Volume 83 — New York Supreme Court Reports

Appeal by the defendant, the N orfoik and N ew Brunswick Hosiery Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 10th day of August, 1893, rendered upon the decision of the court after a trial at the Kings County Special Term.

Appeal by the administrator, Thomas J. Ritch, Jr., from portions of a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Queens county, made on the 31st day of October, 1893, and entered in the office of the cleric of the Queens County Surrogate’s Court, judicially settling his accounts as administrator with the will annexed of the goods, chattels and credits of Nathaniel O. Hauxkurst, deceased.

<p>Appeal■ — ■ from a refusal of a Supreme Go art justice to revoke an approval of an order of the State Commission in Lunacy.</p> <p>An appeal does not lie from a refusal of a justice of the Supreme Court to revoke an approval theretofore given hy him to an order of the State Commission in Lunacy, nor would an appeal lie from a refusal of such justice to approve an order.</p> <p>Quame, whether such an approval may he annulled hy the justice making it. Such approval or refusal to approve is not covered hy sections 1347, 1848 and 1356 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals, nor is it an action or special proceeding within sections 8333 and 3334 of said Code.</p>

Appeal by tlie relator, George Kelioe, from an order of tlie Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Term and entered in tlie office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 1st day of February, 1891, denying the relator’s motion that, a peremptory writ of mandamus issue, without costs.

<p>Damages for injuries — verdict on, contradictory evidence — contributory negligence — basis of computation of damage —specific exception necessary.</p> <p>In an action brought to recover damages resulting from personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, where there is no inherent improbability in the version of the accident given by the plaintiff, nor in the statements made by the defendant’s witnesses, an appellate court will not decide that the jury erred in believing the plaintiff’s version rather than that of the defendant, and the verdict being satisfactory to the trial judge, will not be set aside as being against the weight of evidence.</p> <p>In such an action, the plaintiff, a boy of sixteen, was injured while alighting from the front platform of a car of the defendant, a railroad company, while carrying- bundles weighing fifty pounds. It was claimed that the plaintiff had stepped from the car backwards.</p> <p>Held, that it is contributory negligence to step off backwards from a moving car, unless the party so stepping off is induced to dp so by the negligent conduct of the defendant;</p> <p>'That, whether it is negligence or not, for a person to step off a moving car with bundles, is a question of fact for the jury, depending upon the speed of the car, and the circumstances under which the plaintiff attempted to alight.</p> <p>It is not error for the court to refuse to charge on amere abstract question having no relation to the case under consideration.</p> <p>The court charged that the plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for the pain and suffering which he had endured, and for the pecuniary loss which he sustained, to which the defendant excepted, except as to the matter of permanent loss. On appeal, the defendant raised the question that plaintiff’s parents were entitled to recover the damages sustained by reason of his diminished ability to earn money during his minority.</p> <p>Held, that the point was not raised by an appropriate exception, as the exception taken did not call to the mind oí the trial judge this particular point, and that the question, not having been raised by objection or exception on the trial, could not be raised for the first time on appeal.</p>

Appeal by the petitioner, John F. Alexander, from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in the office of the clerk of the Surrogate’s Court of New York county on the l‘5th day of January, 1894, adjudging that interest upon the tax imposed herein shall be charged at the rate of six per centum per annum on the amount of the tax so fixed from April 10, 1891, tlie date of the death of said testator, to October 24, 1893, the date •of payment of said…

Appeal by Frederick W. Wiegel and others, heirs at law and next of kin of Charles Wiegel, from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of New York county, entered in the office of the clerk of the New York County Surrogate’s Court on the 30th day of October, 1893, settling and allowing the accounts of Solomon Farian, as .administrator, etc., of Charles Wiegel.

Appeal by the New York Baptist Union for Ministerial Education from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of Chautauqua, entered in the Chautauqua County Surrogate’s Court on the 4th day of March, 1892, settling the accounts of the administrator, decreeing a distribution of the proceeds of said estate, and directing restitution of moneys paid the appellant under former decrees made by such Surrogate’s Court.