Cross v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We need not decide whether the defendant, under the facts of this case, so far waived his right of trial by jury as to justify the judge of the county court in proceeding to try the cause. * * * Conceding that such was the case, all we decide is that the agreement to waive the right of trial by jury must ordinarily be construed to apply only to the particular trial at which it is made. Such a waiver is a renunciation of a valuable constitutional right, and must be strictly construed. It may well be supposed that a defendant would be perfectly willing for a particular judge to try him, when he would not risk his successor, or that he would be willing to be tried the first time by a judge, when he would not submit to a second trial by the same judge after such officer had convicted him one or more times, so that the judicial mind might not afterwards be perfectly free from the influence of a bias created by the circumstances of such previous conviction. This would be sufficient ground for the challenge of a juror, and ought not to be considered as waived in the case of a judge, — at least on doubtful implication.” Marton v. King, 72 Ala. 354 ; Stedman’s Heirs v. Stedman’s Ex’rs, 32 Ala. 525 ; Benbow v. Robbins, 72 N.C. 422 . [Emphasis added.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. United States v. Lee

2. ““We need not decide whether the defendant, under the facts of this case, so far waived his right of trial by jury as to jnsiif.y the judge of the county court in proceeding to try the cause. * * * Conceding that such was the ease, all we decide is that the agreement to waive (he right of trial by jury must ordinarily be construed to apply only to the particular, trial at which it is made. Such a waiver is a renunciation of a valuable constitutional right, and must be strictly construed. It may well be supposed that a defendant would be perfectly willing for a particular judge to try him, when he would not risk his successor, or that he would be willing to be tried the first time by a judge, when he would not submit to a second trial by the same judge after such officer had convicted him one or more times, so that the judicial mind might not afterwards be perfectly free from the influence of a bias created by the circumstances of such previous conviction. This would be sufficient ground for the challenge of a juror, and ought not to be considered as waived in the case of a judge, — at least on doubtful implication.” Marton v. King, 72 Ala. 354 ; Stedman’s Heirs v. Stedman’s Ex’rs, 32 Ala. 525 ; Benbow v. Robbins, 72 N. C. 422 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Burnham v. North Chicago St. Ry. Co.