the defendant in this action amended his answer, setting up that the defendant thus served was in fact the wife of J. C. FT. when said notice was published, a,nd when the judgment was rendered, and that she was better known in the county where the action was pending as the wife of J. C. FI. than by her Christian name, or by the initials of that name. Held that the notice as published, conceding the truth of such averments, was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of said defendant, and that it was error for the court to strike out the averments as immaterial.</p> <p>2. Judgment: jurisdiction: notice by publication: collateral attack. Where the court rendered judgment on a notiee by publication, it must necessarily have determined that the service and proof of service were sufficient, and the sufficiency thereof cannot be assailed in a collateral proceeding to set aside a sheriff’s deed made pursuant to the judgment so rendered.</p>

<p>1. Priority of Liens: questions of fact as to amount of land covered by lien of prior date, For consideration of the evidence, see opinion.</p> <p>2. Mortgage Foreclosure: allowance of interest as against junior mortgagee on taxes paid, eto. Where a mortgagee pays taxes and other prior claims to protect his own lien, he should not be allowed more than six per cent per annum interest on such advances, as against a junior incumbrancer in a foreclosure proceeding, though he may have an agreement for ten per cent with the mortgagor.</p> <p>3. -: attorney’s fee: no evidence. The allowance of an attorney’s fee in this case without proper evidence was erroneous.</p>

<p> Appeal from Howard Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action to foreclose two mortgages. Decree for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from Howard Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action to foreclose a mortgage. The petition was dismissed and the plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action to restrain the collection of a five per cent railroad tax voted by the electors of West Union township to aid in the construction of a railroad from Wadena to West Union. The ■ Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company and the Chicago, Clinton, Dubuque & Minnesota Railroad Company answered the petition.

Action in equity to subject certain real estate standing in the name of the defendant Sarab E. Stephenson to the payment of a judgment held by the plaintiff against the defendant T. W. Stephenson. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition, and they appeal.

There was a general verdict for the plaintiff, and also special findings. On the latter the defendant moved the court to render a judgment in liis favor notwithstanding the general verdict. The motion was sustained, and the plaintiff7 appeals.

Ajppeal from ATlamahee District Court. Plaintiff brought tbis action to recover tlie value of certain personal property of wbicli he alleges lie was the owner, and which defendants, as he charges, wrongfully took possession of and converted to their own use. ' The judgment below was for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

The plaintiff is the owner of certain real estate in the city of Burlington, which he claims is exempt from municipal taxes. The city levied taxes upon the property for several years. After paying the taxes for three years under protest, the plaintiff commenced this action to restrain the collection of taxes for subsequent years, and for the recovery of taxes previously paid.

The paintiff is the owner of lot 993, in the City of Burlington. He acquired title thereto in the year 188G. He claims to be the owner of a parcel of land which adjoins said lot. The city of Burlington also claims to own the same, and this action was brought by the plaintiff to quiet his alleged title to said tract adjoining lot numbered 993. Upon a trial to the court there was a decree dismissing the plaintiff’s petition, and he appeals.

The plaintiff brought this suit in chancery under Code,.§ 1543, as amended by chapter 143 of the Acts of the Twentieth General Assembly, to restrain the defendants and another from maintaining a nuisance by keeping a place for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. A 'preliminary injunction was allowed. Defendants, C. Blattner and Gibbs, appeal.

Plaintiff owns certain lots in Barret’s addition to the city of Burlington, which are situated on the west side of Madison street, and abut on that street.

<p> Appeal from Lee Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action on an injunction bond in the penal sum of $100. Judgment was asked for that amount. The judgment rendered was for “one hundred dollars, and costs of suit at $---, and that execution issue therefor.” The defendant appeals.</p>

Action for possession of eighty acres of land in Mills county. The defendant set up an equitable defense, and the case was tried as an equitable action. There was a decree for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant was accused of the crime of murder in the first degree committed, as-was charged in this indictment, in the killing of one Dennis Murphy. He was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, and from this judgment he appeals.

Action in equity to quiet the title to certain real estate. The plaintiff states in his petition that he is the absolute owner and in possession of the land, but that the defendant claims an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff, and asks that his title be quieted, and for general relief.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages on account of certain alleged false and fraudulent repiresentations made by defendant concerning the business and financial condition of the Burlington Shirt & Steam Laundry Company, an incorporation of which he was an officer and member, by which pilaintiif was induced to purchase twenty-four shares of the capital stock of said corporation and piay therefor the piar value thereof, which was §2,400.

Appeal from Des Moines District Court. Action in equity to redeem from a foreclosure and sale under a mortgage. From tbe decree tbe plaintiff appeals.

The parties entered into a written contract by wbicb plaintiff leased to defendant a building in tbe city of Keokuk, for the term of one year., beginning on the first day of October, 1882, at the monthly rental of $35, payable in advance on the first day of each month. On the second day of May, 1883, plaintiff brought suit in justice’s court for the rent for that month.

The board of equalization of tbe town of Keota caused certain assessments to be made against tbe plaintiffs for the purpose of taxation. The plaintiffs caused a writ of certiorari to issue to test the validity of the proceedings of the board, and the circuit court decided that the assessments made under the direction of the board were illegal and void. The defendant appeals. Sampson c& Brown, for appellant G. JD. Woodin, for appellees.

Action to recover $35,721.24 as an alleged balance of a deposit account, and also to recover tlie same amount for money alleged to have been wrongfully used by the plaintiff’s treasurer, one Parsons, in paying to the defendant bis individual indebtedness. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict -and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff for $21,538.44. The defendant appeals.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of willful and 1 malicious mischief', maiming and disfiguring a horse, the property of one B. 0. Graves, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50. lie appeals to this court.

An information was filed before a justice of the peace, in which the defendant was accused of the crime of keeping intoxicating liquors with intent to sell the same contrary to law. Defendant was arrested, tried and convicted of the crime, and a judgment imposing a fine was entered against him. From that judgment he appealed to the district court.

This is an action upon a promissory note and an account. There was a trial by jury. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff for the amount of the note, and for the defendant upon the account. From a judgment rendered upon the verdict the defendant appeals.

Action to recover damages for cattle killed and injured by a train on defendant’s road at a place where the right to fence existed, and also because the train was negligently operated, whereby said cattle were killed and injured. Trial by jury. 'Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

This is an action for the recovery of the value of twenty-eight hogs which plaintiff alleges he delivered to defendant to be transported to Chicago, but which it failed to deliver to him, or to his consignee at Chicago. There was a verdict and j udginent for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This is an action to recover damages for an alleged injury to the plaintiff which he claims he received- by a fall upon a sidewalk, which it is alleged was in a dangerous condition by reason of an accumulation of ice and snow thereon. The claim is that the injury was occasioned by reason of the negligence of the city in not using proper diligence to remove the snow and ice. The answer was a general denial, and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

Indictment for uttering and publishing as true two forged promissory notes. Trial by jury. Yerdict guilty,' and judgment. The defendant appeals.

The plaintiff sought in the court below to establish a claim aganst the estate of Chauncy Clark, deceased, of which estate the defendant, Tallman, was appointed special administrator. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Action in equity to set aside a mortgage on, and conveyance of, real estate. From the decree the defendant Sater appeals.

Action to recover for intoxicating liquors. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal.

<p>1. Injunction Bond: recovery on: damages: evidence. Aninjunction ^ond is to secure such, damages as may be adjudged against the obligors in an action brought to determine whether any damages have been sustained, — a question which cannot be determined in the injunction cause; and the value of the services of an attorney employed in procuring a dissolution of the injunction is an element of such damages, of which proper evidence should be admitted.</p>

The petition, in substance, states that the defendant McEntee was granted a permit to buy and sell intoxicating liquors, as provided in sections 1526 to 1538, inclusive, of the Code, as amended; and that he gave a bond conditioned as provided by law; and that the condition of said bond has been broken by his failing on the last Saturday in June, 1885, or within five days thereafter, to make a return in writing to the county auditor, as provided by statute.

The indictment charges that certain described personal property was of the “ value of $1,235, and was then and there the property of * * * before then feloniously and burglariously stolen, taken and carried away by one Jesse Davis, * * * the defendant unlawfully and feloniously did receive and have, he, the said Thomas Lane, then and there well knowing the said goods, chattels and property to have been feloniously stolen, taken and carried away.” Trial by jury.

<p>1. Practice in Supreme Court: argument in equity case. In an equity case triable de novo in this court, the burden is on the plaintiff, precisely as in the court below, and. he files the opening argument, though the defendant be the appellant.</p> <p>2. -: NO ARGUMENT BY APPELLANT: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Where the appe lant in an equity case does not see proper to file an argument on the merits of the case, the judgment below will be affirmed.</p>

Agypeal from Des Moines Circuit Court. Action in equity to foreclose two contracts whereby the plaintiff sold to the defendant Sarah J. Davidson two pieces of real estate, in the city of Burlington. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal as to the ruling upon one of the contracts.

Action in equity to cancel and set aside two tax deeds, and establish plaintiff’s right to redeem the land covered thereby from the tax sale under which they were executed. The ground upon which the relief is demanded is that no legal proof of the service of notice to redeem the land from said tax sale was on file in the office of the county treasurer when the tax deeds were executed.

The defendant was found guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit a rape, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment was pronounced against him imposing a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, and from that judgment lie appeals to this court.

TnE petition states tliat the defendant published of and concerning the plaintiff the following false and malicious and defamatory libel: “John Hart, being duly sworn, deposeth and saith that a note presented to him by Hiram Larrabee, in favor of J. L).

Plaintiee brought this action in equity, to restrain tlie defendant from foreclosing a chattel mortage on certain personal property. He claims a landlord’s lien on the property for the rent of a hotel in which it had been used. Judgment was entered for plaintiif, and defendant appeals.

This is an action at law, by which the plaintiffs seek to recover of the defendants some $1,200 upon an alleged liability as sureties on a bond. There was a trial to the court without a jury, and a judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.

<p> Appeal from Des Moines District Court. </p> <p>Action to cancel a note and mortgage on the alleged ground that the same were given without consideration. T. C. Scholes intervened as the indorsee of the note, and asked for judgment thereon, and foreclosure of the mortgage. Judgment and decree were rendered in favor of Scholes, as nrayed by him. The plaintiff appeals.</p>

The defendant was convicted of the crime of adultery, and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary, and from this judgment he ajipeals to this court.

<p> Appeal from Lee -Circuit Court. </p> <p>This action in equity was brought by the plaintiffs, as devisees in the will of E. IT. Harrison, deceased, against the defendants, as executors of the will, for the purpose of ascertaining their respective interests in the estate, and for the purpose of obtaining a decree for the payment of the same. The court found that the plaintiffs took nothing under the will, and rendered a decree accordingly. The plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>1. Tax Sale and Deed: sale for less than all taxes due: deed not in valid: code, § 871. Notwithstanding the provision of § 871 of the Code, that a tax sale “ shall be made for and in payment of the total amount of taxes, interest and costs unpaid on such real property,” yet, where the taxes are due and delinquent for successive years, and the sale is made for a part only of such years, and a deed is made pursuant to such sale, such deed will not be set aside at the instance of the owner of the patent title; — following the principle of cases cited in opinion.</p> <p>2.-: notice to redeem: insufficient proof of service. Where the notice to redeem from a tax sale was given by publication to the person to whom the land was taxed, but the affidavit of proof of service did not state where the newspaper in which the publication was marie was published, nor the dates of the publication of the notice, held that it was not sufficient to authorize the treasurer to issue a tax deed, nor to cut off the right of redemption.</p> <p>'B. -■: -: necessity op in particular case. Where J. T. had been the owner of the land, but, though he liad been dead many years, the land was taxed to J. T. at the time when notice of the expiration of the time of redemption from the tax sale should have been given, held that the case was not equivalent to one where the land is taxed to an unknown owner, (Fuller v. Armstrong, 53 Iowa, 633,) because the law will not presume — not at least in the absence of. a showing — that there was not another person of the name of J. T. to whom the land was taxed; and in such case a tax deed issued without proper proof of service of notice on J. T. was invalid, and did not cut off the right of redemption.</p> <p>4. Tax Sals: por part op delinquent taxes: redemption prom: terms op. Where the taxes on the land were delinquent for the years 1871 to 1876, inclusive, but the land was sold for the taxes of 1871 and 1872 only, and the tax purchaser then paid the delinquent taxes for the years 1873 to 1876, inclusive, held that the holder of the patent title was properly required, in order to redeem from the sale, to reimburse the holder of the certificate for the taxes so paid, with six per cent interest.</p>

<p>1. County: deposit of funds in bank: bond to secure : construction. Where county funds were deposited in a hank, and a bond taken to secure the same, under § 912 of the Codo, and the bond was conditioned for the repayment of “ all the sums deposited" whenever the same should be “ needed, desired or demanded," held that the obligors were liable for all deposits made while the bond remained in possession of the county.</p> <p>2. -: -: -: — : no release by surrender of prior bond. Where in such case a prior bond had been given for a like purpose, and it was surrendered after the bond in question was given, and the bond in question did not purport to be an additional bond, and was not shown to be such, held that the sureties on the bond in question were not . released by such surrender.</p> <p>3. -: -: -: deposit in excess of authority : bondsmen not released. In such case it was immaterial, in an action on the bond, whether or not the treasurer had deposited more than the amount authorized by the order of the supervisors, for, if he had, that fact would not release the bondsmen from liability for the amount authorized.</p> <p>4. -: -: -: demand: what sufficient. Where such bond provided for repayment on demand, it was sufficient to make demand on the cashier of the bank.</p> <p>5. -: -: -: certificate of deposit: action on bond: conditions of certificate immaterial. Where, in such case, the bond provided for the repayment of the money on demand, but the certificate of deposit taken for the money provided that the money should be repaid upon return of the certificate properly indorsed, held that it was sufficient for a recovery on the bond to prove a demand, without proving the return of the certificate, — the certificate being brought into , court and surrendered.</p> <p>6. Practice: directing verdict por plaintiff on evidence. Where the undisputed evidence shows a right of recovery by plaintiff, the court may properly direct the jury to return a verdict for him.</p>

<p> Appeal from Polk-Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action commenced on the twenty-third day of September, 1884, to recover rent reserved in a lease of real estate. In January, 1885, the plaintiff filed a supplemental petition, stating in substance that, since filing the petition, another month’s rent had become due, and judgment was asked therefor. On motion of the defendant, the supplemental petition was stricken from the files, and the plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Poweshieh District Oourt. </p> <p>In July, 1879, plaintiff executed to defendants- his promissory note for $1,000, and to secure the same gave them a mortgage of certain real estate: He also assigned to them two promissory notes executed by one Geo. W. Smith. He alleges in his petition that at the time of this transaction he was indebted to defendants to the amount of several hundred dollars on account, and that he gave said note and mortgage and assigned the George W. Smith notes to them, for the purpose of securing said indebtedness; also that since that transaction he has delivered, to them property more than sufficient to satisfy the indebtedness, and he prays for an accounting, and that the defendants be required to cancel said mortgage and surrender said notes, and that he have jugdment for any amount which might be folin'd due him. Defendants alleged in their answer that said $1,000 note and the mortgage securing it were given, and the Smith notes were assigned, to them as security for such indebtedness as should thereafter accrue from plaintiff to them, as well as for a then existing indebtedness; and they deny that the indebtedness so secured to them has been paid, but allege that a large amount remains due thereon; and in a cross-petition they prayed for judgment for the amount dne them, and for a foreclosure of the mortgage given to secure said $1,000 note. The cause was tried to a referee, and on his finding the district court entered judgment for ¡ffaintiff for $391.12; also canceling said mortgage. Defendants appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from Dallas District Court. </p> <p>The defendant was charged by information,-before a justice of tbe peace, with tbe crime of having defaced a public highway, and was found guilty. He appealed to tbe district court of Dallas county, and a trial was bad, which resulted in a verdict of guilty, and judgment was rendered upon tbe verdict. He now appeals to this court. •</p>

<p>1. Estates of Decedents: adjudication op claim against: jurisdiction. The adjudication of a claim against an estate is to be deemed a part of the settlement of the estate, of which the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction.</p> <p>Adams, Cu. J., not concurring.</p>

<p>1. Taxes: payment by unsuccessful claimant to land : recovery from successful claimant. The ground on which the unsuccessful claimant of land has been allowed to recover against the successful claimant the taxes which he has paid on the land is that there was a legal presumption that they were paid at the request of the successful claimant; (Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555;) but such presumption cannot be entertained where both parties pay the taxes for the same year.</p>

This is an action in chancery on a policy of insurance upon the life of Henry L. Carpenter. Plaintiff is his widow, and prays that defendant may be required to make assessments upon holders of its policies to pay the amount insured upon he life of her deceased husband, as provided for in the policy.

This is an action for double the value of two colts, one of which the plaintiff claims was killed, and the other injured so thatit was of no value, — the injury having been caused by a train of cars upon a railroad operated by the defendant. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for double the damages .sustained by him. Defendant appeals.

Action to recover specific personal property. A demurrer to the eighth count of the answer was sustained, and the defendants appeal.

Plaintiff’s action is on two promissory notes, and for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate given to secure them.

The defendant was convicted of tlie crime of rape, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in tlie penitentiary, and from tbis judgment be appeals to this court.

Plaintiff’s intestate was killed while traveling as a passenger on one of defendant’s trains, and this action is prosecuted for the recovery of the damages sustained by his estate in consequence of his death. The cause was tried to a jury, who returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, in which he alleged twenty-one grounds for setting aside the verdict.

Action of mandamus. The plaintiff avers that he is a resident of the independent district of Bock Talley, Sioux county, and that the defendants are directors of the district township of Bock, from which the independent district of Bock Talley was severed in 1883.

Action upon a promissory note given for money borrowed by one Joseph M. Tramel, and signed by him, and purporting to be signed by tbe defendant, W. A. Tramel. The latter denied that he signed the note, or authorized any one to sign the note for him. The plaintiff, by reply, averred that the defendant ratified his signature to the note; also that he promised to pay it; and also that he was estopped by bis conduct from denying the genuineness of his signature.

Plaintiff claims damages on account of an alleged failure by defendant to receive certain property for transportation, lie alleges in his petition that on the thirteenth of October, 1879, he entered into a verbal contract with defendant, whereby it agreed to receive and ship for him two car loads of potatoes from Enfield, a station on its road, in Clayton county, to Denison, Texas, at 83 cents per 100 pounds; that, by the terms of the agreement, the property was to be…

Action to recover damages sustained by plaintiff by reason of the destruction of his property by fire set'out by an engine operated by defendant on its road. There was a judgment ón a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The plaintiff claims to be the owner of certain real estate which is situated on what is known as “Ray Island” and “Shin Island” in the Mississippi river, off the shore of Des Moines county. This action was brought to establish and quiet the title to the land as against the defendants.

This is an action in equity, by which the plaintiff seeks to set aside and cancel the release and satisfaction of a chattel mortgage, upon the ground that the release was procured from him by means of certain alleged fraudulent representations made by the defendant Wilhelm, the maker of the mortgage, and others. There was a demui’rer to the petition, which Was sustained, and plaintiff appeals.

This is an action of forcible entry and detainer, originally brought before a justice of the peace, where it was decided in favor of defendant. Upon an appeal to the circuit court, a like judgment was entered, and plaintiff appealed to this court.

The plaintiff is a banker, and he seeks by this action to recover of defendants a balance alleged to be due upon a bank account against the defendants. There was a trial to the court without a jury, and a judgment for the plaintiff. Defendants appeal.

.Action on a contract for work and labor performed by plaintiff for defendant. Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a contract with defendant, whereby he agreed to work for him by the month for the stipulated wages of $15 for the first month, and $20 for each succeeding month, and that he worked for seven months and seventeen days under said employment.

Plaintiff seeks to recover double the value of certain cattle which, he alleges, were killed on defendant’s railroad track by an engine and train of cars. It is alleged that the injury occurred at a point where defendant had a right to fence its track, but that it neglected to maintain a sufficient fence at said point to keep cattle from entering upon its track, and that the cattle in question, in consequence of such neglect,'entered thereon and were killed.

<p> Appeal from Jasper Gireuit Oourt. </p> <p>The plaintiff, Loretta Shropshire, is administratrix of the estate of J. S. Long, deceased, and the defendant is administrator of the estate of Jeremiah Long, deceased. Her petition shows, in substance, that the defendant’s intestate, in his life, owed her intestate, and that the indebtedness was evidenced by promissory notes; that the defendant’s intestate died first, and her intestate filed tbe notes as a claim against the defendant’s intestate’s estate, which was done in tbe circuit court of Mahaska county, where the administration was pending; that the claim was allowed, but that plaintiff had no knowledge of the same; that the defendant, as administrator, held sufficient funds to pay, but, intending to defraud her, concealed from her the fact that a claim had been allowed against the estate which he represented, and in favor of her intestate, and without paying the same to her, or any part thereof, fraudulently induced her to sign a receipt virtually acknowledging payment, which receipt he filed in the circuit court of Mahaska county as a voucher showing a payment of the claim by him, and was allowed therefor in approval of his final report; that before approval, however, she appeared in the circuit court of Mahaska county, and objected to the approval of the report, basing her objection upon the fact that she had not been paid, and that the receipt purporting to be signed by her, and filed by the defendant as a. voucher, was obtained by fraud; that upon the hearing her objection was overruled, and the credit falsely and fraudulently taken by the defendant was allowed to stand; that the order of that court, however, does not constitute an adjudication against her, because both she and the defendant were residents.of Jasper county, and the court had no jurisdiction. She therefore brings this her action in equity in the circuit court of Jasper county, and asks that the report filed in the circuit court of Maliaslca county be set aside, and that she have judgment against the defendant for $1,000. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff’s petition, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff elected to stand upon her petition, and the court dismissed the same.</p>

Action commenced before a justice of the peace. An attachment was issued thereon, and certain oats levied upon. Olive Manly, wife of the defendant, whose property was attached, intervened, claiming to own the oats. There was a judgment for intervenor before the justice, and a like judgment upon appeal to the circuit court. ■ Plaintiff appeals to this court.

Afjgeal from Johnson District Oov/rt. Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a deed of trust executed to him as trustee by the Iowa City Glass Company to secure the amount of certain negotiable bonds issued by the mortgagor.

This is an action in chancery, brought by the owners of certain real property abutting on Main street, in the city of Dubuque, by which they seek to enjoin the city from collecting certain taxes which are levied upon said property to pay for certain grading, curbing and macadamizing upon the street. There was a decree for the plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Action in equity to subject certain real estate to tbe payment of a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff against tbe defendant F. ITasbrouck, on tbe ground that the title thereto was held by bis co-defendant in fraud of plaintiff’s rights. From the decree tbe defendants appeal.

Action to recover possession of land. The defendants pleaded an equitable defense, and by cross-bill claimed relief. There was a decree granting them the relief prayed for. Plaintiff appeals.

Action to recover damages caused by a collision of the defendant’s cars with the plaintiff’s wagon at the Tenth-avenue crossing, in the city of Clinton. Trial by jury, verdict for plaintiff, and judgment. The defendant appeals.

Plaintiff is the owner of a tract of land on which there is a coal mine. Defendant was in possession of said mine, under a lease of the premises given by plaintiff’s grantor. Plaintiff brought this action to cancel said lease and recover possession of the property, because of certain alleged breaches by defendant of the terms of the contract. The cause was tried as an ordinary action, and there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Plaintiffs, in an action attachment against Cheney, caused a large quantity of corn in cribs to be levied upon by the writ of attachment issued in the case. Porter intervened, claiming to own the attached corn. A judgment was entered against defendant in favor of plaintiffs and against plaintiffs in favor of the intervenor. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment against them in the proceedings of intervention.

This action was brought to cancel a certain deed executed to the defendant by' the Davenport Savings Bank, and to quiet the title to the premises in the plaintiff. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and the defendant, by his guardian ad litem, E. E. Oook, appeals.

Action in equity to enforce the specific performance of a contract. Defendants are the heirs at law of Sarah A. Franklin, who died seized of the property in question on the ninth day of October, 1884. Sarah A. Franklin was the widow of Simeon Franklin, who died in 1881, and she acquired title to the property by a conveyance and assignment executed by her husband in 1875. She was the second wife of said Simeon, and plaintiff is his daughter by the first wife.

The defendant constructed its line of railway through the plaintiff’s farm. After the road was completed the plaintiff pointed out to the defendant the place where he desired his farm crossing to be made. The defendant failed and refused to make a crossing at the point indicated, but constructed one at another place. The plaintiff seeks, by this action, to compel the defendant to make the crossing at the place selected by him.

<p>1. Appeal to Supreme Gourt; force of decisions. The rulings of a court of final appellate j urisdiction in a given case become the law of the case in all future trials.</p> <p>2. Fire Insurance: forfeiture of policy by incumbrance of property: SUBSEQUENT ASSIGNMENT WITH CONSENT OF COMPANY: RIGHTS OF assignee. Where a policy of fire insurance provided, in substance, that if there was, at the time the policy was issued, or should be thereafter, an incumbrance on the property, the policy should be void; and the property was afterwards incumbered; and, while it was so incumbered, the policy was assigned to the plaintiff, and such assignment was assented to by the company without knowledge of the incumbrance, held that, while a new contract of insurance arose between the assignee and the company, the agreement that the policy should be void if the property was incumbered was imported into that contract, and, the property being incumbered when the new contract was made, and continuing to be so incumbered, the assignee could not recover in casé of loss. Ellis v. Council Bluff's Ins. Co., 64 Iowa, 507, distinguished.</p> <p>Beck and Reed, JJ., dissenting.</p>

The plaintiff seeks in this action to recover damages of the defendant, and, as the ground of his claim, he avers, in substance, that, while crossing the defendant’s railroad track with a team of horses and sled, the employes of defendant negligently ran a train of cars against the team and vehicle to which they were attached, and killed one of the horses, seriously injured another, and inflicted upon plaintiff a great personal injury.

The indictment in this case charged that the defendant “ being over sixteen years of age, and the agent and servant of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation, * * * did then and there have, receive and take into his possession, by virtue of his employment * * * twelve hundred dollars, * * . * being the money of the said Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railroad Company, said defendant’s employer, and that he, (the defendant) did then and there unlawfully,…

This action, and some three other causes consolidated with it, involve the validity of certain transfers of real estate made by the defendant N. J. Ehutasel to the other defendants. The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of N. J. Ehutasel, and claims that the conveyances of the real estate in question are void, because they were madé to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of said Ehutasel.

Action in equity, with prayer for a receiver of a stock of goods belonging to the defendant W. A. Barlow, and for the establishment in favor of the plaintiff of the alleged priority of certain liens. M. B. Barlow, wife of W. A. Barlow, is made defendant, as claiming to hold a first mortgage upon the property executed to her by her husband. Certain others are made defendants, as claiming to have attachment liens upon the property.

This action was brought by the plaintiff, A. Masser, as administrator of the estate of his son Walter Masser, who was accidentally killed by one of the defendant’s trains. The plaintiff averred in his petition that the defendant was guilty of negligence in causing the death of his intestate, and the action is brought to recover damages for the injury. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict was rendered for the defendant.

<p>1. Conveyance: delivery necessary. A conveyance not delivered vests no title in the grantee.</p> <p>2. Tax Title: cannot be acquired by tenant aqainst co-tenant: illustration. S. and "W. agreed upon an exchange of homesteads, but neither title was perfect, and they employed H. to clear the titles. H. found that W.’s properly had been sold for taxes and that a tax deed was due. With W.’s money he bought in the tax certificate and procured a tax deed to be made to S., in anticipation of the exchange to be consummated, but the tax deed was not then recorded or delivered • to any one by II. Afterwards the exchange was perfected by the execution of the proper deeds, and all the conveyances, including the tax deed, were filed for record at the same time. The deed from W. was dictated by S., and conveyed the property affected thereby to S. and wife during their joint lives, and afterwards to the survivor, in fee-simple absolute. S.’s wife survived him. An actual exchange of homesteads was made about six weeks prior to final conveyances. Held that S. and wife were joint tenants, and that the tax title acquired by S. was only a fortification of the title conveyed by W. to him and his wife, and that, after his death, his widow took the whole property under the deed from W.</p>

' Appeal from Mahaska District Oowrb. The defendants were convicted of the crime of breaking and entering a store building in the night time with intent to commit a larceny, and they appeal from the judgment pronounced against them. Phillips db Greer, for defendants. A. J. Baker, Attorney-general, for the State.

<p>I. Criminal Law: new trial: newly discovered evidence: cumulative. Newly-discovered evidence which is merely cumulative is no ground for a new trial.</p>

This action is brought by two minor children, by their guardian, E. Wescott, against Mary A. Howell and others, who are children and heirs of Jesse Bowen, deceased. The plaintiffs claim that they also are children and heirs of Bowen, and they bring this action to establish their right as such heirs. They also pray for a decree setting aside an alleged deed purporting to be made by tbe deceased to Mary A. Howell and others of his children.

TnE plaintiff, Elizabeth W. Ten Eyck, is the owner of 160 acres of land in Hamilton county, of which the defendants, Olof Sjoburg and his wife, wrongfully hold possession. The action is brought to obtain an injunction to prevent the defendants from occupying the premises. An application for a preliminary injunction was made to the Honorable H. C. Henderson, district judge, at chambers, and an order for such injunction was granted.

Action for the recovery of specific personal property. Defendant is sheriff of Franklin county, and he seized, the property in controversy on a writ of attachment issued in the suit of the Citizens Bank of Hampton against Nicholas J. Rhutasel. Plaintiff is the wife of Nicholas J. Ehutasel,-and she claims the property under a chattel mortgage executed by her husband to secure an alleged indebtedness.

The petition states that P. R. Baldwin & Co., of which partnership plaintiff was a member, were the agents of the defendant under a contract, not in writing, for the sale of farm machinery; that for his services defendant received a note executed by one McLaughlin, the amount of which, by reason of certain matters stated in the petition, the plaintiff seeks to recover in this action.

The plaintiff is administrator of the estate of George Ware, •deceased. This action was brought to recover $200, and interest, upon a promissory note made by the defendants, and payable to said George Ware or bearer.

Action to recover for injuries done to a pair of horses owned by plaintiff by an engine operated upon defendant’s railroad striking them at a highway crossing. The circuit court directed the jury to return a verdict for defendant, on the ground that the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff contributed to the injury. From a judgment upon the verdict plaintiff, appeals.

Plaintiee’s intestate obtained a judgment against the defendant, Lanning, on which execution issued, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company was garnished thereon as a supposed debtor of the defendant. The garnishee answered, admitting that it was indebted to defendant in an amount greater than that of plaintiff’s judgment.

Action to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff by reason of a horse which the plaintiff was driving becoming frightened at.a hole in a county bridge, and, by backing, causing a buggy in which the plaintiff was seated to be precipitated down an embankment constituting an approach to the bridge. Trial by jury. Yerdict for plaintiff, and judgment. The defendant appeals.

Action in chancery to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

This is an action at law upon the official bond of the defendant Dolan, given for security for the faithful performanee of liis duties as a notary public.

Action for a divorce on the ground that defendant has been guilty of such inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of plaintiff. Decree for the plaintiff' dissolving the bonds of matrimony, and allowing the defendant $200 alimony for counsel fees and expenses. The defendant appeals.

Plaintiff brought this action in equity to recover the price of certain lightning-rods which he alleges he furnished and erected upon defendant’s dwelling-house and barns, under a written contract, and to foreclose a mechanic’s lien therefor. The district court entered judgment in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff’s petition. Defendant appeals.

<p>1. Will: interpretation: error in describing- land. Where a testator, in attempting to dispose of his land, devised to his wife the undivided two-thirds of the “ S. of the E. of section 10,” but he did not own all of the land so described, but did own the S. of the S. E. }4 of section 10, and to substitute “S. E. for ‘‘E. ¡4” would not only limit the devise to the land which he owned, but, taken with another devise in the will, would dispose of all his real estate, held that the substitution should be made in interpreting the will.</p> <p>2.--: substitute por widow's third. A widow cannot take a portion of her deceased husband’s real estate under the will, and also her distributive share under the statute, when to do so would be to take all the real estate and defeat a devise to a daughter of a portion thereof.</p>

This is a proceeding to establish a lost corner. A commissioner was appointed, who made a survey, took evidence, and made a report which included the evidence taken. The plaintiff moved the court to set aside the report and refer the case back to the commissioner. This motion was overruled, and the report confirmed. The plaintiff appeals.

Action upon a promissory note. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

Action to enjoin a. nuisance caused by tbe defendants’ selling and keeping for sale intoxicating liquors contrary to law. Erom an order made by the district court the plaintiffs appeal.

Action to recover for rent of land. The defendant denied that he owed the plaintiff. He also pleaded a counter-claim. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff for nine dollars, and the costs of the suit were taxed to the defendant. Afterwards the plaintiff moved to apportion the costs. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant appeals.

<p> Appeal firom Wright Oirouit Court. </p> <p>Action at law. Trial by jury. Judgment for plaintiff, and both parties appeal.</p>

Habeas Corpus. Upon a hearing of the cause, it was adjudged that plaintiff be remanded to the custody of defendant, the sheriff and jailer of the county. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion. Plaintiff appeals.

<p>X. Tax Sale and Deed: notice to redeem: “blanket” notice not sufficient. A published notice of the expiration of the time of redemption from a tax sale, which is addressed to several different persons and affects several distinct tracts of land supposed to be owned by such persons severally, is insufficient to cut off the right of redemption, or to support a tax deed as to one of the tracts. White v. Smith, ante, p. 818, followed.</p> <p>2. Tax Deed:. who may question. One who claims under a tax deed, though his claim may not be good as against a prior owner, has sufficient interest to entitle him to question the validity of a subsequent tax title. Section 897 of the Code was designed only to prevent the interference of strangers.</p> <p>4. -:-: payment of taxes due: pleading. Section 897 of the Code does not require that before one may question the validity of a tax title he must pay to the holder of such title the taxes paid by him on the land, but only those taxes in which the public is concerned. (Taylor v. Ormsby, 66 Iowa, 109.) Whether the payment of such taxes should be averred in a petition for redemption, qutere.</p>

Action in chancery to quiet the title of plaintiff in certain lands. The defendants separately answered the petition, and set up claims for relief in separate cross-bills, to all of which demurrers were sustained; and, defendants refusing to plead further, a decree was entered against all of the defendants granting the relief prayed by plaintiff. Defendants appeal.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover double the value of one colt and two steers, which he alleges were killed by a locomotive aud train of cars on defendant’s railway track at a point where it had the right to fence.

Appeal from Montgomery District Court Action upon a policy of fire insurance. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered 'for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Ti-ie defendant was charged with peddling goods within the limits of the incorporated town of Spencer without having procured a license to do so, as provided by an ordinance of the town. He was tried in the mayor’s court, and convicted. Thereupon he appealed to the district court, and upon trial, at the conclusion of the evidence, the court dismissed the action, for the reason, as alleged, that the prosecution had failed to establish the fact that the defendant was a peddler.

Action to recover specific personal property which had been seized by the sheriff under and by virtue of a writ of attachment. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and the plaintiffs appeal.

<p> Appeal from Winnebago District Court. </p> <p>This is an action for the foreclosure of two mortgages upon certain real estate. There was a decree for the plaintiff. Defendant A. N. Brones, administrator of Peter Lewis, one of the defendants, appeals.</p>

Action at law to recover rent for a store-room. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Appeal from Bttena Vista Circuit Cou/rt. Action at law. The court directed the jury to find for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

This was a proceeding before the board of supervisors to establish a highway. The supervisors established the road on condition that the petitioners pay all costs, and the damages assessed to plaintiff and others, amounting to $650. Upon appeal to the circuit court by defendant, the cause was dismissed, on the ground that no notice of the appeal was served upon the county auditor as required by law. Defendants appeal to this court.

Action to recover for taxes alleged to have been wrongfully collected by the defendant. There was a trial to the court, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. *

The plaintiffs bring tbis action as assignees of one Moore, and of one Flageolle, who, it is averred, performed labor for the defendant city in filling certain streets to grade, for which labor, it is averred, the defendant became_ indebted to the plaintiffs’ assignors.

Plaintiee brought this action originally to recover the amount of certain costs which had been taxed against defendants in a number of actions brought and prosecuted for them in the circuit court of the United States by plaintiffs, who are attorneys at law, and for which plaintiffs had become responsible as sureties on the cost bonds filed in the causes.

Plaintiff brought this action to recover a sum of money which she alleges defendant received on an order which she delivered to him. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Action oe replevin. A demurrer to plaintiff’s petition being overruled, and defendant declining to plead further, a judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action by an attorney to recover compensation for services rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding. A demurrer to the petition was overruled. Defendant appeals. The amount in controversy being less than $100, it was sent to this court upon questions of law certified by the judge of the circuit court.

alo Alto Circuit Cou/rt This action was commenced before a justice of the peace. Plaintiff claimed $7.37 for labor performed and materials furnished for plastering a building. Defendants filed an answer in which they admitted $6.81 of plaintiff’s claim. They also pleaded a counter-claim, one item of which was for $55, as damages for the negligent and unskillful manner in which they alleged plaintiff had performed a certain job of work which he had contracted to do for them.

Action in equity on an account for building materials, and for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien. The petition alleges that the materials were furnished under a contract with defendants, who were partners in the erection of the building in which it was used, and that said building was erected on a lot of which defendant Burt was in possession under a contract for the purchase thereof.

Action to recover damages for slanderous words spoken by defendant of and concerning the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded a general denial, mitigating circumstances, and jusification. Trial by jury, verdict for plaintiff, and judgment. The defendant appeals.

Action of replevin. There was a judgment upon a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

This action was brought by the plaintiff, Minnie Mielenz, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of defamatory words spoken by the defendant, and also damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of defamatory words published in writing by the defendant. There ivas a trial to a jury, and a verdict was rendered for $1,250. Judgment having been rendered upon the verdict, the defendant appeals.

Action for a personal injury. There was a trial to a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

<p> Appeal from Van Burén District Court. </p> <p>Action on a fire insurance policy. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.</p>

Action for the abatement of a nuisance, and for the recovery of damages caused thereby. The defendant answered that the matters alleged in the petition had been adjudicated in a former action between the parties. The verdict and judgment were for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

Action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s son, who was killed in the coal mine of the defendant because of the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial by jury. Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant

Action for tbe recovery of damages on account of an injury to a building belonging to plaintiff caused, as is alleged, by water which fell from the roof of defendant’s building upon plaintiff’s premises. Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

<p> Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court </p> <p>Action at law. Trial by jury. J udgment for the plaintiff and defendant appeals.</p>