Volume 80 — United States Reports

The findings of the court upon the facts . . . shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.” With this statute in force, Bethell sued Mathews in the court below on certain promissory notes. A written stipulatiou signed by the parties was filed, waiving a jury and submitting the cause for trial by the court. It was so tried, accordingly. Six bills of exception, all by the defendant, were taken to testimony offered by the plaintiff, and all overruled.

Flint brought an action on the case in the court below against the Norwich and New York Transportation Company, to recover damages for an injury received by him in June, 1864, while a passenger on their steamboat, running from New London to New York. The plaintiff, with othe'r passengers from Boston, went on board of the boat at New London about eleven o’clock in the evening.

Held: that he was liable as indorser, although no demand of payment had been made of A., or notice given to him, B., and though, thus in point of fact, B. (except in so far as it may have been prevented by his letter) had been, as indorser, discharged. 3.

” And under the act this lien may be enforced: (1.) By attachment, to be issued upon affidavit that the rent is due and unpaid; or, if not due, that the defendant is about to remove or sell all, or some, of said chattels; or, (2.) By judgment against the tenant and execution, to be levied on said chattels, or any of them, in whosesoever hands they may be found; or, (3.) By action against any purchaser of any of said chattels, with notice of the lien.

The United States sued Boyden and his sureties on bis official bond as receiver of public moneys for the district of lands subject to sale at Eau Claire, in the State of Wisconsin.

The claimant demanded $15,000 from the government by way of damages for breach of contract.

The statutes of California, in force in 1868, provided that “all property of every kind, name, and nature whatsoever within the State” (with certain exceptions), should be subject to taxation according to its value. In 1868, and for several years before, and at the time of commencing this action, Low and others were importing, shipping, and commission merchants in the city of San Francisco, California.

Clyde presented his petition in that court, claiming, by one count of it (the first), compensation for the use of his ferry-boat Tallacca.

Clyde, the claimant in the preceding case, presented his petition in that court, the same petition mentioned in that case, claiming by the second count of it compensation for the use of his barge William Hunt, as he had in the former appeal, claimed by the first count, compensation for the use of the Tallacca.

... makes any assignment, transfer, or conveyance of any part of his property ....

Held: that under the circumstances, the first decree was not a final decree; and that it was the first appeal and noff the second which should be dismissed. 8. The court approves the practice of entering decrees in form before taking appeals to this court.

<p>I. Where a receiver of public moneys has such moneys in his hands, which would not have been in his hands at all, if he had paid them over with the promptness that the acts of Congress and the Treasury Regulations made in pursuance of them, prescribing the duties of receivers, in this respect made it his duty to do, and which therefore—inasmuch as the duties of receivers under their official bonds are defined by those acts and Treasury Regulations—it was also his duty under his official bond to do,—evidence that the moneys were forcibly taken from him by the agents of the so-called “ Confederate States,” usurping the authority of the rightful government, and compelling obedience to itself exclusively throughout the State in which the receiver was, held to have been rightly refused in a suit by the government on the official bond of such receiver, as short of meeting the necessity of the case; it having been owing to the default of the receiver in not paying over promptly and at the right times, that the moneys were exposed to seizure, at all, by the rebel usurping government.</p> <p>2. Where there are no disputed facts in the ease, the court may properly tell the jury in an absolute form how they should find.</p>

This case, like the former, came here on error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The action was debt upon a marshal’s bond, conditioned for faithful performance of all the duties of the office of marshal.

W. Vanleer, a citizen of Tennessee, having died at Nashville, letters of administration were granted by the proper authority there to one Houston, on his estate. It seemed to be admitted by counsel that, at this time, Houston was a citizen of Tennessee. But he afterwards, it was equally admitted, was in Kentucky and domiciled there.

The sale for taxes took place on the 11th day of May, 1865, and she received a certificate stating the sale, and that she would “be entitled to a deed of conveyance of said land in three years from that date unless sooner redeemed according to law,” by payment of the amount bid, with interest and penalties; and accordingly, on the 12th day of May, A.D. 1868, she received the deed which she now sought to establish as the title to the land.

That from and after the passage of this act, every person, &e., who since the 1st day of June, A.D. 1840, has made or shall hereafter make a settlement in person on the public land . . . which has been, or shall have been, surveyed prior thereto, and who shall inhabit and improve the same, and who has or shall erect a dwelling thereon, shall be, and is hereby, authorized to enter with the register of the land office for the district in which such land may lie, by legal…

<p>The case of Johnson v. Towsley, held applicable although no patent certificate was issued to the claimant who showed the better right of pre-emption ; the general principle being laid down that when a party is deprived of his right of pre-emption otherwise perfect, by a mistaken construction of the act of Congress by the land department, equity will relieve.</p>

Gibson brought ejectment in the St. Louis Land Court against Chouteau, to recover sixty-four acres of land in the county of St. Louis, Missouri. By consent of parties the case was tried by the court >vithout a jury. On the trial the plaintiff claimed title to the demanded premises, under a patent of the United States issued to his immediate grantor, which he produced.

e., the 2(1 and 5th sections, not being specially important in this e.ase, and inserted only to give a more full view of the act: “Seo. 1.

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case stemming from the American Civil War (1861–1865) where Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase held that a Congressional statute "impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive" was unconstitutional.

” Under this act, Mrs. Lucy Carroll, administratrix of her husband, George Carroll, presented a claim for the proceeds in the treasury of certain cotton. The husband, as appeared from the findings of the court, resided in Arkansas during the first years of the late civil war, and had raised and was owner of certain cotton. He died in September, 1863. During his life he had given aid to the rebellion.

Held: in the case of the United States v. Klein, † that pardon granted upon conditions, blots out the offence, if proof is made of compliance with the conditions; *156 and that the person so pardoned is entitled to the restoration of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property, if suit be brought within “ two years after the suppression of the rebellion.” The proclamation of the 25th of December granted pardon…

Pargoud filed a claim in the court below to recover under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, the proceeds of certain cotton. This act, as by reference to its provisions, on page 151, supra, will be. seen, makes “proof that the claimant had never given aid or comfort to the late rebellion” a prerequisite to recovery. Pargoud’s petition, however, averred no loyalty at all.

Held: first, that the'condition in the contract, limiting the time within which suit could be brought, was, like the statute of limitation, susceptible of such enlargement, in point of time, as was necessary to accommodate itself to the precise number of days during which the plaintiff* was prevented from bringing suit by the existence of the war.

68,* provides, that “The importation of the articles hereinafter mentioned and embraced in this section shall be exempt from duty: “ 1 Animals, living, of all kinds; birds, singing and other, and land and water fowls.’ ” This provision being in force, an act of May 16th, 1866,† was passed, which provided— “That on and after the passage of this act there shall be levied, collected, and paid, on all horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs, and other live animals imported from…

Held: and that the defendant now held the same; that such seizure was made under claim and color of right and title, by virtue of the laws of Wisconsin'; publicly and notoriously, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff, and under like claim and color, and in like manner had since been held; that the plaintiff, at the time of such seizure, was seized in fee and was in possession of the laud described in…

Steinbach sued the Relief Eire Insurance Company or a policy of insurance against fire. The subject insured was described in writing, as follows, in the body of the policy: “ On his stock of fancy goods, toys, and other articles in his line of business, contained in the brick building situated, &c., and now in his occupancy as a German jobber and importer. Privileged to keep fire-crackers on sale.” The premium paid was 40 cents on the $100.

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

■ This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. It appeared from the record that Wade Hampton, Wade Hampton, Jr., and J. M. Howell, were defendants in the court below to an action of ejectment, and that the bill of exceptions, on which the writ of error was sued out, was tendered by them jointly.

Motion, by Mr. Bobert Leech, to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Montana; the case being thus: The 22d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789,‡ gives writs of error to Circuit Courts of the United States from this court in cases of “ final judgment,” in certain cases specified.

The Pennsylvania College Cases, also known as Trustees of Jefferson College in Canonsburg v. Washington and Jefferson College, was a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1871. Justice Nathan Clifford wrote the opinion, ruling in favor of Washington & Jefferson College. In 1865, two colleges in Washington County, Pennsylvania, Jefferson College in Canonsburg and Washington College in Washington merged to form Washington & Jefferson College, which maintained two campuses, one in each of the towns. That arrangement failed, and in 1869, the trustees voted to consolidate the two campuses in Washington. Shortly thereafter, a number of Canonsburg residents and dissident trustees of Jefferson College sued, claiming that the consolidation was unconstitutional.

Malinda Wilkinson in favor of her husband. Both husband and wife, prior to the rebellion, had been slaves, and the husband came to Keokuk, Iowa, from Missouri. The company did business in Keokuk (where the application was made and the policy delivered), through an agent, one Ball, to whom it furnished blank applications.

<p>Sur petition for a writ of prohibition to the judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.</p>

.. between a citizen of the State where the suit was brought, and a citizen of another State.” The 14th section of the same act, referring to certain courts of the United States, including the Circuit Courts, enacts: “ That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and…

, that “ this court cannot take cognizance under the Judiciary Act of 1802, of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court upon a motion to quash an indictment.” Messrs.

On the 23d of May, 1861, Burbank & Co. contracted with Major McKinstry, a quartermaster of the United States, to furnish transportation for all public stores from St. Paul to Port Abercrombie, at the rate of $2.90 per 100 lbs. The contract specified no period of duration, but the parties acted under and in pursuance of its terms, until the 19th of July, 1863.

Held: that his avowed present disloyalty to the government was a sufficient cause in itself for his discharge, irrespective of his refusal to take the oath; and as it did not appear that he was discharged for the latter cause, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to take jurisdiction of the case.

One section of the charter ran thus: “ It shall bo lawful for the president and directors to purchase with the funds of the company, and place on the said railroad, all machines, wagons, vehicles, carriages, and teams of any description whatsoever which may be deemed necessary for the purposes of transportation; and all the property purchased by the said president and directors, and that which may be given to the company, and the works constructed under the authority of this…

In the case just above adjudged and reported, the property of the railroad company could not by its charter be taxed under any circumstances. In the case of the charter of the railroad company now under consideration the exemption was limited to a term of fifteen years.

Held: and that must now be regarded as settled law, that, where rights of action are to be enforced, it will be considered as a citizen of the State where it was created, within the clause extending the judicial power of the United States to controversies between citizens of different States. * The defendant, therefore, must be regarded for the purposes of this action as a citizen of Wisconsin.

” Under and by virtue of this act, one Fraily, on the 3d of September, 1857, entered a quarter-section of land in Nebraska, at the land office for the Omaha land district, with the register thereof.

Amy brought suit in April, 18G9, against the county of Pendleton, in Kentucky, to recover the aggregate amount of certain coupons or interest warrants attached to fifty bonds of $1000 each. The bonds were dated October 15th, 1858, payable thirty years after date, and were alleged in •the declaration to have been made and issued by the county of Pendleton in virtue of authority conferred by the legislature of the State.

This was an action of ejectment for the possession of certain real property, situated in the city of St. Paul, in the State of Minnesota. The declaration was in the form usual in Minnesota. The plea was the general issue; and by consent of parties a jury was waived and the cause tried by the court. The plaintiff claimed the premises under a deed executed in 1864, by the auditor of Ramsey County of that State upon a sale for unpaid taxes.

This is an incomplete list of Supreme Court of the United States cases in the area of trademark law.

One Borland intervened as claimant. The question was whether the coal had been furnished on the credit of the vessel or on that of her owners only. The facts, as the court assumed them from the weight of the evidence, itself somewhat inconsistent, were thus: The Commercial Steamboat Company, a corporation of Rhode Island, owned and chartered certain steamers, the Kingfisher, &c., and. used them as a line of steamers from New York to Baltimore.

Held: shall be, and are declared to be severally, terms of the Supreme Court of- the District of Columbia; and the judgments, decrees, sentences, orders, proceedings, and acts of said general terms, special terms, circuit courts, district courts, and criminal courts heretofore or hereafter rendered, made, or had, shall be deemed judgments, decrees, sentences, orders, proceedings, and acts of said Supreme Court.” It may be…

<p>1. The treasury regulation, No. 22, forbidding all transportation of coin or bullion to any State or section declared by the President's proclamation to be in insurrection, was valid, and was authorized by the act of May 20lh, 1862.</p> <p>2. Gold coin in packages, and not used for travelling expenses, was merchandise in 1864, in point of fact, and was within the mischief to be remedied by' the non-intercourse acts of July 13th, 1861, and May 20th, 1862.</p> <p>8. The proclamation of pardon and amnesty' of President Johnson, of December 25th, 1868, was limited to persons “ who participated in the lato insurrection or rebellion,” and to the offence of “ treason against the United States, or adhering to their enemies during the late civil war.”</p> <p>4. It did not, therefore, restore to a person not engaged in the insurrection property forfeited under the non-intercourse laws, although the property remained in court, in proceedings not concluded when the proclamation was issued.</p>

, merchants of San Francisco, entered into a written agreement with Major T. T. Hoyt, assistant quartermaster of the United States, “to deliver,” on bis order, “1,000,000 bushels of first quality clear barley.” The barley, according to the terms expressed in the contract, was to be delivered between the 1st of July, 1867, and the 30th June, 1868, at such times and in such quantities as might be required, for the use of the government troops, and at certain posts named; the…

list 11 & Long allowed this suit in their names, for the use of certain insurance companies, against the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Company, to recover the value of cotton shipped by them on the road of the defendant as a common carrier, which was accidentally consumed by fire, while being transported, and “ became and was a total loss.” The cotton had been insured by Hall & Long against loss by fire, in the companies for whose use the suit was brought, and these…

The company founded its exemption on an act passed by the legislature of Michigan, on the 15th of February, 1859, for encouraging the manufacture of salt. The act was as follows: “Section 1.

This was a suit in equity to enforce the lien of two mortgages upon two steamers. The case was thus: On the 12th of July, 1864, one Slaughter, since deceased, purchased of the complainant, Gerson, a steamboat named the George Law, for the consideration of $40,000. Of this sum he paid $15,000 in cash, and for the balance gave to Gerson his bond, conditioned to pay the same in two instalments of $12,500 each in three and six months thereafter.

Alexander brought ejectment against Roulet and others in the court below to recover a piece of land in San Francisco, California. The title was thus: The conquest of California was complete, as decided by this court.,* July 7th, 1846.

During the night of the 16th and 17th, the rebel forces evacuated the forts about the harbor, and abandoned the city. At 9 o’clock on the morning of the 17th, an officer of the land force raised the national flag upon Forts Sumter, Kipley, and Pinckney. At 10 a militarj- officer reached Charleston; and the city surrendered itself, and the rebel stores, arms, and property there to him.

Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a State judge has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings under the writ when issued, for the discharge of a person held by the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States by an officer of that government.

Held: that this was a trust to buy the lands with the bonds at or near the price of $5 an acre; and not to buy them with the proceeds of the bonds after they were sold at a nominal price. 2. Purchasers who fraudulently purchased, in breach of the trust, held liable in trover. 8. The statute law of Arkansas has not changed the common law rule, that a husband cannot legally make a gift to his wife during coverture. 4.

Held: and among the rest the south half of block G, and pointed out such as ho thought the title of might be defective through him, and that Lownsdale agreed verbally for $2000 to give a confirmatory title to all the property thus submitted to him, “that he thought might require it.” Davenport accordingly paid the $2000, and Lownsdale gave to him a deed for half of block 75, and also a confirmatory deed for certain other…

Motion, by Mr. Edward Janin, to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a case wherein the Bank of West Tennessee was the plaintiff, and the Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana, defendant; the case having been brought into this court by a writ of error, issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.

Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434 (1872), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a federal tribunal that is not organized under Article III cannot use statutes referring to Article III courts to call a jury and cannot call a jury at all unless its operating statute grants that power to it. The tribunal in this case was an Article IV tribunal called a territorial court.

Held: accordingly, that a grant by a Departmental Assembly of a tract of land embracing an area of over two millions of acres, the grantees binding themselves to construct two wells for the relief and aid of travellers, and to establish two factories for the use of the State, and to protect them from hostile invasion, was void, whether such grant were approved by the governor or not.

Spalding brought an action at law against Tucker, to recover damages for the infringement of a patent for the use of movable teeth in saws and saw-plates. The plaintiff’s patent claimed the forming of recesses or sockets in saws or saw-plates for detachable or removable teeth on circular lines, and in combination with these recesses, teeth having their base or bottom parts formed on circular lines as described.

There was at the same time a large manufacturing company near Birmingham, England, called “The Patent Nut and Bolt Company,” of which one Watkins was the managing agent. Watkins being in this country, and at New Orleans, had some negotiation with Butler looking to an arrangement by which the company should largely assume the manufacture of cotton-ties under Butler’s patent, giving to him a share of-'the proceeds of sale.

Held: accordingly, after a grant under such circumstances, that the legitimacy could not be gone into by the complainants on a bill for distribution by the persons who had opposed the grant of letters, against the person to whom they had been granted; but on the contrary, that the complainants were estopped on that subject.

This was an appeal in admiralty from the decree of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York; the case being one arising from a collision between the steamer Ariadue and the brig William Edwards, and the questions being purely questions of fact.

Carpentier brought suit against Montgomery and a number of other defendants to recover certain lands in their possession, lying on the east side of the bay of San Francisco, and described in the complaint. Answers were put in by the defendants, severally claiming distinct portions of the lands.

” The exception of this 118th section is that: “ An executor or administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted.” And by the same section: “A trustee of an express trust within the meaning of this section, shall be construed to include a person with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another.” Other sections of the code…

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.</p> <p>This was an action for the possession of a tract of land situated in the county of Sacramento, in the State of California, “commencing at the corner of Main and Water Streets of the town of Sutter, at the east bank of the Sacramento River; running thence, in a northerly direction, up and along said river one-half of a mile; thence in an easterly direction one mile; thence southerly, at right angles, one-half mile; and thence westerly’, at right angles, one mile, to the place of beginning, containing three hundred and twenty acres.”</p> <p>The plaintiff derived his title by deed from a certain R. H. Vance, dated March 1st, 1862. Vance acquired his title through sundry mesne conveyances from John A. Sutter, to whom a grant of land, including the premises in controversy, was made in June, 1841, by the then governor of the Department of California. This grant was, in March, 1852, submitted to investigation under the act of Congress of March 8d, 1851, to ascertain and settle private laud claims in California, and was adjudged valid and confirmed by a decree of the Board of Commissioners created under that act, and by the District Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, to which the decision, of the board was carried on appeal. A patent of the United States pursuant to the decree followed to the grantee, bearing date in June, 1866. As this patent took effect by relation as of the day when the proceedings for its acquisition were instituted, in March, 1852, all the title and rights, which it conferred to the premises in controversy, enured to the benefit of the plaintiff claiming under the patentee, although the deed to him was executed before the patent wras issued.</p> <p>The defendants asserted title to the premises under a deed executed by the sheriff' of Sacramento County upon a sale on a judgment rendered for unpaid taxes assessed on the property for the year 1864, and the whole case turned upon the validity of this tax deed.</p> <p>By an act of California, passed in 1861, the district attorneys of the several counties of the State are authorized and required to commence actions for the recovery of taxes assessed upon real property and improvements thereon, which remain unpaid after a prescribed period.* Such actions are to be brought in the name, of the people in the courts having jurisdiction of the amount claimed in the counties where the property is situated, against the parties delinquent, the real property and improvements assessed, and against all owners or claimants of the same, known or unknown. The manner in which process issued in such actions shall be served, actually upon the defendants if found, and constructively upon defendants absent from the county, and upon the real property and improvements, is specially prescribed. The answers which shall be allowed therein are also designated, and all acts required between the assessment of the taxes and the commencement of the actions are declared to be directory merely. Personal judgments are only authorized against defendants, who are actually served with process or who appear in the actions; but judgments can be rendered, upon service of process by posting, against the real estate and improvements for the taxes assessed, severally against each, if they belong to different owners and are separately assessed, and jointly against both if they belong to the same owners.</p> <p>The act regulating proceedings in civil cases generally in the courts of the State, passed in 1851, and its several amendments, so far as they are not inconsistent with the special provisions of the act of 1861, are made applicable to proceedings under the latter act for the recovery of delinquent taxes, subject to the proviso that the sheriff in selling the property under the judgment “ shall only sell the smallest quantity that any purchaser will lake and pay the judgment and all costs.” By the act of 1851 the sheriff is required to sell property under ordinary'judgments to the highest bidder.</p> <p>A further act of the State, passed in May, 1862, in relation to suits of this character, provides for service of process by publication in a newspaper, as well as by posting, and authorizes the court, in enforcing the lien for taxes, to exercise all the powers which pertain to a court of equity in the foreclosure of mortgages, but at the same time it declares, that when the decree of the court contains no special directions as to the mode of selling, “ no more of the properly shall be sold than is necessary to pay the judgment and costs.”*</p> <p>The judgment under which the sale was made for which the deed in suit was executed to the defendants, was rendered in October, 1865, in an action brought against R. H. Vance, who had transferred his interest to the plaintiff in March, 1862, and against .John Doe, Richard Roe, and the real estate in controversy. It found that $118.75 of taxes were due on the property for the year 1864, and for that sum and the taxed costs, $37.65, and accruing costs, it directed that a sale of the property, or so much thereof as might be necessary, should be made in accordance with the statute, and the proceeds applied to pay the judgment and costs.</p> <p>The deed of the sheriff did not show a compliance in the sale of the property with the requirements of the statutes mentioned. It did not show that the smallest quantity of the property was sold for which a purchaser would pay the judgment and costs, or that any less than the whole property was ever offered to bidders, or that any opportunity was afforded them to take any less than the entire tract and pay the judgment and co3ts. The recitals of the deed were that the sheriff sold the land described to “ the highest bidder,” and for “ the largest sum bid for said property,” language which imported that the entire tract w7as offered in one body, and that there were more than one bidder, and of course that different sums were bid for it in this form.</p> <p>The court instructed the jury to find for the defendant; to which instruction the plaintiff excepted. Verdict was rendered on 3d of April, 1867; the bill of exceptions was signed and dated on the following 13th, and judgment on the verdict was entered on the following 26th, the court not having adjourned until after this date.</p> <p>On error brought by the plaintiff the main question was whether the departure of the officer from the requirements of the statutes rendered the sale invalid; a minor one—of practice—being to the bill of exceptions.</p> <p>1. The bill of exceptions, not having been tendered and signed at the trial, forms no part of the record, and, therefore, cannot be considered on this writ of error.*</p> <p>2. The recitals in the sheriff’s deed show compliance with the statute. Every presumption is in favor of the deed, which was made as the result of an action at law, and bears no analogy to a conveyance by a tax collector. The “ highest bidder” was the man who offered to pay the judgment and costs for the least quantity of land, and “the largest sum bid ” was the amount of the judgment and costs in connection with the least quantity of land, in other words, the sum which involved the highest appraisement of the value of the tract purchased.</p> <p>3. Policy and presumptions are in favor of purchasers under sheriff’s deed.†</p> <p>'4. The statute of California is directory as to the mode of executing the writ, especially under the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State.‡</p> <p>5. The remedy of the judgment debtor for a violation of law by the sheriff in the manner of executing the writ is by application to the court to set aside the sale. The sheriff"is also liable in damages.§</p> <p>6. Recitals in a sheriff’s deed, when not required in law, do not vitiate.*</p>

Held: that no bill in equity would lie by the new corporation against the mortgagees under the first mortgage, to be paid back (as paid under a mistake of fact), what hud been thus paid to them by the new corporation, or to be subrogated to their decree of foreclosure. Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin.

This was a petition by the State of Kentucky, through its constituted authority, asking this court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable G. S. Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, to deliver to the said State a warrant to which it alleged itself entitled for expenses incurred in defence of the Union.

Held: 1st, that a civil action of debt will lie, at the suit of the United States, to recover the forfeitures or penalties incurred under this section ; 2d, that the section is remedial, and not strictly penal in its character; and 8d, that the section applies to illegal importers as well as to accessories after the illegal importation. *532 2.

the gross amount of the compensation received by them, and employés male and female, in the Executive Mansion, and in any of the following-named departments, or any bureau or division thereof, to wit: State, Treasury, "War, Navy, Interior, Post Office, Attorney-General’s, Agricultural, and including civil officers and temporary, and all other clerks and employés. male and female, in the offices of. the Coast Survey, Naval Observatory, Navy Yard, Arsenal, Paymaster-General,…

Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1872), is a United States Supreme Court case that upheld a Kentucky law prohibiting African Americans from testifying against white defendants.

Motion by Mr. C. H. Hill, Assistant Attorney-General (Mr. Edioard Roby, opposing), to dismiss three appeals from the Circuit Ccurt for the Northern District of Illinois; the appeals being from decrees in equity dismissing the cases for want of jurisdiction.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri.</p>

Motion by Mr. W. H. Wadsworth, for the defendant in error (Mr. Cr.

Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 608 (1872), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held an agreement that transfers a copyright from the original author to a second party for perpetuity does not end with the statutory limit of copyright at the time the parties made the deal. If a later act of Congress extends copyright and the extension is available to the work, the second party still controls the copyright or perpetual license to that copyright. This is a notable departure from the Statute of Anne, a 1709 law from Great Britain that was influential in the United States's copyright history.

<p>Although equity have power to order the delivery up and cancellation of a policy of insurance obtained on fraudulent representations and suppressions of facts, yet it will not generally do so, when these representations and suppressions can be perfectly well used as a defence at law in a suit upon the policy. Hence a bill for such a delivery up and cancellation was held properly “ dismissed, without prejudice,” though the evidences of the fraud were considerable, there being no allegation that the holder of the policy meant to assign it; and suit on the policy having after the bill was filed been begun at law.</p>

Held: that there was no such “appropriation ” ns brought the ease within the act of July 4th, 1864, which enacts “ that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims shall not extend to or include any claim against the United States growing out of . . the appropriation of property by the army or navy . . engaged in the suppression of the rebellion.” Appeal from the Court of Claims; the case being thus: By the act of Congress of…

A subsequent act, however—that of July 4th, 1864—eu-acts that this jurisdiction “shall not extend to or include any claim against the United States growing out of the destruction or appropriation of or damage to property by the army or navy engaged in the suppression of the rebellion from the commencement to the close thereof” An act of July 2d, 1864,* amendatory of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act (an act which provides for taking possession and selling of captured…

, while such property was in the service of the United States, either by impressment or contract .... shall be allowed and paid the value thereof, at the time he entered the service. “ The claims provided for under this act,” continues the statute, “ shall be adjusted by the Third Auditor, under such rules as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War,” &c. A subsequent act† (March 3d, 1863), extends these pro visions so as to include all “steamboats and other vessels.”…

the reliance of that party having apparently been on the argument contained in the opinion given by Brown, C. J., in behalf of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Held: that negro slavery having been recognized as lawful at the time when and the place where the contract was made, and the contract *655 having heen one which at the time when it was made could have been enforced in the courts of every State of the Union, and in the courts of every civilized country elsewhere, the right to sue upon it was not to be considered as taken away by the 13th amendment above quoted, and passed…

Motion, by Mr. William Penn Clarice, for a writ of mandamus; the case being thus: The second section of an act of June 25th, 1868, relating to the Court of Claims, thus enacts: “That the said Court of Claims, at any time while any suit or claim is pending before or on appeal from said court, or within two years next after the final disposition of any suit or claim, may, on motion on behalf of the United States, grant a new trial in any such suit or claim, and stay the…

This was an action of assumpsit for money had and received, brought by The Great Western Insurance Company, of New York, against W. Thwing, a citizen of Massachusetts, to recover cértain insurance money which the company had paid to him in ignorance (as they alleged) of a breach of warranty by him.

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the role of secular courts adjudicating ecclesiastical disputes. In Watson, the Court held that in adjudications of church property disputes: (1) courts cannot rule on the truth or falsity of a religious teaching, (2) where a previous authority structure existed before the dispute, courts should defer to the decision of that structure, and (3) in the absence of such an internal authority structure, courts should defer to the wishes of a majority of the congregation.

On motion. The owners of the Chapman bad libelled in the District Court at New York, the steamtug Mabey and the sailing vessel Cooper, which the tug had been towing out to sea, for injuries caused to the Chapman by collision on the way out. The owners of both the tug and sailing vessel appeared in the District Court with their witnesses, but the owners of the tug soon withdrew from court, and gave no evidence in defence of the tug.