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69 Me. 381

Peirce v. Bent

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided April 21, 1879

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1879-04-21

Facts agreed. On motion, filed by said Peirce to have an off-set of judgments, the one against tlie other, so far as the smaller goes, except the costs due the attorneys. The facts are as follows : On the 19th day of May, 1873, said John P. Bent brought his action of trover against said Waldo T. Peirce, for the wrongful and unlawful conversion of two promissory notes of hand for $600 and interest, each dated January 6, 1873.

Relies on Greene v. Hatch · Goodenow v. Buttrick

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1879-04-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 1998

7 state decisions

401879188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Walton, J.

¶1It is well settled, both in England and in this country, that judgments in cross actions may be set off, the one against the other, when the parties in interest are the same, on motion addressed to the court in which one or both of the actions is pending. If the amounts are equal, both will be satisfied. If *386the amounts are unequal, the smaller will be satisfied in full, and the larger to the extent of the smaller, and an execution will issue for the balance. Such a set-off will not be allowed to defeat an attorney’s lien for his costs ; but his lien extends only to the taxable costs. An assignment will not defeat the right of setoff if both causes of action existed at the time the assignment was made. An assignee can have no rights which the assignor did not have ; and if the right of set-off had attached at the time of the assignment (as it always does when both causes of action have then matured), the assignee must take the demand cum onere,— with the right of set-off still clinging to it. Nor will it make any difference that one of the judgments is against a principal and his sureties. A judgment in favor of the principal alone may be applied in satisfaction of one against him and his sureties. And the right of set-off in this class of cases is not dependent upon statutory law. It exists at common law. All of these propositions are sustained by adjudged cases as well as the leading text books. The cases are too numerous for citation. A few only are referred to. Mitchell v. Oldfield, 4 Term Rep. 123. Glaister v. Hewer, 8 T. R. 69. Barker v. Braham, 2 W. Black. 869. Simpson v. Hadley, 1 M. & S. 696. Bridges v. Smith, 8 Bing. 29. Goodenow v. Buttrick, 7 Mass. 140. Greene v. Hatch, 12 Mass. 195. Winslow v. Hathaway, 1 Pick. 211. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Rider, 22 Pick. 210. Moody v. Towle, 5 Maine, 415. Burnham v. Tucker, 18 Maine, 179. Hooper v. Brundage, 22 Maine, 460. Prince v. Fuller, 34 Maine, 122. New Haven Copper Co. v. Brown, 46 Maine, 418. Chit. Gen. Prac., Title, Set-off. Howe’s Prac. 350. 2 Par. on Con., Title, Set-off, 242. Brown v. Hendrickson, Am. L. Reg. for Oct., 1877, 619.

¶2The right to have the set-off moved for in these cases made is unquestionable. All possible objections to it are fully answered by the foregoing propositions, and the authorities cited in support of them.

¶3Set-off ordered as moved for.

Appleton, C. J., Barrows, Danforts, Peters and Libbey, JJ., concurred.
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