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848 N.E.2d 1172

Fuller v. Meloy

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided June 16, 2006

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 2006-06-16

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently June 2006

1 state decisions

Applies IN 35 § 35-50-6-3

Relies on Wolff v. McDonnell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2006-06-16

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DARDEN, Judge,

¶1dissenting.

¶2I would respectfully dissent because I find an implicit due process issue presented here. In an analogous scenario, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), held that where the State has created a statutory right to “good time” credit for a prison inmate, this is a liberty interest which “entitle[s] [the inmate] to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Further, “the touchstone of due process is *1175protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Id. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Therefore, I believe due process requires some showing to the trial court that the Department of Correction has a policy in place that determines the credit to be awarded for the various vocational education programs approved by the Department.

¶3I cannot fault the reasoning of the majority based upon the language of the statute at issue. The statute indeed provides that the inmate “may earn” up to a total of six months of credit for the completion of vocational education programs. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(d). However, I am reluctant to find that the statutory language gives the personnel of the Department unfettered discretion to determine whether to award anywhere from one day to 180 days of credit to the inmate who has completed such a program. Are there different kinds of vocational programs that result in different amounts of credit awarded? If so, why? Does a single Department official make the credit determination, or is it by committee? To protect the inmate “against arbitrary action” in deciding the credit to be awarded, id.,I believe due process requires that there be a written policy with objective criteria for making this determination.

¶4My concern is not meant to cast doubt upon or disparage the integrity of DOC personnel. Rather, I believe that having a policy in place that defines the process for determining a credit toward the inmate’s sentence will serve the best interests of both the Department — to shield it from inmate distrust and claims of arbitrary action, and the inmates — providing a real incentive to pursue programs that will, hopefully, make them more productive members of society upon release.

¶5Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for the trial court to consider evidence concerning how the determination of the amount of credit awarded to Appellants was determined.

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