Volume 70 — Connecticut Reports

<p>Certain coupon bonds iss.ued by the defendant company and owned by IT, its president, while held by the plaintiff as collateral security for a debt due him from 3, were conveyed by the latter to the plaintiff, by a written instrument, and thereby became the plaintiff’s absolute property. In consideration of this conveyance the plaintiff, in the same instrument, agreed to sell and deliver the bonds to 3upon payment of a specified amount within a limited time. Nothing was said by either party as to the coupons. In an action against the obligor, after the time allowed for 3 to repurchase the bonds had expired, to recover the amount of the unpaid coupons, it was held:—</p> <p>1. That upon these facts the trial court was fully justified in holding that the title to the coupons passed to the plaintiff with the bonds.</p> <p>2. That evidence of the price the plaintiff had obtained for certain shares of stock which also became his absolute property by virtue of the aforesaid conveyance, was irrelevant, and properly excluded; as was also evidence of the secret intent of 3 not to transfer the coupons with the bonds. - - ■</p> <p>3. That a previous “ arrangement ” or understanding between the defendant and 3, that he was not to present the coupons for payment until it was convenient for the company to pay them, was unavailing as a defense against coupons overdue at the date of their transfer to the plaintiff, inasmuch as it did not appear that such arrangement constituted a valid contract obligatory upon 3, in whose shoes the plaintiff stood.</p> <p>4. That interest upon the coupons from the time of their presentation for payment was properly allowed.</p> <p>The case of Bose v. Bridgeport, 17 Conn. 243, limited and distinguished.</p>

<p>Action of replevin to recover the possession of a horse, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford. County and tried to the court, Peck, Associate Judge-; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The material facts are as follows: The plaintiff, who was the owner of the hay horse described in the complaint, had for several years permitted his father-in-law, Jeremiah Sullivan, who resided in Burlington in this State, to keep and use it on his farm with his own horses. The plaintiff during this time made his home with said Sullivan, though he only occasionally visited Burlington, passing most of his time in Boston where he was in business. In the early part of February, 1897, Sullivan exchanged the horse in question with the defendant for a black horse and $85. Defendant did not know that Sullivan was not the owner of the horse he so traded. Plaintiff’s horse was worth from $100 to $150, and the black horse about $50. On returning home the following evening, and having learned from Sullivan of the trade, and he and Sullivan having discovered that the horse received from the defendant was blind, the plaintiff was dissatisfied, and told Sullivan he must “ fix it up ” with the defendant. A few days later plaintiff went to defendant’s home to ascertain if he still had the bay horse, and talked with the defendant about the horse, saying it was a good horse; but did not tell defendant that he, the plaintiff, owned it, nor in any manner disavow the trade.</p> <p>Sullivan afterward went to the defendant and complained that he had “ stuck him,” and asked him to trade back, which the defendant refused to do; and on the 19th of February, at the plaintiff’s suggestion, Sullivan caused a writ and complaint to be drawn against the defendant and placed in the hands of an officer for service, in which Sullivan was described as the plaintiff and as the owner of the bay horse, and which alleged that he had been induced to trade by fraudulent representations, and demanded $200 damages.</p> <p>The plaintiff Curnane was present at a conversation with .the officer about serving the writ, and accompanied the officer part way to defendant’s house. The officer did not serve the .writ, but told defendant its nature and advised him to settle ■ the matter; and the plaintiff, Curnane, was present at a conversation at Sullivan’s house where the officer and the defendant had gone, and in which conversation defendant offered to trade back the horse for $10, but Curnane said nothing about owning the horse.</p> <p>The plaintiff and Sullivan afterwards together demanded of the defendant the $35 to be paid by defendant, and on defendant’s claiming that it was not to be paid until March 15th, Curnane urged defendant to pay the money at once, saying: “ Give him the $35 and.it will be all right; ” and that Sullivan wanted the money to buy another horse.</p> <p>On the 26th of February the plaintiff commenced the present action, and at the time of service of the writ brought back to the defendant the black horse, which defendant refused to receive. Previous to the service of the replevin writ plaintiff made no demand upon defendant for the horse, nor had either he or Sullivan informed the defendant, nor had the defendant any knowledge, that the plaintiff owned the horse. On March 15th the defendant tendered to Sullivan the $35, which the latter refused to receive, saying that defendant owed him nothing.</p> <p>During the trial the defendant offered deputy sheriff Morse as a witness, and asked: “ Did you have a writ in your possession in which Sullivan was plaintiff and S cheidel was defendant, with which you went to Scheidel’s house, and which you read to him ? ” To tins question the plaintiff objected, on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant. Prior to this both Curnane and Sullivan had testified that Curnane owned the horse (which was a controverted question in the ease), and also that Sullivan procured the writ in question, and that Curnane knew of the existence and intended service of the writ. The court admitted the question as tending to contradict Sullivan’s testimony that the horse belonged to Curnane, and also as tending, in connection with the other evidence, to show a ratification by Curnane of Sullivan’s act in trading the horse. To the admission of this question the plaintiff excepted. The answer was: “ I did. I read it in part, and told him what the rest was.” Morse produced the writ, and the defendant offered it in evidence. The same objection and ruling were made, and the plaintiff excepted to the admission of the writ. This was the writ procured by Sullivan at the suggestion of the plaintiff, before referred to.</p> <p>Upon the above facts the plaintiff claimed that the title and right of possession was in the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to judgment in his favor; but the court held that the acts of the plaintiff and Ms failure to disavow Sullivan’s trade of the horse, or to assert Ms title, constituted a ratification by Mm of Sullivan’s act in trading the horse, and rendered judgment for the defendant.</p>

<p>A town treasurer cannot bind the town by his acceptance of an illegal town order.</p> <p>By Chap. 126 of the Public Acts of 1887, p. 746, the first selectmen of the five towns which were found to be specially benefited by the layout and establishment of a public highway across the Connecticut River at Hartford, and which were thereafter chargeable with its support, were constituted a board “for the care, maintenance and control of said highway,” and for that purpose became “a body politic and corporate.” Held that the expenses which this board could lawfully incur and impose upon the several towns were limited to those for the repair and maintenance of the highway; and that the towns were not liable for expenses incurred by the board for securing legislation whereby its own corporate exist- ■ ence was terminated and the burden of maintaining the highway was transferred to the State.</p> <p>There can be no ratification of an unauthorized act, unless all the facts are known and an intent to ratify exists.</p> <p>In the case at bar the plaintiff alleged that the defendant town and its treasurer intended to pay certain illegal orders drawR against the latter by said highway board; and the answer averred that several annual reports of the selectmen, treasurer and other town officials, containing these orders as a liability of the town, were accepted by the town. Held that these allegations did not show a ratification by the town of the acts of the highway board.</p> <p>A town is not estopped from setting up the illegality of an order drawn upon its town treasurer, merely because it has passed into the hands of a bona fide holder. Although such orders may be transferable by delivery or indorsement, they do not possess the full characteristics of commercial paper,—freedom from all legal and equitable defenses in the hands of a bona fide holder.</p>

<p>Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Thomas J. Ridgway of Norwich, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved by that court, Shumway, J., upon the allegations of the complaint and answers, for the consideration and advice of this court.</p> <p>The material portions of the will were as follows: —</p> <p>“ Item 1. I give and bequeath to the children of my late niece Catherine Randall, now deceased, who was the wife of John P. Randall of Pittston, Pennsylvania, the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) to be equally divided between them to share and share alike, to them and their heirs forever.</p> <p>“ Item 2. I give and bequeath to my niece Antoinette King (widow) of Stanhope, New Jersey, the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) and in case she dies before me the said sum of Eight Hundred Dollars I give and bequeath to her heirs to be divided equally among them.</p> <p>“Item 3. I give and bequeath to my niece Amanda Jewett of Apalachine, State of New York and [in] case of her death before me to her heirs forever, the sum of Five Plundred Dollars ($500). . . .</p> <p>“ Item 8. I give and bequeath to the heirs of my niece, Minerva Ennis of Hoboken, New Jersey, the sum of Five Hundred Dollars (500).</p> <p>“ Item 9. I give and bequeath to my niece, Martha Kim-ball and her husband of Lackawaxen, Pennsylvania, the sum of Five Hundred Dollars, (500) but in case I survive them said sum so intended for her shall become and remain a part of my residuary estate to be disposed of as hereinafter directed. . . .</p> <p>“ Item 14. I give and bequeath to the heirs of Mary .Gibbs, deceased, of Danville, Pennsylvania, the sum of Five Hundred Dollars (500). . . .</p> <p>“ Item 19. I give and bequeath to Mrs. Amanda Rockwell of Milford, Pennsylvania, to Mrs. Minerva Hazen of Rowland, Pennsylvania, and to Louis P. Hazen of Chicago, 111., the sum of Four Hundred Dollars ($400) each. In case I shall survive either or all of the persons last named then the said sum of four hundred dollars so intended to be given to said deceased shall he paid to their or each of their heirs and I give and bequeath the same to them forever. . . .</p> <p>“ Lastly. I do hereby fully authorize and empower my executor hereinafter named to convert all my real and personal estate which I may die possessed of (except such as I shall reserve to be distributed without inventory) into money, by sale or otherwise as he shall judge to he for the best interest of all the legatees named in this my last will and testament, and to pay the legatees named in this will their respective sums as soon as the same can be done and comply with the laws of this State governing the settlement of estates of deceased persons, and if after the sale of my property as above directed and after the payment of my debts and funeral expenses, it shall be found that my estate will not pay the legacies in full, in that case a proportional deduction is by me directed to be made by my executor from each legacy named in this will and each legacy to' be paid according to such deduction and in case there shall be a surplus of my estate more than sufficient to pay the several legacies herein named said surplus shall become a part of my residuary estate. All of said surplus and all the rest and residue of my estate I give bequeath and devise to all the legatees named in this will to be equally divided among them all, all to share and share alike and in equal amounts of the same.”</p> <p>The will was executed July 19th, 1894, and the testator died in 1896, leaving no widow or descendants.</p> <p>Minerva Ennis had died in 1891, leaving several children, one of whom, David R. Ennis, died in 1895. Her husband is still living. David R. Ennis left a widow and two married daughters.</p> <p>Martha Kimball and her husband both survived the testator. She died before this suit was instituted, and he is insane.</p> <p>Amanda Jewett had died in January, 1894, leaving descendants and a husband.</p> <p>Mary Gibbs had died unmarried, leaving brothers and a sister and children and grandchildren of a deceased brother.</p> <p>Amanda Rockwell had died in 1898, leaving children.</p> <p>The questions as to which the advice of the court was asked, were as follows:—</p> <p>1. To whom and in what shares, shall be paid David R. Ennis’ part of the legacy given in Item 8 to the heirs of Minerva Ennis ? 2. To whom is payable the legacy given in Item 9? 3. Have the respective surviving husbands of Amanda Jewett, the legatee named in Item 3, and of Minerva Ennis, mentioned in Item 8, any interest in the legacies given in those items, respectively, and if so, what interest ? 4. Regarding the legacy given in Item 14 to the heirs of Mary Gibbs, what disposition is to be made of the share in said legacy of William J. Gibbs, who was an heir of Mary Gibbs at her death, but died before testator ? 5. Owing to the fact that the testator survived Amanda Rockwell, but died before Louis P. Hazen and Minerva Hazen, the legatees named in Item 19, what disposition shall be made of the $400 intended to be given to said Amanda ? 6. Whereas the testator in the last section of said will provides as follows: “ All of said surplus and all the rest and residue of my estate I give, bequeath, and devise to all the legatees named in this will to be equally divided among them all, all to share and share alike and in equal amounts of the same ; ” and whereas many of the legatees named in said will died before the testator, and the legacies which they would have taken if alive are by said will given in case of their death to their heirs who are not named, and whereas in items 1, 8 and 14, no legatee whatever is mentioned by name; what disposition shall be made of said residuum ?</p>

<p>Action to recover for work and labor, brought to the Court of Commou Pleas iu New London County and tried to the court, Noyes, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The bill of particulars filed by the plaintiff, was as follows :•</p> <p>H. L. Aldrich & Son.</p> <p>1889. To D. D. Brewster, Dr.</p> <p>To kalsomining rooms in mill at agreed price $400.00</p> <p>Aug. 19 To work of 6 men 1 day each, painting 15.00</p> <p>u 20 u “ u “ . 15.00</p> <p>21 15.00</p> <p>22 4 . 10.00</p> <p>Sept. 6 8 7.50</p> <p>7. . 7.50</p> <p>9 7.50</p> <p>10 1/2 . 3.75</p> <p>$481.25</p> <p>The finding stated the following facts: “ 1. The plaintiff brought his action upon the £ common counts ’ with bill of particulars, the defendants filed their answer, and the plaintiffs replied—all as on file. 2. At the commencement of the trial the plaintiff, by leave of the court, amended his complaint by striking out all the counts except the one now remaining. 3. In July, 1889, the plaintiff, who is a painter, agreed with the defendants, who are the owners of a cotton mill in Moosup, Connecticut, to do the labor of kalsomining and painting the interior of said mill, one coat, for $400, and to do a good job, one coat work. It was agreed that the work should be done while the mill was in operation, and the plaintiff examined, and had full opportunity to examine, the premises before making the agreement. 4. The work contemplated under said contract is stated in the bill of particulars, which also includes one day’s extra work painting, which was performed at the request of the defendants and which was worth $2.50. The other items of painting stated in the bill of particulars were contemplated and performed under said contract, and were not allowed as extra work. 5. The plaintiff did a good job, one coat work, considering the nature of the work required and the circumstances under which it was required to be done, and executed his part of the agreement before the commencement of this action. 6. It was agreed upon the trial that the items in the plea of set-off should be treated as payments, if the plaintiff was entitled to recover. 7. There is due the plaintiff from the defendants, after deducting such payments from the contract price, a balance of $177.54; for which amount, with $2.50 for said extra work, and interest, judgment was rendered as on file. Upon the trial the defendants claimed and asked the court to rule: (1) That the plaintiff could not recover on said contract, because the plaintiff had not proved the contract referred to in the first item of Ms bill of particulars. (2) That the plaMtiff could not recover on said contract upon the count set forth M Ms complaint. The court did not so rule, but rendered judgment as on file.”</p> <p>The defendants appealed and filed two reasons of appeal: the first, that the court erred M not sustaMing their first claim; and second, that the court erred M not sustaMing their second claim.</p>

<p>Itis not unlawful for a telephone company and an electric street railway company to use the same poles in a city street; especially when requested to do so by the municipal authorities.</p> <p>The conclusions of the trial court as to negligence and contributory negligence cannot be reviewed upon appeal, unless it appears that an incorrect standard of duty was applied, or some rule or principle of law, applicable to the facts found, was violated.</p> <p>At the request of the municipal authorities the defendants agreed to use a common pole in certain streets, and the shifting of the wires from the old to the new poles was undertaken by the telephone company. Seld that there was no absolute rule of law which imposed the duty of inspecting and testing the guy-wires and circuit-breakers of the street railway company, upon the telephone company rather than upon its employes who shifted the wires.</p> <p>Whether the master or servant should discharge this duty of inspection in a particular case, depends upon a variety of circumstances, and in some instances becomes a question of fact for the determination of the trial court.</p> <p>A telephone lineman who knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that the wires of an electric street railway company are in a dangerous condition, is bound to use due care, in view of such knowledge, to avoid injury to himself, notwithstanding the negligence of the railway company.</p> <p>The plaintiff, who sued as administrator to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of his intestate, assigned as error several rulings of tlie trial court in respect to evidence. Held tliat tliese rulings, even if erroneous, were harmless, inasmuch as it clearly appeared from the record that the plaintiff’s right of recovery was defeated by the contributory negligence of his intestate, —a conclusion which the rulings complained of in nowise affected.</p> <p>Upon a hearing in damages after a default, the plaintiff, having shown . the extent of the injury, is entitled to substantial damages, unless the defendant proves either his own freedom from negligence or contributory negligence of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Action to recover the amount of a liquor license bond, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, Dow, Assistant Judge, upon the defendants’ admission of the truth of the allegations of the complaint; the court was of opinion that the defendants were liable upon the admitted facts, and rendered judgment against them, whereupon they appealed to tins court for alleged errors in the rulings of the trial court.</p> <p>The condition of the bond sued upon, is as follows : “Whereas the above bounden Holgenson has made application to the board of county commissioners of the county of New Haven for a license to sell spirituous and intoxicating liquors in the town of New Haven, in said county: Now if such license shall be issued to the said Holgenson, and the said Holgenson shall comply with all the provisions of sections 3087 to 3101 inclusive, of the statutes under which said license may be issued, then this bond to be void; otherwise, of full force in the law.”</p> <p>Paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that “said Holgenson was, on the 4th day of December, 1896, in the City Court of New Haven, duly convicted of selling and exposing for sale on Sunday certain spirituous and intoxicating liquors, he not having a druggist’s license therefor, in violation of the provisions of the statutes, sections 3087 to 3101 inclusive, under which the license mentioned in paragraph 2 was issued, to wit: in violation of section 3097 of said statutes, as amended by the Public Acts of 1895. A copy of the record of said conviction will be filed in said court at its first opening upon the return day hereof, and marked Exhibit B.”</p> <p>Exhibit B is the record of a prosecution against Holgenson, the complaint in which contains two counts. The first count was for selling and exposing for sale, dispensing, disposing of and giving away certain intoxicating liquors, between the hours of 12 o’clock on Saturday the 24th of October, 1896, and 5 o’clock on the Monday morning next following; and the second was for keeping open a certain place in which intoxicating liquors were sold and exposed for sale, between the hours of 12 o’clock on Saturday night, the 24th of October, 1896, and 12 o’clock on the Sunday night next following. To tins complaint Holgenson pleaded guilty. The judgment recites that the court “ finds that the accused is guilty in manner and form as alleged in said complaint,” and imposes a fine of $10 and costs of prosecution. From that judgment no appeal was taken.</p> <p>The defendants’ answer to the complaint in the present case, is as follows: “ Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (being all the paragraphs of the complaint) are admitted.” The judgment of the court below recites that the court “ finds the issue for the plaintiff,” and adjudges that the plaintiff recover of the defendants $300 damages and his costs.</p> <p>From this judgment the appeal is taken, on the ground (set forth in various forms in the reasons of appeal) that the judgment is erroneous, because it legally appears from the record of the case that the only conviction, if any, alleged and proved, is a conviction for violating the provisions of the Public Acts of 1895; and no conviction for the violation of any provision of §§ 3087 to 3101 inclusive of the General Statutes, is alleged.</p> <p>Section 3064 of General Statutes provides that each person receiving a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors, shall give a bond with sufficient surety “ conditioned for the due observance of all the provisions of sections 3087 to 3101 inclusive.”’ Section 3097 of the General Statutes, and Chap. 251 of the Public Acts of 1895, are given in the foot-note.*</p>

Action to recover the value of labor and materials and to foreclose a mechanic’s lien therefor, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Robinson, J., by whom a judgment of nonsuit was rendered against the plaintiff as to the defendant Sarah Swayne, from which the plaintiff appealed for alleged error of the court in refusing to set aside said judgment. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. .

<p>Tlie indorsement and delivery of a warehouse receipt transfers the legal title and the constructive possession of the property to the indorsee.</p> <p>Whether our statute (General Statutes, § 3971) gives to such receipts all the characteristics of negotiable paper, qucere.</p> <p>An agreement between a former owner and the warehouseman, that the goods should remain in the warehouse until the purchase price had been paid, cannot affect a subsequent bona fide indorsee without notice.</p> <p>A warehouse receipt provided that certain barrels of whiskey were to be delivered upon surrender of the receipt, after the payment of the government tax “ and all other amounts due.” Held that the words quoted referred only to proper warehouse charges, and therefore gave no constructive notice to the indorsee that any lien existed in favor of a former owner for the purchase price of the whiskey.</p> <p>In the case at bar the warehouseman having paid the government tax upon the whiskey, issued his receipt for the goods with the words “tax paid” stamped thereon. Held that as against the plaintiff, an indorsee without notice, the warehouseman was estopped from claiming a lien for the amount of the tax so paid. £</p> <p>Statements claimed to have been made by a bank president concerning the dealings between a firm, in which he was a partner, and an insolvent debtor, are irrelevant upon an inquiry as to the relation which the bank sustained to such insolvent and to his property.</p> <p>A letter of the plaintiff directing a certain person to make demand upon the defendant for property about to be replevied, is admissible upon the part of the plaintiff to show the agent’s authority.</p>

Suit to determine the title to real estate under Chap. 66 of the Pub. Acts of 1893, involving the construction of the will of John Galvin of Waterbury, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, .Hall, J., where judgment was rendered for the defendant Catherine Holohan, from which the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The ease is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit to foreclose two mortgages, brought by appeal to the Superior Court in New Haven County where judgment was rendered, Cr. W. Wheeler, J., for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed for alleged erroneous rulings. The report of the committee which was accepted by the court, stated the following facts Eugene A. Benham, in 1886, to secure his note for $4,500 mortgaged a ten acre tract of land in Waterbury to tbe plaintiff.

<p>A statement in the reasons of appeal that the trial court erred in reaching a certain conclusion upon the evidence in the case, is insufficient as an assignment of error, in that it fails to specifically and distinctly point out any error of law.</p> <p>In a proceeding under § 2674 of the General Statutes, to compel a town to repair certain of its public roads, the question whether such roads are highways or not is one that may be raised by the town and, if raised, must be determined by the trier as incidental to the decision of the main question.</p>

Writ of error to review a judgment of conviction rendered by tbe Superior Court of Fairfield County, Andrews, J., in a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff for rape, brought to the Supreme Court of Errors holden at Bridgeport within and for the third judicial district, on the fourth Tuesday of October, 1897. The writ recites the material parts of the information, plea, verdict of the jury and judgment in the Superior Court.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a defective bigbway, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and beard in damages to tbe court, Elmer, J., after tbe defendant bad suffered a default; facts found and judgment rendered for tbe plaintiff for $800 damages, and appeal by tbe defendant for alleged errors in tbe rulings of the court.

Actioh to recover damages for fraud in the exchange of real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Ulmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff Johanna Gustafson, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

<p>In an action against an officer for a negligent escape and for a failure to return the process to court, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the actual damage he has sustained by reason of the officer’s default.</p> <p>Ordinarily the amount of this damage is prima facie established by proof of the judgment in the former action and of the plaintiff’s inability to collect it by legal process. But where the officer’s failure to return the writ and complaint makes such evidence impossible, the plaintiff may prove what judgment he might or could have obtained in the former action, had the process therein been returned to court.</p> <p>A complaint alleged that the defendant obtained a loan from the plaintiff by means of a forged and counterfeited promissory note. The evidence showed that the plaintiff was induced, by means of the forged note, to surrender to the defendant a valid claim against him, evidenced by a note upon which he was indorser. Held that the gist of the action was the fraud of the defendant, and that the allegation of a loan was merely matter of inducement. Held also, that if such allegation could be regarded as a material one, the facts proved showed no fatal variance, inasmuch as it appeared that the parties had treated the notes as money or as a loan.</p> <p>The trial court found that the plaintiff’s damage was the amount due him upon the forged note, and rendered judgment for that sum. It did not appear that a judgment against the defendant in the former action would have been valueless, nor did the finding disclose any facts which would necessarily have reduced the plaintiff’s loss below the amount due upon the forged note. Held no error.</p>

Action to recover a balance claimed to be due for stone furnished, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The complaint contained two counts.

<p>Inferences or conclusions of the trial court which result from sifting and weighing evidence and the credibility of witnesses, are matters of fact which this court cannot review; but the inference or conclusion drawn by the trial court from these specific, adjudicated facts, of legal liability, and of subordinate conditions essential to legal liability, are matters of law reviewable by this court upon appeal, where all the adjudicated facts appear of record.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s intestate was killed in a rear-end collision upon the defendant’s railway, which was alleged to have been caused by its negligence in failing to give telegraphic information to each of the colliding trains, of the position of the other, and in failing to exercise proper supervision of the movement of said trains. Erom the special facts found, the trial court inferred that the rules and regulations of the defendant did not sufficiently provide for the emergency, and for the reasonably safe operation of the colliding trains, and held the defendant guilty of negligence in this respect. These rules and regulations formed a part of the record, and the trial court found that for the general movement and operation of trains they were the best and safest general rules yet devised by the best railroad talent in the country. Held :—</p> <p>1. That the inference of the trial court as to the existence of an emergency and the adequacy of the rules, was, in view of all the facts stated in the record, a conclusion in respect to a matter of law, and therefore reviewable by this court.</p> <p>2. That the giving of telegraphic information to the colliding trains was not, upon the facts specially found, a duty imposed upon the defendant by law; and consequently its failure to give such information violated no legal right of the intestate.</p> <p>3. That the conditions attending the colliding trains did not differ essentially from those generally attending trains moving in the same direction, and did not create an exceptional situation or emergency unprovided for by the rules.</p> <p>In some instances it is impracticable for the trial court to set forth its inferences from testimony in a clear, detailed statement of adjudicated facts; and in such cases, although .the inference of liability drawn by the trial court is one of law, yet it cannot be reviewed by this court, because the fact or facts upon which it rested cannot be transferred from the mind of the trier to the mind of the appellate court; and tlie inference is therefore, practically, a conclusion of fact.</p> <p>A railroad company is bound to enforce as well as to adopt, adequate rules for the movement of its trains.</p> <p>The rule exempting the master from liability for an injury to one of his servants caused by the negligence of another, is too firmly established to be reversed or seriously modified by tlie judicial power.</p> <p>The case of Sprague, Admx., v. New York & New England Bailroad Co., 68 Conn. 345, explained and distinguished.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport, ascertaining the heir and distributee of the intestate estate of Julia Clarke, late of Columbia, South Carolina, deceased; taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Ulmer, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.</p> <p>The finding stated the following facts: Henry P. Clarke, the appellant, while domiciled in the State of South Carolina, intermarried with Julia Hurd, in the State of New York, in the year 1886, and the married couple immediately returned to the State of South Carolina, which then-became their domicil of marriage. In 1889, a daughter, Nancy B. Clarke, was born, who still survives, and is the appellee herein. In December, 1893, another daughter, Julia Clarke, the distribution of whose estate is now in question, was born. There were no other children bom of said marriage. On February 10th, 1894, the wife, Julia H. Clarke, died. On May 20th, 1894, the daughter, Julia Clarke, died, leaving no creditors. At all times since said marriage the State of South Carolina has been the domicil of the appellant and his family.</p> <p>During coverture and at the days of the dates thereof, Julia H. Clarke executed the following will and codicil :</p> <p>WILL.</p> <p>“ I, Julia H. Clarke, wife of Henry P. Clarke, residing near Eastover, in Richland county, State of South Carolina, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make and ordain this my last will and testament and hereby revoke all other wills by me at any time heretofore made.</p> <p>“First. I direct that all my just debts and my funeral expenses shall be fully paid by my executor hereinafter named.</p> <p>“ Second. I direct that a portion of my estate sufficient to produce one thousand dollars ($1,000) annually, shall be safely invested by my executor and the said one thousand dollars be paid annually to my father, S. H. Hurd, now of New York, in quarterly payments, during the term of Ms natural life.</p> <p>“ Third. I give and bequeath to Mrs. Laura Sherwood, of Bridgeport, Connecticut, the sum of ten thousand dollars, ($10,000).</p> <p>“ Fourth. I give and bequeath to Miss Agnes C. Patter-sou, of said Bridgeport, the sum of five thousand dollars, ($5,000).</p> <p>“ Fifth. The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real and personal, of whatever description or wheresoever situated, I give, devise and bequeath as follows: One half thereof to my husband, Henry P. Clarke, and one half thereof to my said husband M trust for my daughter, Nancy, until she becomes twenty-five years of age, and then to pay the whole sum over to her. But if she shall marry before that age with the consent and approval of her father, or M case of his death, with the consent and approval of her then guardian, then I direct that one half of her share shall be paid to her upon her marriage and the other half when she becomes twenty-five.</p> <p>“ In case I shall leave surviving me one or more children beside my daughter Nancy, then I direct that the said rest, residue and remainder of my estate shall he divided equally among my said husband and all of my children, share and share alike, my husband and my children sharing per capita, and the shares of said children to be held in trust as above provided in the case of Nancy as being the only one. And I give, devise and bequeath the said rest, residue and remainder as aforesaid, to each and to their heirs and each of them forever.</p> <p>“ I constitute and appoint my said husband, Henry P. Clarke, to be executor and trustee of this my will, and direct that no bonds be required of him under either appointment.</p> <p>“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this twenty-fifth (25th).day of May, A. D. 1891.</p> <p>“ Julia H. Clarke. (Seal) ”</p> <p>CODICIL.</p> <p>“ I, Mrs. Julia H. Clarke, wife of Henry P. Clarke, formerly residing near Eastover, in the county and State aforesaid, but now residing in the city of Columbia, of said county and State, having made my last will and testament bearing date the twenty-fifth day of May, A. D., 1891, at Bridgeport, in the State of Connecticut, do now make this codicil to be taken as a part of the same:</p> <p>“ First. I hereby ratify and confirm my said will in every respect, save as far as any part of it is inconsistent with tins codicil.</p> <p>“ Second. I hereby revoke the third item of said will, and in lieu thereof I will and direct that a portion of my estate sufficient to produce five hundred dollars annually, shall be safely invested by my executor, and the said five hundred be paid annually in quarterly payments to Mrs. Laura Sher-. wood, of Bridgeport, Conn., during the term of her natural life.</p> <p>“ Third. I further will and direct that after the death of Mrs. Laura Sherwood, that the portion of my estate which shall at that time be invested for her benefit under the second item of this codicil, shall then become a portion of my estate, and is hereby disposed of as directed in item five of my said will; and I further direct that if said Mrs. Laura Sherwood shall die before my death, then the divestment directed for her benefit under item two of this codicil shall be and is hereby disposed of as directed in item five of my said will.</p> <p>“ Fourth. I further will and direct that after the death of my said father, S. H. Hurd, that the portion of my estate Avhich shall at that time be invested for his benefit, as directed in item two of said will, shall then become a portion of my estate, and shall be disposed of as directed in item five of my said will; and I further direct that if my said father shall die before my death, then the investment directed for his benefit in said item two shall be disposed of as directed in item five of my said will.</p> <p>“In witness whereof I, the said Julia H. Clarke, have hereunto subscribed my name and set my seal to the foregoing codicil of four items, at Columbia, in the said State, this the 11th day of November, A. D., 1893.</p> <p>“ Julia H. Clabke, (L. S.) ”</p> <p>Said will and codicil were duly established in the Court of Probate for Richland county in the State of South Carolina, and copies thereof have become part of the files and records of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport, pursuant to the proAÚsions of § 550 of the General Statutes.</p> <p>The daughter, Julia Clarke, OAvned no property in Connecticut at the time of her decease, except such as had or should come to her under her mother’s will. The property of the mother, Julia H. Clarke, possessed by her at the time of her decease, consisted of $825.25 in personalty, the home plantation in South Carolina, valued at $20,000, and real estate in Bridgeport, in this State, valued at $138,000. This last mentioned property was distributed to her the day before her death in a partial distribution of the estate of her grandfather, P. T. Barnum, who died April 7th, 1891, leaving a -will under which she took a legacy of $100,000 (paid before said partial distribution), and one sixth of the residue of his estate. She owed debts amounting to $80,000 at the time of her decease.</p> <p>The estate of the daughter, Julia Clarke, referred to in the petition to the Court of Probate, consisted of an undivided one third interest in the real estate so as above distributed to her mother. The value of the said Julia H. Clarke’s entire interest in the estate of her grandfather was several hundred thousand dollars. Both real estate and personal property of large value remained in the said Barnum residue, at the death of the mother, Julia H. Clarke, for future distribution. The real estate so remaining is situated in Connecticut, New York and Kansas.</p> <p>Henry P. Clarke (the appellant herein), “as executor of the last will and testament of Julia H. Clarke and trustee of the estate of Nancy B. Clarke, his infant daughter, under said will,” brought suit against Nancy B. Clarke (the appellee herein) in the Circuit Court for the fifth judicial circuit of South Carolina, praying for the “ judgment and direction of the court in regard to the true construction of said will, and especially the fifth and residuary paragraph thereof, and as to his powers and duties as such executor and trustee under said will in the premises, and for such further relief as may be just and proper.” A guardian ad litem was appointed for the infant defendant, who duly answered, and, after hearing had, the court “ ordered, adjudged and decreed that the will of the testatrix, Julia H. Clarke, worked an equitable conversion into personalty at the time of her death of all her real estate of whatsoever description and wheresoever situated, and that the plaintiff as executor, receive, administer and account for the same as personalty, and that he is by the said will authorized and empowered to sell and convey the same for the purpose of executing said will, and that he have leave to apply for further orders and directions upon the foot of this decree.”</p> <p>This judgment was upon appeal subsequently affirmed by the court of last resort hi South Carolina, as will appear by the report thereof in 46 S. Car. 230, which was made by reference a part of the record in this canse; and said decision was considered by the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport.</p> <p>By the law of the State of South Carolina, the court to which the action was brought had jurisdiction both of the persons and of the subject-matter of that suit; and by a like law the appellant shared equally with Iris surviving child in the distribution of the estate of the deceased.</p> <p>The intestate was at the time of her death domiciled in the State of South Carolina and her estate has, ever since the first day of February, 1897, been in due process of settlement in the proper courts of that State.</p> <p>Prior to May 29th, 1897, letters of administration had been granted by the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport to Henry P. Clarke, as administrator of the estate of Julia Clarke, late of Columbia, South Carolina, but leaving real estate in said district, deceased intestate; and he had duly qualified as such. On May 29th, 1897, he as such administrator made written application to said Court of Probate, stating that divers persons claimed to be entitled to have said real estate set out and distributed to them, and praying that the court might hear their claims and ascertain to whom the estate should be set out and distributed. Actual notice of this petition and of the time set for the hearing thereon was given to Nancy B. Clarke, and John H. Perry, Esq., was appointed by the Court of Probate as her guardian ad litem. After a full hearing, a decree was passed on July 3d, the material part of which is as follows: “ Upon such hearing, this court finds that the intestate was domiciled in the State of South Carolina at the time of her decease ; that the entire inventoried assets of her estate in this State consist of an undivided interest in certain real estate, situated in the town of Bridgeport, of the value of about $ , which said interest was derived from the will of her mother, Julia H. Clarke, who died about four months prior to the decease of the intestate, domiciled in the State of South Carolina, an exemplified copy of whose will ‘ and the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina interpreting the same 'in a case in which the petitioner herein was plaintiff and Nancy B. Clarke was defendant,’ is on file and of record in this court and hereby referred to, and whose estate is as yet unsettled and undistributed. Wherefore this court finds and decrees that the sole heir and distributee of the estate of the intestate is her aforesaid sister, Nancy B. Clarke.”</p> <p>From this decree Henry P. Clarke appealed to the Superior Court, stating that he was a citizen of South Carolina, and the father and only surviving parent of said Julia Clarke, deceased, and an heir at law and distributee of her estate, and therefore aggrieved by the decree. By order of the Court of Probate notice of the appeal was duly given to Henry P. Clarke, administrator on said estate, and to John H. Perry, guardian ad litem of Nancy B. Clarke, and also, by personal service of a copy of the process, to Nancy B. Clarke, at the place where she was temporarily residing, to wit, at Asheville, North Carolina. On the return of the appeal to the Superior Court, Mr. Perry was also there appointed her guardian ad litem, and “ authorized and directed to appear and defend said action in her behalf.”</p> <p>The reasons of appeal were as follows:—</p> <p>I.</p> <p>1. The estate of the intestate in the State of Connecticut consisted of property all of which is for purposes of distribution, and for the purpose of the ascertainment of heirs and distributees, personal estate.</p> <p>2. The intestate was, at the time of her death, domiciled in the State of South Carolina, and her estate has ever since the first day of February, 1897, been in due process of settlement in the proper courts of that State.</p> <p>8. By the laws of South Carolina, the appellant was and is entitled to a distributive share in all the personal estate of the intestate.</p> <p>H.</p> <p>The court erred in assuming to ascertain the heirs and distributees of the intestate, as all of the estate of the intestate for the purpose of the hearing then before the court consisted of personal property, and the courts of South Carolina alone had jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the heirs and distributees.</p> <p>III.</p> <p>The court erred in not dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the application.</p> <p>Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the first reason assigned were admitted by the reply, and the residue of the reasons assigned were denied.</p>

<p>Chapter 212 of the Public Acts of 1895 provides that all contracts for the sale of personal property (with certain exceptions) conditioned thatthe title thereto shall remain in the vendor after delivery, shall be in writing, and acknowledged and recorded within a reasonable time in the town clerk’s office in the town where the vendee resides; and that all sales not so made shall be held to be absolute sales, except as between the vendor and the vendee “ or their personal representatives.” Held that in view of the remedial nature of ,thé statute, the receiver of an insolvent corporation, who had come into possession of certain machinery which had been purchased by the corporation under conditional contracts of sale not made in conformity with the statute, ought not, in respect to such property, to be regarded as the “ personal representative ” of the corporation, but rather as the agent of creditors, whose rights he was appointed to protect and enforce; and therefore that the machinery must be regarded as the absolute property of the corporation, so far as it might be needed by the receiver for the payment of debts.</p> <p>The term “personal representatives” has acquired no fixed, technical meaning. It may under certain circumstances be held to include trustees in insolvency and receivers, as well as executors and administrators; for the former for some purposes as truly represent the debtor as the latter do the deceased.</p> <p>A chattel mortgage not recorded until long after the receiver of the mortgagor had taken possession of the property, is not valid as against him.</p> <p>Recitals in a chattel mortgage or conditional contract of sale, which might perhaps have estopped the vendee from claiming that the instrument had not been properly recorded, cannot estop the latter’s receiver, since in this particular he represents creditors.</p>

Action to recover damages for the unlawful detention and restraint of the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the ruling of the court. The complaint in this action is in three counts.

<p>The charge of embezzling “ moneys ” under § 1580 of the General Statutes, cannot be supported by proof of embezzling a chose in action.</p> <p>The defendant was charged with receiving, as agent, $03 in money and embezzling the same. The proof showed that he received an order for the payment of $230, agreeing to collect the same, to retain $167 of the proceeds in discharge of a debt due himself, and appropriate the balance as his principal directed, and that before the order was payable he indorsed it over to another in payment of his own debt. Held that a charge to the jury that such indorsement was an appropriation of the money of his principal, as charged in the complaint, was erroneous.</p> <p>The trial court may properly refuse to charge the jury in respect to matters which are not pertinent to the case.</p> <p>The drawer of the order testified that the defendant agreed to pay a part of the proceeds when collected, to one S, to whom the drawer was indebted. Held that S might testify, in corroboration of this evidence, that the defendant had afterwards said to him that he, the defendant, would pay his (S’s) claim.</p>

<p>Suit to foreclose a mortgage and also a judgment lien, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Bradstreet, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by both parties for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The complaint alleged that on the first day of August, 1891, the defendants, D. & H. Pratt, made twenty of their promissory notes, each for the sum of two hundred dollars, payable to the order of the Cheshire Manufacturing Company: the first, one year from date, and the other nineteen, one each six months thereafter, with interest at the rate of five per centum per annum payable semi-annually, together with all taxes on said notes laid against said Manufacturing Company or the holders of the notes; that said notes were secured by a mortgage of the tract of land sought to be foreclosed; that thirteen of said notes had been paid in full, and the sum- of $117.22 on the fourteenth, so that there was unpaid, in whole or in part, seven of said notes, being those last payable, and amounting in the whole to the sum of $1,282.28; that on May 19th, 1892, the said company was compelled to pay and did pay the sum of $70 taxes on the property mortgaged, which had been laid against the said D. and H. Pratt; that on October 2d, 1896, the said Manufacturing Company duly assigned the said seven unpaid notes and the mortgage securing them, to the plaintiff, and that he was now the actual and Iona fide owner and holder of the said unpaid notes and said mortgage.</p> <p>The complaint in a second count prayed for the foreclosure of a judgment lien on the same land.</p> <p>Curtis Thompson of Bridgeport and Catherine A. Pratt of Naugatuck, were made parties defendant, each of whom, it is alleged, had acquired some interest in said land which accrued after the rights of the plaintiff.</p> <p>The answer of D. & H. Pratt and Catherine A. Pratt, alleged that the said Pratts had, in the land on which the judgment lien was placed, at the date thereof, no such interest as could he taken or affected thereby; that the said company had discharged D. &. H. Pratt from the payment of said taxes, and that sixteen of said notes had been paid in full, and a part of the seventeenth.</p> <p>The answer of Curtis Thompson alleged that there had been paid the sum of $3,400 on said notes and applied in payment of those which the soonest became due, so that there was at that date due only the sum of $600 of the whole amount pf the said notes; that he loaned to the said D. & H. Pratt, pn the 28th day pf May, 1894, the sum of $570 and took as security therefor a second mortgage on the said tract of land now sought to be foreclosed, in the belief that only $600 was due on th,e principal of said twenty notes; and that he had no knowledge or suggestion that any more was due.</p> <p>The trial court denied the prayer of the plaintiff for a foreclosure of the judgment lien; denied the plaintiff’s claim to have a foreclosure as to the said sum of $70; found that seven of the said notes were unpaid in whole or in part, and, as the principal sum of these notes was not by their terms due, but only the sum of $315.22 of interest, rendered judgment that unless the defendants paid the said sum so due they should be foreclosed of all right to redeem the said premises. From this judgment both parties appealed.</p> <p>The additional facts in the case, so far as necessary, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Suit to determine the construction of the will of Horace Nettleton of Clinton, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and reserved by that court, Thayer, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint and answers, for the consideration and advice of this court.</p> <p>Horace Nettleton, late of the town of Clinton, made his will on the 14th day of January, 1892, by which he made certain bequests and legacies. On the 2d day of December, 1893, he made a codicil, by which he changed those legacies. On the 1st day of April, 1896, he made another codicil, as follows : “ Whereas, I,- Horace Nettleton, of Clinton, Connecticut, have by my last will and testament in writing, duly executed, bearing date January 14th, 1892, and by a codicil dated December 2d, 1893, given and bequeathed to William J. Kelsey 1500, Eugene H. Kelsey $500, Chauneey N. Kelsey $500, the Methodist Episcopal Church $1,000, and the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church the residue: Now I, the said Horace Nettleton, being desirous of altering my said will in respect to the said legacies, do therefore make this present writing, Avhich I Avill and direct to be annexed as a codicil to my said will, and taken as part thereof, and I do hereby revoke all the said legacies, sections fourth, fifth, and sixth, of my said Avill, and the whole of said codicil dated December 2d, 1893. And I give, devise and bequeath to my nephews and nieces, they being my lawful heirs, all the rest and residue and remainder of my property, real and personal; and I do ratify and confirm my said ■will in everything except where the same is hereby revoked and altered as aforesaid. In witness whereof,” etc.</p> <p>It is alleged in the complaint that the nephews and nieces of the testator consist of the following persons, viz: Josiah A. Nettleton, only child of Augustus Nettleton, brother of the testator; Annie Nettleton and Ashford Nettleton, only children of Linus Nettleton, a brother of the testator; Alfred Jackson, Evelyn Jackson, and Adeline Hart, only children of Mary Jackson, a sister of the testator; John S. Nettleton, Warren 0. Nettleton, Wilson F. Nettleton, and Annie A. Reynolds, only children of Danforth Nettleton; and Susan McNamar, only daughter of Alfred Nettleton, a brother of the testator; that some of said nephews and nieces claim that the said rest and residue, so devised and bequeathed by said codicil, should be distributed to them per stirpes ; the others that it should be distributed to them per capita. All these nephews and nieces were made parties defendant. The complaint prayed for an adjudication of these questions.</p> <p>Alfred Jackson, and those of the defendants who claim that there should be a per capita distribution, made answer in this way: “1st. These defendants admit the allegations of the complaint. 2d. The sister and the several brothers of the deceased Horace Nettleton mentioned in the complaint, died at the dates and ages as follows: Mary Jackson died December, 1854, aged 62 years; Danforth Nettleton died April, 1882, aged 80 years; Linus Nettleton died February, 1869, aged 79 years; Augustus Nettleton died July, 1882, aged 87 years; Alfred Nettleton died May, 1883, aged 79 years. Horace Nettleton, the testator, who was the youngest child, died September 6th, 1896, aged 86 years. He, as well as his brothers and sister, was born at the family home in Killingworth, Conn. All his life he had lived either in Killingworth, Mystic, Clinton, or Guilford, Conn. Clinton was his legal residence at the time of his death, and had been so for about twenty years. He was residing there when the Original will was made. Katherine M. Kelsey, named in the original will, was the daughter of his second wife by a former husband. The home of her family was in the house adjoining that of Horace Nettleton in Clinton. His second wife died December 31st, 1891. At the time of making the second codicil, April 1st, 1896, Horace Nettleton was residing, and had been for two or three years continuously, with his niece, Anna A. Reynolds, at her home in Guilford, and he continued to reside with his said niece until the time of his death. During the whole of said residence of said Horace Nettleton with his niece, Anna A. Reynolds, at her home in Guilford, Wilson F. Nettleton of New Haven, a nephew of said Horace Nettleton, a brother of the said Anna A. Reynolds, and a widower without children, was frequently at his sister’s house in Guilford, and it was understood, before the making of the second codicil, between himself and the said Horace Nettleton, that the said Wilson F. Nettleton might be called upon at any time to help take care of his uncle, Horace, and from time to time during the residence of the said Horace at the home of Anna A. Reynolds in Guilford, Wilson F. Nettleton did assist on several occasions in taking care of him, and helped to take care of him at the time of Ms death. The cMldren of Horaee Nettleton had both died some years before the making of the original will, leaving no issue. The various nephews and nieces of Horace Nettleton named in the complaint, were living at the date of the original will and ever since, at the places named in the complaint, and had been living at such places many years prior to the date of the original will.</p> <p>“These defendants claim an order and decree settling the construction of said will, to the effect that said fund remaining for distribution be divided among the nephews and nieces of the said Horace Nettleton, per capita.”</p> <p>Josiah A. Nettleton, and those of the defendants who claimed that there should be a per stirpes distribution, answered in this way: “ 1. The defendants herein named admit the allegations of the complaint. 2. They also admit so much of paragraph second of the answer of Alfred Jackson and others as alleges that the brothers and sister of the testator died prior to his death, and so much thereof as alleges that his nephews and nieces are his only heirs. 3.. The estate left by the testator to be distributed to his nephews and nieces under said will consists of $18,700 in money. 4. These defendants claim an adjudication and decree settling the construction of said will, and an order directing that the fund remaining for distribution be divided among the nephews and nieces of said Horace Nettleton, per stirpes.”</p> <p>These defendants also demurred to all of the second paragraph in the answer of Alfred Jackson et al., excepting what they had admitted, for the following reasons: 1-1 First. For the reason that parol and extrinsic evidence is not pertinent, competent or admissible in the construction or interpretation of wills; that the language used by the testator is clear, free from equivocation, ambiguity and uncertainty. Second. Because the allegations in said paragraph furnish no guide, information or aid in the construction of said will.”</p>

Suit by a testamentary trustee to determine tbe validity and construction of tbe will of Alpbeus F. Snow, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Prentice, J., upon the facts stated in the complaint, for the consideration and advice of this court. From the complaint and answers the following facts appeared : The testator, Alpheus F. Snow of Hartford, died in 1886; leaving a widow, a son, and two daughters.

Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to the City-Court of Hartford and tried to the jury before Morse, Recorder ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors of the court in its rulings upon evidence. The following facts appeared from the finding: In 1895 the plaintiff brought a former action of ejectment against the defendant in the same court, respecting the same land.

Action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from building an abutment or other structure as part of an overhead railroad crossing, within the limits of North Main street in Bristol, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford Comity and tried to the court, Prentice, J., upon the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s second defenses; the court held such defenses sufficient and overruled the- demurrers thereto, and the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the…

Action of replevin to recover possession of a cash register, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Oase, J., upon the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s reply; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

') for want of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs appealed for alleged error in this ruling of the court. The material facts stated in the complaint are as follows : “ 1. The petitioners own a valuable piece of property situated in said Bridgeport, bounded southwest by Bridgeport harbor, northwest by the tracks of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, north by Sterling street, east by Noble avenue, and south by land of Frank Miller and others. ... 6.

<p>Application for a finding that public convenience and necessity requires the extension and construction of a street railway parallel to the line of a steam railroad, made to the Son. George W. Wheeler, a judge of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the applicant, and appeal by the respondents for alleged errors in tlie rulings of the judge.</p> <p>In tliis court the appellee filed a plea in abatement, to which the appellants demurred.</p> <p>The appellants also moved to reject the plea in abatement, claiming that it was not filed with the proper clerk. This, motion was denied, for the reasons stated in Vincent v. McNamara, post, 332.</p> <p>The appeal to this court, filed by the appellants on January 6th, 1898, states that the parties appeal “ to the' Supreme Court of Errors,” and does not state an appeal to any spe cific term, nor state any time or place for holding the court, and the plea alleges these defects as ground of abatement. The appellants demur for the reasons: 1. The plea does not show that the appellee did not have actual knowledge from the proceedings below, that the appeal was taken to this term of court. 2. That the “ notice of appeal ” filed in the court below, states the term to which the appeal will be taken. 3. That the record does not show the appeal to be taken to any term other than the present term of this court.</p> <p>The appellants also read in court an answer, alleging, in bar, a general appearance by the appellee and other facts appearing in the record, and stated that they wished to file this answer in case their demurrer should be overruled. The appellee stated they should demur to the answer, if filed. By agreement of parties the sufficiency of the plea was argued as if the questions had been raised by the appellant’s answer to the plea, as well as by their demurrer.</p>

<p>Tlie clerk of the Supreme Court of Errors who makes up and has charge of the docket for the judicial district at any term, is the only clerk with whom to file original papers presented during the term. But where such papers are required to he filed before the opening of the term to which the appeal is taken, they may be filed either with the clerk for the county in which the j udgment appealed from was rendered, or with the clerk for the county in which the term is to be held.</p> <p>The ten days within which an appellant must, under certain circumstances, appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors, begins to run from the time final judgment is entered up, and not from the date of the decision from which such judgment results.</p> <p>A demurrer to the plaintiff’s complaint was sustained on November 30th and an entry to that effect was made upon the record by order of the Superior Court. On December 31st the court, upon the plaintiff’s motion, entered up judgment as of that date for the defendant, from which the plaintiff within ten days thereafter appealed. Held that the appeal was seasonably taken.</p> <p>An action to recover damages from the defendant, a business competitor of the plaintiff, for a malicious attachment of the plaintiff’s goods and the consequent injury to his business, is not barred by a former judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action of replevin against the attaching officer alone, to regain possession of the goods attached together with damages for their wrongful detention. The causes of action are different and distinct.</p> <p>An unsatisfied judgment against one of two joint trespassers for- the damages resulting from the trespass, does not bar a later suit for the same damages against the other.</p>

Appeal- from an order and decree of tlie Court of Probate for the district of Waterbury accepting the final administration account on the estate of Kate Healy, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Hall, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, and appeal by the appellant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Weit of error to reverse tire judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of summary process, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and reserved by that court, upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Lathrop H. Hooker of Mansfield, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County and reserved by that court, Shumway, Ji, upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Appeals from orders and decrees of the Court of Probate for the district of Ellington, refusing to appoint an administrator de bonis non upon the estates of Elijah S. Chapman and of Eunice Chapman, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in Tolland County and tried as one case to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in each case in favor of the appellant, and appeal by the original appellees for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

, to render a judgment for costs hi favor of the defendants. The following are the material facts in the case: On September 8d, 1897, the plaintiff procured the issuance of a writ and complaint against the defendants, setting forth an equitable cause of action and praying only for an injunction, returnable on the first Tuesday of October, 1897, to said Court of Common Pleas.

Wb.it of error to reverse a judgment of the City Court of Danbury, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, reversing the judgment of the City Court, in part, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit to restrain the defendant from constructing any highway crossing upon the roadbed of the plaintiffs at certain streets in the defendant city, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Boraback, J., upon the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s second defense; the court sustained the demurrer (following a ruling of Thayer, J., in sustaining a similar demurrer at an earlier stage of the cause) and rendered judgment for plaintiffs, and…

Information for theft, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before George W. Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action claiming an accounting and judgment for sucb sum as might be found due thereon, brought to the Superior Court in Hew Haven County and tried to the court, Boraback, J., upon the defendant’s remonstrance to the report of a committee to whom the cause was referred; the court sustained a demurrer to the remonstrance, accepted the report of the committee and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed for alleged errors in the rulings .of the court.

Suit for a divorce, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. No error. The complaint alleged three grounds of divorce: adultery, habitual intemperance, and intolerable cruelty. The answer denied the main allegations of the complaint, and alleged that the plaintiff had committed adultery.

Action to recover tire amount of a tailor’s MR, M’ougKt to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, The complaint in this case was in the nature of an action of assumpsit. The plaintiff was a merchant tailor. The bill of particulars was for goods sold and for work and labor, such as an artisan of that kind would ordinarily furnish to his customers.

Action to recover one third of the sum expended by the plaintiff town for the permanent improvement of one of its highways, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County and reserved by that court, Welch, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action in the nature of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought originally before a justice of the peace and thence by the plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County, and tried to the court, Calhoun, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the ruling of the court.

Action to recover for services as a surveyor and civil engineer, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County and tried to the jury before (Jase, J.; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, which the court, upon motion of the defendants, set aside and granted a new trial, from which action of the court the plaintiff appealed for alleged error.

Action to recover a balance due upon a building contract for work and labor and materials furnished, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. This action was brought to recover the balance due for the construction of a town-hall for the defendant.

; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the trustee, and appeal by Margaret Raiche, a creditor, for alleged errors in the rulings of the court, Milo K. Woodbury, the present appellee, as trustee in insolvency of the estate of one Raiche, presented a petition to the Court of Probate in which said estate was then in process of settlement, alleging, in substance, that the time limited by said court for the presentation of claims to the commissioners upon said estate had…

Action to recover damages for a taking by the defendant of plaintiff’s land for highway purposes, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Prentice, J., upon the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s reply; the court overruled the demurrer and subsequently rendered judgment (Shumway, Ji) for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The original complaint was as follows : “ 1.

<p>Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Samuel A. Healy of Canton, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Shumway, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.</p> <p>Samuel L. Healy made his will on October 26th, 1896, and died January 1st, 1897. The will, which has been duly proved, is as follows: “ 1st. I give and bequeath to the two children of my nephew Bertrand (daughters), Edna and Sada, five hundred dollars each. 2d. I give and bequeath to the daughters of my deceased sister, Betsey Allen (name forgotten), or her legal heirs, one thousand dollars. 3d. I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Jane Coe Healy, ten-twentieths of the remainder of my estate, real and personal. 4th. I give and bequeath to my brother, John Healy, the use of one-twentieth of remainder of my estate, real and personal, at his decease to go to his legal heirs. 5th. I give and bequeath to my brother, Wm. C. Healy, the use of one-twentieth of remainder of my estate, real and personal, at his decease to go to my brother John Healy’s children, share and share alike. 6th. I give and bequeath to my brother, M. L. Healy, the use of one-twentieth of remainder of my estate, real and personal, at his decease to go to his legal heirs. 7th. I give and bequeath to my sister, Julia Warner, one-twentieth of the remainder of my estate, real and personal, at her decease to go to her legal heirs. 8th. I give and bequeath to the legal heirs of my brother, Paul Healy (deceased), two-twentieths of remainder of my estate, real and personal. 9th. I give and bequeath to the legal heirs of my brother John’s children two-twentieths of remainder of my estate, real and personal, share and share alike. 10th. I give and bequeath to the legal heirs of my brother, M. L. Healy, two-twentieths of remainder of my estate, real and personal, share and share alike. 11th. I ordain and appoint my wife, Jane Coe Healy, executrix, and my nephew, Anson W. Healy, executor of this my last will and testarment, without bonds.”</p> <p>Upon settlement of the estate there remains to be distributed some $50,000 of personal estate, with real estate to the amount of $</p> <p>The complaint asks the Superior Court to construe the will in the following particulars: “ First, whether, under section 4, the children of John Healy are entitled to one twentieth of remainder after his decease, or whether said remainder is intestate estate. Second, whether, under section 6, M. L. Healy’s children are entitled to receive, or whether said estate, subject to said life use, is intestate. Third, whether, under section 7, Julia Warner takes absolutely, or her children take subject to her life estate; or if there will remain intestate estate. Fourth, whether, under section 8, Paul Healy’s children or their representatives take, or said remainder is intestate estate. Fifth, whether, under section 9, the children or grandchildren of John take, or the estate given in the ninth clause is intestate. Sixth, whether, under the tenth clause, the children of M. L. Healy take, or the two-twentieths purporting to be given by said clause is intestate estate. ”</p> <p>The court finds that the testator was eighty years old at the date of the will, which was written by one Rollin Humphey, who was at the time about seventy years old; and neither the testator nor Humphrey were lawyers. The court also finds that the defendant Bertrand N. Healy is one of the heirs at law of the testator, being the only son of Nathaniel Healy deceased, brother of the testator; that Thomas G. Healy, a brother of the testator not named as legatee, was a man of large wealth, and has died since the commencement of this action, leaving children surviving him; that the defendants Charles J. and Mabel Healy, Lucretia Barnes and Mary and Clara Beckwith, are the children and all the children of the testator’s brother, John Healy, who died after the execution of the will and before the testator; that Herbert S. Beckwith is a son of Mary Beckwith, and Raymond and Louis Beckwith are sons of said Clara Beckwith (all being minors), and are all the grandchildren of John Healy deceased; that said John Healy lived a near neighbor to the intestate, who was intimate with John and his family and knew well his children and his grandchildren; that the defendants, Emma, Edith, Wallace and Willis Healy, Effa Curtis, Ellen Welton, Hattie Hyde, Winifred Hayes, Egbert N., Elmer and Henry Healy, were the children, and all the children of the testator’s brother, M. L. Healy, and they were all well known to the testator at the time he executed said will; that the testator’s brothers, Wm. C. and M. L. Healy, and his sister Julia Warner, still survive; that Paul Healy died before the testator, and three of his children and three representatives of children survive.</p>

<p>Application- for the removal of the receiver of the Premier Cycle Manufacturing Company, made to the Son. George W. Wheeler, a judge of the Superior Court, in vacation, in a case pending in that court for Fairfield County; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the applicants, and appeal by the receiver in his representative and individual capacity, for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The order of removal was as follows: “ Ordered, that John C. Cassidy be forthwith removed from the position of receiver of the Premier Cycle Mfg. Co., and that he forthwith turn over to his successor in office everything which has come into his possession and hands as such receiver, including therein all boohs and papers and correspondence appertaining to such receivership.</p> <p>“ Ordered, that John C. Cassidy, heretofore receiver of the Premier Cycle Mfg. Co., forthwith prepare and file with the clerk of this court, a full and complete account of all his doings as receiver of said company, and that John C. Cassidy shall not be discharged of all or any of the liabilities resulting from or obligations incurred by said receivership, until said account shall be accepted and approved by the Superior Court or a judge thereof, and until the further order of said court or a judge thereof. George W. Wheeler, a judge of the Superior Court.”</p> <p>The appointment of the appellant had been made in 1896, upon a petition by himself and others, being more than one third of the stockholders of the company, alleging that it was financially embarrassed, but had assets more than sufficient, if properly administered, to pay all creditors, and asking that a receiver might be appointed to take charge of, manage and dispose of the same and wind up its affairs, for the benefit of all parties interested.</p> <p>The order of appointment, made September 18th, 1896, authorized him to continue the manufacturing business of the company, subject to the orders of the court, employing necessary help and purchasing necessary materials. On July 6th, 1897, a further order was passed that the business be closed up by September 28th, 1897, and “ that the receiver pay forthwith all bills for rent and labor now due, and all bills of such character to become due, immediately upon their becoming due.”</p> <p>On July 24th, the rent for the preceding month of the factory formerly occupied by the company, and, since his appointment, by the receiver, being unpaid, the landlord and sundry workmen employed by the receiver, whose wages were unpaid, brought a petition for his removal for violation of the order of July 6th and for negligence in the performance of his duties as receiver. The sums due these petitioners were due and payable prior to July 6th. The receiver made answer that he had not, as such, on July 6th or ever since, any funds wherewith to execute the order, and had conducted the business throughout, from the time of his appointment, without negligence, and with all due care and skill. The order of removal was passed after a full hearing as to all these matters.</p> <p>A memorandum of the grounds of the decision was filed on August 3d, stating that the receiver’s conduct, including among other things, his failure to pay the rent and wages due on July 6th, and his continuing the business since that date at a loss, had made him personally responsible for the loss to the estate. At his request a special finding of the facts upon which the order was passed was subsequently filed. This stated, among things, that he had no money in his hands, as receiver, on July 6th, 1897, and had received none since; and that he had continued the business since that date at a steady and increasing loss, in reliance on the success of a scheme of financial reorganization, which he had been working upon ever since bis appointment, but which had, before July 6th, taken such shape as to be practically hopeless.</p> <p>At the hearing he claimed that the only question to be considered was whether he had been chargeable with negligence or disobedience to the order of July 6th, in not paying the demands of those petitioning for his removal; which claim was overruled. He also claimed that the want of a longer time for the preparation of the case, and the want of notice to stockholders and creditors, prevented the receiver from adequately trying it, and in particular prevented Mm from presentmg, as he believed he could, the formal protest of all the stockholders and of nearly all the creditors, against his removal.</p> <p>The oMy notice ordered and formally given of the petition for removal was notice to Mm, as receiver, but the finding stated that all the parties of record in the action were either present at the hearing or had actual notice thereof, except three creditors; that these tMee, the judge believed, had actual notice; and that none had objected for want of notice. The order of notice was made July 24th and served on July 25th, the hearing being set for July 30th.</p> <p>The receiver also claimed at the hearing, among other things, that no ruling could be made in this proceeding that he was personally liable for any obligations incurred by him as receiver; that want of funds was a sufficient reason for not paying the petitioners’ demands; that one who contracts with a receiver officially cannot hold him personally liable; and that though acting as the representative of the court, if Ms removal and discharge is sought, he is nevertheless entitled to reasonable notice of such application; and if it is sought on the ground of his misconduct, he should not only have reasonable notice, but the grounds upon which his removal is sought should be specified and served upon him with such notice, m order that he may have an opportunity to be heard.</p> <p>The finding contained this statement: “ I considered, and so stated M the memorandum filed, that the facts proven established that the receiver ought to make good to the estate the loss incurred by his misconduct, but the only ruling made or order passed was that of removal. Thereafter I passed orders designed to protect the estate. Except as above stated, I did not overrule the claims made by the receiver’s counsel, but regarded them in the main as inappli cable to the case before me.”</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in Fair-field County, affirming, pursuant to the advice of this court, an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the District of Bridgeport.</p>

. Information for keeping a place in winch the business of transmitting money for betting purposes was permitted and carried on, and for being unlawfully concerned in such business, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence, by defendant’s appeal, to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Cowell, J.; verdict .and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the charge of the court.

, in a receivership suit, disallowing the claim of the Standard Underground Cable Company, an alleged creditor of the defendant company. The finding of facts, agreed to by the parties, is as follows : “ 1. On the 6th day of October, 1896, Edwin S. Greeley was appointed by this court receiver of the E. S. Greeley & Company, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Connecticut, and located in New Haven in the State of Connecticut. 2.

Motion in the Supreme Court of Errors for permission to file a written application for an order vacating an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court in New London County (Gfeorge W. Wheeler, J.), and for a release of the stay of execution thereon.

Action of replevin brought to tbe Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where the plaintiff in a trial to the jury before Studley, J., was nonsuited, from which judgment he appealed 'for alleged error hi the ruling of the court.

Wheeler, as testamentary trustee, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the applicant, and appeal by the respondents for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. Joel B. Wheeler, late of Oxford, died on the 9th, day of January, 1891. He left a will which was on the 22d day of the same month duly approved by the Court of Probate in the district of Oxford.

Suit to restrain the defendant from infringing the plaintiff’s trade-mark, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, JRorabaek, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action of interpleader, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and referred to a committee by whom the facts were found and reported; the court, Rorabaeh, J., accepted the report of the committee and rendered judgment in favor of the claimant William D. Gilbert, executor, from which Eulie M. Tolles, another claimant, appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Bill of interpleader, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of Annie E. and Mary A. Rowe, and appeal by the defendant Thomas Rowe for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a defective highway, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Superior Court -for New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Rordback, J.; verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $5,250 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Actiou to recover damages for fraud, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Roruback, J., upon the plaintiffs’ demurrer to the defendant’s plea in abatement; the court overruled the demurrer and sustained the plea, and thereafter, pursuant to such ruling, judgment was rendered (George W. Wheeler, J.j for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. .

Action to recover damages for the destruction of two ice-houses and their contents, claimed to have been set on fire by a locomotive of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and heard in damages to the court, Robinson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,964, and appeal by each party for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover the amount of a loss under a policy of fire insurance, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Ralph Wheeler, J.. upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries received through, the claimed negligence of the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and heard in damages to the court, Peck, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,000 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The questions in the case arise entirely upon the finding of facts, which is as follows: “ 1.

Action to recover for work and labor in repairing certain highways of the defendant town, brought originally before' a justice of the peace and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Peck, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $15, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action to recover the balance of a tax upon the shares of non-resident stockholders of the defendant company, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Shumivay, J, upon the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint; the court overruled the demurrer and thereafter rendered judgment (Ralph Wheeler, J.,') for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action upon a replevin bond, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County and heard in damages to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered ‘for the plaintiff for nominal damages only, and appeal by him for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit to restrain the operation of an electric railway upon the plaintiff’s land, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, George W. Wheeler, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action upon a bill of exchange, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Cowell, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The complaint was in two counts: one on a bill of exchange ; the other “ the common counts.” Under the latter no bill of particulars was filed. There is no question made on it, and it really has no place in the record.

Action to determine the respective rights of the parties in and to certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Thayer, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendant’s dog, brought before a justice of the peace and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County, and tried to the court, Downs, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit for a cancellation of certain receipts given to the defendant, for an accounting, and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The complaint contains forty-one counts. Each count sets up a different policy of insurance, but they are all alike in other respects.

; facts found and judgment rendered confirming said order, and appeal by the applicant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit for an injunction and for the delivery and cancellation of certain deeds, brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County and tried to the court, Shmnway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister.

<p>The mere fact that an employee of an electric light company, while trimming a lamp at the top of a pole, did not support himself in precisely the same way that his instructor had done, cannot be held to be negligence, as matter of law. The question is not whether the employee performed his work in exactly the manner that his instructor did, but did he exercise ordinary care under all the circumstances.</p> <p>To what extent the court should refer to or comment upon the evidence, in submitting to the jury a question of fact, is within the fair discretion of the trial judge.</p> <p>In an action against a corporation by an employee to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by its negligence, the defendant offered to show that it was protected by insurance against lossrfrom the plaintiff's claim. This evidence was offered as tending to prove that the defendant’s superintendent, a witness, had no motive to testify untruthfully. Held that inasmuch as it did not appear that the witness knew that such insurance had been effected, the fact of its existence could have had no influence upon his mind, and the evidence was therefore properly rejected.</p> <p>Whether under other circumstances such evidence would have been admissible, qucere.</p>

Shit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from diverting the waters of Park river and its tributaries until the damages accruing to the plaintiffs from such diversion had been ascertained and. paid, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Shumway, J., upon the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, for the consideration and advice of this court. In one aspect of it this case has already been before this court.

Action to recover for work and labor and materials furnished, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The following facts were found by the court: “ 1.

Action against a guarantor to recover the value of grain furnished his co-obligor, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the court, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.