¶1Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
¶2Although I agree with the majority opinion to the extent that I would affirm Appellantâs conviction and five (5) year sentence for Tampering With Physical Evidence, I respectfully dissent from the majorityâs holding as to Appellantâs conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the offense of Murder. In my opinion, both the trial court and todayâs majority have erroneously interpreted the KRE 504(c)(2)(iii) exception to the husband-wife *715privilege for âproceedingfe] in which one (1) spouse is charged with wrongful conduct against the person or property of ... an individual residing in the household of eitherâ
¶3To clarify, I do not quibble with the trial courtâs conclusion that Richmond resided with Appellant in a house that Appellant and Teresa Lynch owned in Somerset, Kentucky. That conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
¶4In the trial courtâs original order denying Appellantâs motion in limine, the court based its conclusion on its belief that, in the context of KRE 504(b)(2)(iii), a âhouseholdâ was tantamount to a âplace of occupancyâ:
âHouseholdâ is defined in Websterâs New World Dictionary as âall the persons who live in one house; family and servants.â The word also connotes a place, being, according to Websterâs Dictionary, âthe home and its affairs.â Bal-lentineâs Law Dictionary defines household as âpersons who dwell together as a family.â A definition of household adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Sutton v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, Ky.App., 971 S.W.2d 807, is from 1981 New College Edition of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. It defines household as âa domestic establishment including the members of a family and others living under the same roof.â It is not essential to constitute a household that the persons living together under the same roof be related by blood or marriage. The definitions refer to persons living together âas a family.â The language of the exception itself is important, in that it refers, not to a family member, but to âan individual.â It is also significant to note that the rule does not refer to individuals residing âas members of the householdâ but it *716uses the language âin the householdâ. In that context, the word household encompasses its meaning as both a place of occupancy and the persons living therein as a family. In that .contextâ Donald Lynch living alone has a âhousehold.â Steven Richmond, taking up residence at Donald Lynchâs home is âresiding in the householdâ of Donald Lynch. The Court concludes that the exception to the marital privilege rule is applicable. Therefore, there is no privilege under rule 504 to bar Teresa Lynch from offering testimony about wrongful conduct by Donald Lynch directed against the person or property of Steven Richmond, who was an individual residing in the household of Donald Lynch.
¶5(Emphasis added). On the day the case was called for trial, after Appellant asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of new evidence concerning Richmondâs place of residence, the trial court again indicated that it equated Appellantâs âhouseholdâ with the residence he occupied, and that it viewed the inquiry as distinct from whether Richmond was a âmember of the household.â Later that same day, the trial court again indicated that his findings were premised on the notion that Appellantâs âhouseholdâ was simply the structure in which Appellant lived:
Whether or not heâs part of the household isnât really the inquiry under [Rule 504(c)(2)(iii) ]. The question is whether heâs residing in the household.I interpret the word household to include a single person living alone can be a household. Theyâre all the related people in the family and others, including domestic help and others living under that roof, so whether or not Mr. Richmond was a member of the household isnât the inquiry. The inquiry is whether he was residing in the household of Donald Lynch and in the. context of the rule I think that means the same thing as residing at Donald Lynchâs house or living in his apartment, and he had done so long enough to be considered residing there.
¶6(Emphasis added).
¶7I find the trial courtâs interpretation of âhouseholdâ erroneous. First, and most important, if âhouseholdâ is defined simply as a house or apartment or other âplace of occupancy,â that construction renders the âin the householdâ language in KRE 504(c)(2)(iii) superfluous. .Under the trial courtâs interpretation, the exceptionâs meaning would be identical if the word âhouseholdâ was deleted from the provision and the subsection read âresiding with eitherâ because any individual residing in another personâs house or apartment would, according to this interpretation, necessarily reside in that personâs household. As explained in more depth below, however, the terms âhouseâ and âhouseholdâ are not synonymous. Interpreting KRE 504(e)(2)(iii) in a manner that renders half of it moot violates our rules of construction,
¶8Second, as the trial court recognized in its written order, the primary definitions of âhouseholdâ invariably refer not to structures in which persons live, but instead to the social arrangement of persons *717living together, i.e. âa family living together,â
Whether the term âhouseholdâ or âfamilyâ is used, the term embraces a collection of persons as a single group, with one head, living together, a unit of permanent and domestic character, under one roof, that is, a collective body of persons living together within one curti-lage, subsisting in common and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness.10
¶9And, under federal Medicare statutes, âany person sharing a common abode as part of a single family unit, including domestic employees and others who live together as part of a family unit, is considered a member of a Medicare beneficiaryâs household .... Roomers and boarders are not considered household members.â
¶10Third, KRE 504(c)(2)(iii)âs use of the preposition âinâ does not support the trial courtâs interpretation. This preposition âis used with verbs signifying being, resting, or moving within limits, or within circumstance or conditions of any kind conceived of as limiting, confining, or investing, either wholly or in part. In its different applications, it approaches some of the meanings of, and sometimes is interchangeable with, within, on, at, of, and among.â
¶11Here, the trial courtâs conclusion that Richmond resided in Appellantâs household was based solely upon the fact that the two (2) men occupied the same residence. The trial courtâs orders conclusively establish that it gave no consideration to the question of whether the men lived together as a quasi-familial social unit. Unfortunately, even if it were appropriate for this Court to do so, it appears impossible for us, on the basis of the record before us, to undertake an independent determination of the evidence and determine whether Appellantâs wifeâs testimony would have been admissible under a properly-construed KRE 504(c)(2)(iii) exception to the husband-wife privilege. The trial transcript contains no evidence upon which to base a finding that the men lived together as a household â and in fact, the testimony of at least one (1) witness, Detective Nelson, supports the contrary conclusion by describing the men as âroommates.â However, Appellantâs Designation of Record omitted the evidentiary hearing regarding Appellantâs motion in limine conducted by the trial court on July 19, 2000. While the responsibility falls upon Appellant to ensure the completeness of the record,
¶12Accordingly, I would vacate Appellantâs conviction and sentence of life imprisonment for the offense of Murder, and remand Count One of Pulaski Circuit Court Indictment # 99-CR-0152 to the trial court for it to determine, under a proper-construction of the KRE 504(c)(2)(iii) exception, whether the KRE 504 husband-wife privilege prevents Appellantâs wife from testifying regarding Appellantâs in-culpatory statements. If the trial court were to again find the exception applicable, I would direct it to reinstate the conviction subject to judicial review of the trial courtâs findings on that question. If, however, the trial court were to find, upon reexamination, that the testimony comes within the KRE 504 privilege, I would hold that the erroneous introduction of this evidence at Appellantâs trial would require a new trial on the charge of Murder with this evidence excluded.
¶13. EIRE 504(c)(2)(iii) (emphasis added)..
¶14. In fact, the majority opinion does not address the definition of "householdâ at all and instead defines "residence,â a word not found in KRE 504. Majority Opinion at 74 S.W.3d 711, 713 (2002).
¶15.See KRE 104; Talbott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 968 S.W.2d 76 (1998).
¶16. See GMC v. Book Chevrolet, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 918, 919 (1998) (recognizing a rule of construction that enactments âshould be construed so that no part of it is meaningless or ineffectual.").
¶17. See AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 224 (1997) ("The word 'household' connotes a settled status; a more settled or permanent status is indicated by âresident of the same householdâ than would be indicated by 'resident of the same house or apartment.â â).
¶18. BLACKâS LAW DICTIONARY 744 (7th ed.1999).
¶19. BALLENTINEâS LAW DICTIONARY (3d. ed.1969) (citations omitted).
¶20. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.2000).
¶21. WEBSTERâS REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1998).
¶22. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 224 (1997).
¶23. 70C AM. JUR. 2D Social Security and Medicare § 2462 (2000) (emphasis added). See also 42 C.F.R. § 411.12(b).
¶24. WEBSTERâS REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1998). I would also observe that one of the illustrations following this definition uses the preposition in the phrase "in his family.â Id.
¶25. Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Commission Commentary to KRE 504 (November, 1989) (emphasis added). I would observe that this Commentary suggests that the inter*718pretation urged in this dissent is consistent with the narrow purpose for the exclusion. Although the normative bases supporting the husband-wife privilege have been the target of severe criticism, perhaps none as biting as 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961), but the fact remains that KRE 504 establishes a privilege in the husband-wife context. While the temptation to stretch the limits of the KRE 504 exclusions to permit the admission of relevant evidence is difficult, to resist, judicial fiat is an inappropriate mechanism to change our rules regarding privileges.
¶26. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 143 (1985); Fanelli v. Commonwealth, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 255 (1968).
¶27. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Weartz, Ky.App., 636 S.W.2d 891 (1982). See also Burberry v. Bridges, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 583 (1968).