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82 Me. 379

Ames v. Shaw

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided February 19, 1890

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1890-02-19

On MOTION. This was a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, in a ease submitted to the presiding justice without the intervention of a jury, and in which judgment was ordered for the plaintiff. The action was case. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently and carelessly left open a gate, which plaintiff had built across a private way over Ms own land.

Relies on Short v. Devine · Bakeman v. . Talbot · Brill v. . Brill

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1890-02-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently March 2011

7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Haskell, J.

¶1The motion is grounded upon evidence tending to establish a way by adverse use, distinct and separate from the one described in the Raynes deed that was supposed, at the trial, to be the way in dispute.

¶2Suppose this contention be established, the respective rights of the parties are the same. The deed grants an agricultural way, and the evidence reported shows no more than a way of the same kind, a way for agricultural purposes. It is true that a way gained by adverse use gives rights commensurate with the adverse use, but if the use be for agricultural purposes only, then the way becomes a way for that use, a use to be exercised in a reasonable manner; and reasonable use of a way for agricultural purposes, whether created by grant or adverse user, may pu’operly be subjected to gates and bars not unreasonably established. The way may be gained without being so obstructed at all, but it is nevertheless a way for a particular use, and in the enjoyment of that use, unreasonable obstructions only are prohibited. The nature of the easement gained determines its character, and not the particular manner of the use that created the right. Short v. Devine, 146 Mass. 119 ; Bean v. Coleman, 44 N H. 539 ; Bakeman v. Talbot, 31 N. Y. 366; Brill v. Brill, 108 N. Y. 511; Maxwell v. McAtee, 9 B. Mon. 20.

¶3Since the case shows the defendant entitled to a way for agricultural purposes only, it is immaterial whether his rights arise under the deed or by adverse user, and a new trial could do him no good. The decision in either case would be the same. The *383plaintiff did not unreasonably obstruct tbe defendant’s way, and he must use it subject thereto.

¶4Motion overruled.

Peters, C. J., Walton, Virgin, Emery and Foster, JJ., concurred.
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