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695 F.2d 551

Docket No. 82-5378

Archambault v. United Computing Systems, Inc.

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Jan. 14, 1983.

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1983-01-14

<p>Non-Argument Calendar.</p>

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[t]he findings of the special master are entitled to the same deference as those of the typical factfinder.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Sherri Ad Etc et al. v. Wn Kirby et al.

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 29 U.S.C. § 626 (§ 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967)

Relies on Bonner v. City of Prichard · Pullman-Standard v. Swint · Nettles v. Wainwright

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1983-01-14

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently February 2009

8 federal appellate ·

50198319902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Non-Argument Calendar.

¶2Joseph Egan, Jr., Pilacek, Egan, Cohen & Williams, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

¶3Michael G. Williamson, Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, Fla., Byron J. Beck, Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant-appellee.

¶4Before RONEY, VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6In this age discrimination suit brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1), a magistrate served as a special master under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(2), apparently with the consent of the parties. The findings of such a special master are entitled to the same deference as those of the typical factfinder, reviewable by a district court under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed. R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.”). Contrast this with the designation of a magistrate to conduct hearings under 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) where, on objection to the magistrate’s findings, the district court must “make a de novo determination.” E.g., Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc).

¶7The magistrate here made an express finding of discrimination. The district court correctly reviewed that finding under the then law of this Circuit which provided that discrimination was an issue of *552“ultímate fact” to which the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review did not apply. E.g., Thompson v. Leland Police Department, 633 F.2d 1111, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980); East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 338-39 (5th Cir.1975); Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir.1975).1 Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court rejected this Circuit’s approach, concluding that a finding of discrimination is reviewable only for clear error. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 282, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1787, 72 L.Ed.2d 66, 78-79 (1982). Although Swint concerned Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), there is no reason to distinguish between findings under the two statutes for appellate review purposes. Cf. Smith v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 650 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir.1981) (in a pre-Swint decision, viewing the existence of age discrimination under the ADEA as an issue of ultimate fact, like the existence of race or other discrimination under Title VII).

¶8We therefore must remand to the district court for reconsideration of the magistrate’s finding of discrimination in light of the standard of review set forth in Swint.

¶9VACATED AND REMANDED.

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