Volume 74 — United States Reports

Eastern District of Pennsylvania; the case as presented by bill and answer being thus: The,city of Philadelphia, as originally laid out in 1683, and as incorporated in 1701, was situated upon a rectangular plot of ground, bounded in one direction, by two streets called Vine and South, a mile -¡apart, and in the other by two rivers (the Delaware and Schuylkill), two miles apart;— the corporate title of the eity.being “ the-Mayor, Aldermen, and' Citizens of Philadelphia.” Upon…

Held: that this was a decision by a State court ágainst a right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution or a statute of the United States, and so that this court had jurisdiction under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, and the amendatory act of Fébruary 5th, 1867. 2.' Certificates, of indebtedness issued by the United States to creditors of the *17 government, for supplies furnished to it in carrying…

This ease — brought here by the Bank of New'York — differed from the preceding in two particulars: (1) That the board of supervisors, which in the other cases allowed and audited the’ claims of the banking associations, refused to pillow the claim made in this ease; and (2) That the exemption from State taxa-' tion claimed in this case, was of United .States notes, declared by act of Congress to be a legal tender for all debts, public and. private, except duties on imports…

The case, as derived from the evidence of all'kinds. taken in the proceedings, was thus : The vessel had .been built,, as it appeared, in the years 1862-3, at Greenock, on the Clyde, as a war vessel, for the Confederate government, and called the Japan; or if Not thus built, certainly passed into the hands of that government early in the'spring of 1863.

in the report of the Superior Court is thus: . “ When it is provided by the conditions annexed to a policy of insurance against fire, that… Held: that the insurers were liable, the' immediate cause of the loss being the perils of the. sea. 'And so more recent English cases. † American authorities. • equally assent' the distinction maintained in Jiacou’s maxim. ‡ [In. reply to some remarks by the bench as to the irregular and defective character of the record, tested by the…

Held: further (the statute containing no clause exempting,, the vessel or owners from liability for the.pilotls mismanagement), that the responsibility of the vessel for torts committed by it not being derived from the law of master and.servant, or from the common law at all, but from maritime law, which impressed a maritime lien upon the vessel in *54 whosesoever'hands it might be for torts committed by it, thafact that…

. The case was this: Congress, February,'1862, authorized the issue of $15(ty 000,000 in notes of the United States, and enacted that they should “be receivable in payment of all taxes, internal duties, levies, debts, and demands due to the United States, .except duties, ón imports; and of all claims, and demands of any kind whatever against the.

Held: in the case of Outram v. Morewood, † to be barred by the-record of a former judgment, between-the same parties, recovered long before the second trespass was committed, as it appeared that the same.title, was- involved in both cases.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of' Massachusetts.</p> <p>The Constitution vests appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court under such regulations as Congress shall make, ' ,and Congress, by the act of March 3, 1803, authorizing appeal s,pfo vides that “the said Supreme Court shall be, and hereby is, authorized and required to 'receive, hear, and determine such appeals.”</p> <p>With these provisions in force, Durant filed a bill, in Oe- ' tober, 1847, against the Essex Company, seeking to hold it liable for certain real estate. The bill was finally “dismissed.” An appeal was taken to this court, where; after, hearing the case, the judges were equally divided in opinion; and in conformity with the practice of the court'in such cases it ordered that the decree. of the court “ be affirmed with costs.”</p> <p>,The complainant, conceiving that as the judgment in this court'was by a bench'equally divided, there had been ño decision of his case by the court of last resort, filed another bill — the bill in the court below — for the same relief in the shme matter as he had filed the one'before.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded that the former suit and decree in this court — which the plea averred were made after testimony was taken on both sides, and the case .heard on its merits and argued by counsel — were a bar to the present • bill.. This was determined by the court belo'w to be so; and the mandate of this court being filed, the complainant moved for leave to discontinue the suit, or that the bill be dismissed without prejudice. But the court refused leave, and dismissed the bill, no words being put in the decree that showed that the dismissal was other than an absolute one. Appeal ■here accordingly.</p> <p>The questions which the appellant now sought to-raise were':.</p> <p>1. Whether the decree'of dismissal simply was a -bar to a new suit?</p> <p>2. What was the effect of an affirmance by an equally di- ■. vided court ?</p> <p>}. That' the decree in the first suit being simply one of-dismissal, did not prevent tbe filing of a new bill in another court, or even in the same court.</p> <p>2. That an affirmance by an'equally divided court amounted to nothing; that this court, upon appeal, must “ determine such appeal,” and that a decree by a divided court was not a compliance with the act of Congress. It was an abdication of the appellate power, and, in effect, imparted the power' to the Circuit Court.</p> <p>considering the first point made plainly untenable, were proceeding to the second, when they were stopped- by the court; Grier, J., referring them to a note of the late Horace Binney Wallace, Esq., of Philadelphia, appended to the case of Krebs v. The Carlisle Bank,* as . to the effect of an affirmance of judgment by an equally divided court, which he said was “ clear and satisfactory.”</p>

A. and J. Kendall made an agreement, in the year 1843, with persons representing a branch of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, called the Western Cherokees, to prosecute a claim which these Indians set up against the United 'States.' .It was a part of the agreement that the Kéndalls were to receive, directly from the United States,-5 per cent, upon all sums that might be collected on the claim.

”* And the Supreme Court of Illinois has decided that a county can neither sue or be sued at common law, iude-; pendent of legislative provisions, and- have construed the foregoing sections of the statute to exclude the right -to sue any county elsewhere than in the Circuit Court of the county 1 sued.* In this condition of .the.

An act of Congress of February 26, 1845,* construing, a former act relative to duties paid under protest, says: “Nor shall any action be maintained against any collector, to recover the amount of duties so paid under protest, unless the .said protest was made in writing and signed by the claimant,ator before the payment of said duties, setting forth distinctly and specifically the igrounds of objection to the payment thereof.” 'In this state,o.f the statute.law, Nichols…

Held: that his sub- ■ sequent participation in the fraud and its fruits was as effective 'to charge him as preconcert and combination for its execution. 3. Where fraud in the purchase’or sale of property is in issue, evidence of other frauds of like character, committed by the same parties, at or neai ' the same time, is admissible. 4.

Held: by this court, that by such judgment, the “ full faith and credit ” required by the Federal Constitution had not been given in the State of New York to the judicial proceedings of the State of Illinois; and that so the judgment below was erroneous. 2.

Held: that they were entitled to have their damages assessed and 'paid out of the proceeds before distribution to the captors. 3. The' District Court of the United, States, sitting ás a prize court, may hear and determine all questions respecting claims, arising after the capture of the vessel. Appeal from the District Court for Massachusetts.

Dorsheimer, collector of internal revenue at Buffalo, New York, and two others, informers in the case, tiled a petition in the■ Court of Claims to recover from the United States' One-half of $220,102, which the government received on a compromise with Sturges & Sons, of a. prosecution against property of one Rhomberg, a distiller. ■ The case was this: The act of June 3, 1864, “to provide internal revenue,” enacts, that any distiller who shall fail to make true entry aiid…

<p>1. The act of February 28th, 1839 (g 8, 5 Stat. at Large, 322), providing for the transfer, under certain circumstances named in it, of a suit from one • ■ Circuit Court to the most convenient Circuit Court in the next adjacent State, is not repealed by the act of March ^d, 1863 (12 Stat. at Large, ■ 768), providing that under certain circumstances named in it, the circuit judge of one circuit may request the judge of any other cirduit to hold the court of the former judgo during a specified time.</p> <p>2. A court of the United States has power to adopt in a particular case a rule of practice under a State statute; and where a Circuit Court is possessed of a case from another circuit, under the above-mentioned act of 1839, it may.adopt the practice of the State in which the Circuit Court from whieti the case is transferred sits, as fully as could the Circuit Court which had possession of the case originall}’-.</p>

Held: by the settled adjudications of the highest courts of the State, to possess full power, under its constitution and laws, to.issue 'the same, are ever after valid and binding upon the body issuing them,in the hands of a bond fide holder, although the same courts may- subsequently reverse their previous decisions — is hot open for re-examination-in this court. 2.

That before his decease, the. said Fisher made application to Congress for compensation for the loss and destruction of his property. That after his- decease this application was renewed by his legal representatives.

<p>1. Although the rules of navigation require that a vessel coming up behind • another, and on the same course with her, shall keep out of the -way, yet 1 the rule presupposes that the other vessel' keeps her course, and it is not to be applied irrespective of the circumstances which may render a departure from it necessary to avoid immediate danger.</p> <p>2. Where',-in case of collision, with loss, there is reasonable doubt as to whic^■party is to blflme, the loss must be sustained by,the ohe on which it lias fallen.</p> <p>3. .This court will not readily reverse in a case qf collision, depending on 'a mere difference of opinion as to the weight and'effect of conflicting testimony, where both the ^District and Circuit Courts have -agreed, It affirmed, accordingly, a decree in such a case.</p>

Brown filed his bill in September, 1860, in the court below against three persons, Pierce, Morton, and Weston, alleging that in the spring of 18’57, he settled upon and improved a tract of land near Omaha; that be erected a bouse on the tract; and-continued to . occupy it until August 10th, 1857, when -he entered the tract under the pre-emption laws of the United States; that Pierce claimed the land by virtue of the laws of an organization known as .the Omaha Claim Club;,…

An act of Congress of-27th September, 1850, providing for the survey and for making donations to settlers of public lands in Oregon, — commonly called the Donation Act, — provides by a part (here quoted verbatim) of its fourth section ' as follows: “ There shall be, and hereby is, granted to every white settler or occupant of the public lands, American half-breed Indians included, above the age of eighteen years, being a citizen of the United States, or having made a…

of New York. The facts shown by the record were these: In December, 1851, one Christian Metz, having borrowed of Frederick Bronson, executor of Arthur Bronson, fourteen hundred dollars, executed his bond for the repayment to Bronson of the principal sum borrowed on the 18th day of January, 1857, in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the United States, with interest, also in coin, until such repayment, at the yearly rate of seven per cent.

<p>E. A contract to pay a certain sum in gold and silver coin is in substance and legal effect a contract to deliver a certain weight of gold and silver of a certain fineness to be ascertained by count.</p> <p>2. Whether the contract be for the delivery or payment of coin, or bullion, or other property, damages for non-performance must be assessed in lawful money; that is to say, in money declared to be legal tender in payment, by a law made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>8- There are, at this time, two descriptions of lawful money in use under acts of Congress, in either of which (assuming these acts, in respect to legal tender, to be constitutional) damages for non-performance of contracts, whether made before or since the passage of these acts, may be assessed in the absence of any different understanding or agreement between the parties.</p> <p>4. When the intent of the parties as to the medium of payment is clearly expressed in a contract, damages for the breach of it, whether made before or since the enactment of these laws, may be properly assessed so as to give effect to that intent.</p> <p>5- When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that payment or satisfaction shall be made in gold and silver, damages should be assessed in coin, and judgment rendered accordingly.</p>

The State of Pennsylvania, by certain acts, as expounded by the Supreme Court of that State,* taxed “ money owing by solvent debtors, whether by promissory note, penal or single bill, bond or judgment,” imposing three mills on the dollar of the principal, payable out of the interest.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for Iowa.</p>

the Supreme Court of Minnesota. Schurmeir filed a bill in one of the inferior courts of Minnesota, to enjoin the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company from taking possession, and building its railroad upon, certain ground in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, bordering on the Mississippi, and originally a fractional section of the public lauds. The place was alleged, by Schurmeir, to be a public street and landing.

Mead brought ejectment in the court below against Ballard to recover certain land which the ancestor of him (Meadj had conveyed for a full consideration, on the 7th September, 1847, to Amos Lawrence, of Boston, in fee.

Jacobs filed a bill in the Circuit Court for Southern Ohio against Baker, seeking relief for the infringement of four separate patents, which had been granted to him, Jacobs, for improvements in the construction of prisons. The bill set forth, the different patents. The first, dated January 7th, 1859, was for an improvement in the construction of prisons, which the complainant set forth in his specification with very numerous plates and designs.

Held: notes against the Milwaukee and Superior Railroad Company, indorsed by four of its directors, for about $21,000 (the price of iron furnished to lay the road), and as collateral security for payment, $42,000 in mortgage bonds of the road.

Held: on full consideration, that.whether a case was attempted to be brought to this court by writ of error, or appeal, the record must be filed before the end of the term next succeeding the issue of the writ or the allowance of the appeal, or the court had no jurisdiction of *310 the case.

<p>A return to a mandamus ordering a municipal corporation forthwith, to levy a specific tax upon the taxable property of a city for the year 1865, sufficient to pay a judgment specified, collect the tax and pay the same, or show cause to t'he contrary by the next term of the court, is not answered by a return that the defendants, “ in obedience to the order of the court, did proceed to levy a tax of one per cent, .upon the taxable property cf the said city, for the purpose of paying the judgment named in the information, and other claims, and that-the said tax is sufficient in amount to pay the said judgment and other claims for the payment of'which it’ was levied.” The return should have disclosed the whole act constituting the levy, so as to enable the court to determine whether it was sufficient to pay the judgment of the relator. It was also erroneous in returning that the tax was levied to pay this judgment ‘‘ and other claims.”</p>

Held: that the agreement contained in the letter was a modification of the terms of the ' charter-party in respect to the lard, and relieved the ship from the responsibility of safe carriage of the cargo, so far as that was affected by the lard; and was equivalent to a stipulation to that effect embodied in the charter-party; and- that the stipulation, though of no efficacy as between shipper and vessel, was valid as…

This was a petition, by one Twítchell, for a writ of error to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of the City and County of Philadelphia, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with' a view to the revision here of a judgment of the former court, affirmed by the latter court, which condemned the petitioner to suffer death for the crime of murder.

Tyler brought suit, in the Circuit Court for Massachusetts, against the city of Boston, for infringement of a patent; the ease being this: The plaintiff professed to have discovered a new compound substance, being a combination of fusel oil with the mineral and earthy oils, which compound constitutes a burning fluid, “by which term,” he says, “I mean a liquid which will burn for the purpose of illumination, without material smoke, in a lamp with a small solid wick, and…

The casé was this: On the 9th of March, 1860, the Secretary of War, at that time Mr. Floyd, addressed an order to the Quartermaster-General arid Commissary-General of Subsistence, granting to the said,.Taliafero and Grant the privilege of furnishing. and delivering, at certain posts in Arizona, for a period of two years, all the súpplies that .might'be needed there for the use of the service, at certain stipulated 'rates.

<p>Prior to the act of June 12th, 1858, providing compensation not exceeding one quarter of one per cent, to collectors acting as disbursing agents of the United States in certain cases, such collector, if receiving his general maximum compensation, under the act of March 2d, 1831 (¡S 4), and also his special maximum-of $400, under the act of May 7th, 1822 ($ 18), could not recover on a quantum meruit or otherwise for disbursements made for building a custom-house and marine hospital at the port where lie was collector.</p>

This was a motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court'for "West Tennessee, on the ground that the decree from which it was taken was not final. The record showed that the controversy related to the ownership and transfer of two hundred and four shares of the stock of the Memphis Gaslight Company, and to the rights of the parties under contracts relating to the purchase, Bale, and transfer of the stock.

The Secretary of the Interior having directed the Commissioner of the Land Office to cancel an entry under which Gaines and others.claimed an equitable right to certain lands _in Arkansas, these last brought their suit in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, praying that the secretary and commissioner should be enjoined from making such cancellation. The defendants entered their appearance, and Wilson, the commissioner* filed a plea.

The schooner Diana was captured, on the 26th of November, 1862, by vessels of'war of the United States, off Pass' Cavallo, on the coast of Texas, then in rebellion against the United States, and, for somé'time previously,-under blockade along the whole line of its coast, and taken-,to Key "West for adjudication.

Held: that K. was not a party to, nor interested in the contract. Appeal from the Court of Claims. By an act of March 3d, 1853, Congress authorized the commencement of an aqueduct to supply Washington with water. Captain Meigs was appointed to superintend the work.

Held: and at the same place; and that district courts and criminal courts should also be held by one of said justices at the several times when such eourts.were then required to be held, and at the same place.

Er^or to the'Circuit Court for Missouri. This was an action against the Hartford Insurance Company, upon a policy of insurance in the sum of five thousand dollars, issued by the said company, a corporation created under the laws of Connecticut, to the plaintiff, .upon a.brick building, belonging to him, situated in Kansas City, in the ■State of Missouri. The policy bore date on the first of June, 1861, and was for one year.

■ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Iowa. The case was thus: The Mississippi y,nd Missouri Railroad Company — a company in Iowa, and by the laws of that State, having power to issue its bonds to carry into effect the purposes for which it was created — was incumbered by five several mortgages, given to secure bonds which it had executed, amounting, with arrears of interest, to $7,000,000; a sum greatly beyond what the road was worth.

Held: “ that, though against ejectment for non-payment of rent the court would relieve upon a principle long acknowledged iu this court, but utterly without foundation, it would not relieve where the right of the landlord accrued, not by non-payment of rent, but by the non-performance of covenants which might be compensated in damages.” † Such is' now the settled English rule upon the subject. ‡ Iu Brace-bridge v.…

Ann Payne, a citizen of Virginia, exhibited her bill in. the Circuit Court of the United States for Missouri, against Zadoe Hook, public administrator of Calloway County, in. that State, and his sureties on his official bond, all citizens of Missouri, to obtain her distributive share in the estate of her brother, Fielding Curtis, who died intestate, in 1861, and whose ■ estate was committed to the charge of the public administrator, by order of the County Court of Calloway…

Held: by the four justices who heard the argument, that a tax upon carriages, kept by the owner for his own use, was nót a direct tax.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Maryland.</p> <p>In August, 1860, William Ward, a resident of Alexandria in Virginia, pfiirehased of one Smith, of the same place, then administrator’of the estate of Aaron Leggett, deceased, cer-' tain real property situated in the State of Virginia, and gave him for the consideration-money three joint and several bonds of himself and Francis Ward. These bonds, each of which was for a sum exceeding four thousand dollars, bore date of the 22d of that month, payable, with interest, in six;. twelve, and eighteen months after date, “at the office of discount and deposit of the Farmers’ Bank of Virginia, at. Alexan</p> <p>In February, 1861, the first bond was deposited, at the banlc designated for collection.,. At .the time there was indorsed upon it a credit of over five hundred dollars; and it-was admitted that, subsequently, the further sum of twentyfi v<y.hundred -doljárs was received, by Smith, and'that the amount.of certain taxes on the estate, purchased, paid by the Wards, was to be deducted.</p> <p>" In May,1861, Smith-left Alexandria, where "he then resided,■ and went to Prince William County, Virginia, and remained within’ the Confederate- military lines during the .'Continuance. of the, civil war.’ He took with him the other .two bonds, which were. never' deposited at, the Farmers’ Bank for collection. Whilst he was thus absent from Alexandria, William Ward deposited with the bank to his credit' at different timeé', ’ between June, 1861, and April, 1862, various sums,, in notes of different ■ banks of Virginia, the 'nbpffual amount .of which exceeded by.several thousand •dollar's,.the balance due on the first'bond. .These notes were -,at a-discount at the times they were deposited, varying from . eleven to -.twenty-three, per cent. The cashier of the. bank . indorsed ''tHé- several sums thus received as credits on the first bond; but 'he testified that he made the indorsement Without the knowledge or request of.Smith. ■ It was not -un.til, June, 1865, that Smith was informed of the deposits tp his credit,' and he at once refused' to sanction the transactibu and aeeept-the deposits, and gave notice to the cashier Ojf.lfche bank'and to the Wards, obligees in the bond, of his refusal. The cashier thereupon erased the. indorsements ■made by him on the bond;</p> <p>-Smith. now, brought, the present .action upon the three ■ bonds-to-recover their -entibe amount,'less the sum credited oni- the'first bond when it was-deposited, the sum of'twenty-five .hundred dollars, subsequently'received by the plaintiff, and the amount of the-, taxes .paid by the .defendants on the' estate purchased.', ,</p> <p>The court beloyinstructed the jury, that,if they found that the. defendants executed the bonds, the -plaintiff was entitled to reco.yer their amounts, less the credit, indorsed on' the first-one, and the taxes paid.by defendants, and the subsequent payment to the plaintiff. with interest, on the same. The plaintiff recovered, and the- defendants brought the case to this court by writ of error.</p> <p>1. When securities are left with a bank for collection, the bank is, ipso facto, made the agent of the payee, to receive payment thereof. It is the agent of the payee, uot of -the payer.*</p> <p>2. The bank may release the payer by receiving payment in gold, silver, copper, drafts, or checks on other banks or private bankers, bank notes of its own or other banks, circulating at par or below par.</p> <p>It matters not what may be the particular kind or forms of money accepted by the bank, its relation of agent towards its principal and the debtor ceases the moment the funds so received are mingled with its own funds, and credit is given on its books for the amount so collected, as cash.</p> <p>The relationship of debtor and creditor, from that moment, subsists between the bank and its former principal, and the bank is liable for the full amount so credited.†</p> <p>8. It was stipulated in the bonds that they should be payable at the Farmers’ Dank; and it was thus made part of the contract that all the bonds should be deposited in that bank by the payee, Smith, at maturity, or before; so'that the obligors might be able to make payment of them at.the bank, according to the law and usage of banks, in making collections and receiving payments.‡</p> <p>It is not pretended that the payee, Smith, gave any instructions to the bank, or made any communication to the obligors, attempting-to modify or qualify the general law arid practice of banks in reference to such matters.'</p> <p>4. The defendants were entitled to have credited to. them .the notes they deposited at the bank for the plaintiff, either at their par or actual value; and the court erred in allowing them only the three previous credits mentioned in its instruction; and in allowing plaintiff interest on the entire balance during the war.*</p>

The question in this case arose upon a motion of Mr. Evarts, Attorney-General, in fifteen appeals from the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which judgments had been given on libels for condemnation and forfeiture — as having been employed in aid of the rebellion, with the consent of the owners — against the Trent and five other vessels, from which judgments the owners of the vessels-appealed; and given in favor of the Eleanor and eight other vessels, from which the United…

Court of Claims. The suit was founded on the petition of Adams, claiming .. a balance against the government on contracts with General Fremont, commanding' the Western Military District, for the construction of a certain number of mortar-boats and steam tug-boats, to be used' on the Western rivers in the late civil war.

United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that statutes must be constructed reasonably.

It did not appear when he died, or that he ever transferred the title to the property; but, at a very early day, William T. Barry occupied it, and this occupancy was continued after his death, by his legal representatives; until 1843, when it was sold, as Barry’s property, on an execution in favor of the old Bank of Kentucky (then mainly owned by apd under the control of the State), and purchased for Martha Ami Corbin, and Martha Ann Corbin, her daughter, two of the…

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for Nebraska; the case having been submitted by Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States.</p>

The case was this: In 1848, one Miles Kelly, a native of Ireland,' emigrated, to the United States, and settled in the District of Columbia. In January, 1853,. he married Ellen Duffy, and in - May, 1855, was naturalized.

A statute of Tennessee, passed in 1860,‡ and which by its terms was to take effect from the 1st of September of that year, allowed 10 per cent, interest (instead of 6 per cent., a former rate) to be taken for money lent, provided that such agreement were expressed “ on the face of the contract,” whether evidenced by bond, bill, note, or other written instrument.

Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the court held that Congress has the authority to withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of lower courts at any time. As such, the entirety of the court's appellate jurisdiction is determined by federal law.

The eleyenth section of the Patent Act of 1886, relating to the.assignment of patents, thus enacts: “ Every pátent shall be assignable in law either as to the whole interest, or any undivided part thereof, by any instrument in Avriting, which, assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent to make and use-, and to .grant to others'to make and’ use the-thing patented, within and throughout any specified' part or portion of the…

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. This action was brought by the plaintiff, who was formerly an attorney and counsellor-at-law in Massachusetts, 'against the defendant, who was. one of the justices of the Superior Court of that State, for an alleged wrongful removal by him, of the plaintiff from the bar.</p> <p>The substantial facts, as established by the evidence produced by the plaintiff", and by the records of the State court, introduced by consent, upon which the removal was made, were these r-</p> <p>.• In August, 1864, one Leighton was afrested upon a charge of larceny, and confined in jail in Boston to await the action of .the grand jury in the Superior Court, upon his failure to give a recognizance with sureties in four hundred dollars, required for his appearance. While thus confined, he regained the plaintiff as his attorney, to whom he expressed a will bigness to enlist in the army or navy of the United. States, ifthe prosecution could be discontinued. The plaintiff thereupon proposed to the district attorney to dispose of the prosecution in this way. That officer declined to accede to the .proposition at that time, but encouraged the plaintiff to expect that'he would not object to such an arrangement in court, if the presiding judge approved of,it, when the indictment was presented.</p> <p>The plaintiff and his father, without any-further arrangement with the district attorn fey, thereupon became sureties for Leighton, who, upon his release, proceeded to the office of the plaintiff", and there signed with his., mark — he not being able to write — an agreement to enlist as a substitute for one Brown, of Lowell, for four hundred dollars, which sum ■ was to be retained by the plaintiff", without any subsequent claim upon him, as indemnity for his becoming surety on the recognizance, and also to pay the plaintiff’ four 'hundred dollars for furnishing bail.</p> <p>Leighton subsequently enlisted in the naval service as a substitute for Brown, who paid the plaintiff, for the enlistment, eight hundred and thirty dollars. • .Of this sum, the plaintiff gave Leighton, when the latter "went on board the vessel to which he was assigned, the sum- of ten dollars. Subsequently he paid one hundred dollars to Leighton’s .order. The balance he retained. •</p> <p>Some weeks afterwards, Leighton wrote a letter to the captain of his vessel, stating that he was promised four hum' died dollars for his enlistment, by his lawyer, the plaintiff; that he had only received ten dollars; and that, when he applied to the plaintiff’for settlement, evasive answers were all he obtained. He referred, in the letter, to the fact that he ■ had a wife and two children dependent upon him for support, and he appealed to the captain to see that justice was 'done him. This letter was shown to the plaintiff’, who replied that he had paid Leighton all he had agreed to, and should not pay him another cent. The wife of Leightonalso applied’to the plaintiff’ for a portion of the bounty of her husband, in his hands, stating that the destitution of herself and children was such that she should be qbliged to give them up .to the city, to whom he. replied by advising her to do- so, and gave her nothing.</p> <p>The captain then sent the letter to' the grand jury of the county, at the time sitting upon Leighton’s case. The jury, of course, could not act upon the letter, and its foreman requested the prosecuting.officer to bring it before the court. ■This was accordingly done, the defendant being at the time the presiding justice. The plaintiff was thereupon sent for, and, in open court, his attention was called to the letter, and ' it was' notified to him that on the following "Wednesday then five days distant, his professional conduct and standing at the bar would be considered..</p> <p>At the time designated, he appeared, and showed that, after his citation, he had paid to Leighton the balauee of the four hundred dollars, which Leighton claimed he was entitled to receive. This right of Leighton was never admitted until aftpr the:attention of the court had been directed to the matter. ' •-</p> <p>The court being of opinion that the plaintiff’ took advantage of the situation of Leighton, and obtained from him an agreement, which, under the circumstances, was unconscionable and extortionate, and. therefore grossly unprofessional; that he' had induced Leighton, to enlist by making him believe that his release from the prosecution would be accomplished by his enlistment, and that the money obtained by the enlistment subsequently paid to Leighton was paid only in ■consequence of the inquiry instituted into the professional conduct of the plaintiff', he having previously denied that he was bound to pay anything, found-that he had violated his oath of .office as an attorney-at-law, and was guilty of malpractice aud gross misconduct in his office, and consequently .ordered that he be removed from his office as an attorney-at-la\! within the commonwealth of Massachusetts. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought this suit. The declaration charged the removal to have been made without -lawful authority, and wantonly, arbitrarily, and oppressively.</p> <p>Upon the evidence produced, the court helow instructed' the jury that the action could hot be maintained,'and .that their verdict-should be for the defendant. Such verdict was accordingly rendered, and the plaintiff brought the case here,.</p> <p>The general statutes pf Massachusetts* provide that “an attorney may be removed by. the Supreme Judicial Court or Superior Coqrt, for any' deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct;” and also, that “ a person admitted in any court may practise in every othér court in the State; and there shall be no distinction óf counsellors and attorneys.”</p> <p>The oath required of attorneys on their admission is as follows:</p> <p>“You solemnly'swear that you will do no falsehood,-nor consent to the doing of any in court; you will not wittingly or willingly promote or sno any false, groundless, or unlawful suit, nor.give aid or consent to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but you will conduct yourself in the'office of' an attorney, within the courts, according to the best of your knowledge and discretion, and with all good fidelity as well to the courts as your clients. So help you God.”</p> <p>The Superior Court of Massachusetts is a court of general jurisdiction. Indeed, its jurisdiction is the most general of any court in Massachusetts.†</p> <p>I. The plaintiff's office of attorney-at-law is property. And it has been variously declared by the courts to be a, “license,” a “privilege,” a “franchise,” a “freehold,” a “right to practise law in courts,” a “ profession which is the high road to wealth and distinction.”</p> <p>The grant of the “ office of attorney,” at common law, is the grant of an office for the life, or during the good behavior, of the grantee.</p> <p>In Hurst’s Case,* a mandamus was granted, to restore an attorney to his office, because, declares Lord Holt,</p> <p>“He is an officer concerning'the public justice, and is compellable fo be attorney for any man, and has a freehold in'his jdace.”</p> <p>In Ex parte Garland,† this court says:</p> <p>“ An attorney and counsellor being, by the solemn judicial act of the court, clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor, The right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the command of the legislature. n It is a right of which he can only bo'deprived by the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency.”</p> <p>In Ex parte Austin,‡ Gibson, C. J., delivering, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, thus speaks:</p> <p>“An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court, and his office is an office for life. The grant of an office without express limitation at common law being taken most strongly against the grantor, endures for the life of the grantee; and though the principle has not been applied to offices within the grant of the executive, it must necessarily be applied to the office of attorney. For, to subject the members of the proféssion to removal at the pleasure of the court, would leave them too small a share of the independence necessary to the duties they are called upon to perform to their clients and to the public.' ‘ As a class, they ■ are supposed to be, and, in fact, hate always1 been, the vindicators of individual rights, and thé fearless asisertors of the principles of civil liberty; 'existing, where alone they can exist, in a' government, not of parties or men, but of -laws.”</p> <p>And this view of the dignity of the attorney’s office is supported, by all' authorities:*</p> <p>II. The constitution of Massachusetts ordains as'follows:</p> <p>“No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and .plainly, substantially, and formally¡ described to him. And every subject shall have á right to meet the witnesses against him,, face-to face, and to be fully heard in his defence.” . .' . , .</p> <p>' “ And no subject shall be deprived of his property, immunities, oi; privileges, but by the'judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”</p> <p>■ Alt the common law,’the'words- crime and offence áre used as synonymous and universal terms, and as c.ompi’ehending every act for which- a forfeiture-of any legal right might be worked, or penalty imposed, or punishment inflicted, in any form of judicial proceeding.†</p> <p>The words, the “law of the land,” mean-“due process of law;” and this implies that there shall .be some form of lega] process, sufficient allegations or charge, due notice to t'he party proceeded against, the opportunity to answer to and contest the charge or allegations, and to be heard or tried in a legal and regular course of judicial proceedings, by an impartial judge. And these rights exist in all eases, civil or' criminal, whether by the exercise of á court’s ordinary jurisdiction, with trial by jury, or by the exercise of the discretionary or summary jurisdiction of a court, without the right to trial by jury.*</p> <p>III. At common íaw,.whether a proceeding be criminal or civil, or of a mixed nature, if it has the character-of a judi-' cial .proceeding, some form of-legal process, adapted to the. particular case, must universally be instituted or laid as the foundation of the proceeding, notice of the same- given, and the opportunity presented to the party to make his defence;- and to be legally and regularly tried or heard ere any judgment, or order of forfeiture, or deprivation of any freehold ’ office, or other legal right, can lawfully be effectedAr inflicted; for any purpose, by any tribunal whatsoever; and if, in any essential particular, the proceeding is irregular or defective, the conviction will not be by “due-process of law,” and the’judgment will be a nullity.†</p> <p>IV. “Due process of law,” .in the case of attorneys-at-law, is Jpeld to -require, whatever, may be the form of process 'or mode of procedure, and for whatever cause (invariably jim"ited'to causes involving moral or professional delinquency), that, there shall be a sufficient charge- or allegation in writ- . ing, duly filed of record in court, specifying the .particular ' offence or matter complained of- (usually supported, by the ' oath of' the party preferring the accusation); and-, unless waived of record, written notice served on the.attorney to • show cause why he should not- be removed from his office, , or his name stricken from the roll of attorneys, for the of-fence or matter complained of; and which notice should \ ápécify the time when,, the place .where, and the tribunal before which he is to appear and answer. The attorney is . entitled to a day in court, on which to,make defence, and the trial is vto be conducted like all other trials in summary proceedings at the common law, and the' attorney convicted only if the proofs shall establish or conform to the allegations.*</p> <p>,In numerous cases,† the judgments or orders removing the attorneys from their offices, having been ma(de without “ due process of law,” were declared to be illegal and void (aud were also reversed), by courts having a superintending or appellate-jurisdiction.</p> <p>V. An action on the case may be maintained at common law for the disturbance of a party in the possession and enjoyment of an office, franchise, or other incorporeal right.*</p> <p>It is no objection to the maintenance of a suit simply that it involves a determination of a party’s title to his office.†</p> <p>VI. In an action against a judge of any court, whether of record or otherwise, for any act done by him or by his command, the question in every case to be determined is, ivas the act done a judicial act, done within his-jurisdiction ? If it was not, he can claim-no immunity, or exemption by virtue of his office from liability as a trespasser; “for if he has acted -without jurisdiction, he has ceased to be a judge.’]'.‡</p> <p>I.' Both the admission and removal of attorneys are ju dicial acts.*</p> <p>II.' It is a general principle, applicable to all magistrates, even to those of inferior jurisdiction, that they are not liable to an action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction. In reference to inferior magistrates, it has been said that they are only protected while they act within their jurisdiction.</p> <p>, But in' reference to judges of courts of general jurisdiction, the rule is not thus limited. Such judges are not liable to actions for their judicial acts, whether within or without their jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. The extent of a judge’s jurisdictipn is often the verj¡ question which he is called on judicially to determine. To decide upon this question is-as much a judicial decision-as any .other. And the question, may be a difficult and doubtful one. Yet he is bound to decide, and to decide according to his. judgment. But shall he decide in fear or peril of a lawsuit ?'</p> <p>2. The reason, applicable to inferior magistrates does not apply. There must be some point in the administration of the law where unqualified- confidence is to be reposed and. acknowledged; some ultimate repository of justice, so far as individuals are concerned. In England, the king’s judges occupy this position; the judges of courts, of-'general juris7 diction. To them is delegated- the whole judicial power df , the sovereign; and -they aré responsible to the . sovereign alone.* , As long ago as 1608, in Floyd & Barker’s Case,† it was said:</p> <p>. “ The reason and cause why a judge, for .anything done by him as j.udge, by. the authority which the king' hath committed to him, and as sitting’in the seat of the king (concerning his-justice), shall'not be drawn in question before any other judge, for any surmise of corruption,..except before the king himself,. ,/is for this: the king himself is de jure to deliver justice.td all" his subjects; and for this, that he himself cannot do it to all persons, he delegates his power to his judges,, who have the-custody and guard'of the king’s oath. And forasmuch as this concerns the honor and conscience of the king, there is- great reason that the king himself .shall-take account of it, and.no other.” ■</p> <p>This general doctriné is especially applicable in America, • wberq, by 6ur National and State constitutions, judicial power is vested exclusively in the .courts. . The duties of a. judge are public duties imposed by law. He must perform them. If he acts corruptly or .incompetently, he may be impeached.' And in Massachusetts, he may be removed by the governor, with consent of the council,'upon the address of both houses ' of the legislature.</p> <p>It is inconsistent with - the nature .and true theory of the judicial functions,.that an’action should lie against a superior judge, for any judicial act, even though in excess of his jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The very foundation pf this-principle is to protect judges when they have erred, If they have -decided rightly, they need' no protection; for the correctness of their decision will vindicate them.. To secure the maximum of impartiality, a judge must be protected from personal responsibility,for his errors,. if he happens to make any. It would be absurd to say that he should receive the protection of the law only in those cases where.no protection is required.*</p> <p>Accordingly, for more than five hundred years, by a uni•foirm series of decisions, judges have been held exempt from personal responsibility for their j udicial words and acts.†</p> <p>Consider the results which would follow from a contrary doctrine. Suppose that the defendant consulted several of his associates, who all concurred with him, or suppose that two or more of the justices acted together upon this matter, and that they nevertheless came to a wrong decision, would all be liable in damages? If so, should they be sued jointly or severally? In case one dissented, should he be held liable with the rest, or should he, by reasou of his dissent, be exonerated, and-the rest held liable? This would be to offer a bounty on dissent. Suppose the case was carried by appeal,.or otherwise, before another tribunal, which ratified the doings of the’first, and yet this court should think both tribunals mistaken, should the justices of the higher tribunal be also liable in damages? And if so, should they be sued ■separately, or jointly with the justices of the Superior Court? Are the justices of the Supreme J udicial Court of Massachusetts, who held that the doings.of defendant, now sued, were, in all respects, conformable to the constitution and laws,.also liable in damages? If so, before w]iat tribunal should they be sued? If small damages were claimed, would a justice of the peace, or a judge of inferior jurisdiction', have authority to entertain the case,- and pass upon the question Whether his superior judges acted and decided rightly ,or wrongly ? It cannot be that ’such is the law! “ There is no court,” it was said in Le Caux v. Eden,* “ equal to the trial of a superior judge.” "Were the law otherwise (to use the-words of Lord Stair†), “no man but a beggar.or a fool would be a judge.”</p> <p>This question does not depend upon' reasoning alone. . Tim case of Ackerley v. Parkinson‡ is in point, and oth'er cases are to the same effect.§</p>

This was a motion,: made by Mr. J. H. Bradley, to dismiss a writ of error directed to the Supreme Court of the State of California, on the. ground that the citation had Been signed by a district judge, which the record showed was the fact.

Circuit Court for tbe Eastern District of Louisiana. 'The case was’this-: During the late civil war the city.of New Orleans.was in military occupation of the United States forces, and .most of the neighboring, eottonyegion around, in military possession of rebel en emi.es. , ■ .. ' 1 ■ ■ In this state of things, a circular of the treasury, of July 3, Í863) declared it. to be the intention of that department - to allow no intercourse at all beyond the national and within the…

During the late rebellion, one Anderson, by a proceeding in what was known as “ the Provisional Court of Louisiana” —a court established by proclamation of the President, in October, 1862, when the insurrection which had prevailed in Louisiana, had temporarily subverted and swept away the judicial authorities of the Union, and -which, by the terms of its constitution, was to last only until “ the restoration of the civil authority” — brought some sort of suit against one.

Upon two separate motions to dismiss an appeal' from the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana; the decree being one transferred there, under act of Congress, from the late so-called “ Provisional Court” of that'State; both motions being made by Mr. Durant.

■ In this case, which came on error to the Circuit Court for, Louisiana, it appeared that the only ruling of the court, to be found in the record, .was a judgment rendered in favor, of plaintiff for the recovery of a sum of mouey.

. Error to the Circuit Court for the-Northern District of Illinois. Cooper sued Laber in the court below. His declaration contained ttyo counts upon a promissory note, made by Laber to a certain'railroad company, or its order, and indorse’d, as was alleged, to the plaintiff. It contained also the common Counts. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and three special pleas.

This was a motion by Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, to docket aud dismiss. It appeared'from the certificate of tbe clerk of the Circuit' Coqrt of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, that on the 9th of, January, 1868, a decree of condemnation was entered in the district Court for the condemnation of the Alicia and her cargo, for violation of the blockade.

This was a motion for writs of supersedeas to the Supreme Court of, the District of Columbia to stay execution upon two judgments recovered in that court,-one'by. Harris, against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and the. other by his administratrix, against the same defendant. The first judgment was for injuries sustained by Harris, when a .passenger on the defendant’s railroad.

Motions to dismiss and for supersedeas, pn an appeal from ■ tbo Supreme Court-of the District of Columbia. ■ The case-was thus: The Washington, Georgetown, and-Alexandria Railroad Company had filed, in 1863, a bill' to enjoin the City ¿f Washington and 7. and A. Bradley, trustees, from making sale of certain property conveyed by the company in mortgage to the said Bradleys as trustees, and-UDder .which the Bradleys were about to sell the property to pay the mortgage debt.

By fin act of Congress of August-6th, 1861, property used in fiid of the rebellion was made the lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found; and it was made the duty of the President of the United States to cause the same to be seized, confiscated, and condemned.

Held: though not unanimously, that the case was exceptional iu its character, and that cognizance of the. question certified might be properly taken. It may be doubted whether, in this instance, the exception made to the general rule was quite warranted by the principle established in prior decisions. In the latter ease of The United States v. Reid & Clements, ‡ the point of jurisdiction upon certificate was not noticed.

■ The process formerly in use in the production of yarn from wool, was by a set of carding engines, a' billy and a jenny; a series usually consisting of three carding machines, commholy called a first breaker, a second breaker, and a finisher, one billy and two jennies, sometimes two double carding machines being used instead of three single carding machines. ■ The wool was fed to the first carding machine, called the first breaker, on a feed table, and was doffed off the…

' ''In 1858, the legislature of Wisponsin authorized the town, ' óf Beloit to issue Its coupon bonds for the benefit of a eer-i ■tain''railroad.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for 'Wisconsin.</p> <p>In 1853, the legislature of Wisconsin authorized the town of Beloit to- subscribe to the' stock of a railroad company, and to pay therefor in bonds of the town. The town subscribed and issued its bonds, a portion of which came to the -hands of one Morgan, a bond fide purchaser.</p> <p>In 1856, the legislature created the city of Beloit, this city being carved out of a portion of the territory which had constituted the town of Beloit. The charter of the new city thus provided':</p> <p>“ All -principal and interest upon all bonds which have heretofore been issued by the town of Beloit, . . . shall-be paid when the same or any portion thereof shall fall due, by the city and town of Beloit, in the same proportions as if said town and city were not dissolved. And in case either town or city shall pay more than their just and equal portion of the same at any time, the other party shall be liable therefor.”</p> <p>This provision was re-enacted in 1857.-</p> <p>After the date of this act, and between it and 1867 inclusive — the interest on the bonds being unpaid for every year ' after 1854 — Morgan brought several suits, in the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, against “the town of Beloit,” for the interest due-for the years respectively, and on the 25th of September, 1867, got judgment against the town for it. The judgments being -unpaid, he now filed a bill in the court below against the town and city of Beloit. The bill set forth - facts above stated, alleged that the “ amount of said judgments ought to be paid by said defendants in the proportions respectively as provided in the said acts;” that the taxable property of the city exeeedéd that of the town; and that though the city “ ought to pay the proportion provided in the acts,” yet that the complainant was remediless at law. It then showed, by tabular exhibit, the amount of the interest due on the bonds held by him, in each year respectively, from 1855 . to 1867; then by like exhibit the proportion in value, which, taking the rates of assessment made in each year as a basis, the taxable property of what was now the town bore to what was now the city, in every year, from' 1855 to 1867; then showed, by similar exhibit, that, taking these relative ex-' hibits, the town would be liable on the couponé for each respective year for so much and the city for so much, the' balance, namely; the whole making, with interest from the date of the' judgments Obtained (which the bill alleged “ ought to be paid by the said town and city respectively ”), the sum, of $60,448, as against the city, and $17,986, as against the town;</p> <p>After alleging that' “ the city and town ought respectively to pay interest” on the respective'total amounts; from thp day when-the judgments were obtained till the actual payment of them, and “ought' each.to pay-one-half the costs' recovered in-the judgments,’’ the bill concluded thus:</p> <p>“To the end, therefore, that-the,said defendants may, if they can, show why yo'ur orator should not have the relief hereby' prayed, and may’upon oath, &e. . .. and that your orator may have such other and further relief as the nature o'f his .case may require, and as shall be agreeable to equity .and good conscience.”</p> <p>Prayer for subpoena, &e.</p> <p>The defendants (town and city) demurred, and the bill was dismissed. Appeal accordingly.</p> <p>• The complainant was clearly entitled to some remedy, against the'city for its proportion of the debt, and the\question is, what was the appropriate remedy ?</p> <p>On bonds given' by the town, a joint action at law could not be-maintained against the town and city.* To an action at,law against the city alone, the plea.of non est factum would be true'in fact and fatal in law. If any action at,law coulct be maintained against the city, it would be debt founded on the statute. But there would be the difficulty of settling, as between the city and the town, the proportion which each ought to pay, in an action where the town was not a party. This consideration alone gives a court of equity jurisdiction. If the town were compelled to pay the whole debt, it would be entitled, by the express provisions of the statute, to an action against the city for its,proportion. Circuity of actions j — that which courts desire to prevent — is therefore avoided by maintaining a suit in equity against both. A court of equity is the only tribunal that can render complete justice between all the parties.</p> <p>The bill is without any prayer for special relief. What, indeed, is its object? Is, it for a declaratory decree1 of the proportions in which the judgments should be paid by the city and town, leaving the plaintiff'to his mandamus to enforce a tax accordingly ? Or is it for a decree- awarding execution against the defendants? No one can tell. ■ The omission to make the .proper prayer is fatal. . Even under the d'augéroüs .and inconvenient rule, held in a few cases, that a prayer for general relief is sufficient, and’ -that the special relief may be prayed jbr at the bar, on hearing, the bill must indicate by its frame the special relief sought, which this bill does not. But this court has wisely abrogated that rule, and by its twenty-first rule in'equity, provides that “the prayer of the bill shall ask the special • relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled, and also shall contain a prayer for general relief.”</p> <p>On merits, the case is not good. Though equity is liberal in the adaptation of her remedies, she does not give a remedy' to every party merely because he is in difficulty, nor unless his difficulty be covered by some specific, ground of equitable'jurisdiction. Here there is an adequate legal remedy by mandamus. It may be a troublesome remedy. But ■ he has it. And equity will not devise a new ground of ju- , fisdiction because a speculator in town bonds is unlucky in h’s legal remedies.</p> <p>The prayer is-, in effect, a prayer for both special and general relief. But if it were for general relief alone, that would be sufficient, upon the facts stated in the bill.*</p>

Held: that this made bonds issued by the town valid, assuming that previously to the act they were not so. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wisconsin.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Alabama.</p> <p>The case was thus: The Constitution ordains that the judicial power of the United States shall exteud “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Add the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that the District Courts of'the United States</p> <p>“ Shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, . ." saving tó suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law i-s competent to give it.” '</p> <p>In this state .of Federal law, fundamental and statutory, the State of Alabama, by enactments, entitled “Proceedings in. Admiralty,”* provided that there should be a lien on all vessels for work and materials done or furnished, and for all debts contracted by the master, owner or consignee, and for the wages of1 the officers, crew, &c., 'in preference to other debts due from the owners thereof. ■ By the temis of the code, the lien is to be„ asserted by filing a complaint’ in any county in yrhich the vessel may be found, stating the amount and nature of the claim,'and práying a seizure of the vessel. .Thereupon the clerk is to issue a writ commanding the sheriff to seize the vessel, her tackle, apparel 'and furniture. At a'ny time before judgment, the master, owner "or other'persons may release the vessel by-entering into bond in double the amount of the claim, stipulating to pay-the amount of the judgment. Any number of persons may unite in the same complaint, and if more than onfeyomplaiut be filed the court must consolidate them, and render but one judgment against the vessel, which is to be considered several as to each complainant. If a stipulation be entered into, the stipulators are defendants. If none, the court must render a judgment ex parte condemning the boat, tackle, &c., to be sold in satisfaction of the claim; and the affidavit of complainant is made presumptive evidence of the justice of the demand.</p> <p>Finally, the code provides that, “ unless where otherwise provided in this chapter, the proceedings to enforce the lien shall be the same as in the courts of admiralty of the United States, but either party may have any question of fact decided, by a jury, upon an issue made up under direction of the court.”</p> <p>By the act of 7th October, 1864, “ to amend thie admiralty laws of the State,” these provisions are extended to the contract of affreightment.</p> <p>Under this statute, Boone & Co. filed their libel, March 30, 1866, in the City Court of Mobile, claiming $5800 for the loss of certain bales of cotton, shipped to them from Vienna, in the Stale of Alabama, to Mobile, in the same State, and prayed “process in admiralty ” for the seizure of the steam-bout Belfast.</p> <p>In the same court a libel was also filed by J. & S. Steers, claiming compensation fin other bales, shipped by them from Columbus, Mississippi, to Mobile, in Alabama, already mentioned. Aid a libel by Watson & Co. claiming it for cottoi shipped by them, from and to the same points.</p> <p>• All the navigation which was the subject of the case, was upon the Tombigbee River, navigable water of the United' States.</p> <p>Under these several libels, the sheriff, by virtue of writs of seizure, took the steamer into possession, and posted his monitions, and the causes, under the statute, were consolidated and heard together. The answer, applicable to the three cases alike, set forth that the steamer was duly enrolled and licensed, in pursuance of laws of the United States, and that on the 15th January, 1866, she was regularly cleared at Mobile, Alabama, for Columbus, Mississippi, and that on her downward trip the cotton claimed was lost, and therefore, that the City Court had no jurisdiction.</p> <p>A decree was rendered on 28th July, for the three libellants. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama, where one assignment of errors was: “That the City Court erred in overruling the protest to the jurisdiction.” The decree of the City Court was, however, affirmed by the Supreme Court; and deciding, as that court thus did, in favor of the validity of a statute of a State drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the laws of the United States, the case was brought here under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.</p> <p>Not much contesting the point that if the court had no jurisdiction in the two cases where the carriage was not-wholly within one State no agreement below could authorize what it did about these two (jurisdiction being of ' course to be conferred by the law alone), the matter of debate was reduced, here, chiefly to the first case, that, namely, of Boone & Co., where the whole carriage was within the State of Alabama, aud to the question of constitutional law’ arising upon it, to wit:</p> <p>Whether the contract, made as it was, for the transportation of goods from one place to another, both in the same State, and without the goods being carried in transitu, into or through any other State or foreign dominion, was a contract which could be enforced by a proceeding in admiralty n the Federal courts alone ?</p> <p>If the State court had no jurisdiction in that case, a fortiori, it could have none in the two others.</p> <p>It is ■ matter of uiiiversal knowledge, that the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts has undergone several changes since the establishment of this governmént, and we need not discuss at all the familiar cases of The Thomas Jefferson,* Waring v. Clarke,† The Lexington,‡ The Genesee Chief,§ and some others of a past day. Whether they be all reconcil- . able or not, is unimportant now. The only thing important to be inquired into by us now, is the judgment of this court, as settled in, its most recent decisions, determining the character and limit of the admiralty jurisdiction. And we have here two leading cases on this point. In The Moses Taylor,ǁ the action was on a contract for personal transportation. The court held that this was a maritime contract '; that it was not distinguishable from a contract for the transportation of freight, and that the breach of either is. the appropriate subject of ' admiralty jurisdiction.</p> <p>And, further, that the clause of the Judiciary Act, which saves to suitors a common law remedy, does not save,a proceeding in rem, as used in the admiralty courts. Such a proceeding not being a remedy afforded by the common law.</p> <p>In The Hine v. Trevor,¶ the action was for a collision occurring on the Mississippi, near St. Louis. The record “ raised distinctly the question how far the .jurisdiction in admiralty was exclusive, and to what extent the State courts could exercise a concurrent jurisdiction,” and, owing to the importance of the principles involved, the “case was held under advisement for some time, in order that every consideration which could influence the result might be deliberately weighed.” The .court affirm the judgment given in The Moses Taylor, and reassert the doctrine declared in the ease of The Genesee Chief, that the “ principles of admiralty ju* risdictiou, as-conferred on the Federal courts by the Constitution, extend wherever ships float, and navigation successfully aids commerce, whether internalor external.” It further'declares that-the grant of this power under the act of 1789, is exclusive not only of all other Federal courts, but of all other' State courts, and, therefore, State statutes which confer upon State courts a remedy for marine torts and, marine contracts, by proceeding strictly in rem, are void.</p> <p>The provisions of the Alabama code are those of the acts quoted in the above rece'nt cases, and are subject to the same, condemnation. Judgment, therefore,, must be reversed.</p> <p>1. The case arose in, and concerned alone, the internal commerce of the State of Alabama, and therefore it was one with which the laws of that State only could deal. It lay wholly beyond the region of Federal powers. And it is quite unimportant in what form, or by .what system of pleading and evidence, the State might provide a remedy in such a case. The mere form cannot affect the substance. If the power exercised be one belonging to the State, and not to the Federal government, it does not concern the Federal government whether it be exercised in one form or another';, or' whether the proceeding be called a libel in admiralty, a bill in equity, or an action at common law; whether given by modern statute, or to be found in the Year Books.*</p> <p>2. The particular remedy given by the Alabama statute, ..and adopted in these cases, is within the saving in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act. "What is meant, as well in the act of 1789, as in the Constitution itself, by the “ common law,” has been settled by this court. The language of the seventh amendment is:</p> <p>“In suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”</p> <p>The language of the ninth section, and that just quoted, is obviously used in the same sense. Now in Parsons v. Bedford,* the court say:</p> <p>“By ‘common law,’ the framers of the amendment meant what the Constitution denominated in the third article ‘law;’ not merely sujts, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to-those where equitable rights' ,¿lone were .recognized, and equitable remedies were administered; or where, as in admiralty, a mixture of public law and of maritime law and equity were often found in the same suit. Probably there were few, if any, States in the Union in which some new legal remedies; differing from the old common law forms, were not in use; but in which, however, the tria1 by jury intervened, and the general regulations in other respects were according to the course of the common law. Proceedings in cases of partition and foreign and domestic attachment might be cited as examples variously adopted and modified.”</p> <p>To show that the case at bar is a “ civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’’.shows nothihg to the purpose, if it also appear that there was a common law .remedy at the option of thé suitors, and that they elected that remedy. They .are the very person’s who under the statute had the right,to do. so.</p> <p>It is not necessary to make a case one at common law, that the suit be begun by the service of process, or- by actually bringing into court, in any other w'ay, the party whose rights are to be affected by the proceeding. A defendant may be .brought into court as well by seizing his property, and bringing it into court, under circumstances giving him plain and reasonable notice of the cause of its seizure. If the statute makes provision for his personal appearance, and a day is given to him in court, with the right of trial by jury, then it is as much a common law case as if it had begun by a capias ad respondendum, instead of a seizure of his property. And, on the other hand, though the suit be begun by a capias, and proceeded in throughout according to the most. exact forms of a common law suit in all things but one, to wit, the trial by jury, if that be denied, it is, no true case at common law. It is this distinctive quality alone which the Constitution guarantees and- preserves from all innovation. And there is no instance- in this court in which, where the subject-matter was 'the adjudication of purely legal rights,, and the right of -the'trial by jury has been “preserved,” in-which the case'has been treated as other, than a. common law - ease, whether a concurrent remedy existed, either in admi- ■ ralty or in equity-, or' not, and whatever may have been the mere form of the--proceedings.</p> <p>The Hiñe v. Trevorjano exception to this rule. There, as the report shows, there was, and could be, no jury trial. The Iowa statute, on which that ease rested, made np provision to protect the owner of the vessel, and afforded him no opportunity, by his personal appearance, of converting the proceeding into a common law trial by jury. The proceeding' was begun, continued, and ended, and could only be so, as a civil law proceeding in rem.</p>

The case was this: Au act of Congress, “ providing for the recording of eonveyances of vessels,and for other purposes,” and passed July 29th, 1850,* thus enacts : “Ho bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of any vessel, or part of any vessel of the United States, shall be valid against any person other than the grantor Or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof, unless such bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or…

Held: consequently, tHab the helms of both vessels ought to have been put to port, as provided for in ' such contingencies by the said article, so that each rnight have passed on the port side of the other. And a vessel which, in such circumstance's, put her helm a starboard, and was run down and sunk by the other vessel, was held to have no claim on' her for damages: 4.

Appeals from the Court of Claims. The facts, as found by that court, were thus: Bussell, Majors & Waddell had contracts-for supplies and transportation, to be furnished to the army in "Utah. By tírese contracts, they were to be paid either by the quartermaster at St. Louis,, or by his drafts on the assistant treasurer- of the United States in New York.

Whitely filed, a bill against Swayne, in the Circuit Court for Southern Ohio, to enjoin the use of a certain machine' known as the Kirbey .Harvester. As the case was presented in the argument, he relied upon ‘ a patent granted to one Steadman, May 23,1854, for an im-' provement in clover and grass-seed harvesters, which had ■ been'assigned to him (Whitely), and surrendered, and three reissues granted to him on the 19th June, 1860.

Held: First. That by the true construction of the contract and supplement, the United States were to pay to Garrison the' same price'the-Ordnance Department had previously agreed to pay him for guns of like quality and description. Second.

The Bank of Mobile brought suit in the court belovi against one'James, on bill .of exchange. The-record of the case, as sent here,'contained nothing but the declaration; the plea of the general issue; the proof of protest of the bill of exchange, indorsed by the defendant, and notice to him of nonpayment, and judgment of the court in favor of'the plaintiff. There was no bill of exceptions-, and nothing upon which error could be assigned.

In this case — a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the. District of Columbia — no authenticated transcript of the record had been filed. That which purported to be a transcript contained only a blank form of a certificate of authentication, without the seal o,f the eoúrt below or the signature of its clerk.

Held: by persons resident and liable to taxation in said city or town, in the valuation of the personal property of such person,, for the assessment of all taxes imposed and levied in said town by authority of law, to.be assessed,” &e. *696 In this condition of the statutes,'Federal and State, the assessors of Boston valued and assessed the bank shares of Austin, living in Boston, and being the owner of stock in six…

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the U.S. in 1869. The case's notable political dispute involved a claim by the Reconstruction era government of Texas that U.S. bonds owned by Texas since 1850 had been illegally sold by the Confederate state legislature during the American Civil War. The state filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court, given that, under the Constitution, that institution has original jurisdiction on certain cases in which a state is a party.

The grant purported to have been made on the 2d of May, 1846, by Pio Pico; Moreno being secretary ad interim; this court having decided that, after the 7th July, 1846, Pico had no powers as governor.