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68 Me. 232

Allum v. Perry

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided June 1, 1878

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1878-06-01

On exceptions. Assumpsit, on a negotiable promissory note signed by the defendant, payable to the order of the plaintiff three months after date, and not indorsed. The defendant testified that the note was given in part payment for a horse sold and warranted sound, which turned out to be worthless, and that the consideration had failed.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““the declarations or acts relied upon must have induced the party seeking to enforce an estoppel to do what resulted to his detriment, and what he would not otherwise have done.” (Emphasis added) Allum v. Perry, 68 Me. 232, 234 (1878).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Martin v. Prudential Insurance

Relies on Lancaster National Bank v. Taylor

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1878-06-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently July 1990

7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Appleton, O. J.

¶1It was in proof from both parties, and without contradiction, that the note in suit was given in part payment of a horse, sold by the defendant to the plaintiff; that, shortly after it was given, the plaintiff sold the same to Daniel Page for value ; that, before the sale, Page called on defendant to inquire about *234the note, who said'it was good and would be paid; that, before its maturity, Page sold the note to Samuel D. Hurd, for whose benefit this suit is prosecuted; that Hurd, before purchasing, called on the defendant, who reiterated his previous assurances that the note was good and would be paid, and that thereafter he purchased the same.

¶2The defendant offered to show there was fraud in the sale of the horse, which the court excluded, ruling that the defendant, by his acts and declarations, was estopped from setting up the defense of fraud.

¶3The assignment and delivery of a promissory note before maturity, without indorsement, gives to the assignee only the rights of the payee. Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Maine, 468. It is so, though taken in good faith and for value. Lancaster National Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 18.

¶4The only ground upon which the plaintiff in interest can recover is that the defendant, by his acts and declarations, is estopped to set up that there was fraud in the inception of the note. Upon this branch of the case, the instructions given were too broad.

¶5It does not appear that the defendant knew that the plaintiff in interest, or his assignor, had any intention of purchasing the note in suit, or would be likely to act upon any statements he might make. He is not to be estopped by casual answers made to persons who have no interest in the subject matter of their inquiries. “ Certainly,” remarks Metcalf, J., in Pierce v. Andrews, 6 Cush. 4, “no one can be estopped by a deceptive answer to a question, which he may rightfully deem impertinent and propounded by a meddling intruder.”

¶6It does not appear that the plaintiff in interest was induced to purchase in consequence of what the defendant said ; and if not, there would be no estoppel. To create an estoppel in pais, the declarations or acts relied upon must have induced the party seeking to enforce an estoppel to do what resulted to his detriment, and what he would not otherwise have done. If his action was not changed by what was said he has no cause of complaint.

¶7Exceptions sustained.

Walton, Daneorth, Virgin, Peters and Libbey, JJ., concurred.
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