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85 U.S. 626

Davenport v. Dows

Supreme Court of the United States

Decided October 1, 1873

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1873-10

Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873), is a US corporate law case concerning the derivative suits in Delaware.

Source: Wikipedia ↗

1 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““But such a suit can only be maintained on the ground that tho rights of the corporation are involved. These rights the individual shareholder is allowed to assert on behalf of himself and associates, because the directors of the corporation decline to take the proper steps to assert them. * * * The relief is asked on behalf of the corporation, not the individual shareholder; and, if it be granted, the complainant derives only an incidental benefit from it.””

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R., Consolidated Water Co. v. Babcock

Relies on Trask v. Maguire

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · 8–0 · Opinion by David Davis · Decided 1873-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 116 later decisions (17 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2012 · most notably Pepper v. Litton (1939), Ross v. Bernhard (1970)

24 federal appellate · 3 district · 18 state decisions — followed in 12 states

250187318801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Although a stockholder in a corporation may bring a suit when the corpora- . tion refuses, yet, as in such ease the suit can be maintained only on the ground that the rights of the corporation are involved, the corporation should be made a party to the suit, and a demurrer will lie if it is not so made.

¶2Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa.

¶3Dows, a citizen of New York, in behalf.of himself and all other non-resident citizens of Iowa, who were stockholders in the Chicago, Nock Island, and Pacific Nailroad Company, filed a bill in the court below against the city of .Davenport, and its marshal, to arrest the collection of a tax, alleged to be illegal, levied by the ,said city for general revenue purposes, on the property of the company within its limits. The bill assigned as a reason for its being filed by Dows, a stockholder in the company, instead of .by the company itself, that the company neglected and refused to take action on the subject. A demurrer was interposed to the bill, which was overruled, and on the defendants refusing to answer over, the Circuit Court ordered that the collection of the tax be perpetually enjoined. From this, its action, the defendants appealed, insisting that the Circuit Court erred in overruling the demurrer, for three reasons:

¶4First. Because the railroad company was not made a party to the bill.

¶5*627Second. Because the’ complainant had a complete remedy at law; and,

¶6Third. Because the tax in question was a proper charge against the property of the corporation.

¶7Mr. J. N. Rogers, for the appellants; Mr. T. F. Witherow, contra..

¶8Mr. Justice DAVIS

¶9delivered the opinion of the court.

¶10It is unnecessary to notice the last two reasons assigned, why the demurrer should not have been overruled, as the first is well taken. Indeed, it would be improper to pass on the merits of the controversy until the proper parties to be affected by the decision are before the court.

¶11That a stockholder may'bring a suit when-a corporation refuses is settled in Dodge v. Woolsey,* but such a suit can only be maintained on the ground that the rights of the corporation are involved. These rights the individual shareholder is allowed to assert in behalf of himself and. associates, because the directors of the corporation decline to take the proper steps to assert them. Manifestly the proceedings for this purpose should be so conducted that any decree which shall be made on the merits shall conclude the corporation. This can only be done by making the corporation a party defendant. The relief asked is on behalf of the corporation, not the individual shareholder, and if it be granted the complainant derives only an incidental benefit from it. It would be wrong, in case the' shareholder were unsuccessful, to allow the corporation to renew the litigation'in another suit, involving precisely the same subject-matter. To avoid such a result, a court of equity will not take cognizance of a bill brought to settle a- question in which the corporation is the esseutial party in interest, unless it is made a party to the litigation.

¶12*628In this case the' tax sought to' be avoided was assessed against the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company, and the decree rendered discharges the company from the payment of this tax. The corporation, therefore, should have been made a party to the suit, and as .it was not, the demurrer should have been sustained.

¶13Decree reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings,

¶14In conformity with this opinion.

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