Volume 7 — Customs Court Reports

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstracts 38595 and 38865.</p>

<p>1. Construction of Paragraph 144, Tariff Act of 1913 — Statutes Construed as Written when Possible.</p> <p>The words “antimony oxide, salts and compounds of” in paragraph 144, tariff act of 1913, are plain and unambiguous. It is not apparent that they are either inoperative or in conflict with other provisions indicating a congressional intent at variance with the chosen phrase, and it can not be said that Congress intended a comma after “antimony.”</p> <p>2. Antimony Sulphide, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Antimony sulphide is not a salt or compound of. antimony oxide, and can not be dutiable under paragraph 144, tariff act of 1913; not being more specifically provided for elsewhere, it is relegated to the residuary provision for chemical salts and. compounds in paragraph 5.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38109.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7792 (T. D. 35798).</p>

<p>1. Stab Anise Seed, How Classifiable. '</p> <p>The crude seed of the star anise, a plant totally different from the anise, is not dutiable as “anise seed”; or, its oil being obtained by distillation and not expression, as “other oil seeds,” under paragraph 212, tariff act of 1913; but admissible free as “drugs, such as * * * seeds (aromatic, not garden seeds), * * * which are natural and uncompounded drugs and not edible * * * and are in a crude state,” under paragraph 477.</p> <p>2. N. S. P. F. Clause in Each of Two Competing Paragraphs, Effect of.</p> <p>The presence of the n. s. p. f. clause in each of two competing paragraphs leaves their relative applicability the same as if these words had not been employed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7791 (T. D. 35797).</p>

<p>1 Construction — Paragraph 356, Tariff Act op 1913.</p> <p>The words “composed of metal,” in the fourth clause of paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, do not modify “jewelry” in the first. — Mamluck & Co. et al. v. United States (6 Ct Oust. Appls., 556; T. D. 36198).</p> <p>2. Commercial Designation — Meaning op Words — Presumption</p> <p>Commercial designation is a matter of fact, not within the judicial knowledge, and the collector’s finding is presumptively correct. The interpretation of words of common speech, however, seems to be a matter of law and within the judicial knowledge.</p> <p>3. Legislative History — Jewelry—Beads and Articles Made op Beads.</p> <p>Th'e language of successive tariff acts shows that Congress has regarded beads and articles made of beads as separate tariff entities from jewelry.</p> <p>4. Articles op Personal Adornment Only — Jewelry.</p> <p>Jewelry may be useful as well as ornamental, and all articles of personal adornment are not jewelry.</p> <p>5.' Administrative Practice as to Beads and Beaded Articles.</p> <p>The practice of the Treasury Department has been, until recently, to classify beads and beaded articles separately from jewelry.</p> <p>6. Imitation .Jet — Jewelry.</p> <p>Congress has regarded imitation jet articles as separate from jewelry. — United States v. Beierle (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 457; T. D..31506).</p> <p>7. Imitations of Precotos Stones and Precious Metals.</p> <p>Necklaces and chains in imitation of precious stones and precious metals are commonly characteristic of jewelry.</p> <p>8. Construction — Paragraph 333, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913, is exhaustive as to its subject matter — beads and spangles and articles'made wholly or in chief value of them. It can be invaded only by some other 'dearly and .more specifically expressed intention of Congress.</p> <p>9. Jewelry.</p> <p>Jewelry is commonly composed of the predous metals or imitations thereof, or of precious or semiprecious stones, pearls, or imitations thereof, or cameos, coral, or amber, including artificial, synthetic, or reconstructed pearls, rubies, or other precious stones, strung or set.</p> <p>10. Commercial Designation — Common Understanding.</p> <p>The caprice of fashion or the advantages of trade may vary commercial designations, while common acceptance may remain the same.</p> <p>11. Amber — Jewelry.</p> <p>Inasmuch as Congress, in paragraph 357, tariff act of 1913, has not classed amber' as a precious or semiprecious stone or material for use in the manufacture of jewelry, and in paragraph 356 has expressly avoided its enumeration among the imitations of settings rated at 60 per cent, the purpose seems obvious not to have so rated for duty imitations of amber.</p> <p>12. Beaded Necklaces "Without Beal or Imitation Precious Metals or Beal</p> <p>or Imitation Precious or Semiprecious Stones, How Dutiable. Necklaces, with or without base metal.clasps, in chief.value'of'beads, the beads being made of.wood, gelatin, 'or paste, and'china.or colpréd.glass, some in imitation of jet And''amber, áre' dutiable' as artideV in chief valué of beads under paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913, and not as jewelry under paragraph 356.</p>

<p>1. Handkerchiefs, Embroidered or Scalloped, How Dutiable — Relative Specificity.</p> <p>With, reference to embroidered or scalloped, hemmed or unhemmed, linen or cotton handkerchiefs, paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913 (“handkerchiefs, * * * embroidered * * * or ⅜ * * scalloped, * * * of whatever yarns, threads, or filaments composed ”), is more specific than paragraph 255 (“handkerchiefs * * * composed of cotton”), or paragraph 282 (“handkerchiefs composed of flax ”), and classifies them for duty.</p> <p>2. Construction — One Paragraph Construed in the Light op Others.</p> <p>A comparative reading of all the handkerchief paragraphs shows that paragraph 358 takes from all the others all embroidered or scalloped handkerchiefs.</p> <p>3. Construction — Paragraph 358, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>In paragraph 358 both “handkerchiefs” and “all articles or fabrics” are modified by “embroidered” and “scalloped,” and an unfinished embroidered or scalloped handkerchief, even if not far enough advanced to be a handkerchief, would be dutiable thereunder.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38555.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38223.</p>

<p>1. Pleading — Protest—Multifariousness.</p> <p>The board of general appraisers may not, sua sponte, dismiss a protest for multifariousness.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 167, Tariff Act of 1913 — “ Plated.”</p> <p>The last clause of paragraph 167, tariff act of 1913, taxing articles or wares of certain metals when not plated with gold or silver, excludes from its operation not only such articles as are entirely plated but also such as have a substantial portion of their surfaces plated, and relegates them to the provision in the same paragraph for articles or wares plated with gold or silver.</p> <p>3. Gold or Silver Plated Hand Bag or Purse Frames, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Hand bag or purse frames with a substantial portion of their surfaces plated with gold or silver are dutiable under the first clause of paragraph 167, tariff act of 1913, as “ articles or wares plated with gold or silver ” at 30 per cent ad valorem, and not under the last clause as metal articles not plated with gold or silver at 20 per cent ad valorem.</p> <p>*4. Wares in Chief Value of Glass, with Gold or Silver Plated Trimming, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Penholder racks or stands in chief value of glass, with gold or silver plated metal rims, are dutiable as manufactures of glass, under paragraph 95, tariff act of 1913, and not as gold or silver plated metal articles under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38064.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7762 (T. D. 35627).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 37852.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 37866.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38904.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7814 (T. D. 35896).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers. Abstract 389f>3.</p>

<p>1. “Composed Wholly op” — Lacquered Articles.</p> <p>An article made of metal and coated with lacquer for purposes of preservation and appearance is “composed wholly of” that metal within the meaning of paragraph 158, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Base-Metal Safety Pins and Hair Pins Coated With Lacquer, How Dutiable.</p> <p>The fact that pins answering to the description of paragraph 158, tariff act of 1913, are coated with lacquer does not take them without the operation of the words “composed wholly of” certain named metals in that paragraph and make them dutiable as manufactures of wire under paragraph 114.</p>

<p>1. Construction.</p> <p>The fact that the Board of United States General Appraisers had decided the expression “semivitrified,” as applied to tiles, tariff act of 1897, to be “indefinite, meaningless, and incapable of a uniform understanding” does not justify a conclusion that, by repeating the expression in the tariff acts of 1909 and 1918, Congress •deliberately continued to use the term as one which was “indefinite, meaningless, and incapable of a uniform understanding.” This action by Congress should be taken to mean that, notwithstanding the board’s decision, the term in question aptly applied, at the time of the later enactments at least, to certain kinds of tiles which were known to the trade of this country. The court should not impute to Congress the deliberate use of terms known and designed by it to be “indefinite, meaningless, and incapable of a uniform understanding.”</p> <p>2. Semivitrified Tiles, How Dutiable.</p> <p>A preponderance of the evidence establishes that the term “semiyitrified,” as applied to tiles, had a well-known meaning in the trade at the time of the enactment of the tariff act of 1918 (which meaning, after all, was simply the ordinary or dictionary meaning of the word itself), and that the merchandise at bar aptly responds to it. Accordingly, it is dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 72.</p>

<p>Application for rehearing, decision rendered March 9, 1916 (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 1; T. D. 36253).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7852 (T. D. 3G1(>1).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7800 (T. D. 35844).</p>

<p>I. Relative Specificity — Manufacture of Wood Chip.</p> <p>With respect to ropings made of wood chip, paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913, (“manufactures of * ⅞ ⅜ chip”) is more specific than paragraph 176 (“manufactures of wood”).</p> <p>2. Thompson v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 37; T. D. 31590) Explained.</p> <p>This case held that baskets made of “such wood shavings as are called chip”' were dutiable eo nomine as baskets of wood, rather than as manufactures of chip. It did not hold that a manufacture of wooden chip was dutiable as a manufacture-of wood.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Collectoe’s Action Presumptively Coeeect.</p> <p>There being nothing in the record to overcome the presumed correctness of the collector’s classification of the merchandise as a manufacture of chip, under paragraph. 368, tariff act of 1913, and not as a manufacture of wood, under paragraph 176, his classification must stand.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7758 (T. D. 35595).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38383.</p>

<p>1. Construction — Medicinal Preparation, What Is.</p> <p>The fact that preparations designed to cure or alleviate, or to palliate or prevent, a disease of the human body, also afford nourishment to the patient does not necessarily exclude them from the classification of medicinal compounds or articles similar thereto (par. 17, tariff act of 1913).</p> <p>2. Construction — Change oe Language Signifies Change of Meaning.</p> <p>The addition, in the tariff acts of 1909 and 1913 to the provision for medicinal preparations already existing in former acts, of a provision for similar substances shows that Congress intended to include within paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913, certain other articles which are not strictly and exclusively medicinal, but which nevertheless possess some therapeutic value.</p> <p>3. “Malt Soup Stock” and “Food Maltose,” How Dutiable.</p> <p>Packages of less than 2⅛ pounds of Loeflund’s malt soup’ stock, a preparation of 57 per cent maltose and 12 per cent dextrin with a certain percentage of potassium carbonate, designed to be given, in combination with milk, wheat flour, and water, to marantic infants for their nourishment and to counteract their intestinal acid intoxication, are dutiable under paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913, as being similar to medicinal compounds, and not under paragraph 385 as a nonenumerated manufacture. Loeflund’s food maltose, a preparation 60 per cent dextrin'and 40 per cent maltose, designed to be given to patients in enfeebled states the result of malnutrition, is subject to the same classification.</p>

<p>1. Construction — Paragraphs 324 and 326, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph 324, tariff act of 1913, calling for certain kinds of paper, “by whatever names known,” includes typewriter paper of such kinds and prevents it from being dutiable as typewriter paper under paragraph 326.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Collector’s,Classification Presumptively Correct.</p> <p>There is not sufficient evidence in this record to overcome the presumed correctness of the collector’s classification of the merchandise as imitation parchment paper under paragraph 324, tariff act of 1913, and not as typewriter paper under paragraph 326.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39343.</p>

<p>Tea Sweepings Mixed with Lime and Asafetida, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Tea sweepings, when mixed with lime and asafetida to make them unfit for beverage use, imported for making caffeine, have not ceased to be tea sweepings. The mixture is not classifiable as a drug under either paragraph 27 or 477, tariff act of 1913; as waste not specially provided for, under paragraph 384; or as a nonenumerated article under paragraph 385. Whether or not the merchandise may be considered as segregable mixed goods is not decided; but, in the absence of any such claim or evidence by which segregation might be made, its classification as tea sweepings under paragraph 13 is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38766.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38696.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7810 (T. D. 35880).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39169.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38383.</p>

<p>1. Undervaluation — Paragraph I op Section 3, Taripf Act op 1913.</p> <p>■When zinc ore was entered, in accordance with, the estimate on the consular invoice as being 40 per cent zinc, and the subsequent official assay showed 46.6 per cent zinc, there was no undervaluation such as would subject it to the “additional duty” provisions of paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913. But when the entry stated the market value of the zinc in a ton of 40 per cent zinc ofe to be less than the consular invoice showed, less than the price stated for it in the contract under which it was purchased, and less than the true market value as found by the appraiser, there was.</p> <p>2. Construction — Paragraph N, Subsection 1, Section 4, and Paragraph I op Section 3, Taripp Act op 1913.</p> <p>The fact that zinc ore was entered for rewarehousing to be smelted and the zinc exported does not relieve it of the additional duty incurred under paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, for undervaluation, since paragraph N, subsection 1, section 4, provides that the amount of the duties payable upon such imported ores at the time of their importation shall stand charged against the bonds of the bonded warehouses, and that the metals producible from the bonded ores or any portion thereof may be withdrawn for domestic consumption upon the payment of the duties chargeable against an equivalent amount of ores from which said metals would be producible in their condition as imported. Especially is this true in view of the provision of paragraph I, that the additional duties levied thereunder shall not be refunded “in case of exportation of the merchandise, or on any other account, nor shall they be subject-to the benefit of drawback.”</p> <p>3. Clerical Error, Manifest, What Not.</p> <p>An understatement of the market value per ton of zinc ore, varying from the consular invoice and from the price stated in the contract for purchasing it, the arithmetical extension in the entry being correctly made upon the basis of the declared price per ton, declared number of tons, and declared percentage of zinc content, is not manifest clerical error within the meaning of paragraph Y of section 3> tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>4. Construction — Paragraph 162, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>The fact that paragraph 162, tariff act of 1913, provides a special method of appraising zinc ores does not relieve them from being entered upon invoice as other importations, nor dofes it relieve their importer from the consequences of undervaluation.</p>

<p>Evidence — Pbesumption in Favor of Collector.</p> <p>The evidence in this case being in such hopeless conflict that the court is unable to decide any question of law or fact presented, nothing is possible, under the rule that the burden is on the appellant to establish the material allegations of his protest by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, except to affirm the decision of the Board of General Appraisers sustaining the decision of the collector.</p>

<p>Imitation Jet Bead Necklaces. How Dutiable.</p> <p>Necklaces substantially of imitation jet beads with imitation jet pendents are not dutiable as jewelry, under paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, but as beaded articles, under paragraph 333. — United States v. Beierle (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 457; T. D. 31506), and American Bead Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 18; T. D. 36259).</p>

D. 34279) and Abstract 38196. [Modified. — The opinion is on application for rehearing, the decision having been rendered March 28, 1916, and not published.]

<p>Applications for rehearing, decision in 1601 rendered March 9, 1916 (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 18; T. D. 36259); and that in 1619, March 28,1916 (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 156; ' T. D. 36463).</p>

<p>1. A Trawl is Equipment For, not Part op, a Vessel.</p> <p>A trawl is not a part o/the vessel which draws it, but is equipment for the vessel.</p> <p>2. Trawls por Repairs not Admissible Free op Duty.</p> <p>Trawls imported for repairs are not admissible free of duty as original equipment of American vessels under subsection 5 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, or as repair parts of such vessels under subsection 6 of that paragraph.</p>

<p>1. Construction — Relative Specificity' — Paragraphs 93 and 94, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>If a projection lens mounted in its frame and ready for use be regarded as an optical instrument, its frame and mountings are none the less the frame and mountings of a projection lens; and, as “frames and mountings” for projection lenses are specifically provided for in paragraph 94, tariff act of 1913, that provision must be preferred for the purposes of classification to the broader enumeration, “optical instruments and frames and mountings for the same” contained in paragraph 93.</p> <p>2. “Pathescope” Frames and Mountings, How Dutiable.</p> <p>A metal structure designed to serve as a support for the motive machinery, film reels, lamp house, and projection lenses of a moving-picture machine known as a “pathescope” is not dutiable under paragraph 93, tariff act of 1913 (“optical instruments and frames and mountings for the same”), but under paragraph 94 (“projection lenses, and frames and mountings for the same”).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38257.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers (Abstract 39257).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38523.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 37056 (T. D. 35000).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39313.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7756 (T. D. 35593).</p>

<p>Cross appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7770 (T. D. 35676).</p>

<p>' Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstracts 38550, 38760, and 38765.</p>

<p>1. SPRUCE Gum.</p> <p>There being no evidence in the record that spruce gum is a drug, it can not be classified under either paragraph 27 or 477, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. EVIDENCE' — COLLECTOR'S CLASSIFICATION PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT.</p> <p>The collector’s classification of spruce gum under paragraph 27, tariff act of 1913, though erroneous, must stand when the only claim in the protest is for classification under paragraph 477, also erroneous</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39190.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION — LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SHOWING INTENT</p> <p>The language of successive tariff acts shows that Congress has always either considered the hair of the Angora goat not to be wool, or has thought it best, for purposes of greater certainty, to refer specially to it and treat it independently of wool as a subject of classification</p> <p>2. Construction — Legislative History Showing Intent.</p> <p>The history of the passage of the tariff act of 1913 indicates that Congress intended to impose a higher rate of duty upon the products, fabrics, and manufactures of the hair of the Angora goat than upon similar articles when composed of the hair of certain other animals</p> <p>3. Construction — Change of Language Signifying Change of Meaning.</p> <p>In the tariff acts of 1897 (par. 383) and 1909 (par. 395) it was provided that when the word “wool” is used in connection with a manufactured article of which it is a. component material’it shall be held to include the wool or hair of the sheep, camel, goat, alpaca, or other animal. The corresponding provision in the tariff act of 1913 (par. 304) omits the words “goat, alpaca,” and changes the broad provision “other animal” to the narrower one “other like animals.” To hold that a manufacture of wool, under the tariff act- of 1913, includes a manufacture of Angora goat hair would be to deny any meaning to this change in legislative language.</p> <p>4. Construction Aided by Context — Tautology to be Avoided.</p> <p>Paragraphs 305 to 309, inclusive, tariff act of 1913, levy duty upon the hair of the Angora goat and products, fabrics, and manufactures of it. If the term “ wool,” as used in the act in connection with manufactures, includes Angora goat hair, these provisions are unnecessary.</p> <p>5. Construction — General Description Prevails Over Eo Nomine One if Congress so Intended.</p> <p>The rule that an eó nomine designation prevails over a general description must give way to an expressed intention of Congress to the contrary.</p> <p>6. Angora G-oat Hair Coat Linings in the Piece, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Angora goat hair coat linings, not cut to form or shape, are dutiable as a manufacture of Angora goat hair under'paragraph 308, tariff act of 1913, and not as coat linings of wool under paragraph 290.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38248.</p>

<p>1. Construction — Paragraph 165, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph. 165, tariff act of 1913, though providing for machine tools, does not provide for parts of them. Norma Co. v. United States (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 89; T. D. 35338.)</p> <p>2. Attachments for Carding Machines to Grind the Teeth of the Card Clothing, How Dutiable.</p> <p>An attachment called “Dronsfield’s patent traverse wheel grinder,” designed to fit on a carding machine by means of bearings provided fcir it on the carding machine and to sharpen the teeth of the card clothing of the carding machine by the incidental use of the power which operates the carding machine, is not a machine, hut a part of one. It is not dutiable as a machine tool under paragraph 165, tariff act of 1913, but as a manufacture of metal not specially'provided for under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>1. International Railway Oar.</p> <p>An international railway may bring its cars into the United States free of duty in the due course of international and incidental local traffic only, but not to engage for any period in domestic traffic only.</p> <p>2. Railway Oar Temporarily Engaged in Domestic Traffic.</p> <p>A railway car brought into the United States and used in domestic traffic only is not saved from a dutiable status by its owner’s intention to return it ultimately to international traffic.</p> <p>3. Character op Car Not Determined by Character op Freight.</p> <p>A railway car which travels only within the United States does not acquire an international character by carrying international mail.</p> <p>4. Evidence — Sufficiency op.</p> <p>A claim in a protest that an article is in chief value of wood, against the collector’s finding that it is in chief value of metal, is sustained in this case by the uncontra-dicted testimony of a competent witness, taken with the appraiser’s advisory classification as in chief value of wood, and the fact that the Board of General Appraisers made no finding upon that issue.</p>

<p>1. Special Deputy Collector May Liquidate and Reliquidate.</p> <p>Tlie powers and duties of collectors of customs are equally vested in their special deputies; and the special deputies’ right and power to liquidate and reliquidate are without'question.</p> <p>2. Collector’s Power to Liquidate and Reliquidate.</p> <p>The power of a collector of customs to liquidate and reliquidate is vested in him by statute and unlimited except by affirmative law. This has been recognized by consistent, persistent, and continuous administrative practice, legislative enactment, and judicial decision since the institution of his office.</p> <p>3. Collector’s Power to Liquidate — Time.</p> <p>There never has been, and is not now, a time limit within which the original liquidation must be made.</p> <p>4. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate — Limitation.</p> <p>The first limitation upon the collector’s power to reliquidate was section 21 of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 186).</p> <p>5. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate When Goods Have Gone Beyond His Control.</p> <p>The power of the collector to reliquidate when the goods have gone beyond his possession or control has been administratively, legislatively, and judicially recognized from the earliest time.</p> <p>6. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate Within Year Prom Entry.</p> <p>The collector’s power to reliquidate within a year after entry has received uniform administrative, legislative, and judicial recognition prior to, and since, the passage of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 186).</p> <p>7. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate After Year From Entry in Case of Protest.</p> <p>The collector’s power to reliquidate after the expiration of a year from entry in case of protest has received uniform administrative, legislative and judicial recognition prior to, and since, the passage of the act of June 22,1874 (18 Stat. L., 186).</p> <p>8. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate Recognized in Act of March 3, 1878 (18 Stat. L., 469).</p> <p>The act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. L., 469) “restricting the refunding of customs duties,” etc., implies that the collector has an inherent general power to reliqui-date.</p> <p>9. Collector’s Power to Reliquidate After Year From Entry in Case of Fraud.</p> <p>" The collector’s power to reliquidate after the expiration of a year from entry in case of baud stands upon the same ground as in case of protest; and, like it, has received hniform administrative, legislative, and judicial recognition.</p> <p>10. Construction — “Absence of Fraud,” Section 21, Act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 186).</p> <p>The statute makes the liquidation final “in the absence of baud.” This' does not necessitate a finding of fraud by the collector to justify reliquidation, but directs him not to reliquidate in “the absence of fraud.” If he suspects fraud, he can not say that fraud is absent. A well-founded-suspicion of fraud is sufficient to move him to reliquidation.</p> <p>11. COLLECTOR'S DECISION, CONTENT OF.</p> <p>The law restricts a collector’s findings to rate and amount of duty. He can make no conclusive finding as to fraud or anything else than rate and amount of duty. A reliquidation involves nothing except a different finding as to rate and amount of duty.</p> <p>12. Construction — “Absence of Fraud,” Section 21, Act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 186).</p> <p>The words “in the absence of fraud and in the absence of protest by the owner, importer, agent, or consignee” do not restrict the fraud to the owner, importer, agent, or consignee.</p> <p>13. Evidence — Admissibility.</p> <p>In the trial before the Board of General Appraisers of a protest by F. Vitelli & Son against a reliquidation on account of fraud alleged in the original liquidation; indictments and records of acquittal in prosecutions by the United States against Joseph Vitelli for such frauds, without evidence connecting F. Vitelli & Son with Joseph Vitelli, have no probative force, and were properly excluded by the Board of General Appraisers.</p> <p>14. Collector’s Control of Fraudulent Return by Weigher.</p> <p>That a collector may set aside a fraudulent return by a weigher can not be questioned.</p> <p>15. Fraud Vitiates.</p> <p>Fraud vitiates whatever it touches, and it may be said that a liquidation induced by fraud is no liquidation, and a fraudulent weigher’s return no weigher’s return.</p> <p>16. Evidence — Presumption—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In the trial before the Board of General Appraisers of a protest against a reliqui-dation made more than a year after entry, the legal presumption is, as in all cases, that the collector of customs acted within the powers conferred upon him by law, and the burden is on the protestant to show the invalidity of the reliquidation.</p> <p>17. Evidence — Presumption—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>In the trial before the Board of General Appraisers of a protest against a reliqui-dation made more than a year after entry, evidence that the goods had been bought and sold by importers at weights greater than the entered ones, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of fraud and put upon the protestante the burden of overcoming it.</p> <p>18. Evidence — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>The burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint (protest) is on the plaintiff (protestant).</p> <p>19. Collector’s Power to Take Unofficial Evidence as to Weights.</p> <p>There is no doubt, at least in cases where the weigher did not follow the law or was guilty of fraud, that the collector can proceed, or direct the weigher to proceed, to ascertain from the accounts of merchants to whom the merchandise was sold its true weights and accordingly liquidate.</p> <p>20. Due Process of Law.</p> <p>The customs administrative procedure, in case of reliquidation for fraud more than one year after entry, gives the importer ample notice and abundant opportunity to defend. The record.shows that such notice and opportunity were had in these cases.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39605.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 333, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Tlie language “ curtains, and other articles not embroidered nor appliquéd,” paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913, does not exclude such articles as are not susceptible of being embroidered or appliquéd. — Fensterer & Ruhe v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 93; T. D. 31110) distinguished and limited.</p> <p>2. Bead Curtains, How Dutiable.</p> <p>Curtains composed in chief value of glass or rice paste beads strung on cotton threads suspended from a horizontal bar or rod are dutiable as “ curtains * * * composed wholly or in chief value qf beads ⅜ * ⅜,” paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7925 (T. D. 36528).</p>

<p>1. “Appliquéd,” Definition.</p> <p>“Appliquéd ” means ornamented with a pattern, which has beeü cut out of another color or stuff, applied or transferred to a foundation.</p> <p>2. Binding ob Edging not Appliqué.</p> <p>A silk cord attached around the edges of a comfortable as or simulating a binder or fancy edge, without being cut from another article, and without being laid on the comfortable in or to form any motif or figure, does not constitute an appliqué.</p> <p>3. Appbaiser’s Conclusion of Law.</p> <p>Classification is not the function of an appraiser, and no presumption attaches to his legal conclusions. His statement that the silk cord was “ ap-pliquéd all around the edge of the comfortable ” is his conclusion of law.</p> <p>4. Pleading, Time fob, Poem of.</p> <p>A claim for classification originating in appellant’s brief in this court, not specified in the exceptions, and not raised before and presented to the Board of United States General Appraisers, is not entitled to the consideration of this court.</p> <p>5. Five Pee Cent Discount.2</p> <p>Goods imported in American vessels are entitled to a 5 per cent tariff discount under subsection 7 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>6. Silk Comfobtables with Silk Coed Edging, how Classifiable.</p> <p>Comfortables in_ chief value of silk, edged with a silk cord, are not classifiable as appliquéd, under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, but as a manufacture of silk not specially provided for, under paragraph 318.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7850 (T. D. 36141).</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 419, TARIFF ACT'OF 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph 419, tariff act of 1913, contains no general language. Consequently, only the things named in it are classifiable under it.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 545, Tariff Act of 1913 — “ Meats.”</p> <p>Paragraph 545, tariff act of 1913, contemplates such “ meats ” only as are of everyday consumption and the subject of the meat-inspection laws of the country, its States, and municipalities.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 477, Tariff Act of 1913 — “ Drugs ”• — Similitude.</p> <p>Paragraph 477, tariff act of 1913, levies duty upon such drugs only as are named and as are like the ones named in the paragraph.</p> <p>4. Pituitary Glands, How Dutiable.</p> <p>The pituitary glands of calves, imported for the purpose of making from 'them a watery liquid hypodermically injected in obstetric work, are not classifiable under paragraph 419, tariff act of 1913, because not enumerated. The fact that they can be eaten is not sufficient to make them classifiable as “ meats ” under paragraph 545. They are not dutiable as “ drugs ” under paragraph 477, because not named and not like any of the things named in the paragraph. There is no proof identifying them with the “ antitoxins, vaccine virus, and all other serums derived from animals and used for therapeutic purposes ” of paragraph 400.- So far as is shown by the record in this case, their classification as nonenumerated unmanufactured articles under paragraph 385 must be affirmed.</p> <p>5. Use — Actual, not Possible, the Test.</p> <p>The fact that calves’ pituitary glands, actually imported for use in making a medicine and actually so used, are susceptible of being eaten is not sufficient to make them classifiable as “ meats,” under paragraph 545, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>1. Relative Specificity.</p> <p>A silk article known to the trade as a veil and as a scarf would be dutiable eo nomine as a veil under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, and not generally as silk wearing apparel under paragraph 317.</p> <p>2. Veil, Definition.</p> <p>To hold that the name veils applies only to such articles as cover and protect the face of the wearer only would be too narrow a definition of the word.</p> <p>3. Veils — -Automobile and Chiffon Veils — Automobile Scakfs.</p> <p>Long and narrow light-textured silk fabrics, known variously in the trade as veils, scarfs, automobile and chiffon veils, and automobile scarfs, chiefly used by women as a covering for their hats or faces or both while riding in automobiles or, in the evening, to cover their heads and keep their hair intact or to throw around their shoulders, are dutiable eo nomine as veils under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, and not generally as wearing apparel under paragraph 317.</p>

<p>Cross appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7811 (T. D. 85881).</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPHS 203, TARIFF ACT OF 1909. AND 169, TARIFF ACT of 1913 — “Am Other Cabinet Woods.”</p> <p>In paragraphs 203, tariff; act of 1909, and 169, tariff act of 1913, Congress levied duty upon certain and all-sawed forms of specified woods, in wliicJi oak is not included, and all “ cabinet woods not further manufactured than sawed.” Manifestly what are “ cabinet woods ” besides the ones named is left to common understanding or proof. In view of the well-known and multitudinous uses to which oak is.devoted we can not say as a matter of common knowledge that all oak is a cabinet wood. — United States v. Mitsui & Co. (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 449; T. D. 33876).</p> <p>2. Cabinet Wood — Japanese White-Oak Lumber.</p> <p>The fact that railroad ties are cut from Japanese white oak is not sufficient to prevent Japanese white-oak lumber from being cabinet wood. The evidence shows that the larger portion of Japanese white-oak lumber introduced into-the commerce of this country is used as cabinet wood; and, upon the evidence in this case, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining the collector’s classification of this sawed Japanese white oak as-cabinet wood under paragraph 203, tariff act of 1909, of 169, tariff act of 1913, is affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 391, Tariff Act or 1913 — Chief Use — Sugar-Manufacturing Machinery.</p> <p>The language, “ machinery for use in the manufacture of sugar,” paragraph 391, tariff act of 1913, refers to the chief use made of such machinery when imported, and not to the use made of a particular importation.</p> <p>2. Machinery Imported for Sugar-Making Use, but Chiefly Used Otherwise.</p> <p>Two centrifugal machines and a pump and tank for use in connection with them were imported for use in the manufacture of sugar, and are being actually so used. It was shown, however, that about 90 per cent of such machines are used otherwise. They are dutiable under the residuary provision for manufactures of metal, paragraph 167, tariff act of 1913, and not admissible free of duty as machinery for use in the manufacture of sugar, paragraph 391.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7922 (T. D. 36501)„</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Weight of — Pbestjmption.</p> <p>Where the evidence consisted of the testimony of 11 competent and credible witnesses, 6 for the importer and 5 for the Government, all of the importer’s witnesses being in substantial agreement with each other and 4 of the Government’s being at variance with each other as to the considerations upon which they based their testimony, this court would not be justified in saying that the Board of United States General Appraisers erred in holding that the importer had established his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Pbestjmption — Collector's Action Presumptively Cobbect.</p> <p>Where an invoice, required by the Treasury Department’s regulation pursuant to paragraph 656, tariff act of 1913, to be certified before the American consul, consisted of two sheets seeming in themselves to be parts of the same document, and had the certificate on the first sheet only, the certificate attaches presumably to both sheets as one document. Having been so accepted and passed on without objection by the collector in the line of his official duty, this court must presume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the form it had when filed with him was the form it had when submitted to the consul.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39618.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7888( T. D..36342).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7920 (T. D. 304S7).</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph I op Section 3, Tariff Act op 1913 — Entered Higher than Market Value.</p> <p>The addition by the importer of a certain sum to the invoice value, with a certificate to the effect that the addition was made to make market value as indicated by the appraiser’s advance in similar cases and that his action was taken pursuant to paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, was not a compliance with the paragraph, since it required him to certify that the entered value was higher than the market value (which he did not do) and provided that his action should appear to be taken after due diligence and inquiry (which did not appear).</p>

<p>1. Evidence.</p> <p>A British tariff regulation, quoted and referred to in brief of counsel, but not offered or received in evidence, can not be considered as evidence.</p> <p>2. Denatured Tea Sweepings — Segregation—Evidence—Presumption in Favor of Collector’s Classification.</p> <p>The presumption of correctness attaching to the collector’s classification of denatured tea sweepings (a mixture of tea sweepings, lime, and asafetida) as an entirety (tea sweepings) under paragraph 13, tariff act of 1913, is not overcome by a claim that the lime content is dutiable separately, unless it be shown that the lime and tea sweepings have each maintained their identity in the mixture, and unless it be shown how much is tea sweepings and how much is lime.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7848 (T. D. 36116).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 38869.</p>

<p>1. Shears for Pruning Vineyards and Orchards.</p> <p>Shears used exclusively for pruning vineyards and orchards come within the rule of United States v. Boker & Oo. (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 243; T. D. 35472). They and their parts are admissible free of duty as agricultural implements and parts under paragraph 391, tariff act of 1913. They are not dutiable as “shears” under paragraph 128; and bolts and nuts for them are not dutiable as bolts and nuts under paragraph 123.</p> <p>2. Construction — Intent Controls — Eo Nomine Designation — Use.</p> <p>The rule of eo nomine application is but a rule of construction designed to aid in ascertaining the legislative intent, and while of high importance, is never controlling when it clearly appears that Congress intended a particular article to be otherwise classifiable. Congress intended that those shears which are chiefly used agriculturally should not be dutiable as “shears” under paragraph 128, tariff act of 1913, but admissible free of duty as agricultural implements under paragraph 391. — Quirk v. United States (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 444; T. D. 35983) distinguished.</p> <p>3. Doubt Favors Importer.</p> <p>When the application of the recognized rules of construction leaves a point in doubt, the court should give the importer the benefit of the doubt.</p>

<p>Appesa'l from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7874 (T. D. 36229).</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Judicial Knowledge.</p> <p>The court may well take judicial notice of that which is known by all men— that the sheep which is raised by the American agriculturist furnishes for man not only food but raiment.</p> <p>2. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPHS 128 AND 391, TARIFF ÁCT OF 1913 — “SHEARS”“Agricultural Implements.”</p> <p>The classification of “shears” under paragraph 128 and “agricultural implements’ ’ under paragraph 391, tariff act of 1913, means that all shears chiefly used for agricultural purposes are classifiable under paragraph 391, and other shears under paragraph 128.</p> <p>3. Sheep Shears.</p> <p>“Sheep shears, specially designed for shearing sheep ” and shown to be exclusively used for that purpose are not dutiable as “shears” under paragraph 128, tariff act of 1913, but admissible free of duty as “agricultural implements” under paragraph 391. — United States v. Boker & Co. (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 243; T. D. 35472).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7877 (T. D. 362521.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7865 (T. D. 36193).</p>

<p>1. Legislative and Judicial Provinces.</p> <p>If a construction of a statute made necessary by the settled rules of statutory construction works a hardship, the remedy is with the legislature, not the courts.</p> <p>2. Segregation.</p> <p>It is well settled that goods claimed and invoiced as entireties may, for dutiable purposes, be segregated and the different parts rated for dutyunder separate provisions of the law applicable to such parts.</p> <p>3. Construction, Legislative Recognition op.</p> <p>In reenacting in .substantially the same words the provision for lead pencils in successive tariff acts, Congress sanctioned the administrative and judicial construction which rated them and their holders separately for dutiable purposes.</p> <p>4. Pencils op Wood with Metal Holders.</p> <p>Wooden lead pencils with metal holders are not dutiable as entireties. The pencils are dutiable as such under paragraph 378, tariff act of 1913, and the holders as metal articles under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39119.</p>

<p>Stuteed Chicks and Ducklings.</p> <p>Dried skins of chicks and ducklings with the heads and feet attached, stuffed with cotton, fitted with bead eyes and wired so as to give them a natural appearance, and having a wire attachment apparently for the purpose of fastening them to other objects as decorations, were classified by the collector as “ down dressed on the skin, * ⅜ ⅜ not suitable for use as millinery ornaments, ” paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913. The Board of General Appraisers affirmed the collector’s decision, overruling protests claiming them to be “birds and land and water fowls” (par. 416), feathers and downs not advanced (par. 347), articles manufactured in whole or in part and not provided'for (par. 385), manufactures of cotton (par. 266), and toys (par. 342). The decision of the board is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Reappraisement 84295.</p>

<p>Cross appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39351.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7855 (T. D. 36164).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7898 (T. D. 36363.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7914 (T. D. 36450.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39349.</p>

<p>1. Liquidation Pending Appeal.</p> <p>The collector has no power to liquidate pending appeal to reappraisement.</p> <p>2. Construction, Section 21, Chapter 24, Act op June 22, 1874.</p> <p>A liquidation by the collector pending appeal to reappraisement is not voidable merely, but void. Such action does not constitute a “settlement of duties ” within the purview of section 21, chapter 24, act of June 22, 1874, which provides that a settlement of duties shall be final a year after entry in the absence of fraud and in the absence of protest.</p> <p>3. Pleading — Protest—Error Unassigned.</p> <p>The alleged absence of samples of the merchandise at the time of reappraisement thereof by the board of three general appraisers may not be urged before this court when the point is not raised by the protest.</p> <p>4. Stipulation of Parties.</p> <p>The alleged absence of samples of the merchandise at the time of reappraisement thereof by the board of three general appraisers may not be urged before this court when an examination of samples by the board was expressly waived by a stipulation of the parties, duly entered of record.</p>

<p>Clerical Error — Interlined Invoice.</p> <p>The total of the itemized invoice showed a lower value and an interlineation in the invoice showed a higher one. Importers entered the merchandise at the lower figure. There is nothing in this to justify a presumption that importers did not enter the goods as they intended. “Manifest clerical error” under paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, does not appear, and the additional duty provided for by the paragraph was justly imposed.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 356, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Designed.”</p> <p>In the expression of paragraiih 356, tariff act ol 1913, “articles valued above 20 cents per dozen designed to be worn on apparel or carried on or about or attached to the person,” the words “designed to be” mean something more than susceptible of being. By the use of the word “designed” it must be assumed that Congress intended to include only such articles as were peculiarly and specially fitted lor being carried on or about the person and devoted to such use.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The court can take judicial notice that the pencils in this case, having different sizes of lead and different colors, are used by draftsmen and architects, with frequent changes from one to the other; and that ordinarily they would be laid upon the desk ready for frequent shifting from one to the other, or if placed in the pocket for convenience, could not be designed to be carried on the person.</p> <p>3. Pencils with Metal Attachment, Metal Chief Value.</p> <p>Lead pencils composed in the larger part of wood, but having an attachment of metal, the metal attachment constituting the chief value of the article, are not dutiable under paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, as “articles * ⅞ * designed to be worn on apparel or carried on or about or attached to the person, such as and including buckles,” etc. They are dutiable as manufactures of metal under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The court may take judicial notice that the chief uses to which farmers devote shovels are planting fruit trees, truck gardening, spreading fertilizer, digging potatoes, and digging and keeping in repair ditches for irrigating or drainage purposes.</p> <p>2. Shovels — Agricultural Implements.</p> <p>Long-handled, round-point polished shovels and D-handled, square-point polished shovels are shown by the evidence to be chiefly used by farmers for agricultural purposes. They are admissible free of duty as agricultural implements (par. 391, tariff act of 1913), and not dutiable as metal articles (par. 167).</p>

<p>Cross appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7710 (T. D. 35314).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 324, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Paragraph 324, tariff act of 1913, provides for two classes of papier-máché, paper, or wood boxes — (1) those “covered with any of the foregoing papers,” whether or not lined; and (2) those “covered or lined with cotton or other vegetable fiber.” It was the congressional purpose to make this part of the paragraph exclusive within its carefully prescribed scope.</p> <p>2. Construction — Relative Specificity — Legislative Intent.</p> <p>The power of Congress to select and legislate exclusively for a group of articles' and rate them for a particular duty is unquestioned; and when that purpose is clearly evidenced by all pertinent parts of the law, it becomes the duty of the courts to give effect to that intent even in cases where other competing provisions may be more specific in terms.</p> <p>3. Paper Boxes Covered with Surface-Coated Paper and Lined with Silk, Silk Chief Value.</p> <p>Paper boxes covered with surface-coated paper and lined with silk, the silk lining constituting the chief value of the merchandise, are not dutiable as manufactures in chief value of silk (par. 318, tariff act of 1913), but as “all boxes of paper * * * covered with any of the foregoing papers” (par. 324), by reason of the obvious purpose of Congress to make that provision exclusive.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A.'7916 (T. D. 36452).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 349, Tariff Act of 1913 — Express Exception Excludes Others.</p> <p>The language of paragraph 349, tariff act of 1913, “fans of all kinds, except common palm-leaf fans,” means that all fans except common palm-loaf fans are dutiable under that paragraph, even though they may respond also to the description of some other.</p> <p>2. Relative Specificity — -Embroidered Silk Fans.</p> <p>With respect to embroidered silk fans, paragraph 349, tariff act of 1913 (“fans of all kinds, except common palm-leaf fans”), is more specific than paragraph 358 (“articles * ⅝ ⅜ embroidered * ⅜ * by whatever name known”), and classifies them for duty.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39742.</p>

<p>CONSTRUCTION, ARTICLES 572 AND 573, CUSTOMS REGULATIONS OR 1908.</p> <p>Articles 572 and 573 of tbe Customs Regulations of 1908, pursuant to paragraph 500, tariff act of 1909, and containing the regulations under which returned American goods may be exempted from duty under the paragraph, are reasonable, and therefore have the force of law. Under article 573, the collector and naval officer may waive the production of evidence of outward shipment prescribed by article 572 only when two things concur: First, they must be satisfied that the goods are of domestic origin; and, second, there must be a showing that it is impracticable to produce such evidence. Upon the refusal of the collector to waive compliance with article 572, with a showing that it was impracticable to produce the evidence of outward shipment therein prescribed, the only just inference is that he was not satisfied with the showing made; and it is quite reasonable to infer that he was not satisfied from an examination of the goods that they were of domestic origin. The assessment of duty on the merchandise (positive moving-picture films) as photographic film positives (par. 474, tariff act of 1909) is affirmed.</p>

<p>Repairs por American Vessels — Wireless Apparatus.</p> <p>In. view of the act of July 23, 1912 (37 Stat., 199) amendatory of the act of June 24, 1910, compelling ships of a certain class to be equipped with wireless apparatus of a certain class, such apparatus imported to replace inefficient apparatus upon such American ships is admissible free of duty as repairs for American vessels under subsection 6 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, and not dutiable as being in chief value of metal under paragraph 167.</p>

<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39495.</p>

<p>1. Construction — Eo Nomine Rule.</p> <p>The existence of. the eo nomine rule implies that there is sometimes reasonable-ground to claim that merchandise is embraced in the language of more than one paragraph, and its effect is to classify such merchandise under the one which more-precisely describes it. The question considered is not whether one overlaps the other or whether one is a genus and the other a species, although incidentally either of these questions may arise; but the controlling factor is always whether the language of the one more accurately describes the merchandise than that of the other, and when so found, unless something appears which indicates that it was the intention of Congress that the merchandise should be classified without regard to the eo nomine rule, it is applied.</p> <p>2. Relative Specificity — Jacquard Figured Cotton Laces.</p> <p>Witt reference to Jacquard figured cotton laces not upholstery goods, the provision for laces in paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, is more specific than “all other Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton,” paragraph 258, and classifies them for duty. — Carter & Son v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 253; T. D. 35475) and Wilson & Son v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 255; T. D. 35476).'</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraphs 86, 90, and 96, Tariff Act op 1913 — Glass and Manufactures op Glass.</p> <p>Polished cylinder glass sheets which have been so far advanced or processed as to lose the character of polished cylinder glass under paragraph 86, tariff act of 1913, have concurrently lost the right of classification under that and paragraph 90, and may be classified under paragraph 95 as “ all glass or manufactures of glass * * * not specially provided for,” whether or not they have been so far advanced or processed as to constitute “manufactures.”</p> <p>2. Wind Shields — Polished Cylinder Glass and Manufactures op.</p> <p>Merchandise consisting of two polished cylinder glass sheets glued together, with a rim of adhesive substance to keep dampness from between the sheets, designed for use as material for automobile wind shields, is too far processed or advanced for classification as polished cylinder glass under paragraphs 86 and 90, tariff act of 1913. It is dutiable as “all glass or manufactures of glass * * * or of which glass is the component material of chief value not specially provided for” under paragraph 95.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39365.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 356, TARIFF ACT OF 1913-“ SEPARATE OR IN STRIPS or Sheets.”</p> <p>In the last sentence of paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, the words “ separate or in strips or sheets ” are not words of limitation inserted- to narrow the scope of the sentence, but words of amplification to make certain that, whether imported in the form of strips or sheets or as separate entities cut therefrom, stampings, galleries, mesh, and other materials of metal capable of such forms should not escape the duty prescribed by the paragraph.</p> <p>2. Foxtail, Rope, Tombac, and Snake Chain — Material eor Jewelry.</p> <p>Foxtail, rope, tombac, and snake chain, wound on reels in 100-meter lengths, chiefly used in the manufacture of jewelry and not shown to be used for any other purpose, and worth less than 30 cents a yard, is dutiable as materials of metal suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry (par. 356, tariff act of 1913), and not as metal articles not specially provided for (par. 167).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7910 (T. D. 36421).</p>

<p>Reappratsement, Legality of.</p> <p>To justify a classification board in declaring null and void an appraisement by three general appraisers on the ground that it was based upon a wrong theory of the law, it must appear positively, clearly, and certainly that they Aid proceed upon such wrong theory. This does not appear from a record which does not contain a recital of all the facts before the reappraisement board and does not contain any statement as to the theory of law upon which such board proceeded.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7960 (T. D. 366S6).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7969 (T. D. 36703).</p>

<p>Second rehearing — Opinion May 23, 1916 (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 157; T. D. 36464).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7934 (T. D. 36557).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40310.</p>

<p>Component Material op Chief Value-Mixed Fabric.</p> <p>Goods made by cementing with rubber a cotton cloth to a cotton and wool cloth, and goods made by cementing with rubber a cotton and silk cloth to a cotton and wool cloth, the rubber in each case being negligible in value, are composed in chief value of cotton, wool, or silk, according to which represents the greatest value as yarn, plus its proportion, on the basis of quantity, of the cost of weaving and other expenses incurred in making the cloth and bringing it to the condition it had immediately prior to its combination with the other materials in order to form the goods in question. — Paragraph 386, tariff act of 1933. For this purpose that cloth which is composed in "chief value of one of these fibers should not be regarded as made entirely of it. — Field & Go. v. United States (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 332; T. D. 36876). Raincoats made from such goods are dutiable under paragraph 256, 266, or 291, tariff act of 1913, according to the material of chief value as found by this rule, and not as wearing apparel not specially provided for (par. 261).</p>

<p>Stuffed Olives’.</p> <p>Olives pitted and stuffed with sweet red peppers are within the designation “olives” as that term is commonly and popularly used and understood. It is not shown that they are without that term commercially. They are dutiable as olives (par. 218, tariff act of 1913) and not as edible fruits (par. 217) or nonenumerated articles (par. 385).</p>

<p>Hoshinori — Seaweed.</p> <p>Seaweed, dried, with nothing added to change its character, and packed in tin boxes as a convenient method of getting the product to market, is classifiable as crude seaweed (par. 552, tariff act of 1913), and not, by reason of being edible, as a vegetable (par. 200).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph K op Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913 — Appraisement.</p> <p>Under paragraph K of section 3, tariff act of 1913, authorizing the appraiser ’to use “all reasonable ways and means” in his power to “ascertain, estimate, and appraise ” the actual market value and wholesale price of dutiable merchandise at the time of its exportation to the United .States, in the principal markets of the country whence the same has been imported, the appraiser is justified in arriving at his conclusion by deducting from the value of the merchandise at the port the shipping and freight charges from the place where the shipment originated — the principal market for such merchandise — to the port. Such action ⅛ not an appraisement of the freight and shipping charges, but a convenient method of finding the value at the place where the shipment originated. — United States v. Spingarn Bros. (5 Ct. Oust. Appls., 2; T. D. 34002) distinguished.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph I op Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Where both importer and appraiser arrived at the market value by deducting-inland freight and shipping charges from the value at the foreign port, and a greater deduction was made by the importer than by the appraiser, such action resulting in a larger appraised than entered value, the additional duty provided by paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, was justly imposed.</p>