Volume 8 — Customs Court Reports

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7854 (T. D. 361G3).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 31,1916, by Mr. wasliburn and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39992.</p> <p>[Oral argument Feb. 17,1917, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Jordan.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7984 (T. D. 36788).</p> <p>[Oral argument Feb. 15,1917, by Mr. wemple and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Protest.</p> <p>A general objection, originating in this court, to the sufficiency of the protest, which may be technically multifarious, but which contains averments covering all the grounds upon which the Board of General Appraisers proceeded, is without merit.</p> <p>'2. Judgment on Appeal.</p> <p>No judgment more favorable to the appellee than tbe one appealed from will be rendered by this court.—United States v. Von Ocíele (4 Ot. Oust. Appls., 284; T. D. 33492).</p> <p>.3. Leather-Cased Pocket Sets.</p> <p>Small leather cases, appropriate to be carried in the vest pocket, fitted with pocketknives, penknives or erasers, nail files, wooden lead pencils, and scissors (singly or in various combinations), are not specially designed or intended for the use of the traveler and are not dutiable as cases fitted with traveling sets under paragraph 360, tariff act of 1913.—United States v. Gross Oo. (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., . 274; T. D. 33489). They are dutiable as “articles * * * designed to bo * * * carried on or about the person” under paragraph 356.—Iienscl v. United States (6 Ot. Oust. Appls., 162; T. D. 35434). In view of concession by counsel that the cases and contents shall be treated as entireties, the question .of segregation and separate dutiability is not considered.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 360, Tariff Act of 1913—Leather Cases, Fitted.</p> <p>The provision of paragraph. 300, tariff act of. 1913, for leather cases fitted and furnished with traveling and similar sets treats the leather case as the distinguishing characteristic and claims it with its fittings for duty to the exclusion of other paragraphs under which the constituent fittings might have been dutiable.</p> <p>5. Pocket Toilets, Leather.</p> <p>Small leather cases, fastening with metal clasps, fitted with various toilet implements and preparations, invoiced as “pocket toilets, leather,” are dutiable under paragraph 360, tariff act of 191.3, as leather cases fitted and furnished with traveling and similar sets.</p> <p>'6. Leather-Cased Desk Sets.</p> <p>A desk set consisting of a long pair of shears and a letter opener in a sort of leather scabbard is dutiable as a nonenumerated metal article not plated with gold or silver, under paragraph 167, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7981 (T. D. 36769).</p> <p>[Oral argument Eeb. 9,1917, by Mr. Brown and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction-, Paragraph 17, Tariff Act of 1913—“Compounds, Combinations.”</p> <p>A compound or combination, in the general understanding, is necessarily something composed of more than one component material, and these expressions in paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913, are not applicable to a natural product.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 17, Tariff Act of 1913—“Medicinal.” •</p> <p>The use of the word “medicinal” in paragraphT7, tariff act of 1913, with reference to compounds or combinations, requires that the compound or combination should have healing or curative properties, and probably that it should be commonly so regarded and used.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 17, Tariff Act of 1913—“Similar.”</p> <p>The expression “all similar articles,” used in paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913, with reference to compounds or combinations, applies only to a compound, combination, mixture, or preparation composed of more" than one substance Or material.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 17, Tariff Act of 1913—“Medicinal Compounds, Combinations, and All Similar Articles.”</p> <p>The expression “medicinal compounds, combinations, and all similar articles” means, first, strictly medical compounds and combinations, and, second, compounds or combinations similar thereto in that, while not strictly medical because possessing properties which adapt them to other uses, are nevertheless susceptible of medicinal uses and, in the form and condition imported, are specially designed therefor and so chiefly used.—Britt, Loeffler & Weil v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 118; T. D. 38428).</p> <p>5. Sweet Almond Oil—Castor Oil.</p> <p>Sweet almond oil and castor oil, in small bottles eacb containing not more than 3 to 4 ounces, are dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 45, tariff act of 1913, and not as “chemical and medicinal compounds, combinations, and all similar articles ” under paragraph 17.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 201, TARIFF ACT OR 1913—“SAUCES OR ALL KlNDS.”</p> <p>The language “sauces of all lands” (par. 201, tariff act of 1913) includes not qnly dressings or condiments used with meat, fish, or vegetables, but also numerous-things made chiefly of fruit pulp and many other products of culinary skill, such as sauces for puddings and various other dressings or preparations used at meals.</p> <p>2. Construction—“Not Specially Provided For.”</p> <p>The effect of the term “not specially provided for,” although serving to direct attention to the fact that other paragraphs may cover the merchandise the provision for which is modified by this term, is not such as to lessen the specificity of the language it modifies.—Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne v. United States (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 58; T. D. 33307).</p> <p>3. Construction—Paragraphs 201 and 217, Tariff Act of 1913—Relative Specificity—“Sauces” and “Fruits, Preserved.”</p> <p>The term “sauces of all kinds” (par. 201, tariff act of 1913) is narrower than the term “fruits, preserved” (par. 217).</p> <p>4. Melba Sauce.</p> <p>Merchandise known commercially as “Melba sauce” (a liquid which flows quite freely, is sweetish to the taste, contains a pulpy substance or something which simulates it, and has a raspberry flavor), used as a sauce, dressing, or preparation to be poured over and eaten with fruit, such as peaches, pears, etc., is dutiable as “sauces of all kinds” (par. 201, tariff act of 1913), and not as “fruits, preserved” (par. 217).</p>

<p>CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH I, SECTION 3, TaRIFP ACT OP 1913—ENTERED, HIGHER than Market, Value.</p> <p>The provisions of paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, were designed by Congress to vest in the Secretary of the Treasury the sole and exclusive authority to direct assessment of duty upon an amount less than the entered value of the merchandise. Where goods were entered at a value higher than that stated in the invoice, with a certificate that this was done to meet advances made by the appraiser in similar p ending cases, and the final appraisement was b etween the entered and invoice values, the refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the collector to assess duty upon less than the entered value is not reviewable upon appeal by the Board of United States General Appraisers or the United States Court of Customs Appeals.</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph I or Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913—Entered, Higher than Market, Value.</p> <p>Where goods were entered at a value higher than that stated in the invoice, with a certificate that this was done to meet advances made by the appraiser in similar pending cases, and the final appraisement was between the invoice and entered values, the refusal of the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the collector to assess duty upon less than the entered value is not reviewable upon appeal by the Board of United States General Appraisers or the. United States Court of Customs Appeals.—-Mills & Gibb v. United States (8 Ct. Cust. Appls., 31; T. D. 37164).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39630.</p> <p>[Oral argument October 31,1916, by Mr. washburn and Mr. Tompkins and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39744.</p> <p>(Oral argument October 19,1916, by Mr. Levett and Mr. Doherty.)</p>

<p>3, Evidence op Compliance with Article 570, Customs Regulations of, 1908— Presumption in Favor of Board. .</p> <p>When a witness before the Board of United States General Appraisers testified that'the exporter’s declaration was filed, (is provided for in article 570 of the Customs Regulations of 1908, as amended by T. D. 32388 (art. 333, Customs Regulations of ■ 1915), and no objection was made to this method of proving the fact of filing, this court, upon objection being made to the consideration of the appeal on the ground that the declaration is not in the file, is unable to say that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the finding by the board that the declaration was filed at the time of entry.</p> <p>2. Construction, Article 572, Customs Regulations of 1908.</p> <p>In view of the requirement of article 572, Customs Regulations of 1908, that “if the merchandise be returned to the port of original exportation, outward shipment must appear from the records of the customhouse at that port, ” in connection With proof that the reimportation was made at the port of exportation, the certificate of exportation was unnecessary, since to require its production would be to require proof to the collector of the records of his own office.</p> <p>3. Reimportation—Tin-Plate Disks—By-Product.</p> <p>Disks of tin plate, about 2 inches in diameter, the by-product of the manufacture in Canada of cans from tin plate imported from the United States, are entitled to entry free of duty under paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, as reimportations not advanced in value or inroroved in condition.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraphs 650, 286, 304, and 348, Tarut Act op Í913—: “Wools”—“Hair”—“Furs.” , . '</p> <p>Dressed animal skins with, the wool or hair on are not, when it is not profitable to separate the wool or hair from the skin and use it for wool or hair purposes, within, the terms “wools” or “hair” (pars. 650, 286, arid 304, tariff act of 1913); they are, if devoted to fur uses, within the term “furs” (par. 348). The term “furs” is not limited to products of strictly fur-bearing animals, hut includes sheepskins with wool on, when devoted to fur uses, and not bearing so great an amount of wool as to make it commercially practicable to remove the wool and use it for wool purposes.</p> <p>% Sheepskins Devoted to Fur Uses.</p> <p>Sheepskins, entire or pieced by sewing in the shapes of rectangles and crosses, with the natural growth thereon and the flesh side dressed, used as ordinary fur skins are used, and not bearing so great an amount of wool as to make it commercially practicable to remove the wool and use it for wool purposes, are not classifiable as wools on the skin (par. 650, tariff act of 1913) or as wool advanced (par. 286) and are not within the definition of wool in paragraph 304. They are dutiable as “furs dressed on the skin” (par. 348).</p>

Appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 39912 and G. A. 7938' (T. D. 36577). Motions by the United States to dismiss, and motion by appellant-in 1751 to require the Board of General Appraisers to make a supplemental return, to the record. [Oral argument May 1,1917, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Donihee.]

<p>1. Estoppel—Entered Weight not Conclusive on Entrant.</p> <p>Where merchandise was weighed in accordance with article 1078, Customs Regulations of 1915, the fact that it had been entered at its gross weight did not estop the importers from showing its net weight, since the Government did not act upon any information furnished it by the importers, but upon information which it acquired -itself, and which was. conclusive as against the importers.</p> <p>2. Containers—Unit of Value of Merchandise Packed.</p> <p>Balsam of copaiba was entered and returned at its gross weight packed in tins, and appraised at a value per pound packed. The importers showed the weight of the tins and that the merchandise was always bought and sold in this country at a price which included the containers, but was based on the net weight of the' merchandise. The dutiable value was the value per pound packed, multiplied by the net weight.—United States v. Erancklyn (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 54; T. D. 33306).</p>

<p>1. Construction, P ara graphs 368 and 369, Tarim? Act of 1913—Aided by History or Paragraphs—“India Rubber”—“Hard Rubber.”</p> <p>The language of Successive tariff acts shows that Congress has regarded india rubber and hard rubber as different things for tariff purposes. These two expressions, occurring-in paragraphs 368 and 369, tariff act of 1913, respectively, are construed to be different things.</p> <p>2. Hard Rubber Druggists’ Sundries.</p> <p>Syringes, tubes, combs, and breast pumps in chief value of hard rubber are dutiable as “manufactures of * * * vulcanized india rubber, known as‘hard rubber’ ” (par. 369, tariff act of 1913), and not as “manufactures of india rubber * * *, commonly known as druggists’ sundries'” (par. 368).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7964 (T. D. 36698).</p> <p>[Oral argument February 14,1917, by Mr. washburn and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 356, Tariff Act of 1913—“Suitable for Use.”</p> <p>The expression “suitable for use,” in paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, does not, in the tariff sense, imply or require chief use, but is limited or qualified to susceptibility for the use expressed.</p> <p>2. Chain Used in Manufacturing Jewelry.</p> <p>Brass and German-silver foxtail chain, valued at-less than 30 cents per yard, shown to be used in the manufacture of jewelry, is dutiable under-paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, as metal material “suitable for use in the manufacture of any of the foregoing articles,” and not under paragraph 167 as metal articles or wares not specially provided for.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40400.</p> <p>[Oral argument April 26,1917, by Mr; Levett and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40231.</p> <p>[Oral argument April 25,1917, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40393.</p> <p>[Oral argument April 26,1917, by Mr. Hampton and Mr. I-Ianson.]</p>

<p>CONTAINERS.</p> <p>Where glue was bought at a gross price, packed in bags, the value per pound, for tariff purposes, was the gross price divided by the net weight in pounds.—United States v. Francklyn (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 54; T. D. 33306). Paragraph R of section 3, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 652, TARIFF Act OP 1913—EJUSDEM GENERIS— “Mechanical Process”—Firing op Painting.</p> <p>In the expression of paragraph 652, tariff act of 1913, “such as are made wholly or in part by stenciling or any other mechanical process,” the words “mechanical process” should be construed, under the rule of ejusdem generis, as relating to a mechanical process of like kind as stenciling; that is to say, a process for producing the representation or artistic effect, and not a process for fixing more permanently the production of the artist. The “firing” of a painting on earthenware is not a “mechanical process” within the paragraph.—Bour v. United States (91 Fed., 533) distinguished.</p> <p>2. Mineral-Painted Plaques and Ornamental Mineral-Painted Vases.</p> <p>Earthenware vases and plaques painted in mineral colors and “fired,” the original work of an artist and having no utilitarian purpose, are entitled to free entry under paragraph 652, tariff act of 1913, as paintings in mineral colors. They are not dutiable under paragraph 79 as plaques and vases “painted, colored, tinted, stained, enameled, gilded, printed or ornamented or decorated in any manner.”</p>

<p>1. Treasury Regulations, Effect of.</p> <p>While it was within the power of the Treasury Department to keep in force its-regulations pursuant to section 5 of the act of August 24,1912 (Panama Canal’act), after the time that the tariff act of 1913 went into effect and until the promulgation' of its regulations pursuant to subsections 5 and 6 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, it was not within its power to keep them in force in such manner as to extend the right of free entry to goods not within the terms of the act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Stipulation, Effect of.</p> <p>A stipulation that the merchandise in controversy had been used in a certain manner will be taken to mean that it had been so used prior to liquidation, and not simply prior to the date of the stipulation.</p> <p>3 Estoppel.</p> <p>Where the parties made stipulation as to a certain state of fact, a letter from the Treasury Department.!» the collector of customs, stating that that question would not be raised .in the case, did not estop the Government from making use of the stipulation’s agreement as to that question.</p> <p>4. CONSTRUCTION, SUBSECTION 5 OF PARAGRAPH J OF SECTION 4, TARIFF ÁCT OF 1913—'“Materials Necessary.for the Outfit and Equipment.”</p> <p>In subsection 5 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, the words “materials necessary for the outfit and equipment” mean the outfit and equipment of “naval vessels or other vessels of the United States, vessels built in the United States for foreign account and ownership, or for the purpose of being employed in the foreign or domestic trade.” They refer to all such vessels, and not just those that are being outfitted and equipped for the first time.</p> <p>5. Linoleum for United States Vessels.</p> <p>Linoleum was entered after the tariff act of 1913 went into effect but before the promulgation of the Treasury Department’s regulations pursuant to subsections 5 and 6 of paragraph J of sectiop 4 of said act. Application for free entry under section 5 of the act of August 24, 1912 (Panama Canal act), was made in the manner prescribed by the department’s regulations pursuant to said act. The linoleum was assessed as linoleum .under paragraph 276, tariff act of 1913. The importers protested; claiming free entry under the tariff-act of 1913, and showed that the linoleum was used on vessels belonging to the United States. It was. entitled to free entry under subsection 5 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, as outfit and equipment for vessels of the United States.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 358, TARIFF ÁCT OF 1913—“VEILINGS.”</p> <p>The term “veilings” as used in the tariff act is a designation which signifies a material chiefly or exclusively used for the making of veils. A veil is a piece of cloth or other material, usually thin and light, designed to be worn over the head and face as an ornament or to protect or wholly or partly conceal the face from view. The textile material which is used to mask or screen the features resting beneath the face panels of caskets would be commonly and popularly regarded as veiling.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Sufficiency of—Commercial Designation.</p> <p>Testimony that chiffon, having two closely woven stripes down the middle to serve as selvages.when the fabric is split, is known commercially as “chiffon” or “slide chiffon” 'before_béing split and as “veiling” afterwards, is not sufficient to exclude the goods before being split from the commercial designation of veiling.</p> <p>3. Casket Veiling—“Slide Chiffon.”</p> <p>Black, thin-woven silk chiffon, about 36 inches wide and 60 to 70 yards long,, with two closely woven stripes down the middle to serve as selvages when the fabric is split, used after splitting to cover the face panels of burial'caskets, is dutiable as veilings (par. 358, tariff act of 1913) and not as woven fabrics in the piece composed in chief value of silk (par. 318).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 584, Tariff Act of 1913—Absurdity to be Avoided— “Salts of Cinchona Bark.”</p> <p>A salt of cinchona bark is a chemical impossibility and the provision for “salts of cinchona bark” (par. 584, tariff act of 1913), if literally interpreted, is meaningless. The expression will be construed-to mean salts of quinia.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 584, Tariff Act of 1913—Legislative Recognition—“Salts of Cinchona Bark.”</p> <p>By the reenactment in successive tariff acts of the provision for “salts of cinchona bark” Congress must be presumed to have sanctioned judicial and administrative classifications of certain derivatives of cinchona bark as salts of cinchona bark. This provision, occurring in paragraph 584, tariff act of 1913, will' not be given a meaning at variance with this line of decisions.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 584, Tariff'Act of 1913—Aided by Context— “Salts of Cinchona Baric.”</p> <p>The expression “salts of opium,” occurring in successive tariff acts, has been administratively and judicially determined to have a definite meaning, and this meaning has been sanctioned by Congress in reenacting the provision. “Salts of cinchona bark” (par. 584, tariff act of 1913) will be construed harmoniously with this line of decisions.</p> <p>4. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 584, TARIFF ACT OP 1918—AlDED BY HISTORY OP Paragraph—-“Salts op Cinchona Bark.”</p> <p>The free list of the tariff act of 1913, as it passed the House, provided for “quinine and its combinations with acids and compounds, not subject to duty in this section. ” In lieu of this, the Senate restored the provision of former acts for “salts, of cinchona bark,” and the House accepted the Senate’s amendment. This must be taken to mean that no salts of cinchona bark should be dutiable, but that all of them should be admitted free under paragraph 584, even though some of them may be covered by general language in other paragraphs. •</p> <p>5. Construction, Paragraphs 584 and 18, Tarifp Act op 1913—Relative Specificity—Quinine Glycerophosphate.</p> <p>With reference to quinine glycerophosphate, the expression.“all * * * salts of cinchona bark” (italics ours), in paragraph 584, tariff act of 1913, is more specific than “glycerophospheric acid and salts and compounds thereof” in paragraph 18, and classifies it. ' . ■</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers; Abstract 40440.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 25,1917, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Brown.]</p>

<p>J. Construction, Paragraph 127, Tariff Act of 1913—“Tubbs.”</p> <p>Whether or not an article is a tube within the meaning of that terrain paragraph 127, tariff act of 1913, depends wholly upon its form and not upon the use to which it is applied or the method by which it was manufactured.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 127, Tarief Act op 1913—“Finished.”</p> <p>It is well settled that the finished product of one process of manufacture may-become the'material of the next in rank. Steel tubes which are to be .used as material for manufacturing other articles (such as “ball races” for ball bearings), and which have had applied to them all the processes necessary to complete their manufacture as tub.es, are finished steel tubes within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 127, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>3. Steel Tubes.</p> <p>Seamless tubes of chromium steel, finished as tubes, but designed to be used, not as tubes but as material for the manufacture of other articles (such as “ball races ” for ball bearings) are dutiable as “all other iron or steel tubes, finished, not specially provided for in this section” (par. 127, tariff act of 1913), and not as “all steels by whatever process made, containing alloys such as * * * chromium * * * ” (par. 110).</p>

<p>1. Chief-Value Rule—Down in Quilts no Exception to—Predominant Material.</p> <p>It is the rule that a tarifl provision for articles of, made of, composed of, or manufactured of a given material requires that the articles must be composed either wholly or in chief value of that material. While it is possible to note some exceptions to this rule in case the predominating material should not be the material of chief value, the down in silk quilts can not be held such an exception.</p> <p>2. Down-Pilled Silk Quilts, Silk Chief Value.</p> <p>Down-filled silk quilts, silk being the component material of chief value, are dutiable as manufactures in chief value of silk (par. 318, tariff act of 1913) and not as “quilts of down” (par. 347).</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Protest—Evidence—Burden oe Proof—Contingent-Fee Agreements.</p> <p>Paragraph N of section 3, tariff act of 1913, contains the following language: “No agreement for a contingent fee in respect to recovery or refund under protest shall be lawful. Compliance with this provision shall be a condition precedent to the validity of the protest and to any refund thereunder, and a violation of this provision shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding- 8500, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. ” This does not make it necessary for the protest to deny the existence of an agreement for a contingent fee, nor does it put upon the protestant the burden of proving that no such agreement has been made.</p> <p>2. Cotton Turkish Towels.</p> <p>Cotton Turkish towels are dutiable as cotton towels (par. 264, tariff act of 1913), ■ and not as pile fabrics (par. 257).</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Protest—Evidence—Burden oe Prooi^Contingent-Fee Agreements.</p> <p>Following United States v. Emery-Bird-Thayer 'Dry Goods Co". (8 Ct. Cust Appls., 150; T. D. 37273), decided concurrently herewith, it is not necessary for the protest to allege compliance with the provision of paragraph N of section 3, tariff act- of 1913, forbidding contingent-fee agreements, nor does the burden of proof rest upon the protestant to show such compliance.</p> <p>2. Surgical Instruments with Pivoted Jaws.</p> <p>Surgical forceps and other instruments, with two lever handles working on a pivot, and with cutting, gripping, or punching jaws, identical with those in Koch & Co. v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 534; T. D. 36148), are dutiable as manufactures of steel (par. 167, tariff act of 1913), and not as nippers and pliers (par. 166).</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Protest—Evidence—Burden op Proof—Contingent-Fee Agreements.</p> <p>Following United States v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. (8 Ct. Oust. Appls.,150; T.'D. 37273), decided concurrently herewith, it is not necessary for the protest to allege compliance "with the provision of paragraph N of section 3, tariff act of 1913, forbidding contingent-fee agreements, nor does the burden of proof rest upon the protestant to show such compliance.</p> <p>2. Bamboo or Chip Baskets—Toys.</p> <p>Small, colored bamboo or chip baskets, each containing an artificial chick, are dutiable as bamboo or chip baskets (par. 175, tariff act of 1913), and not as toys (par. 342).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40585.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 385, Tariff Act of 1913—Malt Extract.</p> <p>Malt extract can not be classified under paragraph 385, tariff act of 1913, because that paragraph includes only what is “not provided for in this section,” and malt extract is provided for in paragraph 246. • ' - - ■</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph- 246, Tarier Act or 1913—“Malt Extract”— “Oa.s:ks”—Drums.</p> <p>In'paragraph 385, tariff act of 1913, Congress intended to include all kinds of malt extract, in whatever condition imported and whether in bulk or smaller packages'. To effectuate the intent of Congress, the word “casks” in the paragraph will be held to include iron drums.</p> <p>3. Malt Extract, Fluid, in Iron Drums.</p> <p>Fluid malt extract in iron drums o£"12£ gallons is dutiable as “malt extract, fluid, in casks” (par. 246, tariff act of 1913).</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Admissibility—Judicial Knowledge—Records or Patent OeeiCé.</p> <p>It appearing from the record that the origin of the word “lanolin” was marked by the issuance of letters patent by the Patent Office of the United States for ah article therein denominated as “lanolin” or“lanoline,” whereby a new.term was introduced -into the language of-the country, and the issue being, the meaning of that.term, .the. letters patent were properly admitted in evidence for the purpose of showing its origin and. in part its history and development. Furthermore, the board was justified in refreshing the judicial knowledge by resorting'to these letters patent as public documents and records.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Judicial Knowledge.</p> <p>In determining'the meaning of the word “lanolin,” the. board was justified in refreshing the judicial knowledge by resorting to such dictionaries and scientific ~ treatises as under all the circumstances of the case it deemed safe and- proper.</p> <p>3. Evidence—Presumption that Commercial Agrees with Scientific and Common Meaning—Adeps Lanie Anhydrous—Lanolin.</p> <p>Scientific authorities, dictionaries, and encyclopedias do not class adeps lanse anhydrous as lanolin. Presumptively 'commercial usage is the same, and, in the absence of any showing of commercial usage to the contrary, the board’s,classification of it as “wool grease * * * refined or improved in value or condition,” and not as “lanolin,’’.under paragraph 44, tariff act of 19X3, is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7982 (T. D. 36770).</p> <p>[Oral argument, May 3,1917, by Mr. Lane and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40358.</p> <p>[Oral argument May 7,1917, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. washburn.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8013 (T. D. 36928).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 10,1917, by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Brown.l</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 135, Tariff Act of 1913—“Needlecases.”</p> <p>Tlie definitions of needlecases found in the dictionaries involve the idea that a needlecase is a “case of metal or other material for the holding of needles,” and this definition has been enlarged by paragraph 135, tariff act of 1913, for tariff purposes, so as to permit such a case to accommodate and its contents to include other articles.—United States v. Poirier & Lindeman (6 Ct. Oust. Appls., 239; T. D. 35470). To be a needlecase'within the paragraph, however, an article must be primarily a needlecase in the common acceptation of the term.</p> <p>2. Sewing Baskets, Boxes, and Cases in Chief Value of Leather.</p> <p>Baskets, boxes, and cases, in chief value of leather, of such a size and so fitted as to indicate that they are primarily sewing sets and not needlecases, are not dutiable under paragraph 135, tariff act of 1913, as needlecases by reason of the fact that they contain needles in combination with other articles, such as scissors, thimbles, stilettos, thread, knives, pins, buttons, tape, and hooks and eyes. The decision of .the Board of United States General Appraisers classifying them as baskets, boxes, and cases in chief value of leather (par. 360) is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8012 (T. D. 36927).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 10,1917, by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Brown.]</p>

<p>Goose Skins.</p> <p>Goose skins dressed with, the down on, not suitable for millinery ornaments, are dutiable as “downs on the skin, * * * dressed, * * * and not suitable for use as millinery ornaments” (par. 347, tariff act of 1913), and not, by virtue of paragraph 386, by similitude, as “furs dressed on the skin” (par. 348).-—Hersko-vits v. United States (1 Ot. Oust. Appls., 321; ,T. D! 31410) distinguished. ■</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40404.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 11,1917, by Mr. Levett and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>• Construction, Paragraph 027, Tariff Act of 1913—“Containers of Tea.”</p> <p>Paragraph 627, tariff of 1913, levying duty upon “cans, boxes, or other containers' of tea packed in packages of less than 5 pounds, ” does not levy duty upon the container of the tea itself, but upon the container of the packages of tea. The provision is relative in its terms and does not apply to immediate containers of tea.— Wright & Graham cases (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 453; T. D. 34976, and 6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 528; T. D. 36147). Where tea was imported packed in packages of less than 5 • pounds each, these packages being assembled and placed in a large box or case for transportation, the container of the less than 5 pouiid quantity of the tea itself should have been admitted free of duty, and duty should have been levied upon the box or case, which was the immediate container of the packages of tea.</p>

<p>Baskets.</p> <p>Woven basket-work frames of stained bamboo or like material, having the shape of vases, fern pots, jardinieres, lamp stands, or similar articles, fitted with tin bowls or buckets of the same shape and size to make them water-tight and hence more serviceable, and trays of the same construction fitted with glass bottoms, the wood in each case being chief value, are not removed from the classification of baskets by reason of such tin or glass fittings. They are dutiable under paragraph 175, tariff act of 1913, as baskets, and not under paragraph 176 as manufactures in chief value of wood, not specially provided for.—United States v. Muhlens et al. (4 Ot. Oust. Appls., 496; T. D. 33917) and United States v. Yantine (4 Ct. Oust. Appls., 516; T. D. 33937) distinguished.</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Protest, Time for.</p> <p>A protest against duties must be presented within 30 days after their ascertainment and liquidation. A protest against fees, charges, and exactions which are not duties must he presented within 15 days after date of payment of such fees, charges, and exactions.—Paragraph N of section 3, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Liquidation—Entry—Appraisement.</p> <p>All goods lawfully imported must he entered; there can he no appraisement without an entry and no certain determination or assessment of ad valorem duties without an appraisement.—Section 3, paragraphs C, D, E, and F of the tariff act of 1913, and articles 572-582, Customs Regulations of 1915.</p> <p>3. Forfeitures—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Neither the Eoard of United States General Appraisers nor the United States Court of Customs Appeals has jurisdiction of forfeitures or suits in forfeiture.</p> <p>4. Illegal Mail Importation.</p> <p>Diamonds were brought into this country by mail. They were seized and denied entry by the collector of customs. Upon the recommendation of the United States district attorney, the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the collector to release them upon the payment of a sum of money equal to the duty, plus 20 per cent. This sum of money was not duty. Whether or not it was a fee, charge, or exaction within the meaning of those terms as used in paragraph N of section 3 of the tariff act of 1913 is not decided. If it was, protest presented more than 15 days after its payment was too late. If it was a compromise or settlement of forfeiture proceedings, threatened or commenced, the Board of General Appraisers and this court are without jurisdiction of the subject matter.</p>

<p>1. Evidence.</p> <p>The Board of General Appraisers denied an application, made on December 8, 1914, for a commission to take testimony in Bremen, Germany, of the manufacturers of the merchandise at bar as to their custom or general habit of putting certain ingredients into it. In view of the fact that several competent chemical analyses of the merchandise were in evidence and in view of the manifest difficulties in the way of the execution of such a commission, the action of the board is approved.</p> <p>2. Linoleum Cement—Oxidized Linseed Oil.</p> <p>Merchandise invoiced as linoleum cement, to be used, after grinding and mixing with other ingredients, in the manufacture of lincrusta wall paper, was classified by the collector as oxidized linseed oil (par. 45, tariff act of 1913). The Board of General Appraisers overruled protests claiming classification either as a cement not otherwise provided for (par. 74) or a nonenumerated article (par. 385). Linoleum cement is oxidized linseed oil containing at least approximately 10 per cent each of rosin and kauri gum. It is shown that oxidized linseed oil may contain as much as 8 per cent of rosin. Chemical analyses of various samples of the merchandise at bar showed no kauri gum and the following percentages, respectively, of rosin: 0, 1.26, 7.1, and 8.2. The decision of the Board is affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Begulus of Copper—Copper Matte.</p> <p>That “regulus of copper ” and copper matte are interchangeable terms is established by a line of judicial and administrative decisions, sanctioned by the reenactment of the term “regulus of copper” in three successive subsequent tariff acts.</p> <p>Í.- Construction, Paragraph 153, Tariff Act of’1913—Lead.</p> <p>A matte with a heavy content of lead sulphide can not be dutiable under paragraph 153, tariff act of 1913, as “Lead dross, lead bullion or base bullion, lead in pigs or bars, lead in any form not specially provided for in this section.” The general terms of the paragraph are restricted by the preceding specific enumerations ' to lead of the same general character, namely, lead metal.</p> <p>3. “Regtjlus oe Ooyper”'—Copper Matte,</p> <p>A matte composed, more largely of lead than copper in quantity, more’largely of silver than either lead or copper in value, and not ready for the process of smelting to ' recover the copper content can not properly be called a copper matte, and is not ad- - missible free of duty as “regulus of copper.” (Par. 461; tariff act of 1913,.) It is dutiable by similitude as a lead-bearing oro-under paragraph 152.'</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40448.</p> <p>[Oral, argument Oct. 19,1917, by Mr. Mulvaney and Mr. Lane.]</p>

<p>1. Ship’s Equipment—Spare Pump Parts.</p> <p>Spare or repair parts for pumps to be installed'in .American built vessels are admissible free of duty under subsection 5 of paragraph J, tariff act of 1913—United States v. Richard & Go. (8 Gt. Oust. Appls., 231 T. D. 37496).</p> <p>2. Pleading—Protest, Sufeiciency op.</p> <p>A protest reciting as its basis a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to the collector of customs directing that merchandise of the class of that in question here be admitted free of duty und.er the tariff act of 1913, is sufficient to claim under that act, notwithstanding that the protest also'claims under the repealed section 5 of the Panama Canal act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stats., 562).</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40717.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 11,1917, by Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>1. Evidence—Judicial Knowledge.</p> <p>The court may, in the absence of testimony, know that yam is spun and that a piece of cloth is composed of warp and filling, threads, and that there is a process of manufacture of pile fabrics- and that Wilton velvet carpets are made by this process. The court judicially knows that Wilton velvet carpets are machine made.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 300, Tariff Act of 1913—“Similar Rugs.”</p> <p>Machine-made rugs are not classifiable under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913.— • Beuttell & Sons v. United States (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 356; T. D. 36905).</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraphs 300 and 303, Tariff Act of 1913—Rugs Used for Floor Coverings.</p> <p>It was the intention of Congress to provide, by paragraphs 300 and 303, tariff act of 1913, for all rugs used as floor coverings.</p> <p>4. Wilton Velvet Rugs.</p> <p>Seamless Wilton velvet lugs of various sizes are not classifiable under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913 (“Oriental, Berlin, Aubusson, Axminster, and similar rags”), or under the paragraph covering nonenumerated articles. They are dutiable, by virtue of paragraph 303, at the rate imposed on velvet carpeting by paragraph 294.</p>

<p>“Buttons”—“Parts of Buttons and Button Molds or Blanks”—Paragraph 839, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>A galalith article, shaped like a curling stone, perforated for the reception of a metal shank or wire loop to make it into a shoe button, is,not classifiable under the provision for “buttons, ” bilt under that for “parts of buttons a!nd button molds or blanks',” in paragraph 339, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8024 (T. D. 36999).</p> <p>[Oral argument Dee. 11,1917, by Mr. washburn and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8066 (T. D. 37209),</p> <p>[Oral argument Deo. 5,1917, by Mr. Duffy and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40693.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 11, 1917, by Mr. Levett and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8072 (T. D. 37247).</p> <p>[Oral argument Dee. 12,1917, by Mr. Severance and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7938 (T. D. 36577).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct 17,1917, by Mr. Donihee and Mr. Doherty.]</p>

<p>Wheat—Wheat Screenings—Paragrafhs 644 and 385, Tariff -Act- 'of' 1913.'</p> <p>Wheat-“scalpings” or screenings, the residue after-screening from wheat as it ■ comes from the thrasher all the merchantable wheat—a commodity composed of buckwheat, rapeseed, mustard seed, flaxseed, dust, dirt, and shriveled, broken, and spoiled wheat kernels—not sold or used as wheat, but bought and sold as wheat screenings and used as sheep feed, or as an ingredient in the manufacture of chicken feed, are dutiable as a nonenumerated unmanufactured article under paragraph 385, tariff act of 1913. They are not “wheat” within the meaning of paragraph 644. It being shown that the wheat content can not, as a commercial practicability, be separated, and that, even if that were done, it could not be marketed as wheat, segregation and dutiability under paragraph 644 can not be had.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40714.</p> <p>[Oral argument Deo. 6,1917, liy Mr. ’Wilson and Mr. Tompkins.1</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8064 (T. D. 37188).</p> <p>[Oral argument Deo. II, 1917, by Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Sharretts, and Mr-, washburn.]</p>

<p>Segregation—Rattan Reeds.</p> <p>Upon application and showing by appellants, the United States consenting, the reversal of this canse (8 Ot. Oust. Appls. 204; T. D. 37436), without establishing a precedent, is extended so as to remand it to the Board of General Appraisers with direction that opportunity be given both parties to introduce further evidence, to the end that the different classes of merchandise may, if possible, bo segregated and properly classified.</p>

<p>■Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8087 (T. D. 37313).</p> <p>[Oral argument Feb. 14,1918, by Mr. Wakefield and Mr. Lockett and Mr. Hanson.)</p>

<p>l. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 169, TARIFF ACT OF 1913—“CABINET WOOD1’—Interior-Trim—Evidence—Judicial Knowledge.</p> <p>The term “cabinet wood,” paragraph 169, tariff act of 1913, is not limited to woods used in the manufacture of movable furniture. The fact that a wood' is chiefly used for the interior trimming of rooms does not per se exclude it from classification under the paragraph. If considerable mechanical skill and artistic conception are employed and required to produce a highly ornamental and decorative appearance in the interior trim, wood so used may he properly classified as cabinet wood under the paragraph. That highly ornamental and decorative results are often produced in the interior trimmings of rooms and that the skill required to produce such results rises-to the dignity of cabinetwork are-common knowledge.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Presumption in Favor op Collector's Classification</p> <p>The merchandise having been classified by the collector as cabinet wood, the burden was upon appellant to show that it was not.</p> <p>3. Juanacosta Lumber—Cabinet Wood.</p> <p>Juanacosta lumber, shown to be chiefly used frr the interior trim of rooms and not for making movable furniture, was classified by the collector as cabinet wood under paragraph 169, tariff act of 1913. The protest claimed free entry under paragraph 647. Protestant failed to show that the interior trim for which the lumber was used was not of the kind and character constituting cabinetwork or that for any other reasons it was not a cabinet wood. The decision of the Board of General Appraisers overruling the protest is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract '41231.</p> <p>[Oral argument Fob. 34,1918, by Mr. Hanson.)</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 368, Tariff Act of 1913'—“Natural State”— Dyeing.</p> <p>Dyed straw is not straw in its ‘1 natural state ’ ’ within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 368, tariff act of 19X3.</p> <p>2. Leaves and Flowers Made of Dyed Straw'—Millinery Ornaments.</p> <p>Leaves and flowers for millinery ornaments, made of straw which has been dyed, but the fibers of which have not been separated, are expluded by the dyeing from classification under paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913, as manufactures of straw in its natural state. They are classifiable as articles, composed in chief value of artificial and ornamental leaves and flowers under paragraph 347.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41323.</p> <p>[Oral argument Feb. 13,1918, by Mr Hanson.]</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph I, Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913—“Manifest Clerical Error.”</p> <p>Where the entry was made in gold instead of Mexican dollars, Mexican dollars being worth about half as much as gold, and there was no disclosure by the record that this error was made, there was no “manifest clerical error2’ within the meaning of that language in paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, and the paragraph forbids the assessment of duty “upon an amount less than the entered value.2’</p>

<p>1. Curling Irons.</p> <p>Curling irons are not classifiable as “nippers and pliers” under paragraph 166, tariff act of 1913, but as articles in chief value of metal under paragraph 167.</p> <p>2. Jewelry—Articles or Personal Adornment.</p> <p>While the popular conception of jewelry necessarily implies an article of personal adornment, it does not’imply that all articles of personal adornment are jewelry.— American Bead Co. 1). United States (7 Ct. Oust. Apple.. IS; T. T). 362693.</p> <p>3. Imitation Jet and Base-Metal Articles of Peesonal Adoenment.</p> <p>Articles of personal adornment composed of imitation jet and base metal are not .regarded by people in general as jewelry, and are not classifiable as “jewelry, commonly * * * so known,” under paragraph 356, tariff ast of 1913.</p> <p>4. Evidence--Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The court judicially knows that common black iron hairpin 3, plain bone, celluloid, or galliiith women’s side and back combs, and vinaigrette bottles with metal trimmings, memorandum pads with metal backs, ordinary cigarette cases, match boxes, and similar articles designed to be carried in the pocket or hand bag for utilitarian purposes only and not for wear or as part of the attire are in no sense articles of personal adornment.</p> <p>5. “Jewelry, í:' * * Commercially so Known.”</p> <p>The evidence adduced in support of a claim that certain articles, not commonly known as jewelry, were commercially so known, being confusing, conflicting, and irreconcilable, the common moaning must prevail.</p> <p>. 6. Brooches, Pendants, Bracelets, Combs, Hatpins, and Hairpins of Metal and Paste.</p> <p>Brooches, pendants, bracelets, combs, hatpins, and hairpins, composed of metal and paste, paste chief value, are classifiable as manufactures in chief value of paste under paragraph 95, tariff act-of 1913, and not as jewelry under paragraph 356.</p> <p>7. Necklaces of Paste Beads,</p> <p>Necklaces in chief value of paste beads are not classifiable as jewelry, under paragraph 356, tariff'act of 1913, but as manufactures in chief value of paste beads under paragraph 333.</p>

<p>L. Pleading—Protest, Sufficiency of—Alternative Claims.</p> <p>That alternative claims may be made in a protest is well settled.</p> <p>2. Pleading—Protest, Sufficiency of.</p> <p>A protest declaring that merchandise is dutiable at the appropriate rate and under the appropriate paragraph according to the component material of chief value, without setting forth any applicable paragraph or rate or what is claimed to be the component material of chief value, is bad.</p> <p>3: Pleading—Protest, Sufficiency of—Paragraph N of Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Pour different kinds of merchandise were separately invoiced, imported, entered, and liquidated, each on a date different from any other. All of it was assessed at the same rate under the same paragraph. The protest did not state what the collector’s classification was, simply describing it as “your decision assessing duty at 60 per cent under paragraph 356.” It described the merchandise vaguely as rosaries, medals, crosses, chains, and similar merchandise covered by entries below named(Italics ours.) ' It claimed alternatively at a great number of different rates under a great number of different paragraphs, without any statement as to what classifications were claimed at the different rates under the different paragraphs other than “that said merchandise is properly dutiable at the rate applicable to the component material of chief value, or otherwise’’ (italics ours), with no statement as to what the component material of chief value was. Such a protest only serves to render obscure, rather than to clarify the issue, and is quite the opposite of the requirement of paragraph N of section 3, tariff act of 1913, that the protest shall set forth “distinctly and specifically” the reasons for objecting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8073 (T. D. 37248).</p> <p>[Oral argument Eeb. 14,1918, by Mr. Lockett and Mr. Lawrence.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8069 (T. D. 37216).</p> <p>[Oral argument Dec. 6,1917, by Mr. washburn and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41244.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. IS, 1918, by Mr. Sharretts and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Photest Against Reliquidation.</p> <p>It is incumbent upon one who protests against an original liquidation to show error in the liquidation arid the correctness of the assessment claimed. A protest against reliquidation, claiming that the collector has not reliquidated pursuant to the decision of the Board of General Appraisers, is established when that fact conclusively appears.</p> <p>2. Reliquidation—Collector’s Duty.</p> <p>Protest claiming classification of -cotton cloth under paragraph 252, tariff act of 1913, according to yarn number, was sustained by the Board of General Appraisers without any finding as to yarn number or direction to the collector regarding such finding. It was the duty of the collector to find the yam number as directed by paragraph 253 and the regulations of the Treasury Department. Protest against his reliquidation at the highest rate provided for in paragraph 252, without such finding, should have been sustained.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8033 (T. D. 37032).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 10,1917, by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Brown.]</p>

<p>1 CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 358, TARIFF ACT of 1913—LEGISLATIVE SANCTION— “Braids”—Elastics.</p> <p>Elastics were held administratively and judicially to be braids under the tariff act of 1897. Congress presumably used the word braids in that sense in the tariff act of 1909 and in paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2 Construction, Paragraph 358, Tariff Act of 1913—“Yarns, Threads, or Filaments’’—Rubber Threads.</p> <p>The rubber threads vrhich form the framework or foundation about which the cotton or silk threads are worked into elastic braids are within the meaning of the expression “yarns, threads, or filaments,” paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913.—United States v. Yeit (8 Ct. Oust. Appls. 290 ; T. D. 37540) distinguished.</p> <p>3. Construction—Relative Specificity—Not Otherwise Specially Provided For Clause.</p> <p>The cases in which an interpretation of two conflicting paragraphs of a tariff act may be controlled by the not otherwise provided for clause are restricted to those in which the two paragraphs apply with equal specificity to the article in question.</p> <p>4. Hat Elastics of Cotton and India Rubber—Sleeve and Garter Elastics of Silk and India Rubber.</p> <p>The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers overruling a protest against the collector’s classification of cotton and india rubber hat elastics and silk and ihdia-rubber sleeve and garter elastics as braids, under, paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, claiming the cotton goods to be classifiable as “fabrics with fast edges not exceeding twelve inches in width * * * of cotton * * * and india rubber,” under paragraph 262, and the silk goods to be dutiable as “webbings * * * of which silk and india rubber, are the component materials of chief value,” under paragraph 316', is affirmed.</p>

<p>Feather Wall Ornaments.</p> <p>Colored feathers, fastened upon white cards in the shape of birds, used (o decorate walls in the same manner as pictures are, are not dutiable as feathers of any kind,-but as articles made of feathers, under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>StTEFACE-OOATED PAPER.</p> <p>Paper known as “Perlmutter ” paper, one surface of which has not been treated, the other having been treated with a layer of gelatin and then a layer of lacquer, presenting a shiny, glossy and variegated appearance, is not ’classifiable under paragraph 324, tariff act of 1913, as “Papers, wholly or partly covered with gelatin or flock, papers with white coated surface or surfaces.” The decision of the Board of General Appraisers sustaining its assessment under the paragraph as a surface-coated paper not specially provided for, is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8049 (T. D. 37101).</p> <p>[Oral arguments Apr. 16,1918, by Mr. Watejliousc and Mr. Lawrence.) .</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 40386.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 17,1918, by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Sharretts.)</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraphs 319 and 262, Tariff Act of 191 —‘‘Artificial * * * Silk”—“Vegetable Fiber.”</p> <p>' Artificial silk is not a vegetable fiber within the meaning of those terms as used in paragraphs 319 and 262, tariff act of 1913.—Thomass v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 86; T. D. 31107).</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs 336,262, and 319, Tariff Act of 1913—“ Componeno Material of Chief Value.”</p> <p>While the rule prescribed by statute, paragraph 336, tariff act of 1913, is that “Component material of chief value” shall be held to mean that single component material which shall exceed in value any other single component material in the article or fabric, nevertheless Congress may, and oftentimes does, expressly prescribe that, in the determination oí a particular question of chief value, the combined values of one or more single component materials must be treated as one. This.is the case with paragraph 262, tariff act of 1913, where the component material of chief value may be “ cotton or vegetable fiber and india rubber, ’ ’ and with paragraph 319, where it may be “ artificial or imitation silk * * * and india rubber.”</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 262, Tariff Act of 1913—Aided by Context—Tautology to Be Avoided—’“Made of.”</p> <p>The expression “made of” may mean wholly of only or include wholly of and in chief value of, according to the context. Unless it should be construed in paragraph 262, tariff act of 1913, to mean wholly of only, the'provision for fabrics made of cotton or other vegetable fiber would include the next provision of the paragraph for fabrics “ of which cotton or other vegetable fiber is the component material of chief value”, and reduce it to surplusage. Accordingly the provision of the para- ' graph for fabrics made of cotton or other vegetable fiber and india rubber means made wholly of such.</p> <p>4. Webbing-of Artificial Silic, Cotton, and India Rubber.</p> <p>Webbing, 34.30 per cent artificial silk, 39.31 per cent cotton, and 26.39 per cent' rubber in value are classifiable, not as being made of cotton and india rubber, under paragraph 262, tariff act of 1913, but as being in chief value of artificial silk and india rubber, under paragraph 319.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41670.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 19,1918, by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Lane.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board, of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41675.</p> <p>Submitted on record by appellee.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 16,1918, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>■ Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41875.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 20,1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Washburn.]</p>

<p>Millinery Ornaments oe Dyed Straw.</p> <p>Colored chip-straw millinery- ornaments crudely resembling flowers and leaves . are, following United States v. International Forwarding Go. (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 378; T. D. 37632), decided concurrently herewith, classifiable not as manufactures of straw in its natural state under paragraph 368, tariff act of 1913, but as “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems or parts thereof, of whatever ■ material composed, not specially provided for,” under paragraph 347.</p>

<p>1. Bottles of Whisky, Wooden Tops, Outer Foils, Insert Corks, and Labels por—Nonrbjtllable Device—Stipulation.</p> <p>Where nonrefillable bottles of whisky were imported the stipulation of the parties that wooden tops, outer foil, insert corks, and labels, used for the proper packing and protection of the bottles, nonrefillable devices, and whisky during transportation, and not needed for the proper use of the bottles as containers during' the consumption of the whisky, were parts of neither the bottles nor the nonrefillable devices was binding upon the Board of United States General Appraisers. They should not have been held dutiable under paragraph 83, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Nonrefillable Device for Bottles. . •</p> <p>Where bottles of whisky were imported, fitted with nonrefillable devices to be used with the bottles during the consumption of the whisky to keep the bottles automatically closed, the devices are not nondutiable packing charges of the whisky but were correctly assessed with duty as parts of the bottles under paragraph 83, tariff act of 1913, which levies duty upon bottles.</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION—DRAWNWORK, PLAIN AND ORNAMENTAL—I/ACE—LEGISLATIVE, Administrative, and Judicial History.</p> <p>For 20 years prior to the tariff act of 1913 and during the life of four different tariS acts, plain drawnwork goods were not classified as articles of lace or articles in part of lace or in imitation of lace, and during that period the only drawnwork articles which were so classified by the customs officers .or by the Board of United States General Appraisers were those in which additional threads were employed, not only to group the loose threads together but to form independent figures and designs. The tariff act of 1913 preserves the distinction between plain and ornamental drawnwork and substantially adopts the language used by the Board of United States General Appraisers and the courts in describing ornamented drawn-work. To that language should be given the same meaning accorded to it by the board and the courts.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 358, Tari» Act op 1913—Plain Drawnwork. Plain drawnwork is not classifiable under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>3. Scarps op Hemstitched Drawnwork.</p> <p>Cotton bureau scarfs, within the popular understanding of drawnwork and ornamented with two rows of hemstitching around the margin, the threads used other than those of the fabric itself performing no office except that of strengthening ' the corners of the drawnwork and grouping the loose threads together, are plain drawnwork, and not dutiable under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913, “woven fabrics or articles from which threads have been omitted, drawn, punched, or cut, and with threads introduced after weaving forming figures or designs not including straight hemstitching.” They are dutiable as articles of cotton cloth under paragraph 266.</p>

<p>Evidence—Presumption in Favor oe Collector.</p> <p>Appellant entered the merchandise in controversy upon an invoice which specified different parts shown to he a complete marine engine in a knockdown condition. It was for use in the construction of four American-huilt vessels, which required nine such engines. It was short shipped as to the bedplate and crank shaft, which came in another shipment more than a month later. It was installed in one of the vessels, hut there is nothing to show whether or not it was fitted with a bedplate and crank shaft imported at the same time and which, though designed for some other vessel, was so standardized as to make it equally available for use on the first one. The collector found that the complete engine was imported in a “knockdown condition” and installed in one of the vessels. With no evidence to impeach his findings, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining the collector’s classification of the merchandise as miscellaneous metal manufactures under paragraph 1G7, tariff act of 1913, rather than as outfit and equipment or machinery building materials under section 4, paragraph J, subsection 5, is sustained.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8086 (T. D. 37312).</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 18,1918, by Mr. Lane and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8092 (T. D. 37352).</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 18,1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Lane.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8106 (T. D. 37403).</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 20,1918, by Mr. washburn and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8044 (T. D. 37078).</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 16,1918, by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Wakefield.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 300, Tariff Act of 1913—“Axminster.”</p> <p>Though formerly Axminster rugs were handmade, the evidence being to the effect that now (and at and prior to the enactment of the tariff act of 1913) the term Axminster is generally and commonly understood to cover and include the machine-made product as well as the handmade, and that the handmade article constitutes but a small part of the commerce in Axminster rugs, a machine-made Axminster rug would be dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraphs 300 and 303, Tariff Act of 1913—Rugs.</p> <p>The tariff act of 1913 contains provisions for only two classes of woolen rugs, one being the rugs of paragraph 300, and the other the mats, rugs, etc., of paragraph 303. Since paragraph 300 applies only to certain rugs therein named and those that are similar thereto, the only general provision for woolen rugs is in paragraph 303.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 300, Tariff Act of 1913—“Woven'Whole for Rooms.”</p> <p>It can not be said that rugs woven whole in the loom in whole or in part of wool are, by reason of the process of manufacture alone, sufficiently similar to the rugs named in paragraph 300 to be brought within its provisions.</p> <p>4. Machine-Made Wilton Rugs.</p> <p>Machine-made Wilton rugs are not dutiable under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913 (“Oriental, Berlin, Atibusson, Axminster and similar rugs”), but are dutiable under paragraph 294 by virtue of paragraph 303.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 258, Tariff Aot of 1913—Jacquard Figured Upholstery Goods.</p> <p>The common and usual signification of the term “upholstery goods” includes nets or nettings in the piece. The term has never been proven in this court to have , any commercial meaning different from its common meaning. The provision for “Jacquard figured upholstery goods, composed wholly or in chief value of cotton, * * * in the piece or otherwise,” paragraph 258, tariff act of 1913, was intended by Congress to cover Jacquard figured cotton nets or nettings in the piece notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 358 for nets, nettings, laces, etc., of whatever yarns, threads, or filaments composed.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 258, Tariff Act of 1913—Legislative Sanction— “Upholstery Goods.”</p> <p>■ In reenacting unrestricted in paragraph 258, tariff act of 1913, the term “upholstery goods ” from paragraph 326, tariff act of 1909, after having had its attention specifically directed to the decision of the United. States Court of Customs Appeals that the term included all the interior textile deqorations and fittings of apartments, Congress must be presumed to have used it in this sense.</p> <p>3. CONSTRUCTION'—CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE, FORCE OF.</p> <p>A customs administrative practice may be invoiced as an aid in determining the interpretation to be given to ambiguous statutes, but it is only an aid to such interpretation proper to be considered when the statute is capable of that construction, and is of force only when it has become a settled rule of conduct, long continued, and practically uniform. Such a practice contrary to the decision of the United States Court of Customs Appeals, either before or after such decision, has no force.</p> <p>4. Evidence, Relevancy.</p> <p>Inasmuch as the tariff act of 1913 does not classify upholstery goods of fabrics according to the industry which produced them, evidence that the making of net-tings and laces is a separate industry from that which produces certain other uphol stery goods and tapestries has no relevancy to an issue as to whether Jacquard figured cotton nets or nettings should be classified as Jacquard figured upholstery goods under paragraph 258 or as nets or nettings under paragraph 358.</p> <p>5. Evidence, Relevancy.</p> <p>Evidence that when the tariff act of 1913 was pending in Congress and paragraph 326 of the act of 1909, the predecessor of paragraph 258 of the act of 1913, was under consideration, the parties who made representations to the Ways and Means Cou-mittee on the subject of upholstery goods were not interested in the industry producing laces or nettings or in the product of lace or netting machines, but were interested in other upholstery goods, is not relevant to an issue as to whether certain Jacquard figured cotton nets or nettings are classifiable as Jacquard figured upholstery goods under paragraph 258 or as nets or nettings under paragraph 358.</p> <p>6. Jacquard Figured Nettings.</p> <p>Jacquard figured nets or nettings, wholly or in chief value of cotton, imported in the piece, are dutiable under paragraph 258, tariff act of 1913, as Jacquard figured upholstery goods, and not under paragraph.358, as nets or nettings.</p>

<p>Machine-Made Axminster Rugs.</p> <p>Following the reasoning of Beuttell & Sons v. United. States (8 Gt. Gust. Appls., 409; T. D. 37666), decided concurrently herewith, machine-made Axminster rugs are dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 300, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8151 (T. D. 375901.</p> <p>[Oral argument May 16,1918, by Mr. Frederick W. Brooks, jr., and Mr. Hanson ]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41480.</p> <p>[Oral argument May 16,1918, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>