Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

73 Me. 168

Robinson v. Perry

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided January 20, 1882

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1882-01-20

On exceptions from superior court. Assumpsit on a promissory note for fifty dollars, dated March 3, 1874, payable to J. G. Durgin or order six months afterdate. The case was tried by the presiding justice without the intervention of a jury, subject to exceptions in matters of law.

Relies on Haxton v. Bishop · Chandler v. Drew · Bridge v. Johnson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1882-01-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 1912

3 state decisions

101882189019001910decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Libbey, J.

¶1The question in this case is whether the defendant’s account against the payee of the note in suit, filed in set-off, is admissible as a defence to the action on the note by the plaintiff, an indorser who took it after it was dishonored.

¶2The rule established in England will not allow it. The rule there is that the plaintiff in such cases is liable only to the equities arising out of the note itself, or the consideration for it; or to the allowance of such demands due the maker of the note from the payee as might be found by either express or implied understanding of the parties to have been agreed to be applied in discharge of it. Burroughs v. Mass. 10 Barn. and Cressw. 558.

¶3The same rule has been held in several of the states where the terms of the statutes regulating set-off, were held not- to be broad enough to permit the set-off. In New Hampshire, Chandler v. Drew, 6 N. H. 469. In Connecticut, Stedman v. Gillson, 10 Conn. 55; Robinson v. Lyman, 10 Conn. 30. In New York, Johnson v. Bridge, 6 Cowen, 693; Raymond v. Wheeler, 9 Cowen, 295 ; Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wend. 346; Haxton v. Bishop, 3 Wend. 13 ; Driggs v. Rockwell, 11 Wend. 504. In Illinois, Gregg v. James, 1 Breese, 107. In New York the rule established in the cases cited has been changed by a statutory provision allowing the set-off.

¶4The question received a very full and careful consideration by the court in Massachusetts, in Sargent v. Southgate, 5 Pick. *170312; and it was there held, that where the note in suit was indorsed and transferred to the plaintiff by the payee after it was dishonored, any demand which the maker held against the payee before the transfer, which he had a right to set-off as against the payee, might be set-off in a suit by the plaintiff.

¶5The doctrine of Sargent v. Southgatehas been repeatedly recognized by this court as sound law. Shirley v. Todd, 9 Maine, 83; Barney v. Norton, 11 Maine, 350; Burnham v. Tucker, 18 Maine, 179; Wood v. Warren, 19 Maine, 23.

¶6It may now be regarded as the settled law of this state.

¶7Our statute regulating set-offs, (B. S., c. 82, § 60,) recognizes the right of set-off as a defence in cases like this, of claims not between the parties to the suit, and provides that, in such case, no judgment shall be recovered against the plaintiff for any balance due the defendant.

¶8Exceptions overruled.

Appleton, C. J., Walton, Barrows, Daneortii and Peters, JJ., concurred.
/73/me/168 · .json · Public domain