Volume 71 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover damages for false and fraudulent representations concerning the operation and efficiency of certain patented inventions, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before George W. Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,001 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the charge of the court to the jury.

Action to recover the contract price of certain real estate claimed to have been deeded to the defendant’s testar tor, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where the plaintiff, in a trial to the jury before George W. Wheeler, J., was nonsuited, and appealed from the refusal of the trial court to set aside such judgment. Paragraphs 1, 3 and 12 of the complaint were as follows: “ 1.

Action for damages and for an injunction restraining the defendant from further filling up a cove adjoining the plaintiffs’ land between high and low water-mark, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for one dollar damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and appeal by two of the defendants, guarantors of the note, for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Wheeler, J., upon the respondent’s motion to quash the application and alternative writ; the court overruled the motion to quash and thereafter issued a peremptory writ of mandamus (Ulmer, J.), and the respondent appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action by a receiver to recover the balance due upon certain shares of the capital stock of an insolvent corporation, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved* by that court, Elmer, J., upon the plaintiff’s demurrer to a defense set up in the answer, for the advice of this court.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Jeannette A. Strong of Hew Haven, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Hew Haven County and reserved by that court, Ulmer, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the consideration and advice of this court. The will was made in 1845, and proved in 1857.

Action to recover the amount of three promissory notes for $1,000 each, brought to the Superior Court in New Havem County and tried to the jury before Gteorge W. Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The plaintiff also moved for a new trial for a verdict against evidence, and appealed from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict upon that ground.

Action in the nature of trespass quare clausum fregit for an injury to the plaintiff’s oyster grounds in New Haven harbor, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendants’ answer was sustained by the court, Prentice, J., and thereafter the case was tried to the jury upon a general denial before George W. Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings and…

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Ann M. Mix of Westville, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by tbat court, Elmer, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the consideration and advice of this court. The will in question was executed June 9th, 1874, and the following clauses are the material ones: “ 1.

Action to foreclose a mechanics lien and for damages, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hew Haven County and tried to the court, Hubbard, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit to set aside a voluntary conveyance by a husband to his wife, to foreclose a judgment lien, and for other equitable relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and referred to a committee by whom the facts were found and reported; the court, Elmer, J., accepted the report of the committee and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Actios against a surety upon a replevin bond, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Rorabaclc, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by him for alleged errors of the court in assessing damage. The finding of facts is as follows : “ 1. On May 11th, 1894, Miles Connolly kept a saloon at the corner of Exchange place and West Main street, in Waterbury. 2.

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by several of the respondents for alleged errors of the court in its supplemental judgment distributing among them the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.

Inyormation in tlie nature of quo warranto to determine the validity of the respondent’s appointment as superintendent of streets in the city of Waterbury, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven… Held: said board, under the provisions and by authority of the charter of said city, appointed the defendant to be superintendent of streets of said city, and the mayor of said city, as ex officio chairman of said board, declared the defendant so appointed. 4.

Shit to compel the specific performance of an agreement to assign certain patented improvements, and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and referred to a committee by whom the facts were found and reported; the court, Shumway, Jl, accepted the report of the committee and rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

A. Mack, of Stamford, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Thayer, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

<p>Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from entering the plaintiff’s station grounds at Middletown and there soliciting the carriage of passengers and baggage, broaghtto the Superior Court in Middlesex County where the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint was sustained, proforma, by the court, Q-eorye W. Wheeler, J., and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The substantial allegations of the complaint were as follows : The plaintiff is a common carrier of passengers and goods by rail, and for the purposes of its business and for the use of persons having business with it, was, on September 23d, 1897, and ever since has been, possessed of a passenger depot in Middletown and certain surrounding station grounds.</p> <p>On July 10th, 1897, its directors passed the following resolutions: “ Resolved, that for the purpose of preventing annoyance to the patrons of this company and the public rightfully using the company’s station grounds, and for the purpose of avoiding confusion and securing the proper conduct of the business of this company at such stations, the following regulation is hereby adopted: No person shall solicit the carriage of passengers or their baggage on station grounds of this company unless authorized so to do by written agreement with this company or by its permission; and all owners and drivers of public hacks and carriages and express wagons not so authorized are prohibited from plying their business on said station grounds. Resolved, that the vice-president be and he is hereby authorized to execute on behalf of this company contracts granting carriage and express-wagon privileges on station grounds on such terms as he shall deem reasonable.”</p> <p>On August 19th, pursuant to said resolutions, it entered into a contract with W. 0. Carrier of Middletown, whereby, in consideration of his agreement to perform his obligations under it, it agreed to give him, so far as it lawfully might, “ the exclusive right and privilege to maintain a public carriage stand and baggage transfer on its station premises at Middletown, Connecticut, and to solicit on said premises the patronage of passengers on its railroads for the carriage and baggage business upon the folio-wing conditions, to wit: First. Said parly of the second part shall provide for regular service at said station suitable carriages in number and condition equal to those at present in use, and at all times in sufficient number to fully accommodate the patrons and passengers of said party of the first part; the drivers, horses, carriages, and entire equipment furnished to be satisfactory to said party of the first part. Second. Said party of the second part shall make a schedule of prices for the carriage of passengers or their baggage from said station to any point in said Middletown that shall be satisfactory to said party of the first part, and, in all respects, will conform to such regulations of said party of the first part as it may deem reasonable and proper for the conduct of said business. Third. Said party of the second part shall carry all United States mails transported by said party of the first part to and from the post-office at Middletown, and perform all telegraph messenger service; that within the ‘free limits’ (as established by the Western Union Telegraph Company), to be performed without charge, and all outside of said limits to be at the regular rates, as established by said telegraph company.”</p> <p>The contract also contained these provisions: “ It is hereby understood and agreed that the said party of the first part shall not be put to any expense or cost in securing to said party of the second part the privilege hereinbefore granted, and that said party of the second part shall, and will, at his own cost and expense, take such proceedings, should any become necessary, in the name of the said party of the first part and do such acts as may be required to secure to the said party of the second part the enjoyment of such rights, but no proceedings shall be taken in the name of the said party of the first part without its consent in writing having been first obtained. Said party of the second part hereby agrees to hold said party of the first part harmless from all loss, cost, or expense by reason of any claims or suits growing out of acts or proceedings done or taken by said second party, as aforesaid, to prevent the infringement by others of the rights hereinbefore granted. This agreement to continue in full force -and effect until August 19th, 1898, but it is understood and agreed that it may be terminated upon thirty days’ notice in writing given by either of the parties hereto to the other.”</p> <p>On August 24th, the plaintiff placed in conspicuous positions at the public entrances to said station grounds and on said depot, and forwarded to each expressman in said Middletown, and to the defendant, by registered mail, the following printed notice signed by its superintendent: “ Please take notice that for the purpose of preventing annoyance to the patrons of this company and the public rightfully using this company’s station grounds, and for the purpose of avoiding confusion and securing the proper conduct of the business of this company at such stations, this company has adopted the following regulation: ‘No person shall solicit the carriage of passengers or their baggage on station grounds of this company unless authorized so to do by written agreement with this company or by its permission; and all owners and drivers of public hacks and carriages and express wagons not so authorized are prohibited from plying their business on said station grounds.’ The exclusive right and privilege of soliciting on the Middletown station grounds the patronage of railroad passengers for the carriage of themselves or their baggage, has been granted to W. O. Carrier; and you are notified not' to trespass or ply said business on said station grounds.”</p> <p>On September 23d, for the purpose of soliciting the patronage of passengers arriving on the cars of the plaintiff, for the carriage of themselves, their baggage or merchandise, and contrary to said regulations and notices and against the right of the plaintiff, the defendant, his servants and agents, unlawfully entered with horses and wagons on said station grounds, and then and there, wilfully disregarding said notices and wilfully violating said regulations, and without the permission of the plaintiff, unlawfully solicited and obtained the patronage of Henry D. Butler of New Haven, for the carriage of his baggage and merchandise from the depot, baggage room or platforms on said station grounds, said Butler having arrived as a passenger on the train of the plaintiff reaching said Middletown at 8:37 A. M., on the Air Line Division, from New Haven: and the defendant also unlawfully solicited, then and there, by his servants or agents, the carriage of baggage and merchandise of other passengers, to the plaintiff unknown, who arrived on said train.</p> <p>The plaintiff has many trains arriving every week-day at said Middletown station. The defendant has, since receiving the notice, both before and after the 23d day of September, 1897, been accustomed to wrongfully enter said station grounds before the arrival of said several trains, without having any business with the plaintiff, and to there solicit the carriage of passengers alighting from said trains and of their baggage; and the defendant further threatens to wrongfully continue said practices and to reiterate many times a day such wrongful trespasses on said grounds of the plaintiff without having any business with the plaintiff, for the purpose of unlawfully soliciting on said station grounds in violation of plaintiff’s said rules and regulations for the carriage of passengers and their baggage. The plaintiff by said repeated wrongful acts of the defendant committed and threatened as aforesaid, suffers great damage for which it could not recover at law without a multiplicity of suits, and the defendant has not sufficient property subject to execution to answer damages, if recovered against him by the plaintiff in suits at law, and the plaintiff therefore has no adequate remedy at law.</p> <p>The claim was for an injunction “ to restrain the defendant from continuing to make such unlawful entries, and from continuing to solicit on said station grounds the patronage of passengers arriving on the cars of the plaintiff, for the carriage of themselves, their baggage or their merchandise.”</p> <p>The defendant demurred to the prayer for relief, because on the facts stated the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief therein sought, and assigned the following reasons: “ 1. The mere allegation that the threatened acts of the defendant will result in great damage to the plaintiff is not sufficient ground for an injunction to be granted restraining the defendant from committing such acts, but facts should be stated that the court may see how and why it would result, and that the apprehension of irreparable mischief is well founded. 2. It nowhere appears that the injury, if any, which might result to the plaintiff from such acts of the defendant, is not susceptible of perfect pecuniary compensation by action at law. 8. The allegations that the plaintiff could not recover at law for said alleged trespasses committed and threatened, without a multiplicity of suits, and that the defendant has not sufficient property subject to execution to answer damages if recovered against him by the plaintiff in suits at law, are conclusions of law, and not such statements of fact as entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. 4. The contract set out in the complaint made by plaintiff with W. Ó. Carrier, grants the said Carrier the exclusive right and privilege of soliciting at the Middletown station the patronage of railroad passengers, for the carriage of themselves or their baggage, and mentions as a part of the consideration moving from the said Carrier to the plaintiff whereby said privilege was so granted to him, that he shall and will at his own cost and expense take such proceedings, should any become necessary, in the name of the plaintiff, having first obtained consent in writing of the plaintiff; therefore, the plaintiff having granted this privilege to the said Carrier in consideration that he should take such proceedings as are necessary to enforce his right:; and to prevent infringements of said contract, cannot ask for an injunction against this defendant for doing or threatening to do acts that are an infringement upon the rights granted to said Carrier, when by the very allegations of its complaint it sets forth a contract wherein it appears that the plaintiff can compel said Carrier to bring any action necessary for just such infringements of the rights granted him as the alleged trespasses set out in the complaint constitute; or, in other words, by its contract with said Carrier the plaintiff is es-topped from asking for the relief sought, at least until it has shown that said Carrier had attempted to enforce it and has failed. 5. The plaintiff has leased the absolute privilege to solicit for passengers, etc., to said Carrier for a valuable consideration, and the acts for which it asks an injunction against the defendant are infringements of said contract and to the damage of said Carrier, but it nowhere appears in said complaint that they work any injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff gives certain reasons why it made the regulations prohibiting all owners and drivers of public hacks, carriages and express-wagons to ply their business on its station grounds at Middletown except by its permission. These reasons, however, do not constitute a causé of action in themselves, neither does it anywhere appear in the complaint that the alleged trespasses of the defendant in any way were in opposition to or interference with the purposes so alleged. 6. The contract set forth as a part of plaintiff’s complaint and for the infringement of which the plaintiff asks an injunction against the defendant, is ultra vires and in contravention of public policy, because it attempts to grant to one common carrier of passengers and baggage the right to ply his business at its station in Middletown, to the exclusion of all other common carriers of passengers and baggage. 7. The plaintiff, by selling the privilege to one person to solicit for the carrying of passengers and baggage and only for such prices as are acceptable to the plaintiff, is attempting to compel its passengers to patronize that person and prevent them from employing any other "common carrier, which is an attempt to exercise control over the actions of its passengers after it has carried them to their • destination and landed them at its station; and such an attempt is manifestly beyond any power vested in them by their charter. 8. The plaintiff by assuming the right to sell the exclusive privilege of soliciting for baggage and passengers at its stations to one common carrier, according to a schedule of prices acceptable to the plaintiff, is establishing a monopoly not granted by its charter, which might be solely for its own benefit, and not only not for the benefit of the public, but to the serious damage and inconvenience of the public.”</p>

Action in the nature of assumpsit against a non-resident, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction and the court, Robinson, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, reserved the cause for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action of replevin, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County and tried to the court, Welch, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The trial court found the following facts: The plaintiff and defendant Taylor, are merchants in Torrington, Conn., and the defendant Coe is a deputy sheriff.

<p>Action to recover damages for a breach of contract to assume and discharge the copartnership indebtedness of the plaintiffs, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J., after the second defense of the defendant had been expunged from his answer by Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors of the court in expunging his second defense.</p> <p>On November 15th, 1894, the defendant and the plaintiff Whitney were in partnership under the firm name of Cady & Whitney. On that day they sold their business to the two plaintiffs, who then formed a partnership under the firm name of Whitney & Hines. The new partnership earned on their business until the 28th of January, 1895, when they sold out to the defendant. This transaction was witnessed by a written agreement as follows:—</p> <p>“Know all men by these presents that we, George H. Whitney and John T. Hines, both of Riverton, Litchfield County, Connecticut, partners in company under the firm name and style of Whitney and Hines, for the consideration of a valuable sum in dollars and the performance of stipulation and agreements hereinafter contained, received and to be received to our full satisfaction of Frederic E. Cady of said Riverton, do hereby sell, bargain, transfer and convey unto the said Frederic E. Cady all of the goods, wares and merchandise, store fixtures and furniture belonging to us, said Whitney & Hines, and contained in the store in said Riverton now occupied by us; also all book accounts, choses in action and accounts and bills receivable due to us on account of said store business, also our goodwill; to have and to hold the same to him the said vendee, his executor, administrator and assigns forever, to him and their own proper use and behoof. And we the said vendors, do for ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, covenant and agree with said vendee to warrant and defend said property to him, the said vendee, against all persons whatever, together with full power and authority to collect said book accounts, choses in action, bills and accounts receivable, and to receipt therefor. As an additional consideration for the above conveyance the said- vendee has agreed and does hereby agree to assume and to pay and does hereby assume and agree to pay all of said Whitney and Hines’ liabilities and bills, debts and claims owing from them, said Whitney & Hines, to all persons, parties and copartnerships whatsoever, and to save them harmless therefor. The said George H. Whitney has agreed and does hereby agree not to engage in the mercantile business, such as said Whitney & Hines have been conducting and hereby sell to said Cady, in said Riverton, for the period and term of five years from the date hereof; nor is he, said Whitney, for and during said period, to invest his money in said business and conduct or have the same conducted by any other person, for him or for his benefit, and in opposition or competition to said Gady. In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands at Winchester, Conn., this 28th day of January, A. D. 1895, and agree that this instrument shall remain in the possession of Samuel A. Herman.</p> <p>“Whitney & Hines.</p> <p>“ Witness, Samuel A. Herman.</p> <p>“ I hereby accept the above instrument and consent and assent and agree to all of the stipulations contained therein.</p> <p>“Frederic E. Cady.</p> <p>“ Witness, Samuel A. Herman.”</p> <p>The plaintiffs, in part execution of this agreement, delivered to the defendant possession of the store occupied by them, the goods and other contents of the store, and their book accounts and bills receivable. The defendant, in pursuance of the agreement, proceeded to collect the bills receivable, to sell the goods, and to pay the partnership debts and liabilities of the plaintiffs, until March, 1895, when, as the defendant claimed, the plaintiff Whitney engaged in business in opposition'to the defendant, in violation of the agreement: and the defendant then refused to pay the liabilities of the plaintiffs remaining unpaid. On May 18th, 1895, the plaintiffs brought this suit.</p> <p>The complaint alleges an agreement as follows: “ On or about the 28th of January, 1895, the plaintiffs sold and delivered to the defendant aR of the goods, wares, merchandise, store fixtures and furniture then belonging to the plaintiffs and contained in the store in the village of Riverton then occupied by said plaintiffs; also all book accounts, choses in action, and accounts and bills receivable then due to the plaintiffs on account of said store business ; and in part consideration therefor the defendant then and there agreed to pay all said plaintiffs’ liabilities, bills, debts and claims owing from them to the persons, parties and copartnerships whatsoever, and to save them harmless therefrom.”</p> <p>The complaint then alleges that the defendant has refused to pay certain of the liabilities he promised to pay; that bills amounting to $1,800 remain unpaid; and that civil actions have been brought against the plaintiffs for the recovery of these unpaid bills. The prayer for relief claims damages, and a specific performance of the defendant’s agreement to pay the plaintiffs’ liabilities.</p> <p>To this complaint the defendant demurred, mainly on the ground that the defendant’s contract was one of indemnity, and the plaintiffs had not as yet suffered damage by its breach. The court ('Elmer, </.) overruled the demurrer.</p> <p>The defendant then answered, admitting certain paragraphs of the complaint, denying others, and alleging that the agreement relied on by the plaintiffs was in writing, and setting out the written agreement. The answer states a second defense as follows: “1. The first defense is made a part of this defense. 2. On the day of March, 1895, or thereabouts, and while the defendant was in the faithful performance of his agreement, the plaintiff Whitney engaged in the mercantile business in said Riverton, which business was of the same kind as that bought by the defendant from the plaintiffs, and invested money therein, and had the same conducted by another or others for himself and for his benefit, and in opposition and competition to the defendant, and continued to be engaged or interested in said business for some months, or until July, 1895, all in violation of his agreement thereinbefore referred to, and to the great damage and prejudice of the defendant.”</p> <p>The plaintiffs moved to strike out paragraph two of the second defense, as impertinent; and this motion the court (Ralph Wheeler, V.) granted. Afterwards the parties went to trial on the other issues raised by the answer. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs to recover $1,456.61 damages, made a finding of facts, and the defendant appealed, assigning as errors that the court erred in overruling the demurrer, and in granting the motion to expunge.</p>

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County and tried to the jury before Welch, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action to recover rent, brought originally before a justice of the peace and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, and tried to court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The complaint alleged the defendant’s lease of a market at $5 a month. The defendant answered by a general denial, and as a second defense pleaded infancy.

Appeal of sundry owners of land in Enfield from assessments for “ betterments and benefits ” made against them by the Board of Sewer Commissioners of School District No. 2, in the town of Enfield, “ as to their use of certain sewers on Main ” and other streets in that district. The appeal was taken to Ron.

Action to recover a sum of money claimed to have been paid under a mistake, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Oase, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The complaint as amended, is as follows: “ 1.

Action to recover the amount of a stock subscription, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and, after certain rulings upon demurrers had been made by Elmer and Prentice, Jh., favorable to the defendant, tried to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Carl Gerker of the town of Preston, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved by that court, Roraback, J., upon the facts stated in the complaint, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Sarah Avery of Norwich, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved by that court, Robinson, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the con sideration and advice of this court.

Information for an assault with, intent to murder, brought originally to the City Court of Derby, by which the accused was bound over for trial to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and there tried to the jury before Ror aback, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of a simple assault, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Shit to set aside a transfer of stock made by way of gift, for an injunction and other equitable relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Elmer, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. .

Action to recover damages upon a written instrument in the nature of a promissory note, or for other proper relief, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Bishop, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The finding showed these facts: The defendant was married after 1877 to Edith E. Smith, who then had one child, the plaintiff.

Action in the nature of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried upon the general issue to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the findings and rulings of the court.

Action to recover the value of a mare which the defeudant, as agent of the Connecticut Humane Society, took and caused to he killed; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Curtis, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. In his answer the defendant alleged that he was an agent of the Connecticut Humane Society, and that “3.

, upon the plaintiffs’ demurrer to the defendant’s amended plea to the jurisdiction; the court pro forma overruled the demurrer, sustained the plea and dismissed the cause, and the plaintiffs appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The material parts of the appeal to the Superior Court are as follows : “ 1.

Suit to enforce the specific performance of the defendant McCutcheon’s agreement to purchase certain real estate; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, George W. Wheeler, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action to determine the adverse claims of the parties in and to certain real estate in Bridgeport, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Greorge W. Wheeler, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Thayer, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings of the court in impaneling the jury and in the admission of evidence. The facts necessary for presenting these questions were found by the trial court.

<p>Section 3820 of the General Statutes provides, among other things, that “ buildings or portions of buildings exclusively occupied as colleges, academies, churches, public school-houses, or infirmaries,” shall be exempt from taxation. Held that under this provision,—which did not create a new form of exemption but merely declared the well-settled and long-established policy of this State in dealing with such property,—buildings of Tale University which were occupied exclusively as dormitories and dining-halls by its students, were non-taxahle.</p> <p>In 1834 an amendment (1 Private Laws, 481; General Statutes, § 3822) of the plaintiff's charter exempted from taxation all funds which had been given and might thereafter be given to the college and invested and held for its use, but provided that it should never hold real estate in this State, free from taxation, which afforded an annual income of more than $6,000, and that the private property of the officers of the college should not be exempt. Held that the first clause of the Act plainly exempted all of the property of the college from taxation, while the proviso qualified this total exemption only for the purpose of imposing a limited restraint upon investments in real estate; that the fees of students, whether apportioned as room rent or tuition, could not be treated as income of real estate, and that land occupied and reasonably necessary for the plant of the college was not income producing real estate within the meaning of the proviso. Held, also, that vacant lots owned by the plaintiff were exempt from taxation, and dwelling-houses and factories as well, unless the latter, or some of them, might become taxable because the rents derived therefrom carried the plaintiff's annual income above the prescribed limit.</p> <p>Eeal estate which is held in the name of the plaintiff but is substantially owned and enjoyed by one of its professors, is taxable and should be included in its list.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s charter does not exempt from taxation property which is held by it for any private use, nor does it authorize commercial dealings with its exemptions, whether by way of mere speculation in vacant lots, or of selling land on long leases at nominal rents, or otherwise.</p>

Actios to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the City Court of New Haven where the plaintiffs, after the pleadings had been closed, filed a petition to remove the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, to which the defendant demurred; the court, Bishop, J., sustained the demurrer and subsequently, upon the plaintiffs’ failure to appear, rendered (Bow, J.) judgment of nonsuit against them, from which they appealed for…

Application by a receiver lor instructions in regard to tbe allowance and payment of certain-claims presented against tbe defendant corporation, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Bor abade, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Suit to establish the existence of a lost unrecorded mortgage deed, to foreclose the mortgaged premises and for other equitable relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The trial court found the following facts: — “1.

<p>Action to recover damages for assault and battery and for the wrongful ejection of the plaintiff from a dance hall, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Ourtis, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $300, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the charge of the court.</p> <p>The complaint was as follows: —</p> <p>“1. The defendant was conducting and maintaining a ball and dance, for admission to which and for the privileges of dancing therein, during said ball, the defendant charged an admission fee. 2. On said date the plaintiff purchased a ticket of the defendant’s agent at the door of said ‘ armory,’' entitling her to admission to said ‘ armory ’ hall and the privilege of dancing therein, and immediately after such purchase plaintiff entered said ball room of the defendant. 3. At the time of the grievances hereinafter committed by the defendant, there was a large concourse of people in said ‘armory’ hall. 4. While the plaintiff, on said date, was dancing with a gentleman in the large dance or ball room of the defendant, in the presence of said large number of people, the defendant by its servants and agents, rudely and forcibly seized the plaintiff’s person and removed her from the floor of said ball room, and removed and ordered her from all the adjacent rooms then and there occupied by the defendant and used by its patrons, and ejected her from all of the premises, and denied, deprived and excluded the plaintiff from all of the privileges of said ball. 5. The said agents and servants of the defendant, during the time of the commission of the assault and battery, . . . addressed the plaintiff in loud, threatening and insulting language, . . . and the assault was committed in a gross, wanton and reckless manner and with intent to, and they in fact did, greatly humiliate the plaintiff and permanently wound her feelings, and then and there caused her physical pain and suffering. 6. At the time of said grievances the plaintiff was by trade, and was employed as, a paper-box maker, . . . and the plaintiff was receiving for her personal services in said trade . . . nine dollars per week. 7. By reason of said injuries the plaintiff became sick and nervous, suffered physical pain and great mental distress and anguish, and became unfitted to properly work at her said trade as a paper-box maker, and was obliged to and did abandon the same, and her health is permanently impaired.” The plaintiff claimed $2,000 damages.</p> <p>The first defense was substantially a denial of the allegations of the complaint. The second defense, and the reply thereto, were as follows: —</p> <p>“ Second defense. 1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted. 2. The tickets sold by the defendant for admission to said Armory Hall on said date, were upon the following condition, viz:. ‘ The committee reserves the right to exclude all objectionable parties.’ 3. The plaintiff so conducted herself at said ball that she became objectionable to the managers thereof, who thereupon requested her to cease dancing, but did not deprive her of any other of the privileges of said ball. 4. Except as herein admitted, the allegations of the complaint are denied.”</p> <p>“ Reply of plaintiff to second defense. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the second defense are denied.”</p> <p>The court made the following finding of facts: —</p> <p>“The plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove and claimed to have proved: That on the evening of January 27th, 1898, the defendant gave a public ball at a building hired by it for the purpose in the town of Danbury; that the defendant sold to the plaintiff a ticket for the sum of twenty-five cents, which entitled the holder to admission to said ball, with the privilege of dancing on the ball room floor Avhen dancing was going on; that the plaintiff went to said ball in company with her sister, and the defendant admitted her to said ball on said ticket; that while dancing was in progress upon the ball room floor and the plaintiff was engaged in dancing thereon with a gentleman, a floor manager of said ball duly appointed by the defendant to have the regulation and charge of the dancing at said ball, in the presence of a large concourse of people laid hands upon the plaintiff angrily and rudely, and pushed her and compelled her to stop dancing, at the same time declaring that she and her companion were not proper persons to be dancing there, and ordered her to leave the floor; that she left the floor rather than to attempt by force to persist in dancing, protesting that she was a fit person and that they had no right to stop her dancing for any such reason; that the feelings of the.plaintiff were greatly hurt by such battery committed upon her, and the attending circumstances; that the plaintiff was of a highly nervous organization and that she was thrown into a highly nervous and excited state by said battery, and that in' consequence she was unable to work at her trade of boxmaker up to the time of the trial, except for a period of two weeks and two days, and that she earned wages at the rate of nine dollars per week.”</p> <p>The defendant offered evidence tending to prove and claimed to have proved: “That the plaintiff’s sister who accompanied her purchased the admission tickets to the ball; that said floor manager did not lay hands upon or touch the plaintiff’s person; that at the time she claimed she was assaulted she was dancing in an indecent manner, and that the floor manager simply notified her that she could not dance any longer, and that she thereupon protested loudly and noisily as she left the floor; that the plaintiff continued to work at her usual occupation immediately after said evening for about two weeks, and that she was then discharged by her employer; that her condition of health was unchanged after said ball.”</p> <p>The defendant, among other things, requested the court to charge the jury “that the defendant corporation is not liable in exemplary damages for the malicious acts of its agents and servants, unless such acts were within the scope .of the employment, and were previously authorized or ratified by the corporation;” and “that there is no evidence before this jury of any such authorization or ratification.”</p> <p>The court charged the jury that there were two rights of action described in the complaint: one for an assault and battery, and the other for having been deprived of the privileges of the dancing hall for which the plaintiff had contracted and had paid twenty-five cents; that if the jury found the plaintiff’s story to he true, “that when she was upon the floor the men (the floor managers) or one of them, came toward her and called out to her, and at the same time advanced to her and put his hand upon her shoulder rudely, insolently or angrily, at the same time telling her that she could not dance there, that she was not a fit person to he there,— then the plaintiff has established her case as to this portion of the case which refers to this battery, and she is entitled to receive a verdict from your hands for damages; ” that if the jury found the facts as testified to by the defendant’s witnesses, namely, that one of the floor managers, touching the gentleman with whom the plaintiff was dancing, upon the arm, without touching the plaintiff, said to them, “ You can’t dance here,” then no assault and battery had been committed, and the verdict upon that feature of the case should be for the defendant.</p> <p>The court charged that in fixing the amount of compensatory damages the jury might consider the evidence showing the physical injury sustained, the plaintiff’s mental suffering and the loss of her earnings at her trade ; and upon the subject of exemplary damages instructed the jury as follows: “Now, in addition to those damages, which are compensatory, the law permits you, in case you find this battery to have been inflicted upon her wantonly, maliciously, or in wanton disregard of her rights, to add to that sum which you find will compensate her, a sum as exemplary or punitive damages; and in this State you are allowed to award her as punitive damages such sum as you find, from your knowledge of the course of business in the courts of law in this State, to be her expenses in conducting this trial;” that the taxable costs which she would recover would by so much diminish the expenses of her trial, and should be considered by the jury in determining what the expenses of her trial were.</p> <p>The court charged the jury that the second defense, that is, that the managers had directed the plaintiff to stop dancing because her conduct was objectionable, etc., applied only to the second cause of action described in the complaint, namely, a breach of contract by depriving her of the privileges for which she paid; and that if the jury found that no battery had been inflicted upon the plaintiff, but found that the floor managers were not justified in forbidding her the privilege of dancing, and acted unreasonably and improperly in so doing, that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for the amount of the admission fee, twenty-five cents, and interest, no other element of damage having been proved in connection with that feature of the case; but if they found that there was no battery, and that the plaintiff was acting improperly, their verdict should be for the defendant.</p> <p>The errors assigned relate to the charge to the jury.</p>

, overruled the motion to quash, sustained (Robinson, J.) the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s return, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The alternative writ was as follows : — “ Superior Court, “ Fairfield County. November 5th, 1897. “To Stephen S. Hatch, George S. Kendall, GeorgeS.

; verdict and judgment sustaining the will, and appeal by the contestant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The reasons of the appeal from probate were want of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and that the pretended will was never in fact signed by the testatrix.

Suit to enforce the specific performance of an agreement to sell certain real estate, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Qurtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendants from using a barn for stabling horses and from piling manure upon their premises, and for damages resulting from said acts, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the Court, Gurtis, ■!.; facts found, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by both parties for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

Action by the payee against the indorser of three promissory notes, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fair-field County where judgment was rendered (Curtis, •/.) for the plaintiff for the full amount of his claim, upon the ground that the defense orally disclosed by the defendant’s attorney, in compliance with the order of court, did not constitute a legal defense available to the defendant, from which judgment- the latter appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of…

Action by an indorsee against the indorser of two promissory notes, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Robinson, J., upon the defendant’s demurrer to the amended complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The action was originally brought in October, 1892, for $1,500, on the common counts.

Action to foreclose a judgment lien, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where the defendant filed a cross-complaint asking for a new trial of the original action and for an injunction against the prosecution of the foreclosure suit, which, upon motion of the plaintiff the court, HorabaeJe, J., dismissed for want of jurisdiction and rendered a foreclosure judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the…

Action for goods sold and delivered, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The action was originally brought against Hill and Shethar. Before trial Hill was dropped and Sanford was cited in and appeared as codefendant.

Action for an injunction to restrain the further diversion of the waters of a stream above the plaintiffs’ premises, and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and, after certain rulings adverse to the plaintiffs upon a demurrer and motion to strike out, by Elmer and Thayer, Js., tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts, found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings and findings…

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Martha W. Brown of Hartford, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Prentice, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. The testatrix was a widow without any descendants.

Information for keeping a maternity hospital and lying-in-place without a license, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict of guilty, and appeal by the accused, before sentence, for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action to recover damages for fraud respecting the title to certain real estate upon the security of which the defend ant obtained a loan of $5,000, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The parts of the complaint which set out the fraud are as follows: “ 2.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Eunice Chapman of Yernon, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County and reserved by that court, Q-eorge W. Wheeler, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Action in tlie nature of scire facias to recover the amount of a penalty for the violation of a temporary injunction obtained by the plaintiffs, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County and tried to the court, Welch, J., upon the defendants’ demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer, held the complaint insufficient, and rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action for damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and heard in damages to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $8,000, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

Action for art accounting and for a recovery of the amount found due thereon, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Prentice, -7.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $244 only, and appeal by him for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The complaint contained the common money counts and a special count.

<p>Section 2799 of the General Statutes prescribes that any policy of life insurance for the benefit of a married woman shall inure to her separate use, provided the annual premium thereon shall not exceed §300, and that the amount of any premium in excess of §300, with interest, shall inure to the benefit of the creditors of the person paying it. This statute was first enacted in 1850, when the premium limit was fixed at $150 and so continued until 1871, when it was raised to §300 and the statute was re-enacted in substantially its present form. In an action by the administrator upon an insolvent estate to recover in behalf of creditors the aggregate amount of annual premiums in excess of $300, paid by the husband on five policies of life insurance taken out for the benefit of his wife, three of which were issued before 1871, it was held: —</p> <p>1. That the Act in question was an enabling statute, changing the common law and protecting, to a limited extent, gifts made to a married woman in the form of life insurance, from seizure by the creditors of the donor.</p> <p>2. That all premiums in excess of the statutory amount were not protected, but were available to the creditors of the person paying such excess; and that it was not essential to a recovery that the plaintiff should show that payment of any premium was made in fraud, actual or constructive, of the intestate’s creditors.</p> <p>3. That the statute applied, although the annual premium upon no one of the policies exceeded the statutory amount.</p> <p>4. That the Act of 1871 enlarging the limit of protection in favor of the married woman, applied to all the policies in suit, although three of them were issued prior to that date.</p> <p>5. That the validity and amount of claims against the insolvent estate was a matter which had been determined by the commissioners, and was not open for retrial in the present action; especially as the alleged creditor was not a party to the suit.</p> <p>Whether the amount recoverable in cases of this kind is to be determined by the excess of gross, or of net, annual premiums, quaere.</p> <p>Where the judgment appealed from is based entirely upon an agreed finding of facts, no question of law not presented by such finding Will be considered by this court.</p>

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Ellen M. Pike of Middletown, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and reserved by that court, Robinson, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. The will was made in 1889. It first gave $2,100 in pecuniary legacies and a few small specific legacies.

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport, approving the account of a testamentary trustee in charging certain items of expense to the income rather than the corpus of the trust fund, taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the lower court, and appeal by the life tenant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The finding showed the following facts; The will constituting the trust, after making some particular legacies, proceeded as follows; —</p> <p>“ Fifth. I will, order and direct, that all the rest of my estate and property remain in the care and safe keeping of my executors during the lifetime of my said wife, Fanny Augusta, and that my executors shall collect the rents, dividends, and interest which may accrue thereon as it becomes due, and pay the legal taxes, insurance, and necessary repairs on the buildings, and other legitimate expenses, and pay over the balance to my said wife semi-annually, or from time to time as may be needful, to be used or invested as her own absolutely. Sixth. At the decease of my wife, Fanny Augusta, aforesaid, I give, devise and bequeath to my executors in trust, so much of the homestead, No. 331 State street, as lies south of a line parallel with State street, and distant therefrom one hundred and fifty feet, for the free and unmolested use of my daughters, Helen C. and Fanny L., aforesaid, jointly during their natural lives, or the lifetime of the survivor of them. My said executors to pay legal taxes and assessments thereon, and keep the same in repair out of any funds belonging to my estate, during said term. At the decease of both daughters, aforesaid, the property shall become and be a part of the residue of my estate, and treated as such. Seventh. At the decease of my wife, Fanny Augusta, aforesaid, subject to the foregoing, I will and direct that the residue and remainder of my estate be divided into four equal shares, and I give, devise and bequeath to my executors and their successors in trust, one of said shares for each of my children, to wit: Helen C., Nathaniel Eugene, Fanny L., and Thomas 0., aforesaid, in the manner and for the purposes hereinafter provided and stipulated: First, one share shall be held and managed for my son, Nathaniel Eugene Wordin, M. D., aforesaid, and the net income, rents and profits paid over to him semi-annually, during his natural life. If, at his death, he shall leave a son or sons, his own issue, then I will that said share become and be vested in said son or sons, share and share alike, absolutely, and to his or their heirs. Second, two shares shall be held and managed for Helen 0., and Fanny L., aforesaid, and the net income paid over, one-half to each, respectively, semi-annually. Upon the death of either, the sui‘vivor shall take the net income of both shares during her natural life. Third, the remaining one share shall be held and managed for my son, Thomas Cooke Wordin, aforesaid, and the net income paid over to him semi-annually, during his natural life. If, at his death, he shall leave a son or sons, his own issue, then I will that said share become and be vested in said son or sons, share and share alike, absolutely, to his or their heirs. Eighth. Upon the successive termination of the life uses hereinbefore provided, I give, devise and bequeath the estate and property held therein, to the American Home Missionary Society.”</p> <p>It was then provided that the Societ3>- should add the interest to the principal until the whole amounted to §1,000,000 in value, and might then use the income for its charitable purposes. Should “any loss occur to said trust fund by depreciation or otherwise,” the loss was to be made up from the income, so as to keep the fund always at the value of §1,000,000. His executors and trustees were given full power to sell, exchange, re-invest, and “ generally do whatever may be necessary and proper, from time to time, to carry out effectually the provisions of this will.”</p> <p>The estate was duly settled, and the distributive share to be held in trust for Dr. N. E. Wordin was transferred to a trustee duly appointed, there being embraced therein a mortgage upon land in Iowa, then under process of foreclosure (there having been a default upon the interest) in a suit pending in favor of the executor. The mortgagor was of no financial responsibility, and nothing could be collected upon the mortgage indebtedness by the trustee, unless it were by means of foreclosure proceedings. The trustee received an offer of other property in exchange for the mortgage, and went to Iowa to get the necessary information, as to both properties. He charged in his account §1-17 for his time and expenses in making the trip, and also §175 for money paid-by him for legal expenses incident to the foreclosure suit, in which a decree was obtained. A new trial was afterwards granted in favor of the mortgagor, and since then the trustee has not pressed the suit. The mortgaged property is mainly unimproved, and as it stands could not be made to pay the cost of maintenance. Said charges were reasonable and the expenditures necessary to fulfill the trust. He also charged $112 for money paid to satisfy a lien for a city assessment laid for asphalting a street in Bridgeport in front of land belonging to the trust. No evidence was submitted as to whether this was or was not a permanent improvement. Dr. Wordin is 54 years old.</p> <p>On the trial of the appeal, the appellant’s counsel asked the trustee how much he thought it would cost to realize on the Iowa mortgage, and also what was the value of it, stating that the object of the question was to show that the expenses incurred in the foreclosure were only a part of what it would cost, which would be about $500 and therefore was not an ordinary current expense of administration, but an extraordinary one. The court excluded each question successively, stating that while the appellant might be entitled to prove the value of the asset and the cost of realizing upon it, for the purpose of showing that it was not worth any effort at collection, he was not entitled to show these facts for the purpose of contending that the expenditures already made were of an extraordinary character, it not being claimed that such expenditures were improper, excessive, or unreasonable.</p> <p>The plaintiff made the following claims of law, which were overruled: («) That the municipal assessment for asphalting Main street, assessed against the real estate and charged by the trustee to the income, constituted a part of the corpus of the trust fund, and should be apportioned between the life tenant and remainder-man. (6) That said asphalting was in its nature a permanent improvement, and the expense of the same should be apportioned between the life tenant and remainder-man. (c) That the expense of preserving a definite investment that was not income-producing, and constituting a part of the principal fund, should be apportioned between the life tenant and the remainder-man, or charged against the corpus of the estate, (d) That neither of the items of account complained of and appealed from were, in law, ordinary current expenses incident to the management of the trust, but were of apportionable benefit to the inheritance. (e) That it was the duty of the trustee to convert said defaulted mortgage into income-producing property at the expense of the trust fund. (/) That said apportionment should be made by determining the present value of benefits derived from said expenditures, or by deducting the same from the principal fund.</p>

<p>If the charter of a city specifies the way in which a municipal officer is to be chosen, compliance with the mode or method thus prescribed is essential to the validity of his election or appointment.</p> <p>The charter of Bridgeport provided for a board of public works to consist of six members named by the mayor, of which the latter should ex officio be a member and over which he should preside whenever present at its meetings, and this board was charged with the duty of electing a street commissioner. In an action of quo warranto to determine the respondent’s title to that office, it appeared that he was elected, if at all, by the vote of four members of the board at a meeting over which the mayor, although present and ready to preside, was not permitted to do so, and that the motions were made and put and the result of the vote declared by one of the members of the board, against the protest of the mayor, whose authority as presiding officer was openly and persistently disregarded and defied. Held that the proceedings thus taken were of no avail and the formal election of the respondent was invalid, because the board was not organized and did not proceed as required by the charter.</p>

Action to recover a balance of $3,500 claimed to be due for work and labor, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and. tried to the jury before George W. Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $160 only, and appeal by him for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The defendant is the administrator on the estate of Charles McKiernan, deceased.

Action in the nature of trespass qu. el. fr., brought originally before a justice of the peace and thence by the defendants’ appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Suit to compel the transfer of an undivided interest in a schooner, and for an injunction, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The finding stated these facts: The intestate was the equitable owner of an interest in the schooner H. H Hanscom which stood in the name of one Moulton.

Shit to enjoin the defendant from constructing and operating an electric street railway across the plaintiff’s tracks at grade, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Q-eorge IV.

t. a. to make a proposed settlement and compromise of certain claims and demands held by him, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Roraback, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. Harold St. Clair Johnson died domiciled in New Haven on or about June 6th, 1896, leaving an estate valued at about $60,000.

Action to recover for- services rendered as a real estate broker, brought to the City Court of New Haven and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Superior Court in New… Held: and who was present thereat ? ’ The defendant objected to this question as immaterial, irrelevant, and not within the issues of the case, and that it ought to have been introduced if at all in the opening. The court overruled the objection, admitted the question, and the defendant duly excepted.

Action to recover wages, brought originally before a justice of the peace and thence, by appeal of the defendant Heineman only, to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County and tried to the court, Studley, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action to recover for land taken and for injuries to the plaintiffs’ premises caused by tbe removal of a grade crossing brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and heard in damages to the court, Gceorge W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for $5,000, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

<p>Action for an adjustment of partnership accounts and for 188,000 damages, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved by that court, Robinson, J., upon the facts found, for the consideration and advice of this court. After the Superior. Court had been advised by this court (69 Conn. 392) that the plaintiffs were not entitled, upon the pleadings as they stood, to an accounting, the plaintiffs twice moved for leave to file substituted complaints, which was denied, first by Robinson, and subsequently by Shumway, J., and judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court in disallowing the proposed amendments.</p> <p>The substituted complaint which the plaintiffs first asked leave to file, stated the following case: —</p> <p>On November 2d, 1885, the plaintiffs and Bentley, the defendant’s intestate, entered into an agreement to carry on a lumber business, under the style of the New London Lumber Company, and to hold it out as a copartnership to the public, but that, as between themselves, they should not be partners, and the assets of the company should belong to the plaintiffs. In pursuance of this agreement, such a company was thereupon so formed, and a lumber business was so carried on until December 31st, 1893, when public notice was given, over the signatures of the plaintiffs and Bentley, of the dissolution of “ the copartnership heretofore existing” by said name. Bentley signed it thus: “Andrew J. Bentley, special.” During the continuance of the company, lumber was largely bought by it on the joint credit of the plaintiffs and Bentley, and it sold the same, and Bentley received large sums from such sales, both before and after the dissolution of the copartnership, to use in paying the company’s debts and to account for, and also received some of the lumber so purchased by the.company, the value of which he agreed to apply in liquidation of its indebtedness, and to account for. In 1895 Bentley died, and there was then due to the plaintiffs, and still is, a balance of $84,000, for which they duly exhibited a claim against his estate. The defendant disallowed the claim, and has never accounted to the plaintiffs.</p> <p>In a second count it was averred that the original agreement between the parties was that Bentley was to assist the plaintiffs to carry on a lumber business at said New London in the name and style of the New London Lumber Company. Said company by said agreement was to be and was designated a copartnership, and during all the time of its existence it was represented to third parties by said Bentley that he was a copartner of the plaintiffs therein, and as to third parties the plaintiffs and said Bentley were copartners; but as between themselves it was agreed that the profits of said company should belong to the plaintiffs equally. The other allegations were the same as in the first count.</p> <p>The claim was for equitable relief by way of “ an accounting by the defendant of the property, moneys and credits received by the said A. J. Bentley, belonging to the said New London Lumber Company, purchased in its name and on the joint credit of the plaintiffs and the said A. J. Bentley, and judgment for the amount found due to the plaintiffs from said estate.”</p> <p>In support of their motion to amend, the plaintiffs claimed that their substitute complaint was intended to correspond with the facts already found by the court. The motion was denied QRoiinson, J.') without prejudice, on the ground that the complaint did not correspond with that finding, and so would open the door to a retrial of material facts.</p> <p>Thereupon the plaintiffs asked leave to amend by filing another substituted complaint. This differed from that just described, in substituting for the averments that Bentley, after the dissolution, received money and property to be accounted for, the following;—</p> <p>“ When said dissolution took place, the New London Lumber Company was owing Mr. Bentley, who was doing business under the name of the Columbia Steam Saw and Planing Mills, for capital furnished, labor and for interest on the capital so provided by Mr. Bentley, and the plaintiffs thereupon sold and delivered to said Bentley the entire stock of merchandise of the New London Lumber Company, then on hand, at an agreed price.</p> <p>“ The accounts that were outstanding at the time of said dissolution on the books of the New London Lumber Company, and other obligations due to them, were collected as they could be, and such collections as were made were entered on the books of the New London Lumber Company and the money therefrom was turned into the bank deposit account of the said Columbia Steam Saw and Planing Mills; that is, Andrew J. Bentley’s bank deposit account. There was never any settlement between said plaintiffs and said Bentley.”</p> <p>This motion was also denied (Shumway, </.), on the ground that the proposed complaint did not correspond with the finding, and so was open to the same objections which had led to the denial of the first motion.</p> <p>Six weeks later, the plaintiffs moved for leave to file another form of substituted complaint, which was simply a recital of the facts set out in the finding (as recited in 69 Conn. 395), and for the most part in the same language, omitting occasionally such a phrase as “ it appeared in evidence that,” and adding suitable allegations as to the presentment and disallowance of the claim against Bentley’s estate. This motion was denied (Shumway, Ji), on the same ground on which the former averments had been disallowed, and also because it came too late. Judgment was thereupon rendered for the defendant on the original finding, and the plaintiffs appealed, assigning for error each of the successive refusals of leave to amend.</p>

Action against the defendant as indorser of three promissory notes, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Robinson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and heard in damages to the court, Elmer, J., after the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint had been overruled by Roraback, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for §600, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Suit for an injunction against a nuisance and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for #800 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

Writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Superior Court of Windham County, Robinson, J., rendered against the plaintiffs in error in an action of ejectment after their motion to erase the case from the docket had .been denied by the court, Ralph Wheeler, «/.; brought to the Supreme Court of Errors held at Hartford within and for the first judicial district on the first Tuesday of March, 1899.

Action to recover special damage to premises claimed to have been caused by a change of grade in abutting highways, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $200 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

Application by the State’s Attorney for Hartford County for a writ of mandamus requiring the street commissioner of the city of New Britain to give his written consent to the excavation of a certain street for the purpose of laying telephone ducts and wires, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Thayer, J., upon demurrer to the respondent’s return; the court overruled the demurrer and, upon the refusal of the relator to plead further,…

Suit for an injunction and for an order requiring the defendants to interplead respecting their claims to the amount of a promissory note made by the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the Utica Cement Manufacturing Company, and appeal by the Wind-ham National Bank for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The note in question was as follows:— “ 11,660.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by a defective highway, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff Helen D. Bartram to recover $800 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

Action upon a replevin bond, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and heard in damages to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for $80 only, and appeal by them for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. In July, 1896, William H. Cryne was a partner in a co-partnership called the New Britain Grain Company.

DrusiUa Mitchell, an insolvent debtor, in allowing a claim against her estate, taken by the trustee thereon to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Prentice, J.; facts found and judgment rendered disallowing the claim, and appeal by the claimant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action of interpleader, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Prentice,, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of Louise P. Severson, from which… Held: in the manner prescribed in the by-laws for amendments thereto.” The appeal assigns as error the rulings of the court in admitting said evidence, in sustaining the claim of the defendant Louise P. Severson, and in refusing to sustain the claims of the defendant Mabel P. Stivers.

; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the respondents, and appeal by the petitioner for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The petitioner for the writ was Charles A. Harrison, and the persons for whose enlargement the writ was sought were Charles A. Hull and his wife.

Action in the nature of trespass qu. el.fr. for damages and for an injunction, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note guaranteed by the defendant’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Robinson, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.

Prosecution for willful injury to a public building, brought to the Town Court of Branford and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Action by the payee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange to recover the amount thereof, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Petition by the Insurance Commissioner, under General Statutes, § 2869, for the appointment of a receiver and the annulment of the charter of the defendant company; brought in August, 1898, before a judge of the Supreme Court of Errors (the Superior Court not being in session) and heard in September, 1898, upon issues closed on an answer and supplemental answer.