Volume 8 — Maryland Appellate Reports

NARCOTICS — <italic>"Possession" And "Control" Defined — Duration Of</italic><italic>Possession Immaterial — Evidence That Accused Had Drug Within</italic><italic>His System Tends To Show Possession And/Or Control Prior To</italic><italic>Taking Drug — Accused's Statement To Physician Justified</italic><italic>Inference Of Possession — Evidence Sufficient To Sustain</italic><italic>Conviction For Possession</italic>. The statutory terms "possession" and "control" must be given their ordinary meanings: "control" means "to exercise restraining or directing influence over;" "possession" means "the act or condition of having in or taking into one's control or holding at one's disposal." Code (1957), Art. 27, § 277. p. 138 The duration of the possession is immaterial in determining guilt. p. 141 Evidence showing that a person has a prohibited narcotic drug within his system, while not <italic>per se</italic> constituting possession or control, would tend to show circumstantially that he was in possession and/or control of the drug prior to taking it. p. 138 Appellant's statement to a physician that he had taken an overdose of heroin intravenously, after which he had "passed out," justified not only the inference that prior to taking such drug, he necessarily was in possession of it, but also the inference, absent affirmative contrary evidence, that the drug was self-administered, or administered by another at his direction (thus placing him in constructive possession of the drug). pp. 140-141 Although a physician's medical conclusions concerning appellant's physical condition appeared to be based, in part, upon information given by appellant, the physician's testimony, considered in its totality, showed sufficiently that appellant's symptomatology, particularly his "bluish" and unconscious condition, and the constriction of the pupils of his eyes, provided the requisite quantum of corroborative independent evidence to establish, circumstantially, that he did indeed possess narcotics in violation of the statute. Code (1957), Art. 27, § 277. p. 141 CONFESSIONS — <italic>Distinction Between Confession And Admission —</italic><italic>Confession Does Not Warrant Conviction Unless Supported By</italic><italic>Independent Evidence Establishing Corpus Delicti — Sufficiency</italic><italic>Of Independent Evidence</italic>. There is a real, and not a fanciful, difference<page_number>Page 135</page_number> between a confession and an admission in a criminal case: a confession is a direct acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused and, by the very force of the definition, excludes an admission, which, of itself, as applied in criminal law, is a statement by the accused direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove guilt, but of itself insufficient to authorize a conviction. p. 139 An extrajudicial confession or incriminatory admission of the accused does not warrant a conviction unless there is also independent evidence to establish the <italic>corpus delicti, i.e.,</italic> the facts that are necessary to show that a crime has been committed. p. 140 The sufficiency of this independent evidence need not establish, by itself, the <italic>corpus delicti</italic> beyond a reasonable doubt, but any facts and circumstances that are substantial in nature and fortify the truth of the confession or statement are sufficient to support a conviction. p. 140 The character, nature, and amount of independent proof of the<italic>corpus delicti</italic> need not, of itself, be full and positive; it may be circumstantial in nature when direct evidence is not available. p. 140 PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS — <italic>Communications Made To Physician In</italic><italic>His Professional Capacity Are Not Privileged</italic>. Communications made to a physician in his professional capacity are not privileged under the common law of Maryland, nor, with some exceptions in the case of psychiatrists, have they been made so by statute. p. 141