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79 N.J. 547

401 A.2d 532

Polyard v. Terry

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Decided May 17, 1979

Supreme Court of New Jersey · decided 1979-05-17

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 193 N.J. Super. 413 - Speziale v. Newark Hous. Auth.

Relies on Dolson v. Anastasia

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-05-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 72 later decisions — most recently August 2018 · most notably Kolitch v. Lindedahl (1985), Waterson v. General Motors Corp. (1988)

6 district · 66 state decisions

21019791980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

GEORGE POLYARD, AS ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM FOR THE HEIRS AT LAW OF DOROTHY FERREIRA, DECEASED, AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY FERREIRA, DECEASED, AND HERBERT FERREIRA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID TERRY AND JOYCE HEIL, DEFENDANTS, AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

¶1The Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued February 5, 1979.
Decided May 17, 1979.

¶2Mr. Harold N. Springstead argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Aronsohn, Kahn & Springstead and Mr. Joseph L. Kramer, attorneys).

¶3*548Mr. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Thomas F. Marshall, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5The judgment is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Appellate Division.

¶6PASHMAN, J., dissenting.

¶7I dissent. After a proper charge from the trial judge, the jury concluded that all elements necessary to maintain a claim against the State were proven. Nonetheless, the majority holds that plaintiff is not entitled to recover the damages awarded. In reaching this result, the majority disregards the strictures of prior caselaw and substitutes its judgment for that of the jurors. I cannot accept this abrogation of the jury's function.

¶8The standard governing a motion for involuntary dismissal, R. 4:37-2(b), or judgment n.o.v., R. 4:40-2, was authoritatively enunciated in Dolson v. Anastasia,55 N.J. 2 (1969). We there announced the proper test to be:

¶9whether "the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences therefrom, could sustain a judgment in … favor" of the party opposing the motion, i.e., if, accepting as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can reasonably and legitimately be deduced therefrom, reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.

¶10[55 N.J. at 5]

¶11In applying this limited standard, the court may not consider the "worth, nature or extent" of the evidence presented but must decide only whether the bare "scintilla" necessary to sustain a judgment exists. Id. at 5-6.

¶12Although the evidence here was not overwhelming, the trial court was correct in ruling that "there was sufficient credible evidence from which the jury could have found adversely to the State." Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super.*549 202, 218 (Law Div. 1977). The majority, in denying the presence of this necessary scintilla, in effect acts as a "thirteenth and decisive juror" contrary to the dictates of Dolson v. Anastasia,55 N.J. at 6. Because I find such a departure from precedent unwarranted, I would reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the jury verdict.

¶13For affirmance — Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER — 5.

¶14For reversal — Justice PASHMAN — 1.

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