Volume 88 — Vermont Reports

Assumpsit on an officer’s receipt for attached realty and personalty. Plea, the general issue, with notice of the defences recited in the opinion. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Orleans County, Stanton, J., presiding. At the close of all the evidence both parties moved for a directed verdict. Plaintiff’s motion was granted, and a verdict directed in its favor for $5,773.79 and costs, and judgment thereon, to which the defendants excepted.

General Assumpsit. Pleas, the general issue and payment. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1910, Caledonia County, Butler, J;, presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the ease.

•.. • Case ■ fur ■ negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by-jury at the December Term, 1913, Addison County, Waterman, J., presiding. , Verdict directed, pro forma, for the plaintiff, and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery. This is a bill of interpleader. Answers were filed and the defendants ordered to interplead, which they did. Heard on the pleadings and the facts found by the ehaneeilor at the March Term, 1913, Rutland County, Butler, Chancellor. Decree that the claimant, Lottie Headle, the beneficiary named in the original certificate, is entitled to the disputed fund. The other claimants appealed. ■ The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit on promissory notes. Trial by court, on an agreed statement of facts,. at the September Term, 1914, Rut-land County, Fish, Jl, presiding. Judgment for defendant Connolly to recover his costs. The plaintiff excepted. - The opinion states the cáse. The form of the note was notice to the bank that the borrowing was for Loveland individually, and put the bank on inquiry as to his authority to sign the firm name. Brown v. Peltil, 178 Pa. St. 17,' 56 Am.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard on the' pleadings, including a cross bill, and the report of a special master, in vacation after the September Term, Í911, Franklin County, Waterman, Chancellor. Decree for the orator, strictly pro forma, filed March 9, 1912. The defendant appealed. The opinion states the ease.

General Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. 'Heard on the report of a referee at the September Term, 1913, Washington County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the ease.

• Trespass for assault and battery. Plea, the general issue with notice relying on self-defence. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Washington County, Butler, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants excepted. The opinion states the case.

Replevin for property taken on a warrant for the collection of taxes. Plea, the general issue with notice justifying under a tax warrant issued by the town treasurer. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Franklin County, Taylor, J. presiding. General verdict directed for the plaintiff, and judgment thereon. The. defendant excepted.

Appeal in Chancery. Heard, on demurrer to the bill, at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, Chancellor. Demurrer overruled, strictly pro forma, bill taken as confessed*.. and decree for the orator. The defendant- appealed. The opinion states-the ease. . • ■ The bill is maintainable .as in the nature of “a bill of the peace.” -1 Pom. Eq.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery.' Heard on the pleadings and master’s report, at the June Term, 1913, Windsor County, Miles,- Chancellor. JDecree dismissing the bill with costs to defendants. The opinion states the case.

Case for wilfully and maliciously piling logs on plaintiff’s land and interfering with her use and occupation thereof. Plea, the general issue with notice that defendant claimed title to the land and the easement by deed and by prescription. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1912, Orange County, Stanton, J., presiding. Yerdiet and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Information for becoming a dealer in evergreen trees without first procuring a license therefor. Heard first on respondent’s demurrer to the information, at the March Term, 1913, Washington County, Fish, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and information adjudged sufficient, to which the respondent excepted. Thereupon he pleaded, not guilty. Trial by jury. At the close of all the evidence, the respondent moved for a directed verdict. Motion overruled, to which he excepted.

Case for alienation, of the- affections of plaintiff’s husband. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1910, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Yerdiet and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. If a marriage ceremony is proved, it is presuméd that the celebrant was duly authorized. State v. Abbey, 29 Yt. 60;' Franklin v. Lee, 62 N. TI. 78; 14 Am. & Eng. Ene.

Petition for a divorce. Trial by court at tbe December Term, 1913, Orange County, Butter, J., presiding. On the facts found by the court, the libellee moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction. Motion overruled, and bill granted for intolerable severity, with order for alimony and giving the libellant the custody of her minor child. The libellee excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery. Petition to foreclose a mortgage of real estate. Heard on the pleadings and master’s report, at the December Term, 1913, Windsor County, Stanton, Chancellor. Decree, pro forma, dismissing the petition. The petitioner appealed. The opinion fully states the case.

Replevin. Plea, the general issue. Trial by court at the August Term, 1913, Grand Isle County, Fish, J., presiding. Judgment for plaintiff against defendants, McGowan and Gordon, and judgment that defendant Kinney recover his costs. Defendants, McGowan and Gordon, excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit for. money paid on the purchase price of real estate. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Franklin County, Taylor, J., presiding. The jury returned the special verdicts recited in the opinion, and the court directed a general verdict for the defendants and gave judgment thereon, to which the plaintiff excepted. The opinion fully statés the case.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1912, Rutland County, Waterman, J. presiding.

Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1908, Chittenden County, Waterman, J. presiding. Verdict directed for the plaintiff, and judgment thereon. . The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery, Rutland. County, March Term, 1914, Fish, Chancellor. Heard on the pleadings, master’s report, and defendants’ exceptions thereto. Exceptions overruled, and decree for the orator. The defendants appealed. The petitioner is engaged in the business of brewing and selling malt liquors, having its brewery in Newark, N. J. and its office and. salesroom in New York City, but had no license to sell intoxicating liquors in Vermont.

''Assumpsit. Heard in' vacation after'March Term, 1913, Chittenden.-County, by Waterman, J.', on demurrer to each of the three counts of the 'declaration for insufficiency, and to the whole declaration for misjoinder of counts. Demurrers to the first and second counts sustained, and those counts adjudged insufficient; demurrer to the third count overruled, and that count adjudged sufficient; demurrer for misjoinder overruled.- The defendant excepted.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Chittenden County, Waterman, J., presiding.- Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. That it is negligence per se to alight from a moving train is held by most of courts of last resort in this country.

Ejectment.. Plea, the general issue with notice. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Windham County, Miles, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Information for receiving stolen goods. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at a special term in January, 1913, Chittenden County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict, not guilty on tbe first, third and sixth counts, and guilty on the second, fourth, and fifth counts, and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the April Term,. 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit begun by trustee process; Simpson Clark, claimant. Heard on the facts found by the commissioner as to the liability, of the trustee, at March Term, 1913, Orleans County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment discharging trustee with costs, and that the fund in his hands belongs to the claimant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Sargent of a claim presented by Carl S. Hopkins, as trustee for Walter Bartlett and Lizzie Bartlett. Declaration, special assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the April Term, 1913, Windham County, Taylor, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Information for perjury. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Chittenden County, Waterman, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty; and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case. It is well settled that where a witness is examined on voire dire before his examination in chief is begun, a special oath must be administered.

<p>Adverse Possession — Extent of Possession — Constructive Possession Under Paper Title — Continuity of Possession — Abandonment” — '-Findings in Support of Judgment.</p> <p>Ordinarily tbe constructive possession of one • holding land under a paper title is limited to the bounds fixed by such title, for the writing is a distinct disclaimer of any claim beyond the recited bounds.</p> <p>In trespass quare clausum, where each party claimed title by adverse possession, and the trial court found that defendant cut the timber ' from most of the disputed tract in 1885, that one of plaintiff’s • grantors began cutting thereon a few days after he took his deed, the date of which is August 11, 1885, and no other finding fixed the date -of the cuttings any more definitely, the findings will be construed on review, in support of a judgment for defendant, as showing a cutting by defendant before the middle of August, 1885, for, if a more definite finding was important, the burden of procuring it was on plaintiff. ’</p> <p>Where defendant in 1885 cut most of the timber on a tract of mountain woodland of which he had constructive ’possession under a paper title, and thereafter did no more cutting until 1906, but’ in the meantime frequently went upon the land to look’it over, retraced the lines, and in 1905 resurveyed and marked the lines, there was no “abandonment” of his possession, as matter of law, as only such occupancy is required as is consistent with the use to which the property is adapted, and defendant’s conduct tended to show an intention to retain possession, preventing an abandonment.</p> <p>Abandonment of the possession of land, relied upon as a basis of title by adverse possession, is a question of fact.</p> <p>Where plaintiff claimed title to a disputed 'tract of land by adverse possession, based on constructive possession under color of title, he could not avail himself of his-grantor’s occupancy of other parts of the land covered by his deed, where it did not appear that during such occupancy the grantor was claiming to the limits of his grant; it appearing, on the contrary, that he pointed out the disputed tract as belonging to another adverse claimant thereof.</p>

Assumpsit on an officer’s receipt for attached property. Heard on an agreed statement of facts at the December Term, 1912, Windsor County, Stanton, J., presiding. Judgment, pro forma, for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the casé.

<p>Taxation — Taxpayer’s Inventory — Assessment T>y Listers — Gonchisiveness — Reputation of Taxpayer.</p> <p>Listers act judicially, and they have authority, under P. S. 561, as amended by No. 45, Acts 1910, to reject a taxpayer’s inventory and make up a new one for him, if they believe on reasonable grounds, and not as matter of caprice, that the taxpayer’s inventory is not a full, true, and correct list of his taxable property.</p> <p>In assumpsit to recover taxes paid under protest, plaintiff cannot attack the action of the listers, under P. S. 561, as amended by No. 45, Acts 1910, in assessing him $5,000 in addition to the amount shown by his submitted tax inventory, because the listers believed this too small, where it appears that the listers acted on the facts that three years before plaintiff inherited $28,080; that there were facts and circumstances tending to show his continued use and control of a comparatively large sum of money; and he refused to tell the listers what had become of the $28,080, and the action of the listers was, on appeal, affirmed on the same facts by the Board of Civil Authority and by the Commissioner of Taxes.</p> <p>The fact that a taxpayer is generally reputed to be a man of means cannot he the basis of a judicial belief sufficient to authorize listers, under P. S. 561, as amended by No. 45, Acts 1910, to increase the amount shown by the taxpayer’s inventory.</p> <p>The affirmance on the same facts by the Board of Civil Authority and by the Tax Commissioner, on appeal by a taxpayer, of the action of the listers in increasing by $5,000 the amount of taxable property shown by the taxpayer’s submitted inventory, means no more than that, in the judgment of the appellate tribunal, some of the facts precluded the relief asked by plaintiff.</p>

<p>Exceptions — Sufficiency—Executors and Administrators — Proceedings for Settlement — Evidence—Equitable Estoppel.</p> <p>Where the strict bill of exceptions allowed defendant shows no exception taken by him, but the judgment order is referred to and made a part thereof, and at the foot of the judgment order the trial court noted “exceptions by each party,” it is held on review that defendant took and was allowed an available exception to the judgment.</p> <p>On settlement of an administrator’s account, inconsistent findings of the commissioner considered and held that the trial court was warranted in disregarding the finding that the other heirs consented to the administrator’s conducting decedent’s business and using the property as a common fund for the benefit of himself and the other heirs without settlement in probate court.</p> <p>Where heirs frequently insisted that the administrator should settle the estate, and finally petitioned to compel him to do so, they were not, as matter of law, estopped to deny that they consented to the administrator conducting decedent’s business without settlement in probate court, and the use of the property as a common fund for the benefit of the heirs, merely because they had some of the proceeds of the business so conducted.</p>

Trial by jury, on issues framed ’ by the court, at the June Term, 1913, Addison County, Taylor, J., presiding.

Information charging the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury, at the December Term, 1913, Orange County, Butler, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty; and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Casé for Conspiracy. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Chittenden County, Stanton, J., presiding. At the close of all the evidence the defendants moved for a directed verdict, on the ground stated in the opinion. Motion denied, to which the defendants excepted. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants excepted.

Appeal in Chancery, Windham County. Heard at Chambers, on December 20, 1913, after remand as reported in 87 Yt. 99, on the orator’s motion that a time and place be fixed for an accounting upon the final decree for the orator, as affirmed on appeal, and on defendants’ motion for leave to file their answer. The motion was denied and this was granted. The orator appealed.

Appeal in Chancery, Windham County. Heard at Chambers on December 26, 1913, on orator’s demurrer to defendant’s cross-bill. Demurrer sustained, cross-bill adjudged insufficient and dismissed with costs to orator. Defendant appealed.

Assumpsit. Plea, the geueral issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Washington County, Btitler, J. presiding. Verdict directed for the plaintiff, in the circumstances stated in the opinion, for $299.50. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery, Washington County. Heard at Chambers on August 31, 1914, upon defendant’s demurrer to the bill and its plea thereto, Slack, Chancellor. Decree, pro forma, dismissing the bill with costs to the defendant. The orator appealed. The opinion states the case. The franchise, with its terms and conditions, when accepted and acted upon by defendant, became a contract that it is not at liberty to violate.

Appeal in Chancery. Washington County. Heard at Chambers on August 31, 1914, upon defendant’s demurrer to the bill and its plea thereto, Slack, Chancellor. Decree, pro forma, dismissing the bill with costs to the defendant. The orator appealed. The opinion states the case. Defendant’s grantor entered into the agreement for this fiveeent fare, and defendant is bound thereby. Much less than this would have made a valid contract between the city and the railway.

Habeas Corpus, Windham County, September Term, 1913, Miles, J., presiding. Heard on an agreed statement of facts. The court held that the relator’s discharge in bankruptcy was a bar to both of the judgments in question, and ordered him discharged. The execution creditors excepted. The opinion states the case. The words “wilful and malicious,” as used in the bankruptcy act, mean intentional, or with a wanton disregard for the rights of others.

Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1913, Windham County, Miles, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal in Chancery, Windham County. Heard at Chambers, January 3, 1910, on demurrer to the bill, Hall, Chancellor. Demurrer overruled, pro forma, bill adjudged sufficient, ‘ ‘ and all rights and benefits of the demurrants under the demurrer are saved and reserved for defendants upon final hearing.” Heard at Chambers, August 7, 1912, Fish, Chancellor, on defendants’ exceptions to the master’s report, and on their motion to recommit the report.

Information for illegally having possession of fish protected by law. Heard on demurrer to the information, at the March Term, 1914, Washington County, Slack, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and information adjudged sufficient. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Assumpsit. Trial by court. at the March Term, 1914, Chittenden County, Fish, J., presiding, on the liability of the trustee. Judgment that the trustee is liable. The claimant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case for the'seduction of plaintiff’s daughter. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1914, Eutland County, Miles, J., presiding. At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds stated in the opinion. Motion overruled, to which defendant excepted. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the ease.

Assumpsit for breach of a marriage promise. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1914, Franklin County, Waterman, J., presiding. Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. In an action for breach of a marriage contract, an offer of marriage by defendant after suit brought is admissible in mitigation of damages. McCarthy v. Eeryford (U. S. C. C. Or. 1903), 125 Fed. 46; Kelly v. Renfro, 9 Ala. 325, 44 Am.

Assumpsit. Pleas, tbe general issue with notice, and two pleas of accord and satisfaction. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1910, Lamoille County, Butler, J., presiding. At the close of the evidence each party moved for a directed verdict. Verdict directed for the plaintiff for the amount of his claim, and judgment thereon. The defendant excepted. The opinion fully states the case. This case has been once before in the Supreme Court, see 83 Vt. 415.

Audita Querela to vacate a default judgment, Chittenden County. Heard at Chambers, July 30, 1914, on demurrer to the writ, before Pish, J. Demurrer overruled, and writ adjudged sufficient. Defendants excepted. The opinion states the case.

General Assumpsit. Plea,' the general issue. Trial by court at the June Term, 1913, Lamoille County, Fish, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff for $854.03, and costs. The defendant excepted.

General and. Special Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1914. Washington County, Slade, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the ease.

Ejectment. Heard in vacation after the March Term, 1914, Washington County, by Slack, J., on plaintiff’s demurrer to defendant’s special pleas in bar. Demurrers sustained and pleas adjudged insufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the ease.

Case against a sheriff for the negligent acts and omissions of his deputy. Pleas, the general issue and the Statute of Limitations. Trial by the city court of the city of Burlington, G. S. Palmer, Judge. Judgment for the defendant to- recover his costs. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Cramton, appellant. Heard at the March Term, 1914, Rutland County, Miles, J., presiding on the questions of law presented by the will. Decree of the probate court sustaining the bequest affirmed. The appellant excepted.

Appeal in Chancery, Bennington County, June Term, • 1914. Heard on the pleadings and the mandate of the Supreme Court as reported in 87 Yt. 555, Miles, Chancellor. Decree for the orator. The defendants appealed. The opinion states the case.

Dugan’s estate of a claim presented by Laura A. Barrows. Declaration, general assumpsit. Plea, tbe general issue. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1914, Windsor County, Slack, J., presiding. At tbe conclusion of tbe evidence, both parties agreed that there was no question for tbe jury, and thereupon tbe court rendered judgment disallowing plaintiff’s claim, to which tbe plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

This is a proceeding brought directly to the Supreme Court for the county of Chittenden, under the provisions of P. S. 835-836, to review* a decree of the probate court within and for the district of Chittenden, holding that a certain bequest made by the will of Emma E. Curtis is subject to the inheritance tax imposed by P. S. 822, as amended by §1, No. 55, Acts 1910. The opinion fully states the case.

Assumpsit, brought before the city court of the city of Burlington, G. S Palmer, Judge. Heard on the issue made by plaintiff’s traverse of defendant’s plea in abatement. Judgment that the plea in abatement be dismissed, to which defendant excepted. Case passed to the Supreme Court before trial on the merits. The opinion fully states the ease.

General Assumpsit. Heard on an agreed statement of facts at the September Term, 1914, Rutland County, Slack, J., presiding. Judgment for defendant to recover his costs. The plaintiff excepted. The agreed statement of facts shows the following: In the year beginning May 1, 1903, the intestate conducted a liquor business in the city of Rutland, under a license of the second class, having associated with him one John J. Parris.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by-jury at the April Term, 1914, Windham County, Stanton, J., presiding. Yerdiet and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Information charging adultery, Caledonia County, December Term, 19.13, Pish, J., presiding. The respondent pleaded guilty, and thereupon and before judgment moved in arrest of judgment for the reasons stated in the opinion. Motion overruled, to which the respondent excepted.

Appeal in Chancery, Butland County, Fish, Chancellor. Heard at Chambers, February 13, 1914, on the pleadings and finding of facts by the Chancellor. Decree for the 'orator, according to the prayer of the bill with costs against defendant Chaffee alone, who appealed. The opinion fully states the case.

General Assumpsit. Pleas, the general issue, payment,- offset, and a declaration in offset. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1914, Franklin County, Waterman, J., presiding. -Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Appeal In Chancery. Heard at tbe June Term, 1913, Windsor County, Miles, Chancellor, on the pleadings, master’s report, and orator’s exceptions thereto. Exceptions overruled, and decree for the orator for $11.11, with costs. Both parties appealed. The opinion states the case. The reporter’s utmost efforts have been unable to get the plan referred to in the opinion. No one seems to know what has become of it.

Trespass.for treble damages for cutting and removing trees. Plea, the general issue with notice. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1913, Orange County, Waterman, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the ease. When, as here, a written instrument is equivocal, parol evidence of intention and understanding is admissible.

Petition to the county court to set aside a default judgment. Heard on demurrer to tbe petition at the June Term, 1914, Addison County, Stanton, J., presiding.

Debt on an appeal recognizance. Plea, tbe general issue. Trial by the city court of Burlington on September 4, 1914, G. S. Palmer, Judge. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Case against a sheriff for the default of his deputy. Plea, the general issue and the Statute of Limitations. Replication to the plea of the Statute of Limitations relying on the pendency of a prior attachment at the time of the deputy’s failure to return plaintiff’s writ. Heard on defendant’s demurrer to that replication, at the April Term, 1914, Essex County, Butter, J., presiding. Demurrer sustained and replication adjudged insufficient, to which plaintiff excepted.

Petition for a divorce from bed and board on the ground of adultery. Heard at the March Term, 1914, Washington County, Slack, J., presiding. - Divorce granted on the ground of adultery. The-petitionee excepted. The opinion states the ease.

Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the March Term, 1913, Washington County, Fish, J., presiding. Verdict and' judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted.

<p>Case for negligence. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1913, Caledonia County, Fish, J., presiding. Yerdiet and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.</p> <p>The plaintiff assumed the risk. The defendant especially directs the attention of the Court to the fact that neither side asked the plaintiff any questions respecting his knowledge or appreciation of the dangers from the saw at the time of the accident. All inquiry related to his knowledge and experience at the time he began using the saw. Therefore it becomes purely a question of law as to how far the facts disclosed charge the plaintiff with a knowledge of the risks he took. In this inquiry it must be remembered that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that he did not assume the risk. Wiggin v. E. Z. Waist Co., 83 Yt. 365; Duggan v. Keaphy, 85 Yt. 515; Johnson v. B. & M. B. B., 78 Yt. 344; Burleson v. Morrisville Lumber & Bower Co., 86 Yt. 492; Karligan v. Deerfield Lumber Co., 85 Yt. 133; Flint’s Admr. v. Central Vermont By. Co., 82 Yt. 269; Wallace’s Admr. v. Fox, 81 Yt. 136; Harris v. Bottom, 81 Yt. 346; Hatch v. Beynolds’ Estate, 80 Yt. 294; Skinner v. Central' Vermont By. Co., 73 Yt. 336; Williamson v. Sheldon Marble Co., 66 Yt. 427; Latremouille v. Bennington & Butland By. Co., 63 Yt. 336; Carbine v. B. B. Co., 61 Yt. 348; Stuart v. West End Street B. B. Co., 163 Mass. 391; Lowcock v. Franklin Paper Co., 169 Mass. 313, 47 N. E. 1000; Btcrhe v. Davis, 191 Mass. 20; Sullivan v. Simplex Electric Co., 178 Mass. 35; Qaudet v. Stansfield, 182 Mass. 451; Ciriack v. Merchant’s Woolen Co., 151 Mass. 152; Pratt v. Prouty, 153 Mass. 333; Coullard v. Tecumseh Mills, 151 Mass. 85; Morancy v. Kennessy, 24 R. I. 205, 52 Atl. 1021; Day v. Achron, 23 R. I. 627, 50 Atl. 654; Kelley v. Silver Spring Co., 12 R. I. 112; Cowell v. American Woolen Co., 97 Me. 543; Bessey v. Neioichawanica Co., 94 Me. 61; Cunningham v. Iron Works, 92 Me. 501; Dickenson v. Vernon, 77 Ct. 537; Ogley v. Miles, 139 N. Y. 458; White V. Wittemann Lythographic Co., 131 N. Y. 631; Rickey v. Taafe, 105 N. Y. 26; DeGraff v. N. ¥. C. é R. B. B. Co., 76 N. Y. 125; O’Keefe v. Thorn, 2 Pa. Supr. Cases 73', 16 Atl. 737; Bender v. N. Y. Glucose Co., 72 N. J. L. 218; Carrington v. Mueller, 65 N. J. L. 244; Atlas Engine Works v. Bandall, 100 Ind. 293; Jones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17; Truntle v. North Star Woolen Mill Co., '57 Minn. 52; Wabash By. Co. v. Bay, 152 Ind. 392, 51 N. E. 920; Sievers v. Peters Box & Lumber Co., 151 Ind. 642, 50 N. E. 877; Montgomery Coal Co. y. Barringer, 218 111. 327, 75 N. E. 900; Jones v. Bobérls, 57 111. App. 56; Groth v. Thomann, 110 Wis. 488; Belyea v. Tomahawk Pulp and Paper Co., 110 Wis. 307, 85 N. W. 960; Both v. Barrett Mfg. Co., 96 Wis. 615; Greef Bros. v. Brown, 7 Kan. App. 394; Mackin v. Alaska Befrigerator Co., 100 Mick. 276; Nugent v. Kaufmann Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241; Royle v. Excelsior Steam Laundry Co., 95 G-a. 34; Ranson v. Rommel, 107 Iowa 171; Glenmont Lumber Co. v. Bay, 126 Fed. 524; Kenney v. Meddaugh, 118 Fed. 209; Meyers v.' Chi. St. P. M. & 0. By. Co., 95 Fed. 406; The Maharajah, 40 Fed. 784; Kupkofski v. Spiegel Co., 135 Mick. 7, 97 N. W. 48; Butler v. Frasee, 200 U. S. 459, 53 L. ed. 281; Kellogg v. Stevens Lumber Co., 125 Micb. 222, 84 N. W. 136.</p>

Information charging the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury at the September Term, 1914, Washington County, Miles, J., presiding. Verdict, guilty; and judgment thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the ease.

General Assumpsit. Among other pleas not here involved, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations. Replication of the matter recited in the opinion. Heard- on demurrer to the replication, at the April Term, 1914, Windham County, Stanton, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and replication adjudged sufficient, to which the defendants excepted. The opinion states the case.