Volume 75 — United States Reports

Held: in most respects, for enemies. To the extent, then, of actual supremacy, however unlawfully gained, in all matters of government within its military lines, the power of the insurgent government cannot be questioned. That supremacy did not justify acts of hostility to the United States. How far it should excuse them must be left to the lawful government upon the re-establishment of its authority.

A bill had been .filed below to set aside a deed of land for fraud and inadequate consideration. The allegations of fraud were founded wholly upon the circumstance, that the land was sold for Confederate notes. The bill set up also a lien In favor of the vendor of the complainant.

Held: “that.when a collision occurs in an English port, the rights of the parties depend on the lawT in force at th.at place.” 2. In. addition to these points’-of general law, it should be noted that neither the tug, brig, or barge had the proper *19 characteristics to bring'them within the act of 1845.

In 1837, he sold the land to Edwin Lacy, and receiving payment in full for it, executed and delivered to Lacy, at the time, a regular deed. This deed, however, was never recorded,, and at Lacy’s death, in 1848, his family had no information respecting the deed, or the location of the land. Lacy left one son and only heir named Andrew.

” A subsequent statute,† one of the 26th August, in the same year, enacts by its twelfth section, as follows: “ That no allowance or compensation shall bo made to any clerk or other officer, by reason of the discharge of duties which belong to any other clerk in the same or any other department; and no allowance or compensation shall be ma.do for any extra services whátever, which any clerk or other officer may bo required to perform.” With these two enactments in force,…

Appear from the Court of Claims, the case being thus: In 1859, and subsequently, Reeside made certain contracts with the Postmaster-General to carry the mail until 30th-June, 1862, over certaip parts of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

Held: that it made no difference whether the debtor had the notes in his possession when the repealing act was passed or not. It will thus he seen that Woodruff v. Trapnall, and this case, in all important features, are alike. .

Held: Dean, a citizen of New York (the present appellee, and a large stockholder in the-old company), filed-.a bill in this case, in the court below, against the new company, and also against the city of.

Held: 1st. That the Secretary of "War,, through the Commissary-General, might authorize such a contract to be made without a resort to the advertisement and bids proposed. 2d. That the letter of the Commissary-General was a virtual approval of the contract. 3d. That the contract was an engagement on the part of the United States to furnish 50,000 hogs to the claimant, to slaughter and pack at the stipulated price, and…

Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the court held that, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus.

. Williams did not so transport them, but took them to Louisiana, and was there indicted, convicted, and sentenced to a heavy fine, under a statute of Louisiana, for bringing negroes convicted of crimes into that State. The negroes themselves, however, were not confiscated, but were sold by Williams for a large sum, to bo thereafter received.

Held: Marshall, C. J., giving the

Held: by a unanimous bench, that the tax fell within the terms of the prohibition. As in this case, so in -that, the transportation was between States: it was from the State of California to the State of New York. The transaction had no relation to commerce with any foreign nation. It was between two States; they alone were concerned. - The transaction was an export from one State to another State.

The case was this: With the same provisions of the Constitution as are quoted in the last case in force {supra, p. 128) the State of Alabama passed a statute, approved"-February 22d, 1866, which, by its 13th section, enapted: “ Before it shall be lawful for any dealer or dealers in spirituous liquors to offer any such liquors for sale within the limits of chis State, such dealer or dealers introducing any such liquors into the State for sale shall first pay the tax-collector…

On the 81st of October, 1860, two parties, owners of it, shipped on board the propeller Mohawk, the vessel being then at Chicago, and as was admitted in a stipulation of record, “ in good and seaworthy, condition,” two consignments of wheat, amounting to 20,200 bushels, to be delivered atBuffalo in good-order aiid condition, dangers of navigation excepted, upon- payment of freight and charges.

McKee. The case was this: Congress, by act of July 13th, 1861,† passed soon after the outbreak of the late insurrection against the United States, enacted that it might, be lawful for the President, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of any State or part of a State where such insurrection was existing were in a state of such insurrection, and that “ thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and citizens thereof and citizens of the rest of the…

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869), is a U.S. corporate law decision by the United States Supreme Court. It held that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Of greater consequence, the Court further held that "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce," effectively removing the business of insurance beyond the United States Congress's legislative reach (until partially overturned in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association).

The case, which depended in part on statutes, regulations of the treasury, and a proclamation of the President, was thus: 'Acts of 1861 and 1863. By act of July 13th, 1861, section 5, “all commercial intercourse” by and between States declared in insurrection and the citizens thereof, and the citizens of the rest of the United States, was declared unlawful, except such as should be licensed by the President, and conducted under the regulations made by the Treasury Department.

Held: i. That Seymour took the legal title in trust for the purposes specified; that is, to sell the property within the time limited, and, after deducting from the proceeds the outlay, with interest and'taxes, to‘pay over to Price onc-half of the residue; and that, to this extent, Seymour was a trustee, and Price the cestui que trust. ii.

Lockwood, assignee of the inventors, filed a bill in the court just named to restrain Morey and others from infringing letters patent granted to Charles H. and Herman E. Davidson, on the 31st of March, 1857, for a new and useful improved syringe; and which were surrendered and reissued on the 25th day of April, 1865, with an amended specification. The dit hsam below presents a sectional view of the instrument; now'commonly called The Davidson Syringe.

Held: let it be the pork.” On the 20th March, Drakely & Fenton write: “As the market is now we cannot estimate the entire shipments of McCabe & Co. to a figure any greater than we now have in them; and had the business been consummated, as we originally hoped, we should no doubt ere this have been compelled to ask for a margin.” *251 On the 29th March, acknowledging the receipt of it, Gregg & Hughes speak of an…

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p> <p>The case as found by that court was thus:</p> <p>Gibbons entered into a contract with the United States for the delivery of two hundred thousand bushels of oats within thirty days from the date of the contract.</p> <p>He delivered a portion of the oats, and was ready and' offered to deliver the residue within the thirty days, but was prevented by the officers of the United States from so doing; they would not receive it, because they had not convenient storehouses for it.</p> <p>Subsequently to this refusal, the quartermaster having charge of the contract on the part of the United States, sent an “orderly” to Gibbons, requesting his immediate presence with the messénger at the quartermaster’s office. This was understood by Gibbons to be an arrest. About the same time, notice ivas given'to him, that he must deliver the residue of the oats specified in the contract under penalty of a purchase in open market; the difference of cost to be charged to him. The quartermaster at this time held a large sum of, money in his hands, the price of grain before that time delivered. Gibbons remonstrated, contending that the contract was at an end. Influenced, however, by the above-mentioned assumption of power, and by the threats used, or by some reason, he did deliver the quantity of oats sufficient to make in all the amount specified in the contract.</p> <p>By .this time oats had advanced in price, and the price which Gibbons was compelled to pay in the market to get them, .exceeded the amount paid to him by the government, as hé alleged, 8f and 12 cents per bushel.</p> <p>Gibbons was compelled to pay $333 demurrage on certain vessels which were laden with a portion of the oats, and which were detained by the government officers in receiving the cargoes.</p> <p>On final settlement with the quartermaster, he was charged for 8000 bushels of oats purchased by the quartermaster in open market, after the expiration of the coiitract, at an advanced cost of 12 cents per bushel. This money was detained from him.</p> <p>On this case, the Court of Claims, — upon the petition of Gibbons setting .forth a claim for the difference, 8f- and 12 bents per bushel, in the price of oats, delivered after the expiration of his contract, for demurrage, “foi; damages sustained by failure of the government to'receive oats under contract, at the time of delivery, $400,” and for the money detained, but not alleging anything about duress, — thus announced its conclusions in law:</p> <p>“ The obligation on the part of the government under the contract to receive the oats when they were offered, was as strong as the obligation to deliver. The plaintiff-was not bound under a continuing obligation, and as he had made a reasonable offer, which was improper^ refused, that put an end to the contract, and he was released from his obligation by the conduct of the government. The officers who threatened him-had no authority to compel him to deliver the oats, and the threats used were superserviceable and improper. If he was so unwise as to submit to the unauthorized menaces of the quartermaster, he must take the consequences. - Hence, he cannot recover the 'difference.in price between that named in the contract, and that ruling in market after its expiration.</p> <p>“ Nor can the government withhold from the sum justly due to the plaintiff, any difference which was paid for oats purchased after the expiration of the contract exceeding the price fixed by it.</p> <p>“ Therefore, the plaintiff should recover the sum withheld at the time of settlement; also the demurrage.”</p> <p>Judgment being entered accordingly, Gibbons, claimant in the case, appealed to this court.</p>

Held: that where the language of an instrument expresses imperfectly or obscurely an obligation, which it plainly appears to the court, the party intended thereby to assume, his obscure or imperfect language shall be construed to impose upon him the obligation which he intended it should impose upon him; and in some cases, this principle of supplying defects or imperfections in the language used in an instrument for the…

Held: that by tho terms upon which the purchaser look tho property at the marshal’s sale, and the stipulations contained in the marshal’s deed accepted by him and placed on record, he assumed to pay the amount due on Hoa’s mortgage, and could not, therefore, avoid compliancivwith his contract, in this respect, on the ground that Hoa’s mortgage had, in fact, at the *293 time, lost its priority by not being reinscribed,…

This was a case of collision between the schooner Loon and the steamer Carroll, which occurred on the waters of Chesapeake Bay.

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, condemning the schooner Lucy, the case being this: An act of Congress of 1803* prescribes the circumstances under which appeals are allowed from the District to the Circuit Courts, and from these last to this court.

The suit was brought by the Territory against Mandelbaum and Klauber, in a District Court, to recover from them the amount of certain taxes, which the county assessor had assessed, upon property alleged to be theirs, to wit: upon goods in a store in Carson City, of the assessed value of $70,000; upon twenty tons of hay, at. $800; upon goods in store at Kinkcad & Harrington’s, at $6500; upon timber for a barn, at $600; and upon one hundred tons of hay in Mr. Ormsby.’s…

On. motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas, in a case in which one Iieyburu had filed an amended bill in equity against Jeremiah Clark, and Florinda his wife, and also against one Few, to foreclose a mortgage given by Clark^and wife to him, Rey burn, on certain land then owned by them, and afterwards conveyed by. them to the said Few, in trust for Mrs. Clark, during her life, .and for the children of herself and of her then husband after her death.</p>

had libelled the propeller Lady Franklin, for non-delivery of certain flour.

<p>1. Constructions of statutes, in relation to the accounts of individuals with the United States, made by the accounting officers of the Treasury, especially when so long continued as to become a rule of departmental practice, are entitled to great consideration, and will in general be adopted by. this court.</p> <p>2. But when, after-such a construction of a particular class of statutes has been long continued,, its application to a recent statute of the same clfiss is prohibited by Congress, and following the spirit of that prohibition, the accounting officers refuse to apply the disapproved construction toa still later statute of the same class, this court will not enforce its application.</p> <p>3. The act of June 20th, 1864, increasing the pay of private soldiers in the army, eannbt be construed as having the effect of increasing the allowance to officers for servants’ pay.</p>

On motion to dismiss ‘an appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District, of Pennsylvania. The case was thus: In August, 1865, the American Wood-paper Company filed a bill in the court below to enjoin Ileft, Dixon, and other defendants, against infringing certain patents owned by the company for improvements in paper-making; these patents, including one to Watt & Burgess, granted on the 2d July, 1854, the other to- M. A. Miller, on the 26th May, 1857.

This was an appeal from a decree of the District Court of California, approving a survey of a confirmed Mexicali land claim. There were two grants issued by the Mexican government to the claimant.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska. The case, which involved two distinct subjects, one of jurisdiction and the other of merits, was thus:</p> <p>I. Ns to the matter of jurisdiction. This again involved two different points.</p> <p>An act of 1847* provided, that in all cases of Federal character and jurisdiction commenced.in the Superior Courts of the Territory of Florida, and the Court of Appeals of that Territory, after the 3d of March, 1845, “in which judgments or decreeawere rendered, or which are claimed to have been since pending there, in the records and proceedings thereof, and the judgment and decrees therein, are hereby transferred to the District Court of the United States for the District of Florida.” The provisions of the act were made at. the time applicable to cases pending in the then new State of Michigan, and by an act of 1848,* were afterwards extended to ■ courts of the then new State of Iowa. Neither Florida, Michigan, nor Iowa were, at the time of becoming States, attached to any judicial circuit of the United States.</p> <p>This last act, the act of 1848, declares that the provisions of the act of 1847 shall apply to all cases which may be pending in the Supreme, or other Superior Court of my Territory of the United States which may be admitted as a State, at the time of its admission. ' With these acts in force, Kountze Brothers brought suit in a District Court of the Territory of Nebraska against the United States Express Company. The declaration described the plaintiffs as “ an association of persons not incorporated, formed for the purpose of carrying on the banking business at Omaha, Nebraska, and who were, at the time the cause of action arose, and still were engaged in said business at Omaha,” and described the defendants as “ a foreign corporation formed under and created by the laws of the State of New York.”</p> <p>The answer and a replication being filed prior to the 3d of July, 1867, the proceedings while thus in fieri, were on that day — Nebraska having- now become a Slate of the Union — brought and filed by the plaintiffs in tlié Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p> <p>Nebraska, as a Territory, was, at the time of her admission to the Union, attached to the eighth judicial circuit of the Uidted Slates.</p> <p>• II. Ns to the merits. The suit was brought to recover from the Express Company, as common carriers, the value of certain gold dust which they had undertaken to forward from Omaha to Philadelphia.</p> <p>The dust had been delivered to the company, for the transportation just mentioned, on the 29th of September, 1864, and was one of regular series of consignments, running through a term of more than eighteen mouths, The receipt given for it was the ordinary receipt of the company. It set forth, that it had been expressly agreed, that the company should not be liable “for any loss o.r damage by fire, the acts of God, or the enemies of the government; mobs, riots, insurrections, or pirates, or from any of the dangers incident to a tim.e of war.”</p> <p>There were two routes used by the company to convey their property.- One was across the State, of Iowa,“and the other to St. Joseph, Missouri, and thence across that State by the Hannibal Railroad. The latter route was the most expeditious, but the former was the safest, as the rebellion was in progress at this time, and Missouri, although adhering to the Union, was infested with predatory rebels, as well as with more regular bodies of the Confederate troops.</p> <p>The gold dust was conveyed by the St. Joseph route, and the company was robbed of it, by a band of armed men, while it was in transit across the State.</p> <p>On the trial, the plaintiffs testified that they gave notice to. the agent of the company not to send their gold dust by the St. Joseph route; though there was testimony, also, that tended to prove that -this notice was not until after the robbery of this particular gold.</p> <p>No exception was taken, on the'trial, to the admission or rejection of evidence, and the only subject for review here was the charge given by the court to the jury. The court instructed the jury only on a single.point, that of negligence. The jury were told substantially that, although the contract was legally sufficient to restrict the liability of the defendant as a common carrier, yet, if the defendant was guilty of actual negligence, it was responsible. And that it was chargeable with negligence, unless it exercised the care and prudence of a prudent man in his own affairs. The Express Company requested the court to charge the jury that it was not liable, unless grossly negligent.</p> <p>The jury having found for the plaintiffs, and the judgment having.gone accordingly, the present writ of error was taken.</p> <p>•The case being thus, here the grounds asserted for reversal were:</p> <p>I. As to jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Because there was bo statutory authority for removal, into the Circuit Court.</p> <p>2. Because there was no. such averments of citizenship as to bring the casewithin the provision of the Constitution and Judiciary Act of 1789. [This second point, however, not being taken in the court below,.]</p> <p>II. Because the court had not charged that the company •was not liable, unless .grossly negligent.</p>

The case was begun in a District Court of the Territory jast named, and was carried thence to the Supreme Court of the same, under the provisions of an act of the legislature of the Territory, providing for.appeals to the Supreme, Court, approved January 18th, 1861.* The 1st section of that act provides: “ That hereafter whenever any final order, judgment, or decree is made or rendered in the District Court of the Territory, ..the party aggrieved may have the same reviewed…

Proposals were received for these docks from several persons, and among them from Gilbert & Secor, who offered to build the dock at Kittery for $732,905. The proposals were made on a basis that the docks should have what is known “ as tar and felt sheathing.” If the sheathing known as “copper sheathing” was required, the offer was to do the work for an additional sum of $72,742.

It appeared, from the testimony, that Levison, who kept a clothing store in Chicago, and had, at the time, a stock of clothes there, wrnrth $600Q, went on, about the middle of Match, 1866, to New York, where, according to the testimony, he enjoyed the reputation of “ a responsible, paying, first-class customer,” and there laid in ah additional quantity, which he purchased on credit, and which cost him $11,622 more.

Nye, a man not very provident, bought a city lot of no great value in Washington, with some money that he had, and on the 25th June, 1857, had it conveyed in trust for his wife and children, to one Harkness as trustee.

Avendano brought suit in the court below against Gay; and, in the course of the trial, offered certain evidence, which was objected to by the defendant, but which was admitted, notwithstanding, by the court.' The defendant excepted, and a bill of exceptions was sealed. A verdict was given against the plaintiffs, who brought the case here on error. The writ of error was allowed on the 9th of July, 1867. The citation .was issued on the 10th, and served on the 11th.

The schooner Woolston, with a cargo of coal, and the steamer Baltimore, collided iu the Potomac, on the 16th of December, 1863, and the schooner and her cargo sank. ■ The owners of the schooner accordingly libelled the steamer in the Admiralty Court of the District.

” With this provision in force Bradley sued the administrators of one Rhines in the court below, describing himself in the declaration as a citizen of Kentucky, and alleging the defendants, whom he described as administrators, to be citizens of Pennsylvania. He declared, in a special count on a contract of lease, and in two common counts for money had and received by defendants’ intestate to plaintiff’s use, and for money laid out and expended at his request.

Held: that the evidence was properly admitted. It was said that the declaration was “of the nature of res gestee,” and that the time when it was made was so recent, after the injury was inflicted, as to justify receiving it upon that ground. It is not easy to distinguish this ease and that of The-King v. Foster, in principle, from the case before us, as regards the point under consideration.

intends to prove to have possessed a prior knowledge'of the thing, and where the same had been used,” an.d if he does not comply with that requirement no such evidence can be received under the general issue. With this statute in force, Alonzo Blanchard and others, being owners by assignment of a patent for an improvement in bending wood, granted to Thomas Blanchard, December 18th, 1849, reissued to him November 15th, 185$, and extended for seven years from.

Held: shall not be diminished by taxation. 2. That- the legislature had power to make this contract, and that when made and accepted it became one of the franchises of this corporation, of which it could not be deprived, is too well settled, to require a citation of numerous authorities. * Messrs. Dick and Blair, contra: 1.

In this second case the charter was to the Washington University, an institution of learning. It was granted On the 22d of February, 1853,'and by the same legislature which incorporated the Home of the Friendless on the 3d of that same February.

Kimpton filed a bill against Bronson in one of the State courts of New York to compel satisfaction of a mortgage executed by him to Bronson on the ground that it had been ■paid. The mortgage was given to secure a bond for the payment of a certain sum in gold and . silver coin, lawful money of the United States. The payment relied on was a tender of United States notes equal in nominal amount to the sum due on the bond and mortgage.

Fowler filed a bill in that court to enjoin Bennet and others from infringing two reissued patents, No. 1870 and 1869,* for improvements in hay elevators, issued February 14th, 1865. The improvements had been embraced in one, in the original patent. An analysis of the complainant, Fowler’s, claims presented them thus’: No. 1870.

Held: in the case of The Kingalock, * that they are entitled to a greater award than any other set of salvors rendering the same service, because they can perform such services, owing to the power they possess, with much greater celerity than other-vessels, and with m u'ch greater safety to the vessel in danger, and frequently under circumstances in which no other assistance could be effectual; Consequently the court…

The case was this: There were two firms of both which a certain B. F. Murphy was a member; the one was at Des Moines, and consisted of this B. F. Murphy and a certain Allen. This firm was under the title of Murphy & Allen. The other was at Chicago, and consisted of this same B. F. -Murphy and one Miles Murphy.

The case was thus: On the 4th of December, 1863, D. L. Magruder, the surgeon and medical purveyor of the military department of the West, acting under instructions of the Surgeon-General of the United States, gave notice that proposals would be received at his office in Louisville, Kentucky, until the 20th of that month, for furnishing ice to all ihe general hospitals of the United States at the West, including the division of the Mississippi and the Department of the Gulf,…

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of New York.</p> <p>The code of procedure of the State of New York* thus enacts:</p> <p>“ Parties to a question of difference, which might be the subject of a civil action, may, without action, agree upon a case containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any court which would have jurisdiction, if an action had been brought. But it must appear, by affidavit, that the controversy is real, and the proceeding in good faith to determine the rights of the parties. The court shall, thereupon, hear and determine the case, at a general term, and render judgment thereon, as if an action were depending.”</p> <p>“ The judgment may be enforced in the same manner,'as if it had been rendered in an action, and shall be subject to an appeal in like manner.”</p> <p>With these provisions of the code in force, the JEtna Insurance Company, as plaintiff, and one Aldrich and others, as defendants, agreed upon a case for' the Superior Court of Buffalo as follows:</p> <p>“Aldrich and the others sold and conveyed the schooner Stella, on the 4th of February, 1856, at Chicago, to one Jacobs, and on the same day, took a mortgage of the vessel-back to secure the payment of $6000 of the purchase-money. The mortgage was in due form, and was recorded in the office of the collector, at the port of Chicago, where the vessel was permanently enrolled, and where one of her owners resided. The purchase-money was payable in sums of five hundred, and of ten hundred dollars, extending through the years 1856, 1857, and to March, 1858. Jacobs, the purchaser, who resided in Chicago„immediately took possession of the vessel-, which was in port, and employed her on the lakes till attached in Buffalo by the insurance company, on the 11th December, 1856, for a debt against him.</p> <p>t2At the time of the execution of the mortgage, there was a statute of the State of- Illinois, which enacted, that ‘ no mortgage on personal property shall be valid, as against the rights and 'interests of any third person or persons, unless possession of such personal property shall be delivered to and remain with the mortgagees, or the said mortgage be acknowledged and recorded, as hereinafter directed.’ This mortgage had been neither acknowledged nor recorded, according to the requirements of this statute.”</p> <p>It was agreed by the parties, in settling their case, that if., the decision should be in favor of the company (the plaintiffs), that judgment should be given against the defendants for $475 and interest, but if in favor of the defendants, then judgment against the plaintiff for costs.</p> <p>.The court at a general term at Buffalorendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The cause was removed to the Court of Appeals, the highest court of the State of New York, where the judgment was affirmed, and the proceedings remitted to the Superior Court at Buffalo, in which the judgment of affirmance was entered of record. The casé was then brought before this court on writ of error; it being purported to be brought here under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which gives this court jurisdiction to review upon a writ of error j udgments in the highest court of a State, where there has been drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decree is against their validity; or where there is drawn in question the construction of any statute of the United States, and the decree is against the' title, right, or privilege, or exemption specially set up; or where there is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State on the ground of their being repugnant to the laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; — “the citation,” says this 25th section, “being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.”</p> <p>The writ in this case was allowed by Chief Justice Davies of the Court of Appeals of New York, and was addressed to the Superior Court of Buffalo. The citation was signed by Mr. Justice Miller of this court.</p> <p>The case being here, the questions were,</p> <p>I. As to jurisdiction.</p> <p>II. As to merits.</p> <p>I. On the point of jurisdiction objection was taken to the jurisdiction,</p> <p>■ 1st. On the ground that the judgment, which the writ of' error purported to bring here, had not been rendered in a suit within the words of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, but was rendered on a voluntary submission without suit, containing a statement of facts agreed on by the parties, under the code of procedure in New York.</p> <p>2d. That it did not appear on the face of the record that the validity of a statute or law of the United States, or of the statute of a State as repugnant to such law, or that the construction'of any statute of the United States was drawn in question.</p> <p>3d. That the writ of error was allowed by the chief judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, the writ being addressed to the 'Superior Court of Buffalo, where the record was; and that the said chief judge was not authorized to allow the writ of error.</p> <p>4th. That the citation was not signed by the judge who allowed the writ of error.</p> <p>Assuming jurisdiction to exist, there remained</p> <p>II. The question of merits; the insurance company contending, upon this question, that the mortgage could not be set up as against tbe attachment; that it was void as against it, and that the company was entitled to a judgment declaring the lien of the attachment paramount to that of the mortgage. The mortgagees, represented here by Mr. Robert Rae, maintaining on the other hand the converse of these propositions, Mr. Rae referring to White’s Bank v. Smith* as conclusive of this part of the case.</p>

,” and which establishes those associations for carrying on the business of banking, now known as our “National Banks,” provides, by its 12th section, that the shareholders “ Shall be held individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another', for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares, except, &c.’’ Subsequent sections…

Three acts of Congress, one of July 13th, 1861, another of August 6th, 1861,'and a third of July 17th, 1862, passed during the late rebellion, authorized the seizure and confiscation in the District or Circuit Courts of property used for insurrectionary purposes, and to a certain extent prescribed tbe mode of proceeding.

Held: that the omission was supplied by reference to the attestation clause, which declared that the instrument was “ signed, sealed, and delivered,” in presence of the subscribing witnesses-, of whom the officer taking the acknowledgment was one. 8. It will be presumed, that a'commissioner of deeds, in.

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), was a United States Supreme Court case.

Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 557 (1869), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that courts of equity deciding issues of contract have discretion to determine the form of relief based on the circumstances of each individual case. The Court established a new rule to determine the form of relief: Relief should serve the ends of justice, and should be withheld if it appears likely to produce hardship or injustice to either party.

The case was this: A code of the State of Iowa, adopted in 1851, and known as the code of that year, after enacting that neither the public property of any city corporation necessary to carrying on the general purposes for which the corporation was established, nor the property of private citizens shall be levied on to pay the debt of such corporation, goes on to enact that if any corporation against which judgment has been obtained has no property which can be seized, “ a…

On certificate of division between the judges of the Northern District of Ohio; the case being this: The act of June 30th, 1864, “ to provide internal revenue to support the government, to pay interest on the public debt, and for- other purposes,” enacts, by its 71st section,* that n6 person shall carry on the business of a coal oil distiller until he have obtained a license in the manner prescribed.

The collision occurred on a starlight night in July. The schooner was heading about north, going up the bay, sailing,by the wind, closehnuled, with a fresh breeze, west-northwest. "Whether or not she had a light on board was a matter about which the evidence was contradictory; the weight of it being to tho effect that she had not.

■ In error to the Supreme Court of Missouri; the case being thus: In 1854, Mrs. Tyler leased to oue Dreliman, a house and lot in St. Louis for twenty years, that is to say, till 1874; and by the terms of the lease conveuantod to keep the said Drehman in lawful possession of the premises daring the term for lohieh they were leased to him. In 1860, Mrs. Tyler sold the fee of the premises to one Stifle, who thus became.landlord to Drehman, . her lessee.

Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Chief Justice of the United States, Salmon P. Chase, speaking for the Court, declared certain parts of the Legal Tender Acts to be unconstitutional. Specifically, making United States Notes legal tender was unconstitutional.

The case was this: Magraw preferred a claim by petition in the Probate Court of the city of San Francisco, upon a note made by Broderick to the petitioner at New York, on the 1st of July, 1858. Broderick dying, his executor defended the suit. The defence set up by the executor was a tender of the amount due in United States notes.

<p>A clerical mistake in a writ of error may be amended by the citation.</p>

<p>This was a suit by the Seventh National Bank of Philadelphia-against the Chicopee Bank of Springfield, Massachusetts, founded upon the allegation, that by reason of the neglect of the latter bank, the former lost its remedy against the prior parties on a bill of exchange, to wit, the drawer and payee.</p> <p>The bill was drawn by one Coglin, of Philadelphia, on' Montague,.of Springfield, payable to one Rhodes, of Philadelphia, for $10,000, and accepted" by Montague specially payable at the Chicopee Bank. The day of payment was Saturday, February 18th, 1865. Qu the 18th, Rhodes, the holder, indorsed the bill for value to the Philadelphia bank, which sent it at once by mail, inclosed in a letter, to the Chicopee Bank, to receive payment. The course of the mail between Philadelphia and Springfield, is two days. Ou the 15th, this letter with other letters and papers, was duly delivered by the postman, and placed on the cashier’s table; but (as was afterwards ascertained), this letter slipped from the pile, through a crack in the table, into a drawer of loose papers, and its presence in the bank was not known to the cashier, and as the two banks had no previous dealings, he was not expecting anything from the other bank. On the 18th, Montague, the acceptor, made no attempt to pay the bill, either by calling for it, or depositing funds, and subsequently, at the trial, made oath that he intended not to pay the bill, and had a defence against it. The cashier of the Philadelphia bank, not receiving, ou the 17th, an acknowledgment of the letter which he had sent on the 13th, felt somewhat anxious; and on the 18th consulted the president. On-Monday, the 20th’, he telegraphed to the cashier of the ■Chicopee Bank as follows:</p> <p>“ Did not you receive ours o'f 13th instant, with Montague’s acceptance, $10,000?”</p> <p>The dispatch did not indicate either the time or place of payment of the draft; and the reply was sent,</p> <p>“ Not yet received.”</p> <p>This dispatch was received by the cashier of the Philadelphia bank, at noon of the 20th. He testified at the trial, that he wrote to Mr. Rhodes the same day, informing him of wbat he had learned, that he had no recollection of Writing to Coglin, but, as he knew they were jointly concerned in dealings in petroleum lands, be presumed Rhodes would-iyform him. ’’This was the only step the cashí'ér'took toward charging the prior parties. They both did business at that bank: Coglin was a director; both were frequently there, and well known to the cashier. As the mail required two days, and the 19th was -Sunday, there was no question but. the pashier had until and including the 24th, to give notice to Rhodes and Coglin. After the receipt of the reply of the 20th, at-noon, he took no steps, by post or telegraph, to ascertain from the Chicopee Bank, whether the acceptor had or had not been ready to pay on the 18th. The Philadelphia bank brought no suit against Rhodes or Coglin, but sued the Chicopee Bank for the amount of the note, on' the ground that by its negligence, they had lost the power to charge the prior parties.</p> <p>The court below instructed the jury, that the prior parties were absolutely discharged by what took place at the Chicopee Bank, on the 18th; that where a bill is accepted payable at a particular bank, the bank need not seek the acceptor, but that there must still be a presentment, in order to charge prior parties; that the presence of the bill at the bank, ready to be delivered to the acceptor upon his tendering payment, was equivalent to a presentment, but that if the bill is not at the bank on the day of payment, ready to be delivered as aforesaid, there is a failure of presentment, and the prior parties are discharged, although the acceptor made no attempt to pay; that in this case, therefore, the prior parties co'uld not be held by any notice of whatever description, whenever or by whomsoever given; and that if the loss or-mislaying of the bill during the whole of the 18th, was owing to the negligence of its cashier, the Chicopee Bank was liable for the amount of the note.</p> <p>After the charge was fully delivered, the court was asked by the counsel of the Chicopee Bank, to instruct the jury as to the burden of proof. This the court refused to do, considering that it had already sufficiently instructed the jury.</p> <p>The verdict and judgment were accordingly for the plaintiffs.</p>

Held: when considering this very title, that the judicial tribunals in the ordinary administration of justice had no jurisdiction or power to deal with these incipient claims, either as to fixing boundaries by survey or for any other purpose, but that such a title, until the survey was made, attached to no land, nor could a court of justice ascertain its boundaries, as that power was reserved to the executive department…