Volume 87 — Vermont Reports

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on tbe pleadings and master’s report, at tbe April Term, 1912, Windham County, Fish, Chancellor. Decree dissolving the injunction restraining the defendant from prosecuting his suit at law against the orator to recover the money paid on the purchase price, rescinding the contract between the parties, and adjudging that the orator pay the defendant $656.15 with costs of this suit and of said suit at law. The orator appealed.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on the pleadings and master’s report, at the December Term, 1910, Addison County, Stanton, Chancellor. Decree for the orator. The defendants appealed. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit on a fire insurance policy. The only question at issue was the amount of the defendant’s liability. Trial by jury at-the December Term, 1912, Caledonia County, Waterman, J., presiding. Verdict determining the plaintiff’s loss and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. This case has been once before in the Supreme Court. See 86 Vt. 267.

Assumpsit. Heard in vacation after the September Term, 1912, Washington County, before Stanton, Superior Judge, on demurrer to the declaration. Demurrer sustained pro forma, and the declaration adjudged insufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

<p>Dogs — License—Collar—Name of Oiuner or Keeper.</p> <p>Under P. S. 5623, requiring that the owner or keeper of a dog shall have it licensed, and that it shall wear a collar marked with the name of “the owner or keeper and its registered number,” the quoted' phrase allows the collar to be marked with the name of either the owner or the keeper, regardless of whether the dog was licensed in the name of the one or the other.</p>

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on defendants’ demurrer to the bill, incorporated in their joint answers thereto, at the December Term, 1912, Caledonia County, Waterman, Chancellor. Demurrer sustained, and bill adjudged insufficient and dismissed with costs to the defendants. The orators appealed. The opinion states the case.

Petition, under P. S. 2023, to set aside a default judgment by a justice of the peace. An answer and replication were filed. Trial by court at the March Term, 1911, Franklin County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment that the petition be dismissed with costs. The petitioner excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on demurrer to the bill, at the April-Term, 1913, Windham County, Fish, Chancellor. Demurrer overruled; bill taken as confessed, and decree for the orators. The defendants appealed. The opinion states the case.

Ejectment. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1912, Windsor County, BuBer, J., presiding. The exceptions state that, “At the close of all the evidence defendants moved the court to direct a verdict for the defendants. Neither party desired to go to the jury.” Verdict directed for the defendants, pro forma, and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Petition for divorce. Trial by court at the September Term, 1912, Windham County, Butler, J., presiding. Petition dismissed. The petitioner excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery, Washington County. Heard at Chambers, December 26, 1912, Miles, Chancellor, on the pleadings, master’s report and orator’s exceptions thereto. Exceptions overruled and bill dismissed with costs to defendants. The orator appealed. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery, Lamoille County. Heard at chambers, November 22, 1911, on demurrer to bill, Taylor, Chancellor. Demurrer sustained, pro forma, bill adjudged insufficient and dismissed with costs. The orator appealed.

General Assumpsit, Orleans County Municipal Court, Frank D. Thompson, Judge. Heard on an agreed statement of facts. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. There is a well defined difference between ordinary life insurance company and a benevolent association with insurance as an incidental feature. Com. v. Equitable Beneficial Association, 137 Pa. 412; Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1911, Windsor County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict directed for the defendant, and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Complaint seeking a quo warranto, brought to the Supreme Court for Franklin County at its May Term, 1913, and then heard on demurrer to the complaint. The opinion states the ease.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on demurrer to the bill, at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Butler, Chancellor. Demurrer overruled; bill adjudged sufficient and taken as confessed. Decree for the orator. The defendant appealed. The opinion states the ease.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the October Term, 1912, Esses County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case for failure to grant a fishing license. Heard on an agreed statement of facts at the August Term, 1912, Grand Isle County, Waterman, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Information charging burglary. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1912, Chittenden County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty; and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case. Respondent’s act in pushing further open the car door that he found open an inch was a “breaking” sufficient to support the charge of burglary.

Case against a director of a corporation, under P. S. 4307. Heard on special demurrer to the declaration, at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and declaration'adjudged sufficient, to which the defendant excepted.

• Assumpsit on an accident insurance policy. Pleas, the general issue and a plea relying on the limitation of the cause of action by the terms of the policy. Trial by court at the September Term, 1912, Franklin County, Fish, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Debt on bond. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the March Term, 1912, Washington County, Waterman, J., presiding. After the court had found the facts, and before judgment thereon, defendant moved in arrest of judgment for that the declaration is insufficient to recover the damages recited in the specification thereunder. Motion denied, and judgment for the plaintiff, to all of which the defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit on an accident insurance policy. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1912, Chittenden County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict directed for the defendant, and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted.

Information for violation of P. S. 5454. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury, at the December Term, 1911, Windsor County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict guilty, and judgment and sentence thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

■ Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at- the June Term, 1912, Windsor County, Butter, J., presiding. Verdict directed for the defendant, and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case. William W. Stickney, John G. Sargent, Homer L. Sheets and Ernest E. Moore for the plaintiff. • William Batchelcler and James G. Harvey for the defendant.

Complaint for knowingly receiving and concealing stolen property, filed at the Special Term of Chittenden County Court begun on December 16, 1912.

Complaint for knowingly receiving and concealing stolen goods, filed at a special term of Chittenden County Court begun on December 16, 1912. The same proceedings were had below in this case as in State v. Alfred, the report of which immediately precedes this.

Indictment for murder. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at tbe September Term, 1911, Washington County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty of murder in the second degree, and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Petition for a writ of prohibition, brought to the Supreme Court for Washington County at its November Term, 1912, and then heard on the petition and defendant’s answer thereto.

<p>Appeal in Chancery, Washington County. Heard at Chambers on March 5, 1912, on the pleadings, Taylor, Chancellor. Decree for the orators. The defendant appealed. The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error brought to the Supreme Court for the County of Windham, and heard at its May Term, 1913. The opinion states the ease.</p>

Case for negligence. Heard on demurrer to the whole declaration, at the March Term, 1912, Washington County, Waterman, J., presiding. Demurrer sustained and declaration adjudged insufficient. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Peck, William C. Peck, one of the legatees, appellant. The issues made by the pleadings are stated in the opinion. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1909, Chittenden County, Taylor, J., presiding. At the close of all the evidence the court submitted the special questions recited in the opinion, directed how the jury should answer them, and rendered judgment on the directed special verdict, affirming the decree of the probate court. The appellant excepted.

Appeal in Chancery, Windham County. Heard at Chambers, March 8, 1912, on defendant’s motion for the dissolution, of the temporary injunction restraining the prosecution of the action at law, Taylor, Chancellor. Injunction dissolved. The orator appealed. .The opinion states the case. Though a judgment be not final in the sense of disposing of the case on its merits, yet if it is tantamount to a dismissal of the action an appeal will lie.

General Assumpsit. Plea, tbe general issue. Trial by jury at tbe September Term, 1912, Rutland County, Waterman, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for tbe plaintiff. Tbe defendant excepted. Tbe opinion states tbe case.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Washington County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. Motion overruled, to which the defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

<p>Pleadings — Effect of Reference — Contracts—Statute of Frauds ■ — Pa/rt Performance — Principal and Agent — Right of Agent to Sue — Undisclosed Principal — Defence of Agency — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Where a case is referred the pleadings, including the declaration, are to be treated as adapted to the facts found, unless that would change the form of the action or bring in a new cause of action.</p> <p>Where plaintiff contracted with defendant to stake out a telephone line and order the supplies for 16 sections, each shareholder to build one section and defendant to procure subscriptions for that number of sections, or take them himself, plaintiff’s failure actually to deliver to defendant the materials that plaintiff had ordered and paid for was not a breach of the contract.</p> <p>The Statute of Frauds does not apply to executed contracts, and where plaintiff agreed to stake out a telephone line and purchase the materials therefor, which he did, and defendant accepted a part of the materials, the case is doubly without the Statute.</p> <p>While the general rule is that, where an agent makes, a contract in behalf of his principal, naming him, an action thereon cannot be maintained in the name of the agent, a defendant relying on that defence has the burden of proving both the agency and the disclosure of the principal.</p> <p>Where the nominal promisee in a simple contract is an agent who' has a beneficial interest in the performance thereof, or a special property in its subject-matter, he may maintain an action thereon in his own name.</p> <p>An agent contracting in behalf of an undisclosed principal is personally bound by the contract, and so an action for its breach may be maintained in the name of either the principal or the agent.</p>

Petition for leave to .enter an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace. Heard on a general demurrer to the petition, at the June Term, 1913, Caledonia County, Stanton, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and the petition adjudged sufficient. The petitionee excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit for the price of three carloads of hay. The defendant was a non-resident of this State at the time this process was served. Service was made on an alleged agent of the defendant, who appeared specially and pleaded in abatement that when service was made the person served was not his agent, and thereafter also moved to dismiss the writ for that reason, and for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was overruled, to which the defendant excepted.

<p>Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue with notice of recoupment. Heard at the September Term, 1912, Windham County, Butter, J., presiding, on the report of a referee. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the ease.</p>

Petition, under P. S. 2017, to vacate a default judgment. Trial by court at the April Term, 1913, Essex County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment for the petitioner on the facts found. The petitionee excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on demurrers to the bill at the March Term, 1913. Washington County, Fish, Chancellor. Demurrers sustained and bill adjudged insufficient and dismissed with costs. The orators appealed. The opinion states the ease.

Information for maliciously killing another’s heifer. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1913, Lamoille County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty; and judgment and sentence thereon. The respondent excepted. At the close of all the evidence the court denied respondent’s motion for a directed verdict, to which, he excepted. The opinion states the case.

Petition for writ of mandamus, brought to the Supreme Court for Washington County- at its October Term, 1913, and then heard on an agreed statement. The opinion states the case.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the April Term, 1912, Windham County, Fish, J7, presiding. Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the ease. The “incompetency” of a servant, which will render the master liable to a coservant, does not refer merely to physical and mental attributes, but includes temperament and disposition.

Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Washington County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict directed for. the plaintiff, and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. Whether a transaction between a married woman and her husband’s creditor is one of suretyship is to be determined, not from the form of the contract nor from its basis, but by its real purpose and effect.

<p>Book account, Chittenden County, March Term, 1913. Waterman, J., presiding.</p> <p>The action is against E. T. Monahan and the Winooski Savings Bank, trustee. The writ was dated August 22, 1903, and was served on the bank on August 25, 1903. Judgment by default was rendered against E. T. Monahan. The bank filed a disclosure denying its liability as trustee, and that issue was tried by the court on an agreed statement.</p> <p>The agreed statement shows that on February 28, 1900, J. J. Monahan caused to be served a writ in his favor against E. T. Monahan and the Winooski Savings Bank as trustee, which writ was returnable to the Chittenden County Court, and duly and seasonably entered therein; that when the writ was served on the bank, E. T. Monahan had $193.93 on deposit therein in his own name, and evidenced by deposit book No. 6685; that on October 9, 1900, E. T. Monahan, owing Charles E. Pease & Company $28, borrowed from the Home Savings Bank $75 and secured the payment of those two debts by assigning and delivering to those two creditors said bank deposit book as collateral security; that on April 25, 1903, E. T. Monahan signed and delivered to the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland a written order directing the Winooski Savings Bank to pay said Fidelity and Deposit Company “the principal and interest due on my account, now represented upon my bank book No. 6685, upon the discharge of the Winooski Savings Bank, by order of court as trustee at law in the suit now pending in Chittenden County Court, in which J. J. Monahan is plaintiff and I, Edward T. Monahan, am defendant, and the said Winooski Savings Bank is summoned as trustee, and the payment of a note of $75 and interest due the Home Savings Bank and about $28 due Charles E. Pease and Company, for which my bank book is held as collateral security”; that on April 29, 1903, the Winooski Savings Bank by due course of mail received from said Fidelity and Deposit Company due notice of said order; that on August 25, 1905, Claude L. Allen presented to the Winooski Savings Bank said written order with an assignment thereof to him duly indorsed thereon and signed by said Fidelity and Deposit Company; that on August 25, 1905, but after the service of the writ in this ease, the said Home Savings Bank, said Charles E. Pease and Company, and said Claude L. Allen presented to the Winooski Savings Bank their respective claims upon said deposit and demanded the same, “whereupon this trustee in good faith paid” them “their several claims covering the whole amount of said deposit, ’ ’ which then amounted to $241.69; that this plaintiff on August 25, 1903, on June 24, 1904, and on August 25, 1905, caused to be served a writ in his favor against said E. T. Monahan and the Winooski Savings Bank as trustee, which three writs were returnable to the Chittenden County Court, and duly entered therein where those suits are still pending, the last served being the writ in this case. The court adjudged the Winooski Savings Bank not chargeable as trustee and discharged it with costs. Plaintiff excepted.</p>

Trespass quare clausum, witli account in trover. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913. Franklin County, Miles, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case - for negligence, claimed by plaintiff to be brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, but by defendant to be under the state law. Pleas, the general issue, and a special plea in bar alleging facts showing the cause of action to be under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and concluding with a verification. Replication to that plea, precludi non, because, etc., averring the facts alleged in defendant’s said special plea, and concluding to the country.

Case for negligence. Declaration at common law, bnt manoeuvred into an action under the Federal Employers ’ Liability Act. Pleas, the general issue and a special plea in bar alleging facts showing the cause of action to be under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and concluding with a verification.

Petition for partition, Washington County, March Term, 1913, Fish, J., presiding. Trial by court. The court construed the will of Lorton Hathaway and the decree of the probate court to give a life estate to the widow, with remainder to the daughters in fee, and rendered judgment for partition. Petitionees excepted. The opinion states the case.

Ejectment. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the March Term, 1909, Washington County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff to recover the seisin and possession of an undivided half of the premises described in the declaration, $4,158.84, damages, and her costs. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. A forfeiture may be waived by conduct of the party otherwise entitled to insist thereon, as was done by the testatrix.

Appeal in Chancery, Rutland County, September Term, 1912, Stanton, Chancellor. Heard on the pleadings, including defendants’ cross-bill, and master’s report and exceptions thereto by both parties. Decree, pro forma, dismissing orator’s bill with costs to defendants. The orator appealed. The opinion states the case.

Case for negligence. Heard on demurrer to the declaration at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled, pro forma, and declaration adjudged sufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. The decisions are somewhat conflicting on the subject of joinder of counts under a statute with counts at common law. There is a line of cases holding that they cannot be joined.

Assumpsit to recover money expended in tbe support of a pauper. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1932, Washington County, Stanton, J., presiding. Verdict directed for the defendant, and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Petition for a writ of prohibition, brought to the Supreme Court for Washington County at its November Term, 1913, and then heard on petitionee’s motion to dismiss. The opinion states the ease. The question of necessity, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, is not one of a judicial character. Miss. &• Rum River Boom Co., v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 402; Z7. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513; Cherokee Nation v. So. Kan.

S. 3716, 3718, as amended by No. 119, Acts 1910. Heard on appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal at the September Term, 1913, Orleans County, Waterman, J., presiding. Appeal dismissed. Appellant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Petition, under P. S. 3108, by a wife to compel her husband to contribute to the support and education of their minor child. Trial by court at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding.

<p>General Assumpsit. Pleas, the general issue and payment. Trial by court at the September Term, 1912, Chittenden County, Taylor, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.</p> <p>The vote.-of the town “to. accept and adopt the report” of the town treasurer amounted to a ratification and settlement. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. .4th Ed., §277; Town of Bloomfield v. Charter Oak Bank, 121 IT. S. 121; State v. Brattleboro, 68 Yt. 520; Gardner v. Rogers, 11 Yt. 334; Seymore v. Marlboro, 40 Yt. 171; Cox v. Mt. Tabor, 41 Yt. 28.</p>

<p>General assumpsit oxl an account stated. Plea, the general issue. Trial by Court at the March Term, 1913, Orleans County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants excepted. The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Alteration of Instruments — Materiality—Change of Date Before Delivery — Effect on Liability of Not Consenting — Persons Making Alteration — Act of Stranger — Intent of Alteration —Memorandum—Bills and Notes — Bona Fide Purchasers.</p> <p>Where one of the makers of a promissory note payable to a bank, after his comakers had left it with him to be delivered to the bank in renewal of a note for the same amount, crossed out the date with lines in ink, but so that it still remained perfectly legible, and inserted another date, the change was a material alteration of the instrument, and not a mere memorandum from which interest should be computed, and made the note void as against all the makers without whose knowledge the change was made.</p> <p>The rule that h material alteration of a written contract vitiates it only when the alteration is made or authorized by one who takes some benefit under the instrument applies only to delivered written contracts.</p> <p>The fact that makers of a promissory note after signing it left it with one of them for delivery did not authorize that one to change the date before delivery.</p> <p>Where makers of a promissory note after signing it left it with one of them for delivery and he changed the date before delivery, that alteration could not be regarded as the act of a stranger within the rule that a material alteration by a stranger will not make the instrument void.</p> <p>Any alteration of a written contract, which may in any event change the rights, duties or obligations of the party sought to be charged is material, regardless of whether the alteration is beneficial or prejudicial to him.</p> <p>A material alteration of a written contract may avoid it, although innocently made.</p> <p>Although it is presumed in the first instance that all alterations of a written instrument were made before, or at the time of, its execution, a bank in accepting a note that had been drafted by its cashier eight months before, and the date of which had been since visibly altered, could not rely on that presumption, but was put upon inquiry by the appearance of the note.</p> <p>The order of the reception of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.</p>

General assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the March Term, 1913, Rutland County, Butter, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit on promissory notes. Heard on special demurrer to the declaration, in vacation after the March Term, 1913, Chittenden County, Waterman, J. Demurrer overruled and declaration adjudged sufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

<p>Appeal from disallowance by the clerk of costs to the respondent who prevailed in habeas corpus proceedings, Franklin County. Heard at Chambers on July 14, 1913. Clerk’s decision affirmed. The respondent excepted.</p>

General assumpsit. Plea,' the general issue. Trial by-court at the March Term, 1913, Rutland County, Butler, J., presiding. Judgment for defendants. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion 'states the case.

<p>Public Service Commission — Jurisdictional Facts — Questions Not Raised Below — Sea-ring—Change of Personnel.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission cannot be supported by presumptions, but the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction must affirmatively appear.</p> <p>The question of the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission on the facts found will he determined on appeal, though not raised below.</p> <p>Where only one of the three commissioners constituting the Public Service Commission that heard the case was in office when the judgment was rendered, and the commissioner who made up the quorum that rendered the judgment was not a member of the body when the case was heard, the judgment was invalid, as a hearing cannot be had by one part of the Commission and a decision made by another.</p>

Trespass quare clausum. Plea, the general- issue, with notice of a public way and of a prescriptive right of way in defendants. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1911, Bennington County, Waterman, J., presiding. Verdict for the plaintiff and judgment thereon. The defendants excepted.' The opinion states the case.

<p>Petition for leave to enter a belated appeal from a judgment of the probate court. Trial by court at the September Term, 1913, Washington County, Butler, J., presiding. Petition dismissed with costs to the petitionee. The petitioner excepted. The opinion states the case.</p>

Appeal in chancery, 'Windsor County. Heard at Chambers, August 23, 1913, on the pleadings and master’s report. Decree dismissing the bill with costs. The oratrix appealed. Heard in Supreme Court on motion to dismiss oratrix’s appeal. The decretal order dismissing the bill was filed Aug. 23, 1913. The motion for the appeal now in the files was received and filed by the clerk Oct. 10, 1913.

Case for damages to goods caused by delay in the delivery. Heard on demurrer to the replication, at the September Term, 1913, Orleans County, Waterman J., presiding. Demurrer overruled, pro forma, and replication adjudged sufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case, which has been once before in Supreme Court; 86 Vt. 342.

<p>Negligence — Trial—Rejection of Evidence — Repetition— —Declarations.</p> <p>It is proper for the court to prevent a witness from repeating his testimony as to admissions or any other matter, in avoidance both of prolixity and of undue emphasis. ■</p>

Case. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Franklin County, Miles, 3., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. In putting in the catch-basin to protect the walk from surface waters the defendant was acting in a governmental capacity and is not liable. Aitken v. Wells River, 70 Vt. 308; Welsh v. Rutland, 56 Vt. 228; Weller v. Burlington, 60 Vt. 28; Stockwell v. Rutland, 75 Vt. 76.

Trover and trespass for an automobile, Chittenden County, March Term, 1913, Waterman, J., presiding. Assessment of damages by jury, on remand for that purpose only. See 85 Yt. 355.' The defendant excepted.

Petition for divorce. Heard at the March Term, 1913, Washington County, Fish J., presiding, on petitionee’s demurrer to petitioner’s replication. Demurrer overruled and replication adjudged sufficient, to which the petitionee excepted. Case passed to the Supreme Court before hearing on merits. The opinion states the case.

Petition for a writ of certiorari, brought to the Supreme Court for Caledonia County at its October Term, 1913, and heard at its November Term, 1913, on petitionee’s joint demurrer incorporated in their joint answer, and on petitioner’s motion to strike from the record and from the files said joint demurrer and answer. The opinion fully states the case.

Complaint seeking a quo warranto, brought to the Supreme Court for -Franklin County at its May Term, 1913, and then heard on demurrer to the complaint. That demurrer was sustained, as reported, ante, page 94. Thereupon relator amended his complaint. Heard on demurrer to the amended complaint at the November-Term, 1913. The opinion states the ease.

Case for negligence, Bennington County, December Term, 1912, Fish,, J., presiding. Heard on demurrer and motion to dismiss by one defendant, and on motion to dismiss by the other. Demurrer overruled and motions to dismiss denied. Both defendants excepted. Cause passed to Supreme Court before trial on merits. The only designation in the declaration of any defendant is “said defendant,” or “this defendant.” In other respects the opinion sufficiently states the case.

Appeal in chancery. Heard on demurrer to tbe bill, at the March. Term, 1913,'Franklin County, Miles, Chancellen Demurrer sustained, bill adjudged insufficient, and dismissed. The orators appealed. The opinion states the case. ■

Case for deceit. Heard on demurrer to the declaration, at the December Term, 1908, Lamoille County, Waterman, J., presiding. Demurrer sustained, and declaration adjudged insufficient. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case for negligence. Plea, tbe general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Orleans County, Stanton, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case for deceit in the exchange of automobiles, Windham County, September Term, 1913. Miles, J., presiding. Pleas, the general issue and a special plea in bar relying on a former judgment. Replication, similiter and a special plea relying on the claim that the former judgment was in respect of a different cause of action, though growing out of the same transaction. Heard on the defendant’s several motions for judgment upon defendant’s, second plea, and upon the pleadings.

Petition to punish for contempt of court, brought to the Supreme Court for the county of Franklin at its November Term, 1913, and heard on the pleadings and the report of a special master. The opinion states the case.

Trespass quare clausum and case. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1912, Windsor County, Butler, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in chancery. Heard on the pleadings and the facts found by the chancellor, at the December Term, 1912, Bennington County, Fish, Chancellor. Decree for the orator. The 'defendants appealed. The opinion states the case.