Volume 87 — United States Reports

Held: upon an examination of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New York, and of the statutes on which they purported to proceed, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court, declaring the corporation dissolved, was in excess of- the jurisdiction of the court and therefore entitled to no faith and credit in Massachusetts as a judicial proceeding; and accordingly gave judgment for the'plaintiff, the original attaching…

Held: and that if the defendants shall fail to appear at the term of court, and plead or demur, judgment shall be .entered by default. *9 “Section 55.

<p>Appeal from the-Circuit Court for the Eastern Distriet of Missouri; the case being thus: N</p> <p>. At the beginning of the.late rebellion, which broke out in 1861,- McQuiddy, ;a resident of Nodaway County,' Missouri, and owning a farm there, voluntarily entered the service of the' Confederate States under General Sterling Price^ and followed the fortunes of that .officer ajidhis army when they left Missouri. At this time there were two mortgages op different parts of his farm, or instruments of writing which the holders of them asserted to be mortgages. These weVe due, and the holders in May, 1862, and November, 1868, procured a decree of foreclosure of .them. This proceeding was made in professed pursuance of a statute of Missouri, regulating the subject-of -the foreclosure of mortgages, and which authorizes an order of publication instead of an actual service when the mortgagee alleges and the court in which the foreclosure is applied for, or its clerk, is satisfied “ that the place of residence of the defendant is unknown.'” -The' foreclosures, therefore, so far as the record's of them showed, were made on constructive notices, and on allegations such as above stated.</p> <p>McQuiddy also owed money, when he' left Missouri, to a third creditor; this debt being by a note unsecured. This creditor proceeded to get his debt by a proceeding in attachment, .and in professed pursuance of another statute of Missouri, which authorizes a writ in that sort of proceeding to issue whenever the plaintiff files his petition setting forth his cause of action-, with an affidavit that he has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the defendant has absconded or absented himself from his usual’ place of abode in this State, so -that the ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him. Such affidavit was -made by the unsecured creditor, and under-it, in November, 1868, judgment was got; á judgment, of course, like the other, on a constructive notice, so far at Feast as the record'-of the proceeding showed'.</p> <p>On these three-different judgments all parts of his farm were sold; a sale of one part being in 1863, and of the others in 1864, the sales following at no great intervals the dates of the judgments.</p> <p>By the Revised Statutes of Missouri a party'against whom judgment has been rendered on constructive notice simply, may come in at any time within three years afterwards and file a petition for review.*</p> <p>• • - In this state of things and of law, McQuiddy, in July, 1871, filed his bill in the court below, against the purchasers of the farm (’one Ware, and others), and against their vendees, to set aside the sales audio have possession again of the property sold.</p> <p>His bill attacked the jurisdiction of the court in all three' cases alike.</p> <p>He averred that the orders of publication were based on false'statements, and that in one of the cases, proceeded in. as in the case of a mortgage, the instrument proceeded on was not a mortgage, and that the proceeding was in truth a proceeding to enforce a lien on lands, instead of á suit to-foreclose a mortgage, and required an affidavit of ?u>n-residencé to authorize the giving of constructive notice; and that jurisdiction could not be acquired on affidavit of unknown residence, the sort of affidavit made in the ease. He alleged further that his departure'from the State was for a temporary purpose and with an intention of-soon returning; that he left-his wife at his'domicile,‘and that copies of writs could have been served on her, and fhat he neither absconded nor absented himself from his usual, placq of abode in the sense of the statute, nor was his.-residence unknown; that all these, facts were known to the parties in interest, including the respondents, who either purchased the property at the sales, or-derived title from the person who did purchase.</p> <p>By wayof excuse for his want of diligence in his own affairs, he alleged that the state of feeling was such qgaiust him in Nodaway County, on account of the part he took in the rebellion, that he could not with any sort of safety return to the county, and that in 1863 he removed- his family to Tennessee, where he had since continued to reside. He also alleged, in continuation of this excuse, that being absent from the State, though a resident of the county when the proceedings-were instituted to deprive him of his rights, and no notice of the same having'been given to any member of his.family he had not a day in court given him, and was in ignorance of what was done until recently; and that as soon as. practicable after ascertaining that thé said illegal proceedings were had, he had taken steps to asse.rt his rights.</p> <p>.The only-chárge pf fraud In connection with .the transac-' tions disclosed in the bill related to the' falsity of the. affidavits on which the proceedings were based.</p> <p>The complainant did not make any tender off money at all; but he prayed that an account might be taken of what was due on the instruments of debt'; that an account might be taken also of the rents and profits received by the vendees of the persons who had bought at the judicial sale, and'thát. he, the complainant, might bé- allowed to redeem on payT me.nt of any balance.</p> <p>The defendants demurred, and the Circuit Court sustained' the demurrer.'1 A decree having goiie accordingly, McQuiddy brought the case here for review.</p> <p>cited numerous statutes of the State of'Missouri, and decisions of the Supreme Court of the State upon them, to show that the proceedings, were not in.proper form, aud that upon the faets alleged and which, of course, the demurrer admitted, no jurisdiction existed, and that the sales of necessity were void.</p> <p>contended that the statutes applicable to' the cáse had been strictly pursued; aud, moreover; that the case was void of equity.</p>

as' follows, with the American Telegraph Company, a company already established in the business of telegraphing: “The American Telegraph Company agree to .buy, and Hum.aston agrees to sell a full, perfect, and unincumbered title to all his inventions for all electric telegraph machines and processes, and particularly the patented invention for perforating paper for the purpose of telegraphic messages, and the adaptation and manner of using such perforated paper in the…

- Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

The, ease was thus: By an act of March 12th, 1849, the railroad company was incorporated, as already mentioned, with a capital of $10,000,000,. for the purpose of building a rail toad across the State, from the city of St. Louis, on the eastern line of the State, to a point indicated in the western line. Authority was given to the counties through which it should pass to subscribe for the stock, and it was invested also with the. powers-.usually conferred upon such companies.

Held: in respect to such corporations, that the taxing power of the State is never presumed to be relinquished, and consequently-that it exists -unlessthe intention to relinquish it is declared in clear aud unambiguous terms. † Express exemption is not pretended, nor does the act to provide for the completion of thb railroad contain any provision which, when properly construed, affords any support to the proposition that…

Held: further — the contract in the second'case having been for ten years • ■ from the date of it, and therefore for three years after the first contract *65 had expired — that it was so divisible in regard to the California portion that it could stand for the seven years for which B. was bound to protect it, though it was void as to the remaining three, and accordingly that B. could sue for a breach of it occurring…

1 to No. 5000, and “redeernable after the 31st day of December, 1864.” They were made on their face all payable “to bearer,” arid declared to be transferable on delivery. .The coupons, which extended to December 31st, 1864, and no farthet, were equally payable “ to bearer.” These bonds were known as Texas indemnity bonds. ■ , • On the 16th of December, 1851, in anticipation of the bonds being delivered to it, the State of Texas passed an' act authorizing their governor to…

”* The act contains fourteen sections. The first prescribes the punishment for treason; punishing it with death, or, in the discretion of the court, with imprisonment and fine, and liberating the offender’s slaves.

In these cases, which were several appendages to the case just above reported, and which came here on error or appeal from the .Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana, Marcuard, the Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana, and the Merchants’ Bank of New Orleans, alleged that at the time of filing the information mentioned in the foregoing case as the foundation of the sale which was made of the eight hundred and fort3'-four lots and ten squares of. ground in New Orleans, owned by…

On an information.very similar to that in Slidell’s case, filed in the District Court for Louisiana, by The United-States v. Ten Lots of Ground, the properly of C. M. Conrad, the lots had been decreed by that court forfeited to the United States, and were sold accordingly! the money being paid into the registry of the court..

the only question in the ease being whether the suit originally brought in a State court (the County Court for tbe County of Bennington)', had been rightly removed to the Circuit' Court, in pursuance of the act of Congress of March 2d, 1867;* one enactment of which is as follows: “That where a suit is now pending, or may hereafter be brought-in any State court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of…

A. Burton, of Vermont, in April, 1859, meeting in New York with one William Driggs, of Michigan, offered to sell to him a claim on the-Bank of Tioga County, Pennsylvania, which be, Burton, alleged that he had against it; and by way of showing the reality of his claim exhibited to Driggs a paper, under seal, executed by him, Burton, and three other persons, bearing date October 20th, 1858, whereby it was recited and agreed as follows: “ That the parties had severally…

<p>Error to the' Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York.</p> <p>The Tioga Railroad Company was a corporation duly organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and was the proprietor of a railroad extending from Blossburg, a town in •that State, a little south of the line between Pennsylvania and New York,'up to that said line. The Blossbhrg and Corning Railroad Company was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, and was the proprietor of a railroad connecting with the abovementioned road at the State line and extending thence to Corning in New York; the^two roads forming a complete line of railroad from Blossburg to Corning. The latter company had acquired its part of the road by purchase in 1855, succeeding to the rights of a former company called the Coining and Blossburg Railroad Company. By contract maáe in 1851 the Corning or New York end of the line was'leased to the Tiogá Railroad Company under certain terms-and stipulatiou&J amongst vlhich was the following:.</p> <p>“For the use of the said railroad of the said-Corning and Blossburg Railro- 4 Company, and the use of their depots, engine-houses,- machine-shops, .grounds, water-stations, &e., the Tioga Railroad-iCompany agrees to pay to the Corning and Blossburg Railroad Company two-thirds, of the receipts for passengers, mails, and freights which shall be taken' for the said Corning and Blossburg Railroad, the expenses charged customers for the loading and unloading coal, lumber, find other freights, and for the warehousing, and such additional charges, by way of discrimination, as-'shaU'be made for short distances for motive power, not to ■ be included in the term receipts, as abovementioned.”</p> <p>The parties soon disagreed- as to the meaning of the words italicized. The lessees asserted that they were entitled to keep any excess of way-fares and freights for intermediate places and short distances abo.ve the through rates for those places, and did-qot account for, b'ut retained the-same; and for this difference, running through many.years, the Blossburg and Corning company, on the 6th of May, 1864, sued the other company in the court below.</p> <p>Previously to the bringing of this, the present suit, that is to sa.y, in January, 1855, the. Blossburg company had brought a suit in the Supreme Court of New York against the Tioga company on the contract in question, in which this question of difference was litigated. The record of that case, which went to final judgment (see 1st Keyes, 486), was given in evidence in this one.</p> <p>The present suit was brought for the same class of receipts which had accrued since the commencement of the former action. Besides the defence abovementioned, the Tioga company in this case pleaded the statute of limitations as to all receipts which accrued more than six years before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiff replied that the defendant was a Corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and not created or existing under the laws of the State of New York, aud that when the supposed cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant (the Tibga company) was out of the State of New York, and so remained' until this action was commenced. The defendant denied that at or since the commencement of the action it had been out of the State.</p> <p>The significance of these pleadings was derived from the New York statute of limitations. The period limited for bringing an action of this kind is six years. But by the one hundredth section of the Code of Practice it is enacted as follows:</p> <p>“ If, when the cause of action shall accrue against any person, he shall be out of the State, such action may be commenced within the terms herein respectively limited after the return of such person into this State; and if, after such cause of action shall have accrued, such, person shall depart from and reside out of this State, the time of his absence shall not be, deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for, the commencement of such action.”</p> <p>The Blossburg company insisted that as the Tioga compauy was .a Pennsylvania corporation, it, could have no legal residence or existence in any other State than Pennsylvania, and hence that it was not in the State oí New York when the action accrued, and had not been therein at any timé since; and, therefore, could not claim 'the benefit of the statute of limitations. ' This the Tioga company disputed; and its counsel relied on certain sections of the Code of Practice of New York, which showed that foreign corporations might be sued in New York under certain circumstances, as where they had property in the State, or where their officers, agents, or directors are found within it, and were' served with process. Thus, by act of 1851 (§ 184 of the' Code), after providing for service of process on a corporation by delivering a copy to the president, secretary, treasurer, director, or managing agent, it is said</p> <p>“Such'services can be made in respect to a foreign corporation only where it has property within this State, or'the cause of action arose therein.”</p> <p>Or, by the act of 1859,</p> <p>.“ Where such service shall be made within this State person•ally upon the president, treasurer, or secretary thereof.”</p> <p>The case, according to the New York practice, in cases which it is anticipated may involve the examination of long accounts, was referred to and tried by a referee.</p> <p>Evidence was given which, as the counsel of the defendant asserted, showed — what he alleged was not denied— “ that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the Tioga compauy had property within the State of New York, an office at Corning, directors, officers, and agents, constantly within that State and at all times amenable to the process of its courts, and in fact, in 1855, that the Blossburg company availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portiou of the demand claimed under the contract now in controversy, recovered judgment and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a 'summons upon the defendant’s agent at Corning.”</p> <p>The referee refused to íhid as facts what is above stated in regard to the- Tioga company, and' found-generally in favor of the plaintiff'. Judgment being entered’oh the finding the case was now here on error.</p> <p>I. The same matter disposed of in the Court of Appeals of New York, in 1355, does not come-in question here. No portion of theclaim there made is- embraced in'this action. It is true that the claim arises under, the same contract, but that circumstance is not of consequence if this court is not concluded by its construction in the courts of New York, which it clearly is not under the decision in Swift' v. Tyson* and Chicago v. Robbins.† Moreover, it is not easy to see that the same question was decided in the New York’ courts. A reference to the cases will show this.</p> <p>II. The antiquated rule that a corporation cannot migrate must now be regarded as a legal fiction rather than a substantial reality. In actual practice, corporations created by the laws of one State do travel into other States, carry their property, establish offices, locate agents, transact business, and accumulate money, and they are recognized outside of the territorial limits of their creation as legal beings, having legal rights.</p> <p>It was at one time questioned in this court, whether a corporation created by the laws of a State, made the corporate body a citizen of the State creating it, when the corporators actually resided beyond its territorial jurisdiction, within the meaning of the act of Congress in respect to the removal of causes from a State to a Federal court for trial. It is now the settled law of this court, that a corporation is a citizen of the State creating it, and entitled to all the rights and immunities accorded to a citizen by the Constitution and the law.‡</p> <p>: If it be, as it must be, assumed that a corporation is a Oitizen of th.e State by which it is created, then it must.be accorded the rights of a citizen in all courts and places. •</p> <p>We are aware of certain decisions in. New York not in accordance with'these views. But'there is no greater reason •for this court’s following the decision of State courts in respect to the limitation of actions, than for its following the’ .laws and decisions respecting the validity of bonds in aid of railroads or any other local improvements. These, certainly, it has not followed.</p> <p>It was proved and conceded that during all the time of the existence of the contract of 1851, the defendant had property-within- the State of New York, an office at Corning, New York, directors, officers, and agents co'nstantly within this State, aud at all times amenable to the process of its courts; áhd in fact in 1855 the plaintiff availed itself of this condition of things by bringing a suit against the defendant for a portion of the ¡demand claimed under the contract now in controversy, recovered judgment, and collected the same, and that in fact this suit was commenced by personal service of a summons upon the defendant’s agent at Corning. It is, therefore, apparent that the Tioga company has been at all times subjectlto a suit at law, for any debt-it owed to the Blossburg company, or any other party.</p>

Simpson and eight-.other persons in one of the county courts of Kansas, to recover certain lauds, together with damages for the detention of them; and for waste committed by the whole nine. The nine defendant? filed a joint answer.

sued the Merchants’ Mutual Insurance Company, of New Orleans, for advances made by them, as the declaration in the case alleged, to the. master and owners of the British bark Fanny, for the purposes of her equipment and to procure a cargo for the vessel, in a voyage from Cadiz, in Spain, to the port of New Orleans. The plaintiffs also alleged that through their agents they had obtained a policy of insurance, dated December 6th, 1867, from defendants.

Summers & Co; filed a bill in the court below against Eugene and Naylor Roach (the last a representative of I. W. Roach, deceased), and R.,B. and B. M. Butler, for an account and for the foreclosure of a mortgage.

March, 1870, ■one Tappan became the assignee. Soon afterwards Cooper, Vail & Co. proved a debt against the bankrupt amounting to $67,029, and on the 24th of July; 1870, filed the probate with the assignee.

Appeals in fourteen cases from the Court of Glai'ms; the case being thus: On the 28th of February, 1867, Congress passed this joint resolution:* “That there shall be allowed and paid ... to the following described persons, no.w employed in the civil service ófthe United States, at Washington, as follows: To civil officers, temporary and. all other clerks, messengers, and watchmen, including enlisted men detailed as such, to be computed upon the gross amount of the…

• Pkhlman & Co., distillers in-the district of Illinois just named, sued Paster, a collector of internal revenue in the same district,-to recover- of him certain money which they, had paid to him under protest, as tax upon distilling from February to July, inclusive, in 1871, the amount sued for being, as was asserted by-them, so much in excess of what was really due.; The only question involved was one of law, and. came up on .demurrer to special counts in the declaration. .

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for. the District of Louisiana; the case — divestéd of irrelative incidents, with a great number of which, as seen in the record, it had come here confused and perplexed — was thus:</p> <p>In the year 1819 this court, in The General Smith* decided, as the profession has generally understood, that in respect to repairs or necessaries furnished to a ship in the port or State to which she belongs, no lien is implied unless it is recognized by the municipal law of the State; declaring the rule herein different from that where the repairs or- necessaries are furnished to a foreign ship; in which case the general 'maritime law gives the party a lien on the ship itself for his security.</p> <p>In view of this decision most or all of the States, enacted laws giving a lien for the protection of material-men in such cases.</p> <p>In 'the year 1833, in the case of The ■ Planter '{Peyroux v. Howard),† the converse of the rule in The General Smith was laid down, and process against a vessel in’ her home port was.used and^supported, the State law giving a lien in the case.</p> <p>In 1844, this court, acting in pursuance of acts of Congress which authorized it to adopt rules of practice in the courts of the United States in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction‡ (and adhering to- the practice declared as proper in the eases mentioned), adopted the following Rule of Practice:</p> <p>“ Rule XII.</p> <p>“In all suits by material-men for supplies, repairs,,or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, or against the blaster and owner alone in p'ersonamj and the like proceeding in rem shall apply to cases of domestic ships, where by the local law a lien is given to material-men for supplies, repairs, and other necessaries.”</p> <p>On the 1st of May, 1859, a new twelfth rule was adopted as a substitute for the one above given. It was thus:</p> <p>“Rule XII.</p> <p>“ In all suits by material-men, for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship, or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship or freight in rem, or against the master or owner alone in personam. And the like proceedings in personam, but not in rem, shall apply in cases of domestic ships for supplies, repairs, or other necessaries.”</p> <p>The reasons for the substitution of this latter rule for the former one are stated by Taney, C. J., in the case of The Steamer St. Lawrence,* to have been that in some cases the State laws giving liens, and the constructions put on them by State courts, were' found not to harmonize with the principles and rules of the maritime code, and embarrassed the Federal courts in applying them.</p> <p>With the case of The General Smith, and others following it, unreversed, and with the substituted^twelfth rule in force,' two sailors, on the 30th December, 1870, filed libels in the District Court, at New. Orleans, against the steamer Lottawanna, claiming wages. The libel alleged that the. vessel when they shipped was in tlm port of New Orleans and was making voyages between that port and various ports and places on the Red River and its tributaries, and it was thus, and inferentially, to be gathered that New Orleans was the home port of the vessel.</p> <p>■ By consent of the owners the vessel was subsequently sold tinder an order of court, and the proceeds, $10,500, were brought into the registry.</p> <p>In the meantime about forty different persons intervened, claiming in the aggregate $35,000. Some wer.e sailors, claiming wages. That their claims were a lien on the fund was conceded. But the majority of the claims (in amount $32,804) were for stores, materials for repairs, or for labor arid supplies of different sorts furnished to the .vessel in the port of New Orleans; the port which, as above said, was apparently her home port, thouglffthe fact that it was so was nowhere distinctly asserted, nowhere in any way, denied, and nowhere in aiiy way proved.</p> <p>Among the interveners claiming'a share of the fund for supplies furnished to the vessel, in the port of New Orleans, were two firms, Wilson & Co. and Chaffee & Brother; the' former clainiing,fiá091 and the latter $10,896.</p> <p>None of the interveners alleged in direct terms that they had any maritime lien on the vessel, or its proceeds, or prayed for process to enforce such a lien; though the libels o.f some of them- contained a prayer that the court would •decree the payment of the intervener’s claim with privilege óu the veséel or its proceeds.</p> <p>There was also a firm, Bell &;Kenuett,.who claimed the whole fund in the registry. • This firm had had something to do with the vessel, and had sued its owners and got judgment against th.em in one of the State courts of Louisiana; the Sixth District Court for the Parish of Orleans. On this judgment they issued execution and attached'the funds in the registiy of the District Court. They also had decrees mpersonam against the owners in the admiralty.-</p> <p>A report of a commissioner appointed by the District Court to .report distribution showed, that after deducting costs of the marshal, registrar, &c\,</p> <p>The net proceeds of salé in the registry were . ' . . $9,405</p> <p>That the sailors’ wages (the-only admitted admiralty liens) amounted to . '........2,629</p> <p>Leaving a-balance of......, . $6,776</p> <p>The questiou was, to whom was this balance to be paid? Bell & Kennett claimed .the whole of it, under their attachment in execution.</p> <p>Wilson & Co., Chaffee & Brother, and the other interveners at New Orleans, for supplies furnished in that port, opposed this claim, and — asserting that on an account justly taken between the said Bell & Kennett and the owners of the vessel, it would appear that the former were indebted to the owners, and not the owners to them — were not willing even that Bell & Kennett should come pari passu on the fund; much less that they should sweep it all away.</p> <p>. The commissioner divided the sum ratably between all the interveners, including'with them Bell & Kenneth The owners opposing.this; he made a second report, remarking that the only admiralty liens in the case were the claims for sailors’ wages (which had now been paid), and that the claims of Wilson & Co., Chaffee & Brothér, and the other interveners were not such ligns'; that though where the owners did not oppose such distribution, a fund in the. registry might properly be distributed to material-men, &e., claimants on it for supplies furnished to the; ship, who yet had no admiralty lien in rem, yet that it could not be so distributed if the owners did opposé the distribution, this principle being settled by the cases of The Maitland,* and The Neptune,† and not departed.from except in tli.e case'of remnants unclaimed by. the owner. The eomrhi.ssioner concluded; therefore, that nothing could be done but pay the fund either to the owners, or to the sheriff of the parish of Orleans to answer his execution and attaching process; aud this last he recommended as the more just disposition of the money. i .</p> <p>Upon the ease coming before the District Court on exceptions to this report, that court, December, 18*71, decreed that the interveners mentioned by the commissidner'should be dismissed, and that the fund should be paid, ^s the commissioner had suggested, to' the sheriff, to answer' the process issued in the suit of Bell & Kennett against the owners.</p> <p>From this decree of the District Court the-, interveners took the case to the Circuit Court, and moved in'¡the District Court that the money in the registry there should be transferred to the registry of the Circuit Court. This motion the District Court denied, and the moneys were paid over to Bell &'Kennett; In the Circuit Court objection was made, as also it had been made before, to the regularity of the appeal, on account of some matters of form. The Ch’cuit Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but at the.same time dismissed the appeal. -</p> <p>From this decree Wilson & Co. and Chaffee & Brother brought the case here by appeal; Bell & Kennett being the appellees.</p> <p>Reference has been made in the opening part of this statement of the ease, to the decision in the case of The'General Smith, decided A.D. 1819, and other cases; and to the two different twelfth rules in admiralty.</p> <p>In different cases coming here about eight years ago;*— especially in- The Moses Taylor and in The Sine v. Trevor,— this court decided that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction given by the Judiciary Act to Federal courts is exclusive, that State statutes which attempt to confer'on State courts %remedy for marine contracts or torts by proceedings strictly in rem, are void. And on the 6th of May, 1872, after the present suit was brought, the twelfth rule of 1859, itself an amendment of the rule pS-1844, was thus amended anew:</p> <p>‘iln all suits by material-men .for supplies or repairs or other necessaries, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem., or against the master or owner alone in personam.”</p> <p>The twenty-sixth rule in admiralty (having no connection, 'however, with any of the preceding matters, but yet adverted to in the argument), says:</p> <p>“In suits in rem, the party claiming the.property shall verify his claim on oath or solemn affirmation, stating that the claimant by whom.of o.n- whose behalf the. claim is made is the. true and bona, fide owner, and that- no other person is the owner thereof.”</p> <p>1. The claims of all the interveners were for materials, supplies, repairs, and other necessaries furnished to the boat, undoubted admiralty contracts.</p> <p>Though under the twelfth rule in admiralty adopted by this court iii 1859 they could not have proceeded in rem against this boat, if New Orleans was her home port, yet it is very questionable whether New Orleans was so. No person filed any claim for the vessel, or,her proceeds, according to the twenty-sixth admiralty rule. Consequently there was no one entitled to be heard as owner, nor is there any evidence-in the record to show where the owners reside. But the twelfth rule, as made in 1859, was altered in May, 1872, by this court, and the persons who intervened could now undoubtedly proceed in rem, 119 matter where the owners reside. The'history of the decisions and rules applicable to the matter shows that the court has always meant to" protect by a lien, enforceable somewhere, persons furnishing supplies- in the home port as much as those furnishing them in a foreign port. The General Smith, and Peyroux v. Howard (The Planter), enabled such persons to enforce in the admiralty liens ivhen given by the Stale law, and as liens were given by the law of all the States the protection was complete. But this administration of State lien laws through admiralty courts' was found to cause trouble, as explained by Taney, C. J., in The Steamer St. Lawrence, and in 1859 the new twelfth rule of practice relegated in effect the furnishers in home ports to their home courts, where they were still abundantly protected. But The Moses Taylor, and The Hiñe v. Trevor, in December Term, 1866, decided that this was unlawful. Fur-' nishers in home ports were thus left quite unprotected so far-as a capacity to. enforce a lien was concerned.- They could not uiideh tile‘twelfth rule of 1859 sue in the admiralty; nor under the two cases just mentioned enforce admiralty liens in State courts.' What in these circumstance's did this court do? Availing itself of the power given to it by Congress it enacted the twelfth rule of May, 1872. It plainly meant by this rule to give a remedy in rem to furnishers in horiie port's, and to 'annul The General Smith, and Peyroux v. Howard. The law and rules of this court, as they now exist, must govern, and not those that- .e'xisted when the suit was brought.*</p> <p>But this court had jurisdiction to distribute these proceeds among the interveners, even if the vessel was in her home port, and the parties not entitled to proceed in rem. So .well settled is this principle that text-books declare it as elementary. Parsons* says:</p> <p>“ Where a vessel, or other property against which a suit is brought, is sold, and brought into, the registry, the power of the. court to distribute these proceeds is unquestioned.”</p> <p>And again:†</p> <p>“When a lien is waived by intendment of law, or lost by neglect to enforce it within a proper time, it has been held that the claim may be enforced against the proceeds.”</p> <p>But the interveners have admiralty liens; they are material-men, and though not entitled to process in rem in consequence of the twelfth rule in admiralty, as it existed when this, suit was brought, they still all intervened for claims founded upon admiralty contracts, which would create an implied'maritime hypothecation and lien.</p> <p>In The Steamer .St. Lawrence, this court allowed a material-man a lien for supplies furnished in the' home port of the vessel after the repeal of the original or first twelfth rule in admiralty; not on the ground that a State statute gave it, as the State could not confer jurisdiction on the Federal Courts,; but on the ground that the party had an admiralty contract, and that his proceedings were begun before the. repeal of the first twelfth rule.</p> <p>. Aud in The Kalorama, and The Caster,‡ this court held that *it .was uo'objection to the assertion of an admiralty lien against a vessel for supplies, that the owner was present and ordered them.</p> <p>. 2. The proceeds in the' registry cannot be attached by the process issued frbm a common-law-court.§ In The Albert Crosby,|| Dr. Lushington said:</p> <p>“I should certainly interfere by attaching any person,who would meddle with any registrar.”</p> <p>3. The District Court should have transferred the proceeds of the sale of the steámer Lottawanna to the registry of the Circuit Court. If the cause was one proceeding in rein, the res involved (or the proceeds if converted into money), passed from the District Court to that of the Circuit .Court.*</p> <p>' We therefore ask of this court that the decree of the District and Circuit Courts be reversed; that the claim of Ken-nett,& Bell be dismissed; that they deposit in the registry of the Circuit Court the amount which they received, with interest; that the claims of the appellants be recognised as admiralty liens against it, and that the money be paid over to them in proportion to their respective .claims.</p> <p>1. The point'decided by the District Court in its confirmation of the commissioner’s report ivas, that where interveners in admiralty have no admiralty lien the proceeds of the sale of the steamboat will not be distributed, if there is.any opposition to such distribution. That was quite right' as the cases cited by him show. It is clear that the powers' and jurisdiction of a bankruptcy or of an equity'' court would be engrafted upon our admiralty courts, were they to atteihpt to make distribution of the proceeds of the sale in their registries, in the mode contended for by appellees, in all cases in which a surplus should,result. Suppose, for example, that a vessel should be libelled at her home port upon a claim for maritime wages of $50, and should be sold for $20,000, and the proceeds in the registry, amounting to $19,950y should be claimed by creditors of the owners who had no admiralty liens, it is obvious that by indirection the creditors would be extending and, enlarging the jurisdiction of the admiralty court so as to embrace causes which could not have been enforced directly and in the first instance as against the vessel. This would be a great abuse of the admiralty jurisdiction. The admiralty judge, when there is no admiralty lien, can only proceed to the distribution of the surplus in the registry when an act of Congress directs him so to do.*</p> <p>2. Holding the money of th& owners in the registry of the admiralty liable tó thé garnishee process under execution, of the same or any other admiralty court, is within the necessary incidental jurisdiction of the admiralty. The analogy is perfect between the present case and that of Jones v. Andrews.†</p>

Held: that extrinsic evidence could be used to show fraud, remarking— “ In civil suits all strangers niay falsify for covin, either fines, or real, or feigned recoveries, and this, whether the covin is apparent on the record or extrinsic.”- In Butler v. Watkins, † it is said, “that in matters of fraud, large latitude is to be given to the admission of evidence.” Messrs.

Held: without an exception, that such acts or the proceedings under the same do not discharge debts due to the crown. * Text writers also, of the highest authority, have uniformly promulgated the same rule.

'instruments, relating to the titles of real estate. They aré thus: 1. .An act of 20th December, 1836, after requiring all persons who claim lands, by deed, lien, or any óther color of' title, to record their instruments of title in the clerk’s office of the county, where the land lies within twelve months from, the 1st April, makes it, by the thirty-fifth section, the duty of the, clerk to record all deeds, conveyances, mortgages, aüd other liens, and all other instruments…

Held: on a suit between the parties for a settlement under the original contract for paving, that the cgntractor could discharge himself from his obligation to return the Bonds to the city by charging himsélf with and paying their market value at the time of accounting in the suit; and that he was not obliged to return the bonds in specie before he could compel the city to pay him for .his work.

Held: that whether the tax on dividends arising from the earnings of corporations for the year 1869 be viewed as a tax on the shareholder or on the corporation, it was intended to tax the earnings for that year by the section which limited the duration of the income tax. 3.

The Washing-Machine Company, assignee of Sylvanus Walker, this last being assignee of one Sergeant, filed a bill in the court below against the Providence Tool Company, for an infringement of Division No. 2829, of a patent for an improvement in clofhes-wringers. The original patent was granted to Sergeant, July 27th, 1858, and was reissued in two divisions, the one in suit being dated December 31st, 1867.

Ilailes & Treadwell, manufacturers of.stoves, filed a bill in the court below against-Van'Wormer et ah, engaged in the same business, to enjoin these last from making a certain sort of coal-stoves called “ base-burning,” “ self-feeding,” or “reservoir” stoves. These stoves are so called because they have a magazine or reservoir susponded ahove the fire-pot, which may be filled with coal at its upper extremity. This, when filled, is closed'by a cover.

<p>1. The act of Congress under -which.Utah was organized as a Territory pro-. vided for a Supreme Court, District Courts, Frobate Courts, and justices . of the peace, and distributed the judicial power among them.</p> <p>2. It gave to the Supreme and'Dlstrict Courts a general jurisdiction at coro-' •mon .law and in. chancery, and limited arid defined the powers of the,justices of the peace.</p> <p>3. It declared that the legislative power should extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or with the organic act.</p> <p>4. The act of tlie Territorial legislature conferring on the Probate-.Coürts a , general jurisdiction in. civil' and criminal case's, and both in chancery, and at common law, is inconsistent with the organic act, and is,'therefore, void. .</p>

■ Appeal from the Circuit iCourt for. the District of Massachusetts; the case being thus : About one o’clock at night, on the 18th of July, 1871, a collision occurred in the Vineyard Sound,, between the schooners C. F. Beebe and S. B. Wheeler, by which the Beebe was sunk and totally lost. Hereupon .her owners, libelled the Wheeler in the District.Court for the District of Massachusetts.

It was held by military occupation until the 18th of March, 1866, when its government was handed over to the proper city authorities.. The condition r>f things which subsisted before the rebellion, was then restored. During the military occupation, it was gov-r erued by a mayor," a board of finance, and a board of street landings, appointed by the commanding general of the department. On the 8th of June, 1865, Hugh Kennedy was thus appointed mayor.

Held: in a suit for damages by the party thus ejected — the' general issue being pleaded and notice of special matter given- — that the defendant might prove that the party ejected' was unfit to perform his ■ duty by reason of' the use of opiates, and by reason, of unsound mentál condition.. . • 2.

. Avery, assignee of Blake, a bankrupt, brought trover in the court below against Hackley & Co. to recover the value of certain saw-logs, alleging that they had been transferred by the bankrupt' to the said .Hackley & Co. in fraud of the Bankrupt Act. . The ease, as found by the court on a waiver of a jury, was thus: Hackley & Co. were owners of saw-mills and engaged in sawing logs, and so making boards from them.

' Some years afterwards, that is to say, on the 16th of January, 1868, he.' gave to a Mrs. Fritton a bond for$4000, payable in one year, with warrant to confess judgment. Ou this warrant Mrs. Fritton caused a judgment to be entered- ou the day on which it was given.

On her return voyage from Calcutta to New York, she sprung a leak, was obliged to put into Mauritius for repairs, and to take up $46,000 on bottomry, the bottomry bond (now held by the Messrs. Ward in New York), covering ship, cargo, and freight. There were p>olicies of insurance on both the sliip and freight.

In the southern part of the State of Wisconsin, about a mile and a half east of Portage City, and at a' point about equidistant from the eastern and western boundaries of the State, rises the Fox River.

Court or Federál courts, and file in the office of the secretary of state a written instrument, duly signed and sealed, certifying such appointment, which shall continue until another attorney be substituted.” This statute being in force, the Home Insurance Company of New York, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York,.and having its office and principal place of business in the city of New York, being desirous of doing business in the State of…

Held: after mature consideration, that the effect of the act of Congress of March 12th, 1868, to provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property in insurrectionary districts, under which the present action is brought, is not to confiscate, or in any case absolutely divest, the property of- the original owner, even though disloyal, and that by the seizure the government' constituted itself a trustee for those…

The case was thus: On the 2d December, 1862, the executors of the will of C. J. McDonald, being fully authorized, sold and conveyed to the Confederate government certaindand in.Bibb County, Georgia, to be used (through the agency of certain laboratories built upon it for the preparation of ammunition) in promoting the rebellion against the government of the United States.

The Civil Practice Act of the Territory of Montana thus enacts: “In an action to recover possession of personal property, judgment for the plaintiff may be for the possession or the value thereof, in cas.o a delivery cannot bo had, and damages for the .detention of them/’ This act being in force, Griswold sued Boley in one of the District Courts of -Montana for the recovery of the possession of certain cattle.

Appeal in equity from the decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. Hearne filed a bill in the court below against the New England Mutual Marine Insurance Company to reform a contract of insurance, he alleging that the policy as made out did not conform to the. agreement of the parties,- taking that agreement with the usage or custom which he insisted entered into, and-formed a pan of it.

.Appeal from the-Circuit Court'for the District of Massachusetts. , The controversy in this'case grew out of a contract of in-1 sura nee upon the same .charter-party as in the preceding case, though here the insurance was by a different .company from [he insurance there.

Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874), is an 1874 decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the patent eligibility of abstract ideas. As explained below in the Subsequent developments section, it is intermediate in the development of that aspect of patent law from Neilson v Harford, through O'Reilly v. Morse, to Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., and then to Parker v. Flook, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l. The Rubber-Tip Pencil case has frequently been cited in the subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning the patent eligibility of computer-related claimed inventions, such as Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Diamond v. Diehr, Parker v. Flook, and Gottschalk v. Benson,

. Atchison and others filed a bill in the District Court of the Territory just named, for an injunction to restrain Peterson and others from carrying on certain mining operations on a creek in the county of Clark and Lewis, in the said Territory, known as the Ten-Mile Creek. The bill alleged that the water, diverted by the complainants from the stream for mining purposes, was deteriorated in quality and value.

In November, 1864, A, J. Gill was owner of five hundred and thirty-six tons of hay, at Point of Rocks, near Fort Fillmore, in the Territory of Colorado. On the 27th November, 1864, he applied to Lieutenant Dunn, the comma,nding officer at the fort, to purchase the same for the use of' the United States.

By an act passed in 1854, the legislature of Alabama chartered a bank to be called the Central Bank of Alabama. The capital was $900,000, divided into shares of $100 each. The charter made certain provisions in case of the insolvency of tlie bank, or of its suspension qf payments in specie.

Held: or an isolated act done at. a later period. * The reason is that the agent to do the act is not authorized to narrate what he had done or how he had done it, and his declaration is no part of the “ res gestee.” Applying this rule to the present case, how does it stand ?

The defendant’s absence from the State is not, however, to be computed. But in tbe ease of a foreign corpora- ■ tion, if it-has a managing agent in tbe State, service of' the writ may be made upon such managing agent;* These provisions of the code being in force, Ware delivered, on the 29th of September, 1864, and during the late’ rebellion,'to the United States Express Company a quantity of gold, to be carried by it. from Nebraska City ,to New York.

District of Columbia. Ambler filed a bill in the court just named against one Whipple and a certain Dickerson. A cross-bill and a supplemental bill, made additional pleadings.

Held: that this requirement of the charter-had reference only to executed contracts-or policies of insurance, and not to the initial or preliminary arrangements for insurance which precede the execution of the formal instrument by the officers of the company. 2. -An agent'for an insurance company authorized to take and approve risks, and to insure, is by general usage also authorized to allow credit for the premium. -Its…

Bullard, assignee of Marden, sued Gillette upon an appeal bond. The action was commenced on the 80th of January, 1872.

E&ror to the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania; the case beiifig thus: Á.

' Error to the-Supreme Court of Louisiana; the case being, thus: The Constitution of the United States ordains as follows:† ■ “ Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.' Uo State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage.” With these provisions in force as fundamental law, the city of New Orleans made an ordinance as follows: ' “From and after the 1st day of January,…

The case was thus: On the 1st of March, 1856, Iowa City issued a number of bonds, dated on the day just named, promising in each to pay to the bearer, on the 1st of January, 1876, the sum of $500, with interest at 10 per cent., payable on the 1st of January in each year. Eor this interest ten coupons, or interest warrants in negotiable form, for $50 each, were, annexed to the bonds.

Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. William Tod Otto argued the case on behalf of the City of Memphis. Because the case was both argued originally and reargued before the appointment of Chief Justice Waite, he took no part in the judgment. Murdock challenged on several grounds a state court's decision relating to land devised by Murdock's ancestors. The city's federal claim which was outcome determinative was that a federal statute created a trust for the land. The state court accepted this claim and the Supreme Court affirmed. Murdock, however, urged the Supreme Court to review the state court's findings on state law based on the Judiciary Act of 1867.

On motion to dismiss a writ -of -error to the Court -of Appeals of Maryland.

On motion to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction. The case was thus: On -the 15th of April and 19th of April, 1861, the President, by his proclamation, declared that insurrection existed-in Louisiana and-certain other Southern States, and that the ports of Louisiana, with those of the said States, were under blockade.

'of the bank pledged .for re* demption of the notes.forfeited, and give notice to the note-holders to preseht them to him for payment.

Rule twenty-one of this court provides that the brief of the counsel for the plaintiff in error shall contain, 11 in the ■order here Stated,”— 1. A statement of the ease, &c. “2.

Mrs. Johnson brought suit against one Parcels, in one of the Circuit Courts of Adair County, Missouri, to have an assignment of dower in a certain one hundred and twenty acres of land, of which she alleged that her husband had been seized in fee simple and in such way as that she was dowable of the land.

The Citizens’ Savings an.d Loan Association o'f Cleveland brought their action in the court below, against the city of Topeka, on coupons for interest attached to' bonds of the city of Topeka.

of Murdock v. City of Memphis, and as paragraph 9 thereof; and also to consider the same thing as inserted in the Index, on page 698, as a paragraph between the paragraphs 2 and 3 of the title “Jurisdiction,” now there. "Where an act of Congress calls into operative- effect a provision in a deed, in virtue of which provision thus called into effect, a party claims title and right in such a way that, confessedly, but for the act, no. suit would lie, the party so claiming…