83 Ind.
Volume 83 — Indiana Reports
156 opinions
- 83 Ind. 1Riley v. Davis (1882)
<p>From the Marion Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 4Grave v. Bunch (1882)
<p>Prom the Randolph Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 9Richmond Street Railroad v. Reed (1882)
<p>From the Wayne Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 14Belknap v. Caldwell (1882)
<p>Fbaud. — Parties.— Complaint. — In a suit for relief from fraud, against several defendants, where as to one of them the complaint fails to show any knowledge of or connection with it, he is not a proper party, and a demurrer by him should be sustained.</p> <p>Pleading. — Money Had and Received. — A complaint for money had and received by A., and to enjoin B. from asserting any claim thereto, which fails to show that B. claimed the money, is, as to him, bad on demurrer.</p>
- 83 Ind. 18Copenrath v. Kienby (1882)
<p>From the Newton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 25Mills v. Todd (1882)
<p>Pbactice. — Pleading.—Where tlie general denial is pleaded, a special paragraph controverting some of the averments of the complaint is useless,, and there is no available error in sustaining a demurrer to it.</p> <p>Contbact. — Extension of Time. — Forbearance to Sue. — An agreement to extend the time for the payment of a debt for a limited period, even if founded on a sufficient consideration, is in substance an agreement not to sue within the time, and can not be pleaded in bar.</p> <p>Same. — Considmtion.—Interest.—A parol agreement to give definite time, beyond one year, for the payment of a debt, in consideration of a promise to pay the same rate of interest which the original contract would, bear, is void.</p>
- 83 Ind. 28Sanders v. Farrell (1882)
<p>From the Henry Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 36Reynolds v. Bond (1882)
<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 43Pipes v. Hobbs (1882)
<p>Partition. — Gomplaint.—Title.—A complaint for partition complies -with the statute (R. S. 1881, section 1187,) requiring the rights and titles of the parties to be stated, if it avers that the plaintiff and defendants are the owners in fee simple and tenants in common of the real estate (described); that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the undivided one-fourth, and the defendants of the remaining three-fourths thereof.</p> <p>Same. — New Trial as of Right on Payment of Costs. — In partition, prior to the act of 1881, where there was no pleading seeking to recover imssession- or quiet title, a new trial as of right on payment of costs was not given-</p>
- 83 Ind. 48Hunt v. Campbell (1882)
<p>From the Porter Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 55Wilburn v. Wilburn (1882)
<p>From the Spencer Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 57Baltimore, Ohio & Chicago Railroad v. Johnson (1882)
<p>Supreme Court. — New Trial. — Evidence.—No question is presented for decision in the Supreme Court on the overruling of a motion for a new-trial, when the evidence is not in the record.</p> <p>Same. — Appeal.—Amount in Controversy. — Where, in an action originating-before a justice of the peace, the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is less than fifty dollars, no appeal will lie to the Supreme Court (R. S. 1881, section 632).</p>
- 83 Ind. 58Clark v. Merriam (1882)
<p>From the White Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 60Dant v. State (1882)
<p>LiquobLaw. — Sale of Intoxicating Liquors. — Evidence.—In a prosecution for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, it is not necessary to show by direct and positive testimony that the liquor was intoxicating; it may be shown by circumstantial evidence.</p>
- 83 Ind. 62Travellers Insurance v. Brouse (1882)
<p>From the Johnson Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 67Bishop v. State ex rel. Lord (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 76Murphy v. City of Indianapolis (1882)
<p>Negligence.— Oily.— Street. — Surface Water.— Complaint.— A. complaint against a city for personal injury resulting from a defective street, which, with the other necessary averments, alleges that the city had negligently permitted the street to become dangerous to use, and that the plaintiff was without fault, is good on demurrer, though it appear that the street had never been improved or graded, that the defect was caused by the action of surface water, and that the plaintiff had knowledge of it.</p>
- 83 Ind. 78Start v. Clegg (1882)
<p>Evidence. — Proof of Title to Real Estate. — Possession.—Conveyance.—Title to real estate, where there is no actual possession, must be shown by conveyance, either from the original source of title, or from some one in possession.</p> <p>Same. — Practice.—Harmless Error. — "Where the evidence to show title to real estate consists of a series of deeds not reaching back to the original source of title, without any evidence that any of the grantors had possession, it is utterly insufficient, and striking it out is a harmless error.</p>
- 83 Ind. 86Smith v. Zent (1882)
<p>Judgment. — Reversal.—Property Sold Pending Appeal. — Measure of Damages. A party whose personal property has been sold upon an execution issued upon a judgment rendered against him may, after the reversal of such judgment, recover from the judgment plaintiff the value of the property thus sold, and is not restricted in his recovery to the price for which the property sold.</p>
- 83 Ind. 89Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Davis (1882)
<p>Railroad. — Killing or Injuring Animals. — Action is Local. — Jurisdiction.— Under the statute providing compensation to the owner of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any railroad company in this State, section 4026, R. S. 1881, the owner’s action is-local, and he must allege in his complaint, as a j urisdictional fact, that his animals were killed or injured in the county where he brings his. suit. Otherwise the complaint will be bad, on demurrer thereto, for the-want of sufficient facts; but where such complaint contains a description of the land where the railroad’s road-bed was located, and avers that the-animals were there injured, and avers that the land so described was in the county where the suit is brought, the complaint is sufficient to repel a demurrer for want of an allegation of jurisdiction.</p>
- 83 Ind. 92Mobley v. State ex rel. Swan (1882)
<p>Bastardy. — Transcript of Justice. — The transcript of the proceedings before a justice of the peace, in a bastardy case, need not contain a copy of the charge.</p> <p>Same. — Verdict.— Venire de nemo. — A general verdict in bastardy proceedings for the plaintiff, “and that the defendant is the father of the bastard child,” is good against a motion for a venire ele novo. It implies that the child was born alive.</p> <p>Practice. — Special Instruction. — If a party desires a special instruction, going beyond one given, which is good as far as it goes, he must request it; otherwise he can not complain of the one given.</p> <p>Same.— Questions, How Presented on Appeal. — An appellant can not, in the Supreme Court, raise questions, nor urge grounds of objection or exception, which were not presented to the trial court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 94Froman v. Rous (1882)
<p>From the Switzerland Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 96Thompson v. Parker (1882)
<p>Judgment. — Revivor.—Lien.—Proceedings to revive a judgment against the heirs of a judgment defendant, so as to have execution against lands inherited by them, must be brought in the court where the judgment was rendered, and an independent suit therefor in another county, where a transcript had been filed, to obtain a lien, can not be maintained, where the lands have, without fraud, passed to a purchaser.</p> <p>Pbaududent Conveyance.— Trust.— Voluntary Assignment.— Prefemng Creditors. — A conveyance to another, by an insolvent debtor, of all his property, in trust, to pay certain creditors, to the exclusion of others, and return the balance of the proceeds to the debtor, is fraudulent and void as to the creditors excluded, by reason of the statute concerning voluntary assignments. R. S. 1881, sections 2662, 2683.</p> <p>Statute of Limitations. — Pleading.—Demumr.—A. demurrer raises no question under the statute oi limitations, where the pleading demurred to does not show affirmatively that the case is not within any of the exceptions to the statute.</p> <p>Acceptance. — Contract for Benefit of Stranger. — Pleading.— Vendor and Purchaser. — A purchaser of real estate agreed in writing with his vendor, as part cf the consideration, to pay a certain j udgment against the vendor, which was afterwards assigned to the plaintiff. The complaint upon this ■agreement did not show that either the plaintiff or his assignor had accepted or consented to this agreement, or become a party to it, or that the plaintiff had any interest in it.</p> <p>Held, that the complaint was bad on demurrer.</p> <p>Same.. — Bescission.—A contract containing a promise for the benefit of a stranger to the contract, may be .rescinded by the parties thereto, at any time before the stranger accepts it or consents to it.</p>
- 83 Ind. 108Wilson v. McVey (1882)
<p>Promissory Note. — Principal and Swrety. — Tender.—Answer.—To a complaint on a promissory note, an answer by tlie surety, that, after the note matured, the principal tendered to the payee the amount due in goods, which the surety offered, at the same time, to take and pay for, which offer the payee refused and suffered the principal to become insolvent, is bad. So, also, is an answer alleging, in addition, that the surety counted out and offered to the plaintiff the full amount of the note and interest, and the latter refused to accept the money.</p>
- 83 Ind. 110Corwin v. Thomas (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 112Lofton v. Moore (1882)
<p>From the Washington Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 121Pine Civil Township v. Huber Manufacturing Co. (1882)
<p>From the Warren Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 124Hassinger v. Newman (1882)
<p>From the Noble Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 126Thetge v. State (1882)
<p>Criminal Law.— Verdict. — New Trial. — Where, on the trial of a criminal cause, the verdict of the jury finds the defendant guilty of an act which, in the nature of things, he could not commit, which the law does not recognize as an offence, and with the commission of which he is not charged, such verdict is contrary to law, and a motion for a new trial, for that cause, ought to be sustained and a new trial granted.</p>
- 83 Ind. 129Bannister v. Jett (1881)
<p>Practice. — Open and Glose. — The refusal of the trial court to award the defendant, upon whom the burden of the issues rests, the open and close of the case before the jury, is such error as will reverse the judgment.</p> <p>Judgment. — Set-Off.—In an action upon a judgment, the fact that a set-off existed before the rendition of the judgment does not preclude the defendant from availing himself of it as a defence to such action.</p>
- 83 Ind. 131First National Bank v. Deitch (1882)
<p>From the Henry Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 135Mackison v. Clegg (1882)
<p>From the Clark Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 136State v. Brumfiel (1882)
<p>From the Fayette Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 139Chandler v. Ruebelt (1882)
<p>Intoxicating Liquor. — Application for License to Sell.— Competency of Juror. —Case Distinguished. — One who is firm in the belief that none but an immoral man would sell or apply for license to sell intoxicating liquors, is not a competent juror in a case of application for such license. Elliott y. State, 73 Ind. 10, distinguished.</p> <p>Same. — Evidence.—An applicant for license to sell liquors must prove by a preponderance of evidence, that he is fit to be trusted with such license.</p>
- 83 Ind. 143Perry v. Randall (1882)
<p>From the Randolph Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 147Gipson v. Shanklin (1882)
<p>From the Clinton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 152Smith v. Ryan (1882)
<p>Assignment of Errors. — Supreme Court. — Finding for Appellees.- — A specification in an assignment of errors, “ that the court erred in finding for the appellees,” is void and presents no question.</p> <p>Bill of Exceptions. — Time of Filing. — A bill of exceptions, filed after the' expiration of the time granted, is not a part of the record.</p>
- 83 Ind. 153Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Wilkerson (1882)
<p>Railroad. — Killing Stock. — Complaint.—-Venue.—Jurisdiction.—A complaint against a railroad company, under the statute providing compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars or locomotives of railroad companies, section 4026, R. S. 1881, which avers that the road was located upon a certain section of land in the county where the action was brought, that a portion of the road upon said section was not fenced, and by reason thereof the stock went upon the road and was then and there injured, sufficiently shows that the injury occurred in the county.</p>
- 83 Ind. 155LaPlante v. Lee (1882)
<p>From the Knox Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 157Bishop v. Redmond (1882)
<p>Fraudulent Conveyance.— Oreditcn•, Who Is. — One who has a legal right to damages, capable of enforcement by judicial process, is a creditor; and a claim for the maintenance of an illegitimate child or for seduction will support an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made for the purpose of defeating such claim.</p> <p>'Same. — Subsequent Creditors.— Wife. — Divorce.—Alimony.—Where a grantor, .intending to defraud those who may thereafter become his creditors, makes a conveyance to one who has knowledge of the corrupt purpose, it may be set aside by such subsequent creditors; and a wife, suing for divorce and alimony, may be such a creditor.</p> <p>Same. — Conspiracy.—Eoidence.—Declarations.—Where a fraudulent conveyance is made in part execution of a conspiracy to defraud a third person, the declarations of the grantor made after the execution of the conveyance, but before the accomplishment of the purpose of the conspiracy, are admissible in evidence against the other conspirators.</p> <p>Same. — Consideration.—Where a grantee takes a conveyance for the purpose of aiding the grantor in defrauding his creditors, the fact that he pays a valuable consideration does not divest the conveyance of its fraudulent character.</p> <p>Seduction. — Marriage.—Conspiracy.—Fraud— Where a conspiracy is formed for the purpose of defeating the claim of a woman for her seduction, in which a fraudulent purpose to marry and then abandon her enters into and forms a part thereof, the claim for damages for the seduction is not defeated by a marriage entered into for the purpose of carrying such .scheme into execution.</p> <p>Evidence. — Conspirators.—Declarations.—The declarations of one conspirator concerning the common purpose, made before the conspiracy is accomplished, are admissible in evidence against his confederates.</p> <p>Practice. — Instructions.—Where instructions are correct as far as they go, and are relevant to the case made by the evidence, there is no such error as will warrant a reversal. A party who desires more specific instructions than those given must ask them.</p> <p>Same. — Proof.—It is sufficient if the substance of the issue is proved.</p> <p>Same. — Interrogatories to Jury.— Verdict. — All the answers of the jury are • to be taken together, and if, when so taken, there is no irreconcilable conflict between them and the general verdict, the judgment must be given upon it.</p>
- 83 Ind. 163Hutson v. Pressnall (1882)
<p>From the Henry Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 167Baltimore, Ohio & Chicago Railroad v. Crissman (1882)
<p>Prom the Porter Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 171State v. Beebe (1882)
<p>Criminal Law. — Pleading. — Certainty. — Affidavit and Information. — In charging offences, the same certainty is required in the affidavit and information that is necessary in an indictment, and the information must he quashed if the affidavit upon which it is based is insufficient.</p> <p>Same.— Venue. — An affidavit, like an indictment, must in some manner name with certainty the county and State in which the offence charged was committed.</p>
- 83 Ind. 173Slipher v. Earhart (1882)
<p>Railroad. — Subscription for Stock. — Condition.—Waiver.—Promissory Note.— The defendant subscribed for shares of the stock of a railroad company, payable on certain conditions, one of which was that the road should be built to E. prior to a certain date. Subsequently, he gave notes for the amount, payable on the happening of the conditions, except the one above specified.</p> <p>Meld, that the omitted condition was thereby waived.</p> <p>¿Same. — Stock Certificate. — Tender.—A subscriber for the stock of a railroad company can not defeat a recovery of his subscription, on the ground that no certificate of stock has been tendered to him.</p>
- 83 Ind. 180Leslie v. State (1882)
<p>Criminal Law. — Practice.—Change of Venue. — Transcript.—Copy of Indictment. — Jurisdiction.—Upon a change of venue in a criminal case, the transcript need not contain a copy of the indictment, and the setting out of an inaccurate copy will not affect the jurisdiction of the court to which the change was ordered.</p> <p>Same. — Upon a change of venue in a criminal case, the trial proceeds upon the original indictment, which need not he copied into, hut must be transmitted with, the transcript of the proceedings of the court from which the change is taken.</p> <p>Same. — Motion in Arrest. — Amendment of Record. — Nunc Pro Turne Entry.— Pending a motion in arrest in a criminal case tried upon a change of venue, the court may permit a nune pro tunc entry, showing the filing by its clerk of the original papers and transcript of the record of the court from which the change was taken.</p> <p>Same. — Transmission of Papers. — Record.— Presumption.— On a change of venue in a criminal ease, it is not necessary that the record of the court to which the change is had shall show affirmatively a transmission and deposit of the papers by the proper sheriff. This will be presumed, the record not showing the contrary.</p>
- 83 Ind. 183Sidener v. Coons (1882)
<p>Judgment. — Correction of Record as to Amount. — Promissory Rote. — Mistake.— Practice. — -Where a judgment by default is taken upon a promissory note, and, by mistake in computation, the amount of the judgment is incorrect, the record may be corrected on motion, after the lapse of two years. The proceeding is not controlled by section 396, R. S. 1881, and it seems that the sufficiency of the application can not be tested by demurrer.</p>
- 83 Ind. 188Headrick v. Brattain (1882)
<p>From the Henry Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 191Umback v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. (1882)
<p>Negugeece. — Master and Servant. — Defective Machinery. — Injury to Servant. — Wben a servant of mature age voluntarily continues in an employment, tbe hazards of which he knows are increased by reason of the use by his principal of faulty machinery, he can not recover for injury resulting from the use of such machinery.</p> <p>Same. —Case Criticised. — St. Louis and South-Eastern Railway Company v. Valirius, 56 Ind. 511, as to the nature and extent of a master’s duty to his servant to furnish safe appliances and machinery, criticised.</p>
- 83 Ind. 195Hoover v. Malen (1882)
<p>From the Miami Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 196Gilmore v. Hamilton (1882)
<p>From the Union Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 200Fleece v. O'Rear (1882)
<p>Promissory Note.— Payment.— Decedents’ Estates.— The application of money belonging to an estate by an administrator upon Ms individual note, which money is afterwards recovered from the payee, does not operate as a payment of the note.</p> <p>Same.— Vendor’s Lien. — Husband and Wife. — Where land for which such note is given is conveyed by the payee to the wife of the maker at the time of such application, and such wife pays no other consideration for the land, and has notice of all the facts, the payee of such note, notwithstanding such attempted payment, retains a vendor’s lien upon the land against such wife for the amount due upon such note, and this lien may be enforced against the land, notwithstanding the fact that the payee may also have the right to recover from the administrator the amount of money recovered from the payee.</p>
- 83 Ind. 204Sager v. Schnewind (1882)
<p>From the Porter Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 208Ridenour v. Miller (1882)
<p>Practice. — Defective Verdict.— Venire de Novo. — Where it appears on .the face of the record, that the verdict of the jury is defective and imperfect, because it contains no finding and assesses no damages on one of the paragraphs of complaint, a motion for a venire de novo must be granted.</p>
- 83 Ind. 211McDougal v. City of Brazil (1882)
<p>From the Clay Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 218Deatty v. Shirley (1882)
<p>From the Boone Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 219Moore v. Beem (1882)
<p>Pleading. — Complaint.—Partners.—In a complaint which states that the “plaintiffs complain of the defendants, and say that they are partners,” etc., the personal pronoun refers to the plaintiffs, and the complaint, in this respect, is sufficient on demurrer.</p> <p>Evidence. — Principal and Agent. — The admission of testimony, showing the instructions given an agent at the time he receives money as to its application upon a note, is not erroneous because such instructions were given in the absence of one of the parties.</p> <p>Same. — Promissory Note. — Statement by Third Person as to Payment. — An assurance from a third party to the maker of a note, at the time of its execution, that the maker would never have to pay the note, constitutes no defence, and proof of the statement was properly excluded.</p> <p>Same. — Consideration.—■ Instruction. — An instruction which substantially states that if the payee furnished the money for which the note in suit was executed, the maker is liable, is a correct statement of the law.</p>
- 83 Ind. 223State ex rel. Huffman v. Parish (1882)
<p>From the Shelby Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 226Rooker v. Rooker (1882)
<p>Deposition. — Evidence.—Hearsay.—Practice.—A witness, testifying by deposition upon the vital point in question, whether a deed, absolute in form, was in fact a mortgage, testified in chief that the deed was signed on condition that the grantee would reconvey upon being repaid what he had been compelled to pay for the grantors, and on cross-examination stated that his only knowledge upon the subject was derived solely from the statements of the grantors before and after the deed was made. A. motion to suppress was overruled, and exception taken, and no further objection was made to reading the deposition.</p> <p>Held, that this was error, and that it was not rendered harmless by the-circumstance that legitimate evidence to prove the same point was put in.</p>
- 83 Ind. 228State v. Nichols (1882)
<p>Criminal Law. — Prostitution.—Statute Construed. — Section 2003, R. S. 1881, malees it an offence for a female to live in a house of ill-fame — the plural “ houses ” therein importing also the singular — and hence an indictment charging such living in a house of ill-fame is in that respect good.</p>
- 83 Ind. 230Coon v. Welborn (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 234Keiser v. State (1882)
<p>Erom the Henry Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 237Williams v. Second National Bank (1882)
<p>Promissory Note. — Signature.— Eescñptio Persona.— Evidence.— Primate Corporation. — Trustees.—A promissory note, in the usual form, “ we promise to pay,” etc., given for an indebtedness of a corporation, and signed by the trustees thereof, thus: “ G. W., I. B., G. W. F., Trustees Perry Lodge 37, F. & A. M.,” is the note of the persons whose names are appended, and parol evidence is not admissible to show that the parties intended and supposed it to be the note of the lodge, and agreed that such should be its effect.</p>
- 83 Ind. 243Shrock v. Crowl (1882)
<p>Ineaítoy'. — Contract.— Disaffirmance.— Mortgage.— Pleading.— Vendee of Infant. — Where an infant mortgagor has, in a suit against him and his vendee to foreclose, pleaded his infancy, he thereby avoids and renders his mortgage void ab initio, and a separate answer by the vendee, alleging such infancy and avoidance, is good.</p> <p>Same. — Primes in Estate. — Infancy can only be pleaded by the infant, but when he has by plea, or otherwise, avoided his contract, then his privies in estate may avail themselves of such avoidance.</p>
- 83 Ind. 246State v. Stephenson (1882)
<p>Erom the Delaware Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 250Rooker v. Benson (1882)
<p>Subrogation. — Principal and Surety. — A surety, upon full payment of the debt, is subrogated to the remedies of the creditor, not only against the principal, but against others liable for the debt, and which he had before as well as at the time of the payment.</p> <p>Same. — Privity.—-Subrogation does not depend on privity nor strict suretyship. It is the mode in which equity compels the ultimate discharge of a debt by him who in good conscience ought to pay it, and to relieve him whom none but the creditor coukl ask to pay it.</p> <p>Same. — Mortgage.—Replevin Bail. — Vendor and Purchaser. — Judgment.—Payment. — A., owning land subject to a mortgage made by him to C. to secure four promissory notes, one of which had been put into a judgment upon which V. had become replevin bail, conve}red the land to B., subject to the entire mortgage debt, B. assuming by parol to pay that debt so far as evidenced by the last three notes, but not the judgment stayed by V., this agreement being made with Y.’s consent, and B. paid the three notes to C., and took an assignment thereof to himself for the purpose of keeping the mortgage lien alive, to the exclusion of V.?s claim to be subrogated to the mortgage security by reason of having been compelled to pay the judgment aforesaid.</p> <p>Held, that B.’s purchase of the notes, as against V., was a payment, and Y. is entitled to foreclose the mortgage for what lie paid in'satisfaction of the judgment. Elliott, J., dissenting.</p>
- 83 Ind. 261City of Bloomington v. Rogers (1882)
<p>From the Monroe Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 263McClead v. Davis (1882)
<p>IDecedents’ Estates. — Bents of Béal Estate. — Administrator No Authority to Beceive. — Letters of administration give no authority to take the rents and profits of the decedent’s real estate; and an administrator doing so is liable to the heirs for their value, even though he charge himself' therewith and account therefor in his settlements as such.</p>
- 83 Ind. 266French v. Sheplor (1882)
<p>■Guardian and Ward. — Trust and Trustee. — Where a guardian purchases lands for himself, upon his own credit, and takes a conveyance, and after-wards, in violation of his duty, uses the money of his wards in payment of the purchase-money, no trust in the lands results or arises in favor of the wards.</p> <p>Same. — Lien.—Redemption.—Subrogation.—Where a guardian applies the money of his wards in the discharge of liens upon his own lands existing when he purchased, and which he had agreed with his vendor at the time of his purchase to pay, or in redeeming the lands from other liens, the wards are not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the lien-holders.</p>
- 83 Ind. 275Hays v. Carr (1882)
<p>Vendor and Purchaser.— Conditional Sale.— Contract. — Mortgage.—A grantee of lands executed to his grantor a written agreement, which, with the deed to the grantee, constituted the entire contract, in which he undertook to pay certain debts of the grantor, and upon repayment to him of the aggregate thereof within three years, with interest, to reconvey to his grantor the same lands.</p> <p>Held, that the transaction was a conditional sale and not a mortgage.</p> <p>Same. — Specific Performance. — Tender.—A party seeking a specific performance of a contract to convey lands to him upon the payment of a certain sum must show that he has made or tendei'ed the payment.</p> <p>Same. — Action to Quiet Title. — Oomplaint.—Construction.—Peed.—A complaint which, by its prayer and general structure, is plainly intended either to quiet title or cancel a deed, and not to obtain damages for the bx-each of a contract, if insufficient for the purpose intended, will be held bad on demurrer, though it may aver facts which would be sufficient to éntitle the plaintiff to recover damages in a suit for that purpose.</p> <p>Same. — Consideration.—Payment.—Alligation of. — A complaint to cancel a deed and quiet title, which fails to allege payment or offer of payment of money, which- it appears that the grantee has paid in consideration of the deed, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>Same. — A complaint to quiet title, -which shows that the plaintiff has no title, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>Judgment. — Estoppel.—A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction concludes the parties upon the point in issue, and estops the defeated party in a subsequent suit by him against the other party and those .claiming- through him, founded upon averments, the truth of which was in question, and which were adjudged against him, but it is of no avail upon questions which were not and could not have been litigated in the cause.</p> <p>3Tbaud. — Complaint.— A complaint, basing a right to relief on account of fraud, must aver the facts constituting it, and the application of epithets to characterize a transaction which is lawful will not be sufficient.</p>
- 83 Ind. 289Weaver v. State (1882)
<p>‘Criminal. Law. — Arraignment and Plea. — Necessary Preliminaries.— Verdiet. —Jeopardy.—Under sections 1762 and 1763, R. S. 1881, in a criminal cause, the arraignment of the defendant on an indictment or information, and the entry of his plea thereto, are necessary preliminaries to his legal trial, and to sustain a verdict of guilty, and until these preliminaries are done the defendant is not in legal jeopardy.</p> <p>Same. — Refusal to Plead. — Practice.—Where, on arraignment, the defendant refuses to plead to the indictment or information, it is the duty of the court, under section 1766, E. S. 1881, to enter a plea of not guilty in his behalf, and proceed with the trial.</p> <p>Same. — Motion for New Trial. — Misconduct of Juror.— Weight of Evidence.— Where, in the motion for a new trial in a criminal case, the misconduct of a juror is assigned as cause therefor, and affidavits and counter affidavits are filed in relation to such misconduct, it is competent for the court to determine the question upon the weight of the evidence, and the Supreme Court will not disturb the decision if there is any evidence tending to sustain it.</p> <p>Same. — Conflicting Evidence. — Supreme Court. — Where the question for decision is one of fact, depending upon conflicting evidence and the credibility of witnesses, the Supreme Court will not disturb the verdict of the jury.</p>
- 83 Ind. 294Cummings v. Pottinger (1882)
<p>Bedemption. — Sheriff’s Sale. — Judgment. — Execution.—Foreclosure.—A. recovered a personal judgment against B. in 1870. C. afterwards also recovered a personal judgment against B., and on execution thereon hid off B.’s land, after which A. foreclosed an older mortgage upon the same lands, not making C. a party to his foreclosure suit. After C. received his deed from the sheriff the land was sold to A. by the sheriff upon an execution on A.’s judgment and on his decree jointly, and in due time A. received a sheriff’s deed.</p> <p>Held, that C., after the lapse of a year from A.’s purchase, could not redeem; Attter, if A.’s purchase had been upon his decree of foreclosure only.</p>
- 83 Ind. 297Fowler v. Griffin (1882)
<p>Execution. — Proceedings Supplementary. — Pleading.—In proceedings supplementary to execution under sections 518 and 519 (Code 1852), the complaint must show that execution had issued to the proper county.</p> <p>Same. — Presumption.—Beturn of Nulla Bona. — When, in proceedings supplementary, the complaint shows that upon the plaintiff’s affidavit the clerk issued execution upon the transcript of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, it will he presumed that before the filing of the transcript an execution had been issued to a constable and returned nulla bona.</p> <p>Same. — Money.—Ghoses in Action. — Money and choses in action in the hands of third parties may be reached by proceedings supplementary to execution.</p> <p>Qucere, whether or not, before an order for distribution, an administrator can be required to answer in such proceedings against a judgment debtor who is an heir or distributee.</p>
- 83 Ind. 300Blizzard v. Riley (1882)
<p>Assignment of Ebbob. — Practice.—An assignment that the court erred “ in entering judgment against the appellant” is not specific enough to present any question in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Bill of Exceptions. — Instructions.—A bill of exceptions which indicates a place for the instructions thus “ (h. i.) ” and then follows “ (for which instructions see page 67, and following, of this record. Clerk.) ” does not make the instructions a part of the record.</p> <p>Same. — Judges Signature. — A bill of exceptions not having the judge’s signature is no part of the record.</p> <p>Dbainage.— Verdict. — Under the act of 1875 (Acts 1875, Reg. Sess., p. 97), a verdict on appeal from the county board, in proceedings to establish a drain, which finds that the proposed work will be “ conducive to the public health, convenience and welfare, and will be of public utility,” was sufficient without finding that the work was necessary.</p>
- 83 Ind. 303Williams v. Hitzie (1882)
<p>From the Benton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 310Torian v. McClure (1882)
<p>From the Vanderburgh Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 313Gibson v. Richart (1882)
<p>Vendor and Purchaser. — Failure of Title. — Covenants.—In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, a failure of title to real estate conveyed Without covenants, when the grantee continues in undisturbed possession under his deed, is no defence to an action for the purchase-price the general rule being that after conveyance the purchaser has no remedy for want or failure of title, even though evicted, except on the covenants he has obtained, if there was no fraud practiced by the seller.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Copy of Deed. — If a defence to an action for the purchase-price of land be founded on a covenant, a copy of the deed should be made a part of the plea, and the particular breach alleged.</p> <p>.Same. — Fraud.—Mistake.—A plea that the vendor of real estate represented that he had a right to convey, and that the purchaser so believed,, without alleging a fraudulent intent or showing that the seller knew and the purchaser did not know the facts, does not make a case of either fraud or mutual mistake.</p>
- 83 Ind. 317State v. Thistlethwaite (1882)
<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 319McClaren v. Indianapolis & Vincennes Railroad (1882)
<p>From the Owen Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 325Blackburn v. Wagner (1882)
<p>From the Posey Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 326Wilson v. Trafalgar & Brown County Gravel Road Co. (1882)
<p>From the Johnson Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 331Maden v. Emmons (1882)
<p>Cbiminai Law. — Jeopardy.—Habeas Qm'pus. — A party was put on trial upon a valid indictment, before a jury .duly sworn, who heard the evidence and were regularly sent out to deliberate. While out they discovered that one of their number was not a resident of the county, and thereupon, without the knowledge of the court, counsel or defendant, they dispersed, and the court made no effort to re-assemble them.</p> <p>Held, that this was a putting in jeopardy, operated as an acquittal, and entitled the defendant to a discharge.</p>
- 83 Ind. 334Miller v. State (1882)
<p>From the Huntington Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 335Wilcox v. Monday (1882)
<p>From the Hendricks Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 337Crossley v. Taylor (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 339Maxwell v. Featherston (1882)
<p>WrLii. — Lapsed Devise. — Iieir.—There was a devise of lands “ to M. and his heirs.” M., who was not a descendant of the testator, died before the latter, leaving a widow and children.</p> <p>Held, that the words “ his heirs,” in the devise, were words of limitation and not of purchase, and that the devise lapsed on the death of M.</p>
- 83 Ind. 344DeHaven v. Covalt (1882)
<p>Judgment. — Mortgage.—Execution.—Injunction.—Collateral Attack. — When a. court, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, renders a personal judgment, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage, for sums not due, providing in the decree that if the real estate should not sell for enough to satisfy all the indebtedness, there should be execution against other property, there can heno remedy by injunction, to prevent collection by execution, while the judgment stands unreversed.</p>
- 83 Ind. 347Nash v. Taylor (1881)
<p>From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 353Pauley v. Langdon (1882)
<p>Judgment. — :IAen.—*Eeeedents’ Estates. — Pleading.—In an action to enforce a judgment against the real estate of a deceased judgment debtor, under sections 642 and 645, R S. 1881, if the complaint do not show that the personal estate has been exhausted or is insufficient, it is bad on demurrer.</p>
- 83 Ind. 357Dorrell v. State (1882)
<p>From the Ohio Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 362Hannon v. Hilliard (1882)
<p>From the Grant Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 368Carver v. Carver (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 374State ex rel. Reiter v. Foulks (1882)
<p>From the Knox Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 376Moore v. Butler University (1882)
<p>Deed. — Delivery to Agent. — Consideration.—Notice.—Where A. signs a deed' which states the consideration to he $14,000, and hands the same to hi& agent to be by him delivered to B. upon his agreement to perform certain things, and such agent delivers such deed to B., the grantee, who has; no notice of such conditions, upon the grantee agreeing to perform a. portion of the things named, which is done, A. can not thereafter recover-from B. the consideration named in the deed.</p> <p>Same. — Principal and Agent. — Contract.—Ratification.—If a principal adopts, a contract made by an agent, he must accept the consideration agreed upon, and a suit for the consideration named in a deed is an affirmanceof the contract, and when the contract is affirmed the consideration, agreed upon can not be rejected and a different one recovered.</p>
- 83 Ind. 381Galbreath v. Trump (1882)
<p>‘•Supreme Court. — Appeal.—Amount in Controversy. — An appeal will not lie to the Supreme Court in cases originating before a justice of the peace or mayor of a city, where the amount in controversy, excluding interest and costs, is less than fifty dollars. R. S. 1881, section 632.</p>
- 83 Ind. 382Welch v. Bunce (1882)
<p>Infancy. — Conveyance of Land. — Disaffirmance Du/ring Minority. — Where an infant has conveyed his or her real estate, such infant can not disaffirm such conveyance solely on the ground of infancy, until he or she has arrived at the full and lawful age of twenty-one years. This rule of law is not changed or affected by the provisions of section 10 of the civil code of 1852, now in force as section 255, R. S. 1881.</p> <p>Same. — Infant Plaintiff. — Next Friend. — Mamed Woman. — Suit for Separate Property. — Under section 8 of the civil code of 1852 (section 254, R. S. 1881), where the action concerns her separate property, a married woman may sue as sole plaintiff, or her husband may be joined with her as her co-plaintiff. If she be an infant, and sue as sole plaintiff, under section 11 of the civil code of 1852 (section 256, R. S. 1881), a competent and responsible person must consent in writing to appear as her next friend; but if her adult husband be joined as co-plaintiff with her, no next friend is necessary or can be required.</p>
- 83 Ind. 387Rothschild v. Williamson (1882)
<p>From the Decatur Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 391Flory v. Wilson (1882)
<p>From the Cass Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 392Memphis & Ohio River Packet Co. v. McCool (1882)
<p>Witness. — Character.—Impeachment.—Where, for the purpose of impeaching a witness, evidence is first put in showing bad character at his place of residence at the time of testifying, there is no error in then permitting the assailing party to show the bad reputation of the witness for a reasonable time, say two or three years before, at a former place of residence.</p> <p>Negligence. — Evidence.—Relevancy.—Where the suit is for an injury to a. steamboat passenger by reason of the negligence of the defendant’s servants in allowing a bale of cotton to fall upon and injure the plaintiff,, evidence to show defects in the construction of the boat is irrelevant, and should be rejected.</p> <p>Same.— Master and Servant.— Presumption. — Onus Probandi. — Where it is-shown that the act of the servant of a carrier of passengers has injured' ■ a passenger, the presumption of the servant’s negligence attaches, so that, the burden of proving due care is then on the carrier.</p> <p>Harmless Error. — Evidence.— Verdict. — The Supreme Court will regard an error in admitting evidence as harmless only when it affirmatively appears from the record that it could not have influenced the verdict. .</p>
- 83 Ind. 399Zerger v. Flattery (1882)
<p>From the Whitley Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 402Cooke v. State (1882)
<p>From the DeKalb Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 405Williams v. Scott (1882)
<p>Promissory Note. — Principal and Surety. — Extension of Time. — A valid agreement by the payee of a note to give a definite extension of time, for a valuable consideration, discharges a surety, if done without his consent and with knowledge that he is surety; but such agreement is not available to the principal, by any form of pleading, in a suit on the note brought before the time given has elapsed.</p> <p>Same. — Proof of Knowledge by Payee of Surety. — Where a note is made by two, without any designation that one is surety, the surety must prove the fact and the plaintiff’s knowledge of it, to make this defence available.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Variance.—Consideration.-—-Where a surety pleads that the principal paid to the payee a sum of money “ for the consideration alone of the extension of time for one year,” and the payee agreed to wait, etc., and the proof is that the sum paid was for a year's interest in advance, in consideration of which the extension was given, there is no variance.</p>
- 83 Ind. 411Baker v. Griffitt (1882)
<p>Decedents’ Estates. — Sale of Lands. — Consent of Oreditm-s. — Payment of Debts. — Quardian’s Sale. — That a former administrator had sufficient assets to pay an intestate’s debts, and that he, with the assent of the creditors of the estate, “conveyed and delivered” the real estate to an heir,, whose guardian, by order of court, sold it, and it was thereafter conveyed to a purchaser for value who did not know or believe it would be-needed to pay the intestate’s debts, are not such facts as will bar an application by the administrator de bonis non for the sale of the same-real estate to pay debts.</p>
- 83 Ind. 417Coan v. Clow (1882)
<p>From the Clay Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 420Hoover v. Kilander (1882)
<p>From the Huntington Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 421Wright v. Williams (1882)
<p>From the Cass Superior Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 425Strattan v. Elliott (1882)
<p>Highway. — Obstruction.—Turnpike Company. — Toll-IIouse.—Damages.—The owner of land, over which a highway runs and upon- which a turnpike company has constructed its road by the consent of the county commissioners, may maintain an action against such company for placing a toll-house upon his land, though such house is within the limits of such highway.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Practice.—Harmless Error. — An answer in such action, which denies that the plaintiff owns the land in dispute by alleging that it belongs to the defendant, is good, but no available error is committed in sustaining a demurrer to it when the general denial remains on file; nor is such a ruling rendered available by afterwards withdrawing the denial.</p> <p>Same. — Evidence.—Ownership.—The defendant haying withdrawn his answer and gone to trial on the amount of damages, it was not error to refuse to allow him to prove that he owned the land upon which the toll-house stood.</p>
- 83 Ind. 429Travellers Insurance v. Chappelow (1882)
<p>Erom the Howard Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 436Brown v. Lacy (1882)
<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 439Lomax v. White (1882)
<p>From the Grant Circuit Court,</p>
- 83 Ind. 442Zent v. Smith (1882)
<p>From the Huntington Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 444McCarty v. Tarr (1882)
<p>From the Harrison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 447Baldwin v. Fagan (1882)
<p>Promissory Note. — Negotiable by Law Merchant. — Endorsee and Maker.— Fraud. — Answer.—Complaint to Cancel. — Burden of Proof. — In an action by an endorsee against tbe maker of a negotiable note, a cross complaint to cancel tbe note because obtained of an illiterate man by a false reading and misrepresentation of the character of the instrument, is good, and puts upon the holder the burden of showing himself to be a purchaser in good faith.</p> <p>Same. — Possession.—Consideration.—Presumption.—Evidence.—A promissory note imports a valuable consideration, and possession is presumptive evidence of property rightfully acquired; but upon a showing that the note, though negotiable by the law merchant, was obtained of the maker and put into circulation by force or fraud, these intendments of law are rebutted and proof becomes necessary.</p> <p>Cross Complaint. — The sufficiency of a cross complaint on demurrer must be determined by its own averments without reference to the complaint.</p>
- 83 Ind. 449Campbell v. Parker (1882)
<p>IDhaiítage. — Report of Appraisers. — Appeal.—Under section 12 of tbe act of March 13th, 1879, for the drainage of wet lands (Acts 1879, p. 238), any person aggrieved by the proceedings of the appraisers might appeal the same to the circuit court of the county; but such appeal would bring before the court only the proceedings of the appraisers, and none of the preliminary proceedings of the county board.</p> <p>■Same. — Pleadings on Appeal. — On such appeal formal pleading of any kind is improper and unnecessary, and the striking out of an answer of general denial is not, therefore, an available error.</p> <p>.Same. — Trial.—Burden of Proof. — Conflicting Pmdence. — Supreme Court. — Under the statute, on the trial of such appeal the burden of proof was on the appellant; and where the evidence is conflicting the Supreme Court will .not disturb the verdict of the jury.</p>
- 83 Ind. 453Board of Commissioners v. Hammond (1882)
<p>Soldiebs’ Bounty. — Offer of, by County Commissioners. — Pleading.—Condition Precedent. — Suit to recover a bounty offered by a county board for volunteers. The order of the board making the offer was to citizens of the county who should, by a certain day, enter the military service of the United States, to fill the quota of the county — provided that no bounty should be paid to such as became commissioned officers.</p> <p>Held, that an averment in the complaint, that the “ plaintiff had in all things complied with the terms of said offered bounty,” was, under the statute (R. S. 1881, section 370), a sufficient allegation that the plaintiff did not become a commissioned officer.</p> <p>Same. — Militia.—Enlistment.—Muster-In.-—An offer of bounty to persons who will enter the military service to the credit of a county is intended to avoid conscription, and, in view of the army regulations of January 12th, 1864, upon the subject, mere enlistment was not sufficient to secure the bounty, but a muster-in must also appear.</p> <p>Same. — Eoidence.—An offer of bounty by a county board was made for 104 men, to be paid upon presentation of a certificate from the captain, colonel and surgeon that the applicant had been received and mustered in.</p> <p>Held, that such certificates are not legitimate evidence against one suing for the bounty to prove the muster-in of other men, with a view to establish a defence that 104 had been received before the muster-in of the plaintiff.</p> <p>Evidence. — Harmless Error. — When improper evidence is admitted which tends only to establish a fact which is conclusively proven by other legitimate evidence, the error is harmless.</p>
- 83 Ind. 463Day v. Wilson (1882)
<p>Vendor and Purchaser. — Statute of Frauds. — Conveyance.—A party to an oral contract for the purchase of real estate can not refuse a conveyance and recover the purchase-money paid.</p>
- 83 Ind. 466Stout v. Noblesville & Eagletown Gravel Road Co. (1882)
<p>Gravel Road. — Damages for Abandonment of. — A citizen who has suffered no special damage by the abandonment and failure to maintain a portion of a gravel road, and whose interest in the matter is .merely such as pertains to others in the same vicinity, can not maintain a private suit against the company for damages; nor will the fact that his lands have been assessed for the construction of the road change this rule.</p>
- 83 Ind. 469Board of Commissioners v. Benson (1882)
<p>From the Crawford Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 473Campbell v. Dwiggins (1882)
<p>Constitutional Law. — Gmistruction of Statute. — Supreme Court. — In considering the constitutionality of a statute, it lias been and is the rule of the Supreme Court to construe and interpret its provisions, if it can be' done, in such manner as will sustain and not defeat the law in question.</p> <p>Same. — Legislative Power.— State and Federal Constitutions. — Acts of Gongress. and Treaties. — Duty of Courts. — The authority of the Legislature of this State is the right to exercise supreme and sovereign power, subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the State or Federal Constitution, or by acts of Congress or treaties made under and pursuant to the Federal Constitution; but where it clearly appears that a statute is repugnant to, or in conflict with, any provision of either the State or Federal Constitution, the legislation can not be upheld, and it is the plain duty of the courts to declare it null and void.</p> <p>Same. — Drainage.—Repairs of Ditches. — Township Trustee. — Sections 4282 and 4307, B. S. 1881, providing for the repairs of ditches or drains by township trustees, are repugnant, to and in conflict with section 12 of the Bill of Bights in the State Constitution, and to section 1, of'article 14, in the: Federal Constitution, and are, therefore, null and void.</p>
- 83 Ind. 483Fox v. Town of Monticello (1882)
<p>Practice. — Demurrer.—Exception.—No question arises upon a ruling on demurrer unless an exception is taken to the ruling.</p>
- 83 Ind. 483Hicks v. State ex rel. McDonald (1882)
<p>Bill of Exceptions. — Supreme Court. — When the reasons for a motion to dismiss a cause do not appear by bill of exceptions, they are not in the record, and the Supreme Court can not'review a ruling denying the motion.</p> <p>Continuance.— Witness. — Diligence.—Service of Subpoena,. — While section 26 of the act of 1879 was in force (Acts 1879, Spec. Sess., p. 130), a subposna could only be served by the sheriff or his deputy, and, if served otherwise, it was such want of diligence that a continuance for the absence of the witness might be denied.</p> <p>Bastardy. — Justice’s Examination of Relatrix. — Evidence.—In a trial for bastardy in the circuit court, neither the sworn complaint filed before the justice of the peace, his warrant or the return thereto, his transcript, or the recognizance given by the defendant, is proper evidence; but it is otherwise as to the sworn examination of the relatrix, signed by her and sent up by the justice with the papers, if she be dead, though it be not attested by the justice.</p>
- 83 Ind. 489Everroad v. Gabbert (1882)
<p>Verdict.— Venire de Novo. — Election.— Conversion.— Damages.— In a suit against four for a joint conversion of personal property, the defendants-answered jointly, and the verdict was “ for the plaintiff,” assessing his damages against two of the defendants at $980, and against the other two at $670.</p> <p>Held,, that a motion by the two defendants assessed $980, for a venire de novo, should have been granted.</p> <p>Held, also, that the plaintiff might, by election, have cured the defect in the verdict and taken judgment for either sum against the defendants assessed therewith, entering a nolleprosequi as to the others.</p> <p>Same. — Tort.—-Where a tort is charged against several jointly, who join in their pleadings, and the jury find them jointly guilty, the damages, must be assessed against all jointly, even where all are not equally culpable.</p>
- 83 Ind. 496Frank v. Purkhiser (1882)
<p>From the Harrison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 498Lease v. Owen Lodge No. 146 (1882)
<p>From the Owen Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 501Gurley v. Butler (1882)
<p>From the Switzerland Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 502City of Madison v. Smith (1882)
<p>From the Jefferson Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 520Smith v. Clifford (1882)
<p>Pleading. — Ditch Assessment. — Gopy.—In an action to recover the amount', of a ditch assessment, the assessment is the foundation of the action, and a copy thereof must be filed -with the complaint and identified by a reference thereto in the complaint.</p>
- 83 Ind. 522Smith v. Wood (1882)
<p>From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 524Messmore v. Stephens (1882)
<p>From the Grant Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 528Jarvis v. Banta (1882)
<p>From the Elkhart Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 534Haskett v. Hazel (1882)
<p>Married Woman.' — Beal Estate in Virtue of Previous Mamage. — Descents.— Execution. — Exemption.—Subsequent Marriage. — The real estate held by a married woman in virtue of any previous marriage may not be levied upon and sold under execution against her during her second or any subsequent marriage.</p> <p>Same. — Statute Construed. — Section 18 of the statute of descents, as amended March 29th, 1879, R. S. 1881, section 2484, constituted an exception to section 9 of the act of March 25th, 1879, Acts 1879, p. 160, both going into effect May 31st, 1879, and being in pari materia.</p>
- 83 Ind. 536Nash v. Berkmeir (1882)
<p>Landdobd and Tenant. — Married Woman. — Separate Lease of Ser Land:— Contract. — A wife’s parol lease of her land for the term of five years, made • without the husband’s concurrence, may he enforced in respect to the-terms for the payment of rent against the lessee holding possess) on under the lease.</p> <p>Same. — Statute of Frauds. — Leases.—Under the statute of frauds, a parol lease of land for a longer time than three years is not void, and the lessee who has taken and holds possession under such lease must pay rent according to its terms, the tenancy being from year to year, but in other respects governed by the agreement.</p>
- 83 Ind. 539Hutton v. Stoddart (1882)
<p>Payment. — Satisfaction of Debt by Part Payment. — Contract.—A. employed B. as a traveling salesman at a salary of $1,200 per annum, and becoming dissatisfied with, him sent him a check for $400 in payment of the last half of the salary before the expiration of the year, with instructions to return it if not satisfactory. B. retained the check, collected the money upon it, and assigned the residue of the salary, for which suit was brought.</p> <p>Held, that the action can not be maintained; that the retention of the money was an acceptance of A.’s proposition, and operated as a complete satisfaction of the clainj.</p> <p>Same. — The payment of a part of a debt in satisfaction of the whole, if made before the debt is due, is a complete satisfaction of the whole debt.</p> <p>Same. — -Gmnpromise.—A dispute about a claim is sufficient to sustain a compromise, and thus render the payment of a part of a debt a complete satisfaction of the whole debt.</p>
- 83 Ind. 542State v. Weaver (1882)
<p>From the Criminal Court of Allen County.</p>
- 83 Ind. 543Scherer v. Schutz (1882)
<p>From the Lake Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 546Axtel v. Chase (1882)
<p>Mobtgage. — Consideration.—Answer.—Gross Complaint.— Failure of Title.— Surrender of Possession.— A complaint to foreclose a mortgage and for a personal judgment, is not well answered by averring that the consideration was the purchase by the defendant of the mortgaged premises; that, possession was taken under the purchase; that the plaintiff had no title, and that on learning that fact the defendant offered to surrender the possession ; nor will such facts bar a merely personal judgment; nor are they sufficient as a cross complaint.</p> <p>Same. — Foreclosure.-—Correction.—In a suit to reform and foreclose a mortgage, it is unnecessary to allege or prove a request to reform the mortgage. Aliter, when the suit is only to reform the instrument.</p> <p>Covenant. — Deed.—Reformation of Mistalce'in Description. — When, in an action for breach of covenants in a deed, it appears by the complaint that by mutual mistake the conveyance was of lands not intended, and no reformation is demanded, and none has been requested, there can be no recovery, and the complaint is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>Same.— Vendor and Vendee. — Paramount Title. — A vendor of real estate may voluntarily yield possession to the true owner of an outstanding paramount title without the coercion of legal process, and is in such case entitled to recover upon the covenants of his deed, but the surrender must' be to the rightful owner, and not to the vendor.</p> <p>Former Adjudicatioít. — Coimter-Claim.—A former adjudication does not . conclude as to matters which might be but were not pleaded by way of counter-claim, but only as to matters which were in issue.</p> <p>Pbactice. — Demurrer.—Joint and Several. — -A.demurrer to a complaint by two defendants, in which they say that they “ demur separately because it does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them or either of them,” is joint, and not separate, and should be overruled if the complaint be sufficient as against either.</p> <p>Same. — Pleading.—Every pleading must be judged by its own averments, and can not be helped by reference to some other pleading.</p> <p>Same. — Evidence.—Harmless Eiror. — The admission of improper evidence to prove a fact alleged and not denied, and not possibly calculated to affect the finding in any way, is a harmless error.</p> <p>Same. — Complaint.—Answer.—Where, notwithstanding the facts stated in ' the answer, the complaint entitles the plaintiff to any relief, the answer is insufficient on demurrer.</p>
- 83 Ind. 559Proctor v. DeCamp (1882)
<p>From the Elkhart Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 561Parks v. Barrowman (1882)
<p>'Mabbied Woman. — Executory Contract to Convey Realty. — Estoppel.—A wife has no power to make an executory contract for the conveyance of her real estate, and before the enactment of 1881, sections 5115 et seq., R. S. 1881, could not by conduct estop herself from asserting title.</p> <p>•Same. — Husband and Wife. — Separate Deed of Husband. — Specific Performance of Parol Contract. — The separate deed of a husband for his wife’s land is void, neither passing title to nor creating an equity in favor of the grantee, and consequently the executory contract of husband and wife to convey her land can not be specifically enforced against either or .both of them.</p>
- 83 Ind. 563Tyler v. State ex rel. Wilson (1882)
<p>Deainage. — Constitutional Law.— Repairs of Ditches.— Township Trustee.— Stats and Federal Constitutions. — Sections 4282 and 4307, R. S. 1881, which in terms clothe the township trustee with autocratic powers in relation to the repairs of ditches or drains, are repugnant to and in conflict with the provisions of section 12 of the Bill of Rights, in the State Constitution, and of section 1 of article 14 of the Federal Constitution, and are therefore void.</p>
- 83 Ind. 566Bennett v. Meehan (1882)
<p>Drainage. — Evidence.—-Appeal from Commissioners of County. — Highways.— Transcript of Record. — Upon the trial of a proceeding to establish a ditch, appealed from the board of commissioners of a county to the circuit court, as in proceedings in highway cases, it may not be available error to admit in evidence parts, at least, of the record of such proceeding before the hoard,showing the preliminary steps taken by the petitioners.</p> <p>Same. — Non-Expert Witness. — Opinion Based on Facts Stated. — On such trial, it was proper to allow a witness who had stated in detail the number of acres in the vicinity of the ditch, and who had given its size and location, to testify as to how many acres of land would be benefited by its construction.</p> <p>Same. — Public Health. — In such case, a further question: “ You may state what effect, if any, the drainage of the wet land would have upon the public health of the community,” was proper.</p>
- 83 Ind. 570Lacey v. Willson (1882)
<p>From the Ripley Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 572Cunningham v. Dungan (1882)
<p>Will. — Construction—Descent.—Decedents’ Estates. — Amongst other bequests-a testator gave to his granddaughter $500. She died at the age of twenty-five, and before the testator, leaving one infant child, Joseph. A codicil provided that the legacy of any one dying in infancy should go to his or her children, if any, and that the ulegacies” should only be paid to those respectively who have arrived at full age.</p> <p>Held, that Joseph took the share of his mother, not under the will, but by virtue of the statute (R. S. 1881, section 2571), and that payment to him could not be delayed until his majority. Woods and Elliott, JJ., dissenting.</p>
- 83 Ind. 575Harrison v. Phœnix Mutual Life Insurance (1882)
<p>Estopped. — Judgment.—Collateral Attach. — A decree of the U. S. Circuit Court taken on default of a party, adjudging that his interest in land is junior and subordinate to the rights of the plaintiff thereby established, estops the party thus defaulted to maintain a suit in the State court to establish his title as paramount against the other party.</p> <p>Same. — A judgment, not void but merely erroneous, of the United States Circuit Court, estops the parties thereto to attack it collaterally in another suit.</p>
- 83 Ind. 577Iles v. Cox (1882)
<p>From the Howard Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 583Brumbaugh v. Stockman (1882)
<p>From the Marshall Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 589Rusk v. Gray (1882)
<p>From the Montgomery Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 593Coffeen v. McCord (1882)
<p>Practice. — Supreme Gowrt. — Demurrer.—Interrogatory.—An error committed in overruling a demurrer to a special paragraph of an answer will not reverse the judgment where the jury find, in answer to an interrogatory, that the plain tiff was not entitled to recover upon his complaint.</p> <p>Same. — Instructions.—Exceptions.—Instructions given hy the court will not he considered unless exceptions are reserved to them in the trial court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 595Masters v. Beckett (1882)
<p>From the Union Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 597Carey v. State (1882)
<p>From the Hancock Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 598Ross v. Chinworth (1882)
<p>From the Kosciusko Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 598Chauncey v. Taylor (1882)
<p>From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 598Brown v. Lee (1882)
<p>From the Spencer Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 599Baldwin v. Killion (1882)
<p>From the Clay Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 599Broyles v. Board of Commissioners (1882)
<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 599Murphy v. Patterson (1882)
<p>From the Wabash Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 600Newcomer v. Perril (1882)
<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>
- 83 Ind. 600Bromley v. Wheeler (1882)
<p>From the Montgomery Circuit Court.</p>