State v. Holt

¶1OPINION

¶2Regina H. Holt was charged with driving while intoxicated after her arrest at a sobriety checkpoint. The trial court sustained Holt’s motion to suppress the evidence concerning her arrest, holding the sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Texas Constitution.

¶3On appeal, the State contends the trial court erred in holding the constitutionality of a checkpoint depends not only on the Brown test, but also on a threshold finding that the checkpoint was adminis*49tered in accordance with a state-wide legislatively developed administrative scheme.1See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Because the existence of an administrative scheme is an element to be considered in the third prong of the Brownbalancing test,2 rather than a prerequisite to the applicability of the test, and because the trial court found the checkpoint passed the test, as evidenced by its conclusions of law which state: “this checkpoint was illegal under the Fourth Amendment in one respect ... there is no state-wide scheme for sobriety checkpoints promulgated either administratively or legislatively ... the checkpoint would also violate Art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution for the same reason,” we sustain the State’s first two points and reverse and remand the case for trial.

¶4The trial court sustained Holt’s motion to suppress the evidence, because it relied on two Dallas Court of Appeals cases and dicta in a concurring opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that interpret Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), as requiring legislative authorization for a DWI roadblock. See State v. Wagner, 810 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (concurring opinion); State v. Wagner, 821 S.W.2d 288, 290-91 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (opinion on remand); King v. State, 816 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). We find error in this interpretation for two reasons. It is not the holding of Sitzand it is contrary to search and seizure jurisprudence.

¶5It is not the holding of Sitzbecause the Supreme Court only considered the significance of Michigan’s legislatively developed program during its discussion of the subjective intrusion on motorists,3 so the existence of such a program is only an element to be considered when applying the Browntest. See State v. Hubacek, 840 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref’d); State v. Van Natta, 805 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth), pet. ref'd, 811 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

¶6The reason the Dallas Court of Appeals and the concurring Justice of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals misconstrue the holding of Sitzis because they misinterpret the following statement:

The actual language from Brown v. Texas, upon which the Michigan courts based their evaluation of “effectiveness,” describes the balancing factor as “the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.” ... This passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger.

¶7Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453, 110 S.Ct. at 2487, 110 L.Ed.2d at 422. They read “politically accountable officials” in isolation and conclude that a legislative body must authorize the checkpoint. Wagner, 810 S.W.2d at 208; Wagner, 821 S.W.2d at 290; King, 816 S.W.2d at 451. When viewed in context, the passage merely instructs courts to defer to officials’ choice of enforcement techniques when analyzing prong two of the Browntest; it does not instruct courts to make a threshold finding that politically accountable officials authorized the technique.

¶8*50Search and seizure jurisprudence suggests that when a Fourth Amendment challenge is asserted against a seizure the relevant inquiry is was the seizure reasonable. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450, 110 S.Ct. at 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d at 420. Reasonableness is determined by applying the three-prong balancing test. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449, 110 S.Ct. at 2484, 110 L.Ed.2d at 419. The Fourth Amendment’s concern is preventing arbitrary seizures, not requiring state-wide plans.

¶9Also, courts outside the State of Texas do not suggest Sitzstands for the proposition that a state-wide sobriety checkpoint is automatically arbitrary in the absence of a state-wide legislatively developed plan. See, e.g., Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir.1992); Crail v. State, 309 Ark. 120, 827 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1992).

¶10Because we sustain the State’s first two points, we will not address its third. The trial court’s decision is reversed and the case is remanded for trial.