In Re Franklin

¶1(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While this Court may not always be the beneficiary of whatever blessings are secured by unanimity of decision, I think no one can be unmindful of the very considerable lengths to which we go in order to avoid a divergence of opinion in disciplinary matters. Uo other area of the law seems to inspire more flexibility among us in the quest for harmonious disposition.1 Probably it is more effective as *430well as more becoming that we speak with one voice in proceedings which call for the exercise of our regulatory powers over this State’s attorneys. The desirability of avoiding confusion while furnishing guidance to the members of the bar is self-evident. It is therefore with no little regret that I find myself unable to agree that the discipline here imposed by the Court adequately reflects the severity of the offense.

¶2Nothing could be clearer to me than that respondent was involved in a calculated and systematic scheme to bilk his own company. No indulgent reading of the record before us affords escape from the plain fact that he stole money from his employer — not on just a single occasion, but over an extended period. When discovered, he immediately resigned his position as president and chief executive officer and shortly thereafter negotiated with the company an agreement settling their differences. By means of that agreement he relinquished all retirement and pension rights and made a cash payment, in all amounting to about $52,000. In exchange the company gave respondent a release from any liability on account of all claims of the company surrounding reimbursed expenses during the entire period of his employment.

¶3The Morris County Ethics Committee made a specific finding that respondent submitted vouchers and received reimbursement in substantial amounts for entertainment expenses which were never incurred. A report from Peat, Mar-wick, Mitchell & Co. verified that alleged recipients of respondent’s entertainment efforts over a six months period had in fact not been so favored. These fictitious expenses amounted to $11,775 of a total of $44,087.32 reimbursed food, liquor and entertainment charges submitted for the period *431January 1, 1973 to July 23, 1973. Respondent did not testify or personally appear before either the Committee or this Court. However, he did acknowledge in an affidavit filed with the Committee that some of the claimed reimbursements were “overstated” and “insupportable.”

¶4What all this amounts to is expense account cheating on a grand — if not very sophisticated — scale, and the Committee’s finding of fraud properly supported its conclusion that both DR 1—102(A) (3) and DR 1-102(A) (4) had been violated. My own independent review of the record satisfies me by clear and convincing evidence that dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation abounded. The fact that the transgressions occurred in other than a lawyer-client context is of no moment, In re Belluscio, 38 N. J. 355, 357-58 (1962).

¶5In the present circumstances I am not at all prepared to accept respondent’s suggestion that no situation has “less significance to the practice of law or the sustaining of the moral integrity of the Bar than a business dispute involving the overuse of an expense account.” On the contrary (and quite apart from the fact that “overuse” here is a euphemism for deliberate distortion), an attorney’s insensitivity to basic honesty in any context should be a matter of our deepest concern.

¶6Whatever the conventional morality of the business world may be with respect to exaggerating or “padding” expense accounts, respondent’s conduct exceeds what any reasonable indulgence would render tolerable. Irrespective of what ethics may prevail elsewhere, this Court should not look lightly upon the wrongdoing revealed in this record. These violations bespeak a callous disregard of that level of behavior demanded of members of our bar. In my opinion nothing less than a three years suspension from the practice of law is appropriate.

¶7Judge Confohd joins in this opinion.

¶8*432For suspension for one year—Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sullivan, Pashman, and Schreiber—4.

¶9Concurring and dissenting—Justice Clieeord and Judge Coneord—2.

¶10ORDER

¶11It is ORDERED that BENJAMIN ERANKLIN III of New York City be suspended from the practice of law for one year and until further order of the Court, effective immediately; and it is further

¶12ORDERED that BENJAMIN ERANKLIN III be and hereby is restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension.