80 Wash. 2d
Volume 80 — Washington Reports, Second Series
81 opinions
- 80 Wash. 2d 1Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schroeter (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 7State v. Waggoner (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 13Newbury v. State Department of Public Assistance (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 19State v. MacK (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 28State v. Blubaugh (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 38West Am. Ins. Co. v. STATE FARM MUT. (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 38West American Insurance v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 44Royse v. Boldt (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 47State v. Stiltner (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 59Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. v. Port of Seattle (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 70In Re Estate of Boston (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 77Scymanski v. Dufault (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 91Wilson v. Lund (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 106Zorotovich v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 111Belancsik v. Overlake Memorial Hospital (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 117Pratt v. Thomas (1971)
- 80 Wash. 2d 121STATE EX REL. MANDATORY BUSSING v. Brooks (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 121State ex rel. Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 139Durocher v. King County (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 157Terry v. Puget Sound National Bank (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 161Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 173Silvernail v. County of Pierce (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 175State Ex Rel. Distilled Spirits Institute, Inc. v. Kinnear (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 196State v. Estill (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 201Osborn v. Public Hospital District 1 (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 209Bartz v. Board of Adjustment (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 222Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kennedy (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 242Hanson v. City of Seattle (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 252Parker v. City of Everett (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 254Lansinger v. Local Improvement District 6368 (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 262Snohomish County Board of Equalization v. Washington State Department of Revenue (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 266State Ex Rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 274Ashley v. Lance (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 283Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 293Friedlander v. Friedlander (1972)
<bold>[1] Divorce — Granting to Both Parties — Prejudice.</bold> Where both parties to a divorce action have sought and obtained a divorce from the other on similar grounds, neither can successfully allege as error the granting of the divorce to the other. <bold>[2] Divorce — Alimony — Determination — Needs of Wife —</bold> <bold>Accustomed Lifestyle.</bold> Alimony is not a matter of right, but is based on the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband to pay. The mere fact that a person has adjusted during marriage to a higher standard of living is not a measure of need. <bold>[3] Courts — Judicial Discretion — Abuse — What Constitutes.</bold> Abuse of judicial discretion is present when the court has exercised its discretion upon a ground, or to an extent, clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable. <bold>[4] Husband and Wife — Prenuptial Agreement — Nature and</bold> <bold>Purpose.</bold> A prenuptial or antenuptial agreement is one entered into by prospective spouses prior to marriage, and in contemplation and consideration thereof. The purpose of such an agreement is to secure or determine the property rights of one or both prospective spouses or their children. They are to be distinguished from postnuptial agreements which are made by couples who are already married. <bold>[5] Husband and Wife — Prenuptial Agreement — Consideration.</bold> Consideration for a prenuptial agreement can consist of the subsequent marriage itself or, independently of the marriage, it can consist of mutual waivers of property rights in the contract. <bold>[6] Husband and Wife — Prenuptial Agreement — Burden of Showing</bold> <bold>Fairness.</bold> The burden of establishing fairness of a prenuptial agreement generally rests on the party asserting the agreement. When the provision for the wife is disproportionate to the means of the husband, the burden is on the husband to show that the wife had full knowledge of all facts and circumstances that materially affected the contract, including property rights waived. The wife need not know the exact financial status of the husband but she must have at least a full and fair disclosure of all material facts relating to the amount, character, and value of the property involved in order to intelligently determine whether she desires to enter the contract. She must freely and voluntarily sign the agreement with full and independent knowledge of her rights. <block_quote> [See Ann. 27 A.L.R.2d 883; 41 Am.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife § 314.]</block_quote> <bold>[7] Husband and Wife — Prenuptial Agreement — Public Policy.</bold> Prenuptial agreements freely and intelligently made are generally regarded as conducive to marital tranquility and are looked upon with favor.<page_number>Page 294</page_number> <bold>[8] Husband and Wife — Prenuptial Agreement — Relationship of</bold> <bold>Parties.</bold> Parties entering into a prenuptial agreement are in a relationship of confidence and trust rather than at arms length, and are required to exercise good faith, candor, and sincerity in all matters bearing on the proposed agreement. <bold>[9] Appeal and Error — Findings of Fact — Review — In General.</bold> Findings of fact entered on substantial evidence must be accepted as verities on appeal. <bold>[10] Appeal and Error — Conclusions of Law — Review — In</bold> <bold>General.</bold> Conclusions of law must be upheld on appeal when supported by the findings of fact. <bold>[11] Divorce — Disposition of Property — Factors Considered.</bold> In a divorce action all property of the parties, regardless of its nature or characterization by the parties, is before the court for distribution pursuant to RCW 26.08.110, which requires that the distribution be just and equitable. In addition to the statutory considerations in awarding the property, the court should consider the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband, the parties' ages, health, education, and employment history and training, as well as future earning prospects. The court should give regard to the nature of the property and the value of the parties' respective contributions to the community, and possible fault of one or the other in causing the divorce. The primary concern is the economic condition in which the decree will leave them. <block_quote> UTTER, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.</block_quote>
- 80 Wash. 2d 307Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 327Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 338Koehn v. Pinnock (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 343State v. Sonneland (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 362Rainier Avenue Corp. v. City of Seattle (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 372Golconda Mining Corp. v. Hecla Mining Co. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 382State Ex Rel. Guthrie v. City of Richland (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 392In Re Petition of Port of Seattle (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 400State Ex Rel. Morgan v. Kinnear (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 406National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 427State v. Boggs (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 438State v. Belmont Improvement Co. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 445Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 461Weaver v. Evans (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 492State v. Satiacum (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 496Anderson v. Anderson (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 502Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 518Buell v. City of Bremerton (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 531Johnson v. Moore (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 547Sorenson v. City of Bellingham (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 561Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 590Dravo Corp. v. City of Tacoma (1972)
<bold>[1] Municipal Corporations — Taxation — Business and Occupation</bold> <bold>Tax — In General.</bold> Cities have the authority to levy business and occupation taxes. <bold>[2] Taxation — Power to Tax — Territorial Limits.</bold> A taxing authority has no power to levy a tax upon activities which occur outside its territorial limits. [See 51 Am. Jur., Taxation (1st ed. §§ 58, 64).] <bold>[3] Taxation — Statutes — Construction — Taxing Statutes.</bold> The principle that a taxing statute or ordinance must be construed most strongly against the taxing power and in favor of the taxpayer is inapplicable unless the statute is ambiguous or its meaning doubtful. <bold>[4] Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax — "Accepting and</bold> <bold>Executing the Contract."</bold> A municipal business and occupation tax ordinance in which one of the taxable events is "accepting and executing the contract" when doing business with that municipality, refers to the activity of <italic>entering</italic> <italic>into</italic> a contract, not to the <italic>performing</italic> of the contract. <bold>[5] Taxation — Taxable Event — Location of Event — Indicia.</bold> When the totality of the factual indicia surrounding a taxable event lead to the conclusion, and are sufficient to establish, that for taxation purposes, the event occurred at a specific location, this conclusion will determine which taxing authority may claim the event. <bold>[6] Taxation — Taxable Event — Determination — Amount and Time</bold> <bold>of Collection — Effect.</bold> The fact that the measure and the schedule of collection of a tax are directly related to an activity other than the taxable event does not, by itself, indicate an indirect taxation of the other activity. <bold>[7] Taxation — Power to Tax — Due Process of Law.</bold> In order to tax an event within its territorial limits, a taxing authority must provide an environment of service and protection to the taxpayer, in return for his taxes, which enables him to engage in the activity that is the subject of the tax. Due process is satisfied when there is a reasonable relationship between the event taxed and the benefit conferred so as to provide a definite link, or nexus, between the taxing authority and the taxable event. <bold>[8] Taxation — Measure of Tax — Relationship to Taxable Event.</bold> The measure of a tax must reasonably relate to the taxable event. When examining a challenged tax statute to determine if the relationship of the measure and the event are constitutionally sufficient the court must consider the practical operation of the tax<page_number>Page 591</page_number> to determine its economic effect. There is no constitutional objection to use of extraterritorial elements in determining the measure of the tax. <bold>[9] Taxation — Measure of Tax — Income Producing Activities.</bold> The gross proceeds of a retail sale bear a substantial relationship to the value of a retail selling activity and may properly constitute the measure of a tax on an activity defined as "selling at retail." <bold>[10] Taxation — Business and Occupation Tax — Apportionment —</bold> <bold>Applicability.</bold> RCW <cross_reference>82.04.460</cross_reference> and similar ordinances providing for apportionment of tax liability, is not applicable when a taxable event occurs entirely within the taxing jurisdiction; activities which only enhance the measure of the tax and which occur outside the taxing jurisdiction have no effect on the question of apportionment. WRIGHT and UTTER, JJ., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
- 80 Wash. 2d 604In Re Schatz (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 624State Department of Motor Vehicles v. McElwain (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 629Voetberg v. State Department of Motor Vehicles (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 630Harris v. Kuhn (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 633Roza Irrigation District v. State (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 642Cook v. Cook (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 652Schurk v. Christensen (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 668Bixler v. Hille (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 672State Ex Rel. Graham v. City of Olympia (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 690Hynes v. Ravetti (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 695Rao v. Board of County Commissioners (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 701Brow v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 707Deutsch v. West Coast MacHinery Co. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 720Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 722In Re Estate of Riemcke (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 736Baker v. Baker (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 749Wenatchee Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mission Ridge Estates (1972)
<bold>[1] Liens — Proceedings — Claim — Contents — Engineering</bold> <bold>Services.</bold> RCW 60.48.020, which provides that liens for engineering services shall be established and foreclosed in the same manner as liens for clearing and otherwise improving real estate (RCW 60.04.040), makes such reference to chapter 60.04 only for the procedural steps necessary to perfect the lien and for the manner in which the lien is to be foreclosed. A claim of lien under RCW 60.48 for engineering services is insufficient if filed in the general nonspecific form authorized by RCW 60.04.060, since one claiming such a lien must assert rendition of a particular service specified in RCW 60.48. [See 53 Am.Jur.2d, Mechanics Liens § 219.] <bold>[2] Liens — Commingling of Lienable and Nonlienable Items —</bold> <bold>Effect.</bold> When items in a lien claim are commingled in such a manner that one is unable to determine with certainty which claims are lienable and which are not, the entire lien is of no effect.
- 80 Wash. 2d 749Wen. Fed. S. & L. v. Mission Rdg. Est. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 755Moen v. Erlandson (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 783Lee v. Cloes (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 784Jacqueline's Washington, Inc. v. Mercantile Stores Co. (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 797Hall v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 804Lundmark v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance (1972)
- 80 Wash. 2d 808State v. Bowen (1972)