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86 Me. 194

State v. Clark

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided December 26, 1893

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1893-12-26

<p>Pleading. Cruelly to Animals. Charge or Custody. S., e. 124, § 29.</p> <p>A complaint, charging a defendant with having the “ custody and control” of a horse without further particulars, is sufficient under a statute which provides a penalty for cruel treatment of ahorse by any person “having the charge or custody thereof, as owner or otherwise.”</p> <p>The custody need only be alleged or proved.</p> <p>The statute excuses averments as to the particulars of custody.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently January 1950

2 state decisions

Relies on Commonwealth v. Curry

Cited in Black's (1910)’s definition of “Charge”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1893-12-26

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Haskell, J.

¶1The complaint, after proper averments as to* time and place, avers that the defendant, "then and there having' the custody and control of a certain horse, did unnecessarily fail to provide such horse with proper shelter and protection from* the weather, contrapacem et contra forrnam statuti.”

¶2The statute, R. S.,c. 124, § 29, provides that, " every person-who cruelly overdrives . . any horse . . or, having the charge* or custody thereof, as owner or otherwise, unnecessarily fails to provide such animal with proper food, drink, shelter and. protection from the weather,” shall be punished.

¶3The defendant, having been convicted below, contends that judgment should be arrested, because the complaint does not, charge him with having the charge and custody of the horse,, as owner or otherwise.

¶4The words, "charge,” and "custody,” are frequently used as synonymous. The lexicographers give them as synonyms. They are placed in the statute, however, disjunctively, and, in such cases, need not be conjunctively averred, and cannot be disjunctively averred. The statute word, "custody,” therefore, in the complaint, sufficiently charges the defendant’s control of the horse. It is not necessary to define the nature of the defendant’s custody, "as owner or otherwise.” Those words were inserted for the very purpose of obviating any supposed necessity of that sort. The statute meant to reach persons having either the "charge or custody,” if there can be any distinction *196made in the meaning of those words, without requiring any further particulars to be averred or proved, as such a requirement might paralyze any attempt to punish apparent cruelty.

¶5It is sufficient to charge and prove, that the defendant, having the custody of the animal, was guilty of the inhuman treatment prohibited by the statute. See the reasoning in State v. Haskell, 76 Maine, 399 ; Commonwealth v. Curry, 150 Mass. 509.

¶6 Exceptions overruled.

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