United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 24, 2023 Decided August 15, 2023
No. 21-7134
ANNE DAVIS, ON BEHALF OF BRAEDEN DAVIS,
APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-02884)
Diana M. Savit argued the cause for appellant. With her
on the briefs was Charles Moran.
Craig E. Leen was on the brief for amici curiae Advocates
for Justice and Education, Inc. (The DC Parent Training and
Information Center) and Council of Parent Attorneys &
Advocates (COPAA) in support of appellant.
Sonya L. Lebsack, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Karl A. Racine,
Attorney General, at the time the brief was filed, Caroline S.
Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal
2
Deputy Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy
Solicitor General.
Before: CHILDS and PAN, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge CHILDS.
CHILDS, Circuit Judge: Anne Davis, acting on behalf of her
son, Braeden Davis, a student who qualifies for special
education services under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., appeals an
order of the district court denying her motions for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to the
IDEA’s “stay-put” provision,
id. § 1415(j). The stay-put
provision provides that, “during the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State
or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,” a
student “shall remain” in the student’s “then-current
educational placement.” Id.
In 2021, the residential treatment center where Braeden
received special educational services unilaterally discharged
him. Since then, the District of Columbia (District) has been
unable to locate a new residential placement, leaving Braeden
without the educational services to which he is entitled. The
District has offered Braeden in-home or virtual special
education services until it identifies a new residential treatment
center available to admit him.
Ms. Davis argued that the District’s interim services
proposal violates its statutory obligation to maintain Braeden’s
educational placement because in-home and virtual services do
not provide Braeden an alternative therapeutic residential
environment “as close[ly] as possible” to a residential facility.
3
Davis Br. 30, 47, 53. The district court determined that the
stay-put provision does not apply in these unique
circumstances and declined to enter an injunction against the
District. We affirm.
I.
The primary substantive guarantee of the IDEA is a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE) to all students with
disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). The particulars of a
student’s special education program are devised by school
officials in collaboration with parents and set forth in an
“Individualized Education Program” (IEP),
id. § 1414(d),
which “serves as the ‘primary vehicle’ for providing each
[student] with the promised FAPE,” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty.
Schs.,
580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017) (quoting Honig v. Doe,
484
U.S. 305, 311 (1988)).
When an IEP is developed, the school district must provide
the student with an “educational placement” capable of
implementing that program. The statute provides that an
appropriate placement is the student’s “[l]east restrictive
environment” — that is, the environment in which the student
can be educated to “the maximum extent appropriate” with
others who are not disabled. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see
also Olu-Cole v. E.L. Haynes Pub. Charter Sch.,
930 F.3d 519,
522–23 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (identifying integration as “[o]ne of
the statute’s key goals”).
In addition to a student’s substantive right to a FAPE, the
IDEA provides certain procedural guarantees when
disagreements over a student’s educational placement arise.
Disputes typically fall within one of three categories: the
school proposes a change in a student’s IEP that the student’s
parents believe fails to offer a FAPE, the school is attempting
4
to expel a student for disciplinary reasons, or, as alleged in this
case, the school and the parents agree on the content of a
student’s IEP, but the school fails to implement the IEP as
written. Parents may request an impartial administrative due
process hearing when such disputes arise, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), and any party aggrieved by the hearing
officer’s decision may seek judicial review,
id. § 1415(i)(2)(A);
see also Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at 523–24 (describing the IDEA’s
administrative dispute resolution process).
Central to this appeal is the IDEA’s requirement that a
student “shall remain in [the student’s] then-current
educational placement” until the dispute resolution process
concludes. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (entitled “Maintenance of
current educational placement”). While a FAPE claim centers
on whether the school district has fulfilled its substantive
obligation to provide an appropriate and individualized
education to a student, Congress designed the stay-put
provision with a limited operation and purpose: to prevent
schools from unilaterally changing a student’s educational
placement while parents seek review and to ensure an
uninterrupted continuity of education for disabled students
pending administrative resolution. Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at 523–
24.
A parent is entitled to stay-put relief under § 1415(j) “upon
a two-factor showing that (i) an administrative due process
proceeding is pending, and (ii) the local educational agency is
attempting to alter the student’s then-current educational
placement.” Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at 527 (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted); see also Lunceford v. D.C. Bd.
of Educ.,
745 F.2d 1577, 1582 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
an educational placement has not “change[d]” unless a
“fundamental change in, or elimination of, a basic element” of
the student’s educational program has occurred).
5
If the two preconditions are met, the stay-put provision
functions as an automatic statutory injunction, meaning parents
need not meet the traditional four-part test for obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at 528;
Andersen ex rel. Andersen v. District of Columbia,
877 F.2d
1018, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“If the [stay-put] provision
applies, injunctive relief is available without the traditional
showing of irreparable harm.”).
II.
Braeden Davis is a 23-year-old student with multiple
disabilities, including autism spectrum disorder. 1 Braeden has
a history of aggression toward others, self-injury, and property
destruction, and he is easily triggered by a wide range of
environmental sensory stimuli. Because of Braeden’s
disabilities, he is eligible for special education services under
the IDEA.
Braeden’s most recent IEP, issued in March 2021,
identifies his “least restrictive environment” as a residential
treatment center and specifies the IEP services he is entitled to
receive. Given the severity of his disabilities, Braeden is
“unable to attend school with general education peers” and
requires instruction in a “highly structured educational and
1
Braeden is above the age of majority, but the District and
the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent of Education
(OSSE) recognize Braeden as eligible for special education and
associated services under the IDEA until at least 2024 as a
result of related litigation not at issue here. Braeden was a
“child” for purposes of the IDEA at the time this lawsuit was
filed. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (covering “children”
between ages three and twenty-one); 5-E D.C.M.R. § 3002.1(a)
(covering “children” between ages three and twenty-two).
6
residential environment, with [one-to-one] supervision and a
highly structured behavioral intervention program.” March
2021 IEP at 27, J.A. 34. Braeden’s IEP entitles him to the
assistance of a dedicated aide for eight hours per day,
specialized instruction for twenty-two-and-a-half hours per
week, speech and language therapy for six hours per month,
and occupational therapy and behavioral support services, each
for twelve hours per month. See id. at 26, J.A. 33.
Beginning in August 2020, Braeden received his IDEA
services at the Community Services for Autistic Adults and
Children, a private residential treatment center in Maryland,
and its affiliated school, the Community School of Maryland
(together, CSAAC). On October 1, 2021, without input from
Ms. Davis or the District, CSAAC notified the District that it
planned to discharge Braeden at the end of that month because
CSAAC was “no longer the appropriate placement for
Braeden.” Letter of October 1, 2021 from Scott Murtha,
Director of Education of the Community School of Maryland,
J.A. 91. CSAAC declined to reconsider its decision or to
extend Braeden’s residency to allow the District additional
time to find a new placement. See Decl. of Katie Reda ¶ 33
(Nov. 8, 2021), J.A. 176–77.
After receiving CSAAC’s discharge notice, Braeden’s IEP
team did not consider changing his IEP or whether such a
change was appropriate. See Decl. of Nicholas Weiler ¶ 14
(Nov. 10, 2021), J.A. 183. Ms. Davis and the District agreed
that it should continue to implement Braeden’s IEP in his least
restrictive environment, which is a residential treatment center.
See Compl. ¶ 10, J.A. 118–19. The District began searching
for a new residential placement and ultimately referred
Braeden to nineteen alternative residential facilities. None
accepted Braeden’s application because they either lacked
capacity, did not accept out-of-state referrals, were unable to
7
meet Braeden’s needs, or could not receive the District’s
referral due to Braeden’s age. See Reda Decl. ¶¶ 13–32, J.A.
174–76.
With a dwindling list of prospects, locating a new
residential facility before CSAAC discharged Braeden
appeared unlikely. As a backstop, the District authorized
funding for Braeden to receive his IEP services at home
through independent providers until a new placement is found. 2
The District also offered Braeden the option to receive his
instruction virtually with the assistance of a virtual support aide
in a “Communication Education and Support” classroom at
Woodrow Wilson High School as an alternative to in-home
services. Weiler Decl. ¶ 14, J.A. 183.
Three days before Braeden’s expected discharge, Ms.
Davis initiated administrative due process proceedings with
OSSE, claiming that the District “refused to arrange for a safe
and appropriate living arrangement or behavioral support
comparable to those required by Braeden’s then-current IEP.”
Admin. Compl. at 7, J.A. 104. Ms. Davis requested a stay-put
injunction ordering the school district to keep Braeden “in a
safe and appropriate location” and provide his IEP services
while a new residential placement was sought. Alternatively,
Ms. Davis requested that the school district be ordered to
“create an environment capable of implementing Braeden’s
IEP.” Id. at 10, J.A. 107.
2
Shortly after issuing the initial interim services plan, the
District amended its proposal to allow funding for an additional
dedicated aide for eight hours per day during the school week.
With that adjustment, the revised interim services plan
authorized all of the services provided for in Braeden’s March
2021 IEP. See Weiler Decl. ¶ 15, J.A. 183.
8
On November 1, 2021, CSAAC discharged Braeden.
Because no residential facility had accepted his application,
Braeden was released to his parents and lost access to his
special education program.
Ms. Davis immediately filed a complaint on behalf of
Braeden against the District in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. Ms. Davis alleged that the District’s
interim services plan was insufficient, primarily because the
District did not provide Braeden a “therapeutic residence”
outside Ms. Davis’s home or behavioral support sufficient to
allow him to make progress on his IEP goals. Compl. ¶¶ 34–
44, J.A. 123–24; see also Davis Br. 15–17.
Like the administrative complaint, the federal complaint
alleged that the District failed to provide “reasonably
comparable” interim services and thereby violated its statutory
obligation to provide Braeden a FAPE as required by
§ 1412(a)(1)(A). Compl. ¶¶ 1, 35, 44, J.A. 117, 123, 124. Ms.
Davis then moved for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put
mandate, § 1415(j). The substantively identical motions sought
an order requiring the District to “maintain Braeden’s then-current educational placement” at a residential facility or to
provide “truly comparable” interim services. Mot. Prelim. Inj.
12–13, ECF No. 7; Mot. TRO 12–13, ECF No. 6. 3
3
On November 10, 2021, the OSSE hearing officer
concluded that Braeden’s discharge from CSAAC was a
“fundamental change in placement,” Hearing Officer
Determination (HOD) at 4 (Nov. 10, 2021), J.A. 187, but
denied Ms. Davis’s request for a stay-put injunction because
Braeden’s placement was “functionally unavailable due to the
unilateral decision of CSAAC,” id. at 6, J.A. 189 (citing
9
The district court denied Ms. Davis’s motions for stay-put
relief. The district court determined that § 1415(j) did not
apply because Braeden’s residential placement became
unavailable due to circumstances outside of the District’s
control, the District engaged in a “thorough and ongoing
search” for a new residential placement, and the District
otherwise made all of Braeden’s IEP services available to him
at home. J.A. 230. Ms. Davis appeals.
III.
This court reviews the denial of a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but
it reviews de novo a district court’s interpretation of the IDEA.
Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
On appeal, Ms. Davis maintains that, when a student’s
placement becomes unavailable, the IDEA’s stay-put provision
imposes an affirmative obligation on the District to replicate a
student’s then-current educational placement “as close[ly] as
possible.” Davis Br. 30, 47, 53. Ms. Davis acknowledges that
the District began searching for a new residential placement
soon after CSAAC announced its plan to discharge Braeden,
and that the District issued referrals to nineteen potential
residential treatment centers. But she believes that the District
fell short of its statutory duty to maintain Braeden’s residential
placement because it did not provide Braeden interim housing
or continuous behavioral support.
Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty., 335 F.3d 297,
302 (4th Cir. 2003)).
10
A.
Before addressing whether the relief sought is available to
Ms. Davis under § 1415(j), we must determine whether the
stay-put provision is implicated at all in this case. We hold it
is not.
The stay-put mandate does not apply because the District
did not effectuate a “fundamental change” in Braeden’s
educational placement by attempting to “alter” or “undo” the
services to which he is entitled under his IEP. See Olu-Cole,
930 F.3d at 527; see also Knight ex rel. Knight v. District of
Columbia,
877 F.2d 1025, 1026–27 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (school
district initiated a student’s change in placement by proposing
to enroll him in a public school instead of the private school he
previously attended); McKenzie v. Smith,
771 F.2d 1527, 1533
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (school district triggered the stay-put mandate
when it sought to transfer a student from a private day school
to a public high school). 4
4
The term “educational placement” is varied in its
interpretation across circuits. See also Bd. of Educ. of Cmty.
High Sch. Dist. No. 218 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545,
548 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing that the term “falls somewhere
between the physical school attended by a child and the abstract
goals of a child’s IEP”); see also Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Educ.,
959 F.3d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 2020) (defining
“educational placement” as “the general type of educational
program in which the child is placed,” i.e., “the classes,
individualized attention, and additional services a child will
receive”). Here, we need not determine whether Braeden’s
discharge from CSAAC was a fundamental change in his
educational placement because the discharge was not within
the District’s control.
11
Here, both parties agree that Braeden’s IEP entitles him to
receive education at a residential treatment center. Ms. Davis
acknowledges that neither CSAAC’s decision to end Braeden’s
residency nor the lack of available openings at the nineteen
potential replacement facilities the District identified was
attributable to any action taken by the District. And the district
court found that the District has “indisputably engaged in a
thorough and ongoing search for an appropriate placement.”
J.A. 226. Indeed, in seeking to place Braeden at a new
residential facility, the District sought to implement Braeden’s
IEP as written by maintaining his then-current placement, even
though its efforts were ultimately futile. Although Braeden
was removed from his least restrictive environment when
CSAAC discharged him, based on the facts of this case, we
hold that the stay-put provision is inapplicable because the
residential component of Braeden’s IEP became unavailable
for reasons outside of the District’s control. 5
At least four circuits have concluded that the stay-put
provision does not apply when a student’s educational
experience changes due to circumstances beyond the school
district’s control. See Weil v. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary
Educ., 931 F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
stay-put provision did not apply when a student’s educational
5
In her reply brief, and without elaborating on or providing
any evidence in support of her claim, Ms. Davis contends for
the first time on appeal that the District’s ongoing good faith
efforts to locate a different facility since Braeden’s initial
nineteen referrals were rejected are “questionable and
disputed.” Davis Reply Br. 11 n.5. Because the issue is not
presented in this appeal, we do not reach the question of
whether relief is available under the stay-put provision, or any
other theory, had the District abandoned all reasonable efforts
to seek out a new residential placement for Braeden.
12
placement unexpectedly changed due to a school closure
“beyond the control” of the school district); see also N.D. v.
Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that furloughs resulting in fewer school days did not
trigger the stay-put provision even though the budget cuts
might be the subject of a due process complaint for material
failure to implement an IEP); Tilton ex rel. Richards v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
705 F.2d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the stay-put provision did not apply when facility
that offered the only year-round treatment program for
mentally handicapped children was closed due to budgetary
reasons beyond the school district’s control); Wagner,
335 F.3d
at 302 (“[I]t is only the current placement, available or
unavailable, that provides a proper object for a ‘stay put’
injunction.”). Although the students’ educational programs in
those cases became unavailable for different reasons, and the
opinions differ in whether to characterize such a loss as a
change to the “then-current educational placement,” those
cases uniformly hold that the stay-put provision is inapplicable
where a change is not instigated by the school district.
The limited utility of § 1415(j) also reinforces our
decision. A stay-put injunction runs only against the school
district because it is intended to shield against a school
district’s unilateral attempt to change a student’s placement.
See Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington. v. Dep’t of Educ. of
Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 371–74 (1985) (Notwithstanding
§ 1415(j), a parent may change their child’s educational
placement “at their own financial risk.”); see also Honig,
484
U.S. at 323 (The purpose of the stay-put provision is “to strip
schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally
employed to exclude disabled students . . . from school.”).
Notably, entitlement to stay-put relief is not predicated on the
provision of a FAPE. Olu-Cole,
930 F.3d at 524 (“To put it
more simply, ‘all handicapped children, regardless of whether
13
their case is meritorious or not, are to remain in their current
educational placement until the dispute with regard to their
placement is ultimately resolved.’” (quoting Mackey v. Bd. of
Educ. for Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir.
2004))). In other words, the IDEA’s substantive guarantee is
not necessarily realized through the procedural safeguard of
§ 1415(j).
Ms. Davis’s request for stay-put relief rests entirely on the
District’s failure to materially implement Braeden’s IEP due to
a lack of similar placements. See Davis Br. 44 (arguing that
Ms. Davis’s interim proposal “came much closer to
[Braeden’s] IEP than the District’s”). But facility
unavailability did not cause Braeden’s placement at CSAAC to
end, even though the District may ultimately be responsible for
failing to provide Braeden a FAPE. See, e.g., Weil 931 F.2d at
1073 (holding that placement unavailability does not trigger the
stay-put provision).
B.
Even if § 1415(j) applies, Ms. Davis’s requested relief is
beyond the District’s responsibility under that provision.
Knight does not lend support to Ms. Davis’s broad
assertion that § 1415(j) automatically entitles Braeden to an
interim placement in an alternative setting that comes “as close
as possible” to a residential treatment center. Davis Br. 47. In
Knight, because the District did not raise the issue on appeal,
this court assumed without deciding that a change in placement
sufficient to trigger the stay-put provision occurred when a
student’s private school placement became unavailable. 877
F.2d at 1028–29. The school district nevertheless met its stay-put obligation by offering the student a “similar” public school
14
placement. Id. Knight made clear that a placement is “similar”
if it can fully implement a student’s IEP. Id. at 1029.
Here, Ms. Davis and the District agree that residential
services are a necessary component of Braeden’s IEP and that
no “similar” placement is available to him. In other words, Ms.
Davis’s proposed relief—a safe alternative living environment
with continuous behavioral support—would not provide the
“highly structured educational and residential environment”
that Braeden’s IEP requires. March 2021 IEP at 27, J.A. 34. A
placement that “comes close” to implementing a student’s IEP
is not “similar” under the standard defined in Knight. To allow
the stay-put relief Ms. Davis seeks would be a substantial
extension of our holding in Knight because it would require the
District to provide a new placement that implements an IEP “as
closely as possible” when a “similar” placement is not
available.
Any right to such relief must be grounded in the IDEA.
The plain language of § 1415(j) does not expressly contemplate
that a placement might become unavailable while
administrative proceedings are pending. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(j) (a student “shall remain” in their “then-current
educational placement”). However, because a student cannot
“remain” in an unavailable placement, placement availability
is reasonably implied. Ms. Davis urges this court to reject this
common-sense reading because Congress did not intend to
write an “unavailability exception” into what is otherwise an
unequivocal obligation to maintain a student’s placement in all
circumstances while the dispute resolution process is ongoing.
Davis Br. 43. We disagree.
Ms. Davis’s reading is inconsistent with the stay-put
mandate’s limited role and operation within the IDEA’s overall
statutory scheme. Section 1415(j) is only a shield to
15
temporarily block the District from fundamentally changing a
student’s educational placement; it is not a “sword to effectuate
affirmative remedies.” J.A. 228. The affirmative relief that
Ms. Davis desires “goes beyond the ‘prohibitory’ nature of the
statute,” Gross-Lee ex. rel. D.A.-G. v. District of Columbia, No.
22-cv-1695, 2022 WL 3572457, at *14 (D.D.C. July 20, 2022)
(quoting Wagner,
335 F.3d at 301), and it is incompatible with
the automatic nature of relief available under § 1415(j). A stay-put injunction is solely a tool for maintaining the educational
status quo, and ordering the District to provide Braeden a new
placement that cannot, by definition, fully implement his IEP
would not maintain the status quo. See Olu-Cole,
930 F.3d at
523 (“[T]he IDEA’s ‘stay put’ provision strikes the balance
heavily in favor of maintaining the educational status quo for
students with disabilities until proceedings have
concluded.”); see, e.g., Wagner, 335 F.3d at 301–02.
The stay-put mandate does not, as Ms. Davis contends,
“do[] more than ensure educational continuity” by also
guaranteeing that the educational placement in place during the
dispute resolution process is one that “[a student’s] parents
helped to develop and with which they agree.” Davis Reply
Br. 23. By creating a mechanism to block school districts from
changing a student’s placement until placement disputes are
resolved, Congress did not intend to clear a direct path to the
district court for parents to challenge how “close” an interim
placement comes to an unavailable placement compared to any
number of dissimilar alternatives. See Schaffer ex rel. Shaffer
v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 59–60 (2005) (“Congress could have
required that a child be given the educational placement that a
parent requested during a dispute, but it did no such thing.”);
see also Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
959 F.3d
519, 534 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To hold otherwise would turn the
stay-put provision on its head, by effectively eliminating the
school district’s authority to determine how pendency services
16
should be provided.”). Such a holding would transform this
procedural safeguard into “a roving and unbounded implement
for change” whenever a student’s placement becomes
unavailable. District Br. 23; see also Gross-Lee, 2022 WL
3572457, at *14 n.26 (“[F]ederal courts would be busy fielding
emergency stay-put motions requesting new placements that
would implement portions of an IEP.”). We therefore decline
Ms. Davis’s invitation to extend the stay-put provision beyond
the scope of its plain language and purpose.
Based on the circumstances of this case, we reject Ms.
Davis’s argument that the District must create an alternative
placement that implements a student’s IEP “as closely as
possible” when a “similar” placement is unavailable.
C.
Finally, Ms. Davis wrongly assumes that, absent a stay-put
injunction, Braeden will be left without a remedy while the
District escapes its statutory obligation to provide him a FAPE.
As both the administrative hearing officer, HOD at 6 n.2, J.A.
189, and the district court observed, J.A. 229, § 1415(j) allows
the parties to agree on a temporary placement. Alternatively,
and outside the parameters of the stay-put provision, Ms. Davis
could seek traditional injunctive relief pursuant to the court’s
authority under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which broadly
authorizes the court to “grant such relief as the court determines
is appropriate.” See, e.g., Wagner,
335 F.3d at 303 (“The
difference between section 1415(j) and section
1415(i)(2)[(C)](iii) is that any preliminary injunction entered
under section 1415(i)(2)[(C)](iii) is by no means automatic.”);
see also Honig,
484 U.S. at 327 (“The stay-put provision in no
way purports to limit or preempt the [equitable] authority
conferred on courts.”).
17
Moreover, if the administrative hearing officer or the
district court ultimately find that the District has shirked its
statutory duties to provide a FAPE, compensatory education or
retroactive reimbursement may be warranted. See Burlington,
471 U.S. at 370; Olu-Cole,
930 F.3d at 530. But we have no
occasion to review the merits of Braeden’s FAPE claim at this
preliminary stage. That question should be litigated below in
the first instance.
…
To sum up, CSAAC’s unilateral decision to discharge
Braeden did not trigger the IDEA’s stay-put mandate because
the District did not refuse to provide a similar available
placement. Neither the text of § 1415(j) nor our previous
decisions applying the provision impose an affirmative duty on
the District to provide an alternative residential environment
when a student’s then-current placement becomes unavailable
for reasons outside the District’s control. And Ms. Davis’s
attempt to bring a substantive challenge on behalf of her son by
invoking the stay-put mandate is procedurally improper
because § 1415(j) is not intended to afford parties affirmative
relief, on the merits, in the form of an automatic injunction.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying
the stay-put injunction.
So ordered.
