Cantrell v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

54 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “* * * The relevancy of the extraneous offense derives purely from: the point of view of the doctrine of chances — -the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all. Without formulating any accurate test, and without attempting by numerous instances to secure absolute certainty of inference, the mind applies this rough and instinctive process of reasoning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in one instance, but that the oftener similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them. [[Image here]] It will be seen that the peculiar feature of this process of proof is that the act itself is assumed to be done, — either because (as usually) it is conceded, or because the jury are [sic] instructed not to consider the evidence from this point (sic) view until they [sic] find the act to have been done and are proceeding to determine the intent. This explains what is a marked feature in the rulings of the courts, namely, a disinclination to insist on any feature of common purpose or general scheme as a necessary requirement for the other acts evidentially used. It is not here necessary to look for a general scheme or to discover a united system in all the acts; the attempt is merely to discover the intent accompanying the”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reid v. State · Wiggins v. State

2. “Where it is apparent that the testimony can be used for no other purpose than that of impeachment, it is not necessary for the Court to limit the purpose of the same in its charge. If it could be used otherwise, either as an incriminating fact, or to exercise a strong, undue, or improper influence upon the jury as to the main issue, injurious and prejudicial to appellant, then it would have been the duty of the court to limit and restrict its effect in his charge so that no unwarranted results could ensue.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Paez v. State