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299 U.S. 171

Schafer v. Helvering

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued November 17, 1936.

Decided December 7, 1936.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1936-12-07

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"§ 1.471-5 Inventories by dealers in securities ****** “ * * * For the purposes of this section, a dealer in securities is a merchant of securities, whether an individual, partnership, or corporation, with an established place of business, regularly engaged in the purchase of securities and their resale to customers; that is, one who as a merchant buys securities and sells them to customers with a view to the gains and profits that may be derived therefrom. * * * Taxpayers who buy and sell or hold securities for investment or speculation, irrespective of whether such buying or selling constitutes the carrying on of a trade or business * * * are not dealers in securities within the meaning of this section.””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Mirro-Dynamics Corp. v. United States, United States v. Ross

“(a) At cost, (b) At cost or market, whichever is lower, or (c) At market value,”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Lauderdale v. Commissioner, Lauderdale v. Commissioner

Relies on Seeley v. Helvering · Commissioner v. Stevens · Hammitt v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Cited in Case Law’s definition of “dealer in securities”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 8–0 · Decided 1936-12-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 108 later decisions (7 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2007 · most notably Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner (1957), Kemon v. Commissioner (1951)

40 federal appellate · 6 district · 2 state decisions

39019361940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. Eugene Untermyer, with whom Mr. Edgar J. Goodrich was on the brief, for petitioners.

¶2Assistant Attorney General Jackson, with whom Solicitor General Reed and Messrs. Sewall Key, Carlton Fox, and Charles A. Horsky were on the brief, for respondent.

¶4Mr. Justice McReynolds

¶5delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶6Petitioners in these three causes were partners in Schafer Brothers, brokers at 120 Broadway, and member of the New York Stock Exchange. The firm traded for others; also bought and sold securities for itself. The *172latter were carried on its books in the so-called “Error Account.”

¶7In order to ascertain the partners’ taxable profits during 1929 the Commissioner held that securities in that account should be valued at their cost price; that as to them the partnership was not a dealer permitted to use inventories under Article 105, Treasury Regulations 74. Accordingly he found material deficiencies against each of the petitioners. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained his action; the court below affirmed.

¶8The petition, upon which we granted the writs, states this as the “question presented”: “Was the partnership of which these petitioners were members a ‘dealer in securities’ as to securities bought and sold for its own account, and as such entitled to inventory such securities at cost or market, whichever was lower, in computing its income for 1929? . . . Determination of the amount thus to be included in the income of each petitioner depends upon the basis upon which the partnership income is computed.”

¶9And as “reasons for granting the writs” it averred: “(1) The decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, is in irreconcilable conflict on a matter of statutory interpretation with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Stevens, 78 F. (2d) 713, and with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Commissioner v. Charavay, 79 F. (2d) 406. (2) The precise question of statutory construction here presented is one of general public importance which has never been settled, and should be determined by this Court because of the number of pending cases involving the question, as well as the frequent occasions that the question is bound to arise in the future.”

¶10Our consideration is confined to the issue so tendered by the petition.

¶11*173Commissioner v. Stevens and Commissioner v. Charavay, supra,turned on the question whether Stevens and Legg, a “Specialist” on the New York Stock Exchange, was a dealer whose profits should be determined upon inventories under Article 105, Treasury Regulations 74. The Board of Tax Appeals held it was, and the Circuit Court of Appeals in both the Second and Third Circuits approved that view. Considering the differing circumstances, we find no real conflict between the holdings in those cases and the ruling below. See Vaughan v. Commissioner, 85 F. (2d) 497.

¶12Pertinent provisions, Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, and Treasury Regulations 74, are in the margin.*

¶13*174Schafer Brothers was not a “Specialist” in the stocks entered in its “Error Account.” The Board of Tax Appeals found: “The stocks in dispute were purchased for the firm’s own account solely in expectation of a rise in the market, for sale to anyone at a profit ‘as distinguished from a purchase to create a stock of securities to take care of future buying orders in excess of selling orders.’ ” “They were purchased solely in expectation of a rise in the market, for the partnership’s own account for resale, to any buyer, at a profit. The meaning of ‘dealer in securities,’ as defined in the controlling regulation, has 'been considered many times by the courts, and this Board. It is limited to one who, as a merchant, buys and sells securities to customers for the profit thereon.”

¶14The evidence adequately supports these findings.

¶15Seeley v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 323, Hammitt v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 494, and Vaughan v. Commissioner, supra, axe in harmony with our conclusion.

¶16We find no adequate reason for disturbing the challenged judgment, and it is

¶17, Affirmed.

¶18Mr. Justice Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

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