Volume 9 — Oklahoma Criminal Reports

<p>1» APPEAL — Grant of Change of Venue. An application for a change of •venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and, unless an abuse of this discretion is shown, the judgment will not he reversed on appeal.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Change of Venue — Counter Affidavits. On an application for a change of venue, on the ground "that the minds of the inhabitants of the county in which the cause is pending are so prejudiced against the defendant that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had therein,” the court may permit the introduction of counter affidavits for the purpose of contesting the grounds of the application.</p> <p>3. JURY — Challenge to Panel — Harmless Error. A challenge to the panel on the ground that only two jury commissioners participated in selecting the jury list, and that the names from the municipal townships were not selected in proportion to the voting strength of such townships, is insufficient, unless it is shown that the irregularities were such that the defendant has suffered material prejudice, as prescribed by section 6795, Procedure Criminal (Comp. Laws 1909 [sec. 5242, Rev. Laws 1910]).</p> <p>4. SAME — Insufficiency of Regular Panel — Open Venire. At any time during the term of court after the regular panel has been drawn and summoned, when for the trial of any cause the regular panel of petit jurors shab appear to be insufficient, as a matter of discretion with the court, the jury may be completed from talesman, or the court may direct that an open venire be issued to the sheriff or his deputies for such number of jurors as may be deemed necessary.'</p> <p>5. APPEAL — Harmless Error. Where a petition in error assigns error on every proceeding had upon the trial, but the brief does not point out specifically the grounds of objection, nor the portion of the record applicable thereto, and counsel fail to support the assignments with citation of authority, and it appears from an examination of the record that the constitutional right of the defendant to a “trial by an impartial jury of the county” was fully accorded, this court will not disturb the discretion exercised by the trial court in denying a change of venue and overruling a challenge to the panel.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.,)</p>

<p>1. GAMING — “Gambling Device” — Information. The proh'bitions contained in sections 2422 and 2426, Comp. Laws 1909, do not alone extend to those who deal or play or conduct the 'various games of chance therein specified, but such prohibition extends to the carrying on or opening of any such prohibited game, and the use therein of any device. And any table or other device, necessarily adapted to the use, and necessarily used in the carrying on of any such game, is a gambling device in contemplation of law, and the setting-up or using of such table or device is prohibited; and an information under said sections, charging the defendant with permitting certain tables to be set up and used for the purpose of gambling in rooms occupied by him and under his control, charges a public offense.</p> <p>2. JURY — Summoning Talesmen. Where all of the jurors, whose names have been regularly drawn from the jury box and summoned, do not appear at a term of the court, the trial judge, in his discretion, may order other drawings from the jury box, or he may order an open venire addressed to.the sheriff summoning the necessary number of talesmen from the body of the county to complete the jury.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Affirmance. When a petition in error and case-made are filed in th's court, it is the duty of counsel to prepare and file briefs or appear and orally argue any assignments of error relied upon for reversal. When this is not done, the appeal is treated as abandoned, and in the absence of fundamental error, the judgment of the lower court will be affirmed for want of prosecution.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Gaming—Distribution of Governmental Powers — Statutory Provisions — Definition of Offense of “Gaming.’* (a)It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what shall constitute a crime, but it is the duty of the courts to determine whether a particular act done or omitted is within the in-tendment of a general statute. '</p> <p>(b) The Legislature in creating an offense may define it by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it, or it may define it as any act which produces or is reasonably calculated to produce a certain defined or described result.</p> <p>(c) Section 2782, Comp. Laws 1909, which provides that any person who wilfully and wrongfully commits an act which grossly injures the person or property of another, or which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or 'which openly outrages public-decency, and is injurious to public morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor, is not void for uncertainty, but constitutes a valid provision of our law, and as such should be enforced.</p> <p>(d) When the Legislatnre creates, withont defining, an offense which was a crime under the common law,-the definition of the crime given by the common law will be treated by the courts as though it were a part of the statute itself, and will render certain and definite that which might otherwise be uncertain and indefinite.</p> <p>(e) Gaming has always been an offense at common law. A wager laid upon the result of any contest of chance, skill or-strength between men or beasts or men and beasts constitutes, gaming.</p> <p>(f) Bets publicly and openly made ;n the presence of and among an assembly of men, women, boys, and girls who are witnessing a game of base ball are prohibited by section 2782, Comp. Laws 1909.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFO RMATIO N — Evidence—judicial Notice-—Duplicity in Indictment, (a) Thiis court takes judicial notice of the fact that the game of baseball when properly conducted is. an innocent public amusement, and constitutes the most entertaining and popular public pastime or sport of the American people.</p> <p>(b) For an indictment held to be good which charged, the-offense of openly and publicly betting upon a game of baseball, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from, District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. McEeown, Judge. </p> <p>Edmond Morgan was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Le Flore County; Malcolm E. Rosser, Judge. </p> <p>James B. Bayless was convicted of larceny of two mules, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from, Garvin County Court; W. B. M. Mitchell, Judge.</p> <p>J. T. Welch was convicted of violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>1. TRIAL — Separation of Jury. On proof of a violation of the provisions of Procedure Criminal (section 6858, Comp. Laws 1909, Rev. Laws 5906), by permitting the jury to separate'after the case is finally submitted, the defendant is entitled to the presumption that such separation has been prejudicial to him, and the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that no injury could have resulted therefrom to the defendant.</p> <p>2. NEW TRIAL — Separation of Jury. Where a bailiif in charge of a jury, after the case has been finally submitted, permits a juror to leave the jury room and go out upon the streets, and such juror’s conduct during his absence is unexplained, the trial court should sustain the motion for a new trial.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court..)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Review of Conviction. Where the jury find a verdict of guilty, which is approved hy the trial court, and there is evidence in the record to sustain the verdict, it will not be set aside in the absence of prejudicial error.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Loclcridge, Judge. Joe Cline and Ellis Cline were convicted in tbe county court of Pottawatomie county, charged with the offense of disturbing religious worship. The punishment of appellant Joe Cline was assessed at a fine of $50 and 10 days confinement in the county jail. The punishment of appellant Ellis Cline was assessed at a fine of $25 and 10 days confinement in the county jail. Appealed.

<p>1. APPEAL — Writ of Error — Review—Questions of Fact. In the absence of prejudicial error, this court has uniformly declined to disturb the verdict of a jury on controverted questions of fact.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Questions for Jury — insanity of Accused. When a plea of insanity is entered on behalf of a person on trial for crime in the courts of this state, the issue as to whether or not he was sane or insane at the time of the commission of the offense is one for the jury, to be determined from all the facts and circumstances in evidence under proper instructions from the court, and is hot an issue upon which an accused is entitled to an instruction advising an acquittal. Such issue should be fairly submitted to the jury under the doctrine laid down in Adair v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 284, 118 Pac. 416.</p> <p>3. JURY — Objection to Panel — Waiver of Error, (a) An objection to the jury panel, raised after the verdict of the jury, in the absence of any showing- or contention that the accused had other than a fair and impartial trial, will not be considered on appeal.</p> <p>(b) It is the duty of counsel to raise, at the' proper time and in the proper manner, all objections to the proceedings, and save proper exceptions. When this is not done, they are treated as waived, and there are few exceptions to this rule.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Jackson County . Frank Mathews, Judge.</p> <p>Percy Belcher was convicted of crime and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Le Flore County; Malcolm F. Rosser, Judge. </p> <p>Davis Miller was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p>(130 Pac. 820.)</p> <p>1. TRIAL — Right to Counsel — Assignment—Waiver, (a) It is a fundamental right of a person accused of crime.to be represented by counsel, and, in order that the accused may have the full benefit of this right, it is provided that, when he appears for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and he must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires, and is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him. Const, art. 2, sec. 20 (sec. 6731, Comp. Laws 1909).</p> <p>(b) This right may be waived by the defendant, but it cannot be denied by the court.</p> <p>2. SAME — Assignment of Counsel — “Counsel.” The term “counsel,” as used in section 6731, Proc. Crim. Comp. Laws 1909, providing that the court must assign counsel to defend indigent defendants, means one who has been admitted as an attorney and counselor at law in this state.</p> <p>3. SAME — Evidence—Judicial Notice — Attorneys. Under the law (section 250, Comp. Laws 1909) no person resident of the state shall be permitted to practice as an attorney in any action or proceeding in which he is not a party concerned unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order of the Supreme Court, and the courts will take judicial notice of the fact that a person appearing and acting as an attorney and counselor at law is or is not duly authorized.</p> <p>4. SAME — Assignment of Counsel to Defend — Persons Not Admitted to the Bar. In a prosecution for a felony, it having been made to ap-</p> <p>. pear that the defendant was destitute of means to employ counsel, the court appointed a person to defend him who was not authorized to appear as an attorney at law in the .courts of this state. Held, that this was, in effect, the denial of a fundamental right, and constitutes reversible error.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court..)</p>

<p>1. APPEAL — Dismissal. An appellant has the right to dismiss his appeal whenever this can be done without prejudice to the rights of the state and the administration of justice.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Remand with Directions. Where there is a variance between the verdict of the jury and the sentence of the court, or whenever the judgment is incomplete, which can be corrected without depriving the appellant of a substantial right, it is the duty of the Attorney General to file a motion to remand the cause, with directions to the trial court to correct its judgment and make it conform to the verdict and the law.</p> <p>3. JUDGMENT — Conviction—Punishment—Effect of Statutes. A judgment of conviction and sentence must conform to the punishment prescribed, and be enforced in conformity with the statute. In case of conviction for violating the prohibitory law, the punishment must be both by imprisonment"and fine, within the terms prescribed by the statute.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. TRIAL — Verdict—Degree of Offense. The provision of Procedure Criminal (section 6874, comp. Laws 1909, [sec. 5922, Rev. Laws]) that “whenever” a crime is distinguished into degrees, the jury, if they convict the defendant, must find the degree of the crime of which he is guilty,” must be construed in connection with other provisions; i. e., section 6873, authorizing a general verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty,” and declaring that such verdict “imports a conviction or acquittal of the offense charged,” and section 6878, providing that the court may direct informal verdicts to be reconsidered, and “rendered in some form from which it can be clearly understood what is the intent of the jury,” also section 2028 of the Penal Code, providing that the jury shall “assess and declare the punishment in their verdict.”</p> <p>2. HOMICIDE — Verdict—Definiteness. On the trial of an indictment for murder, the court instructed the jury, in effect, that they might find the defendant guilty of murder, and, if they should so find, they must designate in their verdict whether he shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, but, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt of murder, they should acquit him of that charge, and determine whether he was guilty of “manslaughter in the first degree,” and, if they should so find, his punishment must be by imprisonment for not less than four years, and that, if every essential element of this offense was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, it was the duty of the jury to acquit him, and so say by their verdcit. The issue of “manslaughter in the second degree” was not submitted to the jury. The verdict was: “We, the jury, * * * do upon our oaths find the defendant guilty of manslaughter as charged in the indictment, and assess his punishment at confinement in the state prison for a period of ten years.” Held, that the verdict is sufficiently definite and certain as to the offense of which the defendant was convicted, and is in fact a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.</p> <p>3. NEW TRIAL — Newly Discovered Evidence — Impeaching Testimony. A verdict should not be set aside because of affidavits being filedl in support of motion for new trial, showing that the af-fiants had heard a witness for the state make statements directly contrary to such witness’ testimony in the trial.</p> <p>4. APPEAL — ‘Harmless Error. Technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the defendant must under section 6957, Comp. Laws 1-909, (Sec. 6005, Rev. Laws), be disregarded on appeal. Prejudice is not presumed from error being made to appear, in the absence of reasonably clear indications that the defendant was thereby prejudiced upon the merits, or that it tended to his prejudice in respect to a substantial right.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. HABEAS CORPUS — Petition—Demurrer. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus, setting up facts which show that the petitioner was imprisoned under a valid judgment of the court on the date the commitment was issued, and that no appeal was taken from such judgment, and that after incarceration in the prison petitioner was by the county judge, county attorney, and sheriff discharged from such imprisonment on their own initiative, and without authority of law, and that petitioner was thereafter, after the expiration of more than the time for which he could have been imprisoned under the original judgment, recommitted under the same judgment, states ground for relief, and is not demurrable.</p> <p>2. PARDON — Punishment — Sentence—Wrongful Discharge — Effect— “Trusty.” The petftioner was convicted of a misdemeanor in the county court of Jackson county. Judgment was pronounced by the court sentencing him to 30 days’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of $50, and upon the failure to pay such fine in cash that he should be imprisoned 25 days in lieu thereof. Commitment was issued, and he was incarcerated in the county jail. The county judge, county attorney, and sheriff released him within a short time, and, after the expiration of more than the time for which he could have been imprisoned under the judgment, the county court ordered him recommitted on the same judgment to serve the original sentence. Held, that the action of the officers in discharging the petitioner was without authority of law. Held, further, that the petitioner was in the control and custody of the sheriff, and was in effect a “trusty” under the facts disclosed, and, as a matter of law, his period of imprisonment expired 55 days from the date of his incarceration; and that any further imprisonment would he unwarranted and unlawful.</p> <p>3. SAME — Authority to Pardon. County judges, county attorneys, and sheriffs in this state have no power to parole or pardon persons convicted of crime in the courts of this state. That power is vested solely in the Governor.</p> <p>4. SAME — Power to Release Prisoner. When a person is tried for crime in a county court, convicted, and judgment pronounced, such court has no authority to release him from imprisonment under a commitment issued upon the judgment, unless the judgment he vacated or set aside on lawful grounds, or upon habeas corpus, when the judgment under which the imprisonment is had was void, except in certain cases on appeal.</p> <p>5. ESCAPE — Incarcerated Person — Unlawful Discharge. When a person is imprisoned on a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and later such court, acting with the county attorney . and sheriff, usurps the power to release, and does release, him from imprisonment, such person is not guilty of escape, technical or otherwise.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. GAMING — Indictment—Sufficiency. An indictment which charges a person with conducting the prohibited game of roulette for value, but which fails to charge that the persons who played at the game were playing for money, or a representative value, does not charge a public offense under our statute..</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Following Decisions of Appellate Court. It is the duty of prosecuting attorneys to follow the decisions of the appellate courts in the preparation of in-formations, and there is little justification for a failure to do so, when the appellate court has spoken in plain, unequivocal language on any specific proposition.</p> <p>3. SAME — Demurrer—Duty of Court. When questions of law are properly raised by demurrer, which are fatal to an information under the established law, it is the sworn duty of the trial courts to sustain such demurrer, and direct the prosecuting- officer to file a proper information, or dismiss the prosecution.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Cole, Judge. Pude Wadsworth was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. There are no questions involved in tliis ease which require a statement of the testimony.

<p>Contempt proceedings (by the State, on the relation of H. S. Tucker, against Barney Davis and another.</p> <p>Owing to the disposition made of this case, it is not necessary to make more than a condensed statement of the facts involved. II. S. Tucker was confined as a prisoner in the county jail of Custer county, Okla., upon a charge of rape pending against him in the superior court of said county. He presented an application to the Criminal Court of Appeals, in which it appears that, being unable to employ counsel to conduct his de-dense, the judge of said superior court had appointed T. B. Norfleet and P. S. Hillman, members of the Custer county bar, to defend him; that, owing to the gravity of the charge pending against said Tucker, it was necessary that he should have an opportunity to confer privately and fully with his said atT torneys with reference to his defense in this case, but that Barney Davis, sheriff of Custer county, and W. M. Van Bibber, jailer of said county, refused to permit the said Tucker to confer with his said counsel, except in the presence of said sheriff or jailer. It was further made to appear that there was no suitable place in the jail at which a private conference could be had, but -that some room might toe selected in the courthouse, which was adjacent to the jail, in which such private conference could be had. It was further made to appear that Hon. J. W. Lawter, judge of the superior court of Custer county, was absent from the county, and therefore could not afford the relief desired. Upon this showing the 'Criminal Court of Appeals issued an order addressed to said sheriff and said jailer of said Custer county, Okla., ordering and directing that they at any reasonable time, upon the request of his said attorneys of record, should take, said H. S. Tucker from the jail to “some room in the courthouse of said county, to be selected by said officer or officers, and that the said H. S. Tucker be there permitted to-consult privately with said attorneys. A copy of said order was served upon tooth the sheriff and jailer' of said Custer county. It was further made to appear to the court that after service of such order, and in total disobedience thereof, said sheriff and said jailer of Custer county refused to permit the said Tucker to privately consult his said attorneys as directed in said order, although so requested to do. Thereupon a citation was addressed to both of said officers, requiring them to appear before the Criminal Court of Appeals and show what cause, if any, they had for disobeying said order, and why they should not be punished for contempt; The matter coming on to be heard, both of said officers appeared and denied that they had disobeyed the said order of the court. A great deal of testimony was offered by both sides, a detailed statement of which is unnecessary.</p>

<p>1. CONTINUANCE — Absent Witness — Diligence. It is no abuse of discretion to overrule an application for continuance, where no diligence is shown to procure the attendance or to take the deposition of a nonresident witness.</p> <p>2. HOMICIDE — Verdict—Penalty. Section 2275 of Comp. Laws 1909 (Rev. Laws, sec. 2319), authorizes the penalty of death at the discretion of the jury; and, if they find the defendant guilty of murder, they must designate in their verdict whether he shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, and, when a plea of not guilty is entered to an indictment or information charging murder, the extreme penalty can be adjudged only upon the verdict of a jury fixing the punishment by death, only “upon a plea of guilty, the court shall determine the same.” In such cases section 2028 and section 2029 of Comp. Laws 1909 have no application.</p> <p>3. JURY — 'Competency—Homicide. Under section 6812, subd. 8, Comp. Laws 1909, (Rev. Laws, sec. 5859), providing, “If the .offense charged be punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious opinion as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty of, in which case he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror,” held, where on a trial for murder a juror^ who on his voir dire answers that his conscientious scruples against the death penalty are such as would preclude him from agreeing to a verdict of guilty, is incompetent to sit as a juror, and a challenge for cause by the state was properly allowed.</p> <p>4. WITNESSES — Cross-Examination. On cross-examination of a witness, as a general rule, the party cross-examining should be confined to the matters concerning which the witness has been examined in chief, but this rule should be liberally construed so as to permit any question to be asked on cross-examination which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by the witness in chief, or to test his accuracy, memory, veracity, character, or credibility. This must necessarily include impeaching questions, although they may relate to matters independent of the questions testified to in chief.</p> <p>5. SAME. When the cross-examination is directed to matters not inquired about in the principal examination, its course and extent are very largely subject to the control of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion; and, unless it affirmatively appears that this discretion was abused, the rulings of the court will not be reviewed on appeal.</p> <p>6. EVIDENCE — Res Gestae — Self-Serving Declarations. Mere self-serving declarations, made to third parties by the defendant at a place distant from the scene of the homicide, are not admissible as a part of the res gestae; and, while the defendant may prove that he conversed with persons who were at the place he claimed to be, he cannot introduce telephone conversations there had which on his part appear to be self-serving declarations.</p> <p>7. TRIAL — Declarations of Jury — Inspection. Where the jury in open court request permission to take with them to the jury room, to inspect during their deliberations, articles introduced in evidence, the granting or refusal of the request is within the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which will not be reviewed on appeal without an affirmative showing that the discretion was abused, In so far as the case of Hanslng v. Territory, 4 Okla. 443, 46 Pac. 509, conflicts herewith, it is overruled.</p> <p>8. NEW TRIAL — 'Grounds. Where, on a trial for murder, the court permitted the jury, to take, on retirement, and to have the same in their possession in the jury room, while deliberating, the defendant’s shotgun and the shells and shot which had been introduced in evidence, and it not being made to appear that they were used by the jury in a manner not consistent with the evidence, it cannot be said that the jury thereby received evidence out of court, and the statutory grounds as to new trials — section 6S96, Comp. Laws 1909: “Second. When the jury has received any evidence out of court. Third. Or have been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented”— do not apply.</p> <p>9. TRIAL — Declarations of Jury — Inspection—“Papers.” While a shotgun, shells, ^nd shot were not “papers” within Comp. Laws 1909, sec. 6864, authorizing' the jury to take to the jury room papers' received in evidence, the taking of such articles to the jury room did not constitute error, where they were not used or handled by the jury in a manner inconsistent with the evidence.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.) .</p>

<p> Appeal from Craig County Court; 8. F. Parks, Judge. </p> <p>Asa Simerson was convicted of violating the prohibitory liquor law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Error, from Pawnee County Court; Fred S. Liscum, Judge. </p> <p>A. J. Vaughn was convicted of violation of the prohibition law, and brings error.</p>

II. Wells, Judge. Information against Adam Zanger for violating the prohibitory law. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer thereto,the State brings error.

Ciarle, Judge. B. H. Updike was convicted of murder, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, and he appeals.

<p>1. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF — What Constitutes. When personal property is defaced or destroyed, without malice, by. a person acting in good faith under the belief that it is his and that he has a legal right to do the act complained of, a charge of malicious mischief cannot be sustained.</p> <p>2. INDIANS — Lands Held in Common — Inclosure—Improvements—Removal. (a) Prior to allotment, the lands of the Choctaws and Chickasaws were held in common, and, until legislation providing for allotment was passed, any member of such tribes had a right to inclose and occupy any unoccupied portion of the lands belonging to his tribe.</p> <p>(b) A member of the Choctaw or Chickasaw Tribe, who was entitled to an allotment of 'the lands of said tribe, and who, after taking such allotment for himself and family, had improvements remaining on other lands, was entitled to remove the same or sell such improvements to other members of said tribe who were entitled to take allotment, or remove them, at his option.</p> <p>3. SAME — Crimes by Indians — What Constitutes — Evidence. A member of the Choctaw or Chickasaw Tribe, who at the time of allotment, had more lands inclosed than he and his family were entitled to take in allotment, and who removed fencing therefrom without knowing the same had been allotted, cannot be prosecuted for malicious mischief, under the statute.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. GRAND JURY — Clerks of Courts — Criminal Law — Impaneling Grand Jury — Powers of Deputy Clerk — Challenges to Panel — Discretion of Court, (a) The act of the Legislature of the territory of Oklahoma directing the manner in which grand juries should be impaneled was expressly repealed by Act Cong. Feb. 9, 1906, c. 155, 34 St. at L. 11.,</p> <p>(b) A deputy clerk may perform the purely ministerial duties which are performed by the clerk of the district court in the matter of recording the list of jurors upon the journal of the court and certifying to the correctness thereof.</p> <p>(c) It was not error for the trial court to overrule a challenge to the panel of the grand jury because the grand jury was selected after the commencement of the term of the court at which the indictment complained of was returned, instead of before the commencement of such term.</p> <p>(d) A substantial compliance with the law in the matter of ' selecting, summoning, and impaneling grand jurors is all that the law requires.</p> <p>(e) It is discretionary with the court to permit the withdrawal of a plea of not guilty for the purpose of allowing a defendant to file a motion to set aside an indictment, and such action will not be reviewed upon appeal, unless an abuse of this discretion is shown.</p> <p>2. VENUE — Change of Venue — Proceedings, (a) Where a defendant has filed motion for a change of venue supported by affidavits as provided by law, the state may file counter affidavits putting in issue the grounds upon which such change of venue is sought.</p> <p>(b) Where a motion for a change of venue is filed and affidavits in opposition to such change of venue are presented by the state, the court may have the parties making such affidavits on both sides or such other persons as the court may think proper sworn as witnesses and examined in open court regarding the controversy.</p> <p>(c) The presumption of law is that a defendant can get a fair and impartial trial in the county in which the offense was committed, and, if this is not true, the burden is upon the defendant who seeks a change of venue to establish his right thereto.</p> <p>(d) The granting of a change of venue is discretionary with the trial court, and will not he reviewed upon appeal, unless it is made clearly to appear that there has been an abuse of this discretion.</p> <p>3. JURY — Criminal Law — Right to Justice — Qualifications of Jurors— “Prejudice” — “Impartial”—Harmless Error, (a) It is the constitutional right of every citizen of Oklahoma, if charged with a criminal offense, to have a public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense was committed, and that upon such trial justice shall be administered to him without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.</p> <p>(b) The acts of the Legislature with reference to the conduct of criminal cases and the qualifications of jurors must be construed in connection with and in subordination to the provisions of our Constitution. The words “prejudice” and “impartial," as used in our Constitution, have no narrow, technical meaning in a legal sense, and must be construed as used in the everyday affairs of life, and as understood by persons of ordinary intelligence.</p> <p>(c) “Prejudice” means prejudged; without due examination; an opinion formed beforehand.</p> <p>(d) “Impartial” means not favoring one more than another; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair and just.</p> <p>(e) Light impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind to a fair consideration of the testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror, but those strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, and which will combat that testimony and resists its force, will disqualify a juror.</p> <p>(f) Where a juror testifies on his voir dire that he has a fixed opinion as to the guilt of a defendant, which-'it will take strong evidence to remove, and that he was then upon one side of the case, such juror is clearly disqualified; and the mere fact that the juror may be of the opinion that he can try the case fairly and impartially by the testimony heard in court and the instructions of the judge does not qualify such juror.</p> <p>(g) The doctrine of harmless error has no application to a ' case in which the defendant has been deprived of a substantial right.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Error from District Court, Ellis County; G. A. Brown, Judge. Harry Weatherholt was convicted of manslaughter in tlie second degree, and brings error.

<p>1. VAGRANCY — Evidence. The information in this case charged the defendant with being a vagrant, to wit, “a professional gambler,” and, upon the trial, the court admitted evidence of the defendant’s general reputation to support the charge. Held, error, and that it devolves upon the state to prove the particular facts showing the defendant to be a professional gambler.</p> <p>2. SAME — General Reputation. Whether a defendant is or is not a professional gambler depends upon matters of fact, and not his reputation or character, and evidence of general reputation to prove such fact is not admissible.</p> <p>3. SAME — “Professional Gambler.” A professional gambler is one who makes his living in pursuing the business or practice of unlawful gaming, by the use of cards, dice, or other gaming device, with the purpose of thereby winning money or other property, or who conducts either as owner or employee a place for gambling.</p> <p>4. SAME — Sufficiency. Evidence examined, and held, insufficient to support the verdict.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Appeal from, Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge. E. Bishop was convicted of maintaining a place for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and appeals.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge. </p> <p>Eobert Franklin was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Taking of Appeal — Time. In misdemeanor cases the appeal must be taken within 60 days from the date of the judgment, unless the trial judge, for good cause shown, extends the time for taking the appeal not exceeding 60 days additional.. After this time has expired, no appeal can be taken.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Mayes County; Preston S. Davis, Judge. </p> <p>Joe Starr was convicted of aggravated assault, and he appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Failure to File Brief. Where counsel for appellant fail to file a brief pointing out the specific errors upon which they rely, and also fail* to appear and make an oral argument when the case is set for' submission, the court will treat the appeal as abandoned, and will not examine the record, except for jurisdictional errors.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Pontotoc County Court; Conway 0. Barton, Judge. </p> <p>Baldy White, alias Wallace Owens, was convicted of vagrancy, and he appeals.</p>

County; Robert M. Rainey, Judge. Jonas Jones was convicted of murder, and his punishment assessed at confinement for life in the penitentiary, and he appeals.

<p>1. PERJURY — Indictment—Sufficiency. An indictment for perjury need not set out the facts from which it will be made to appear that the alleged false testimony upon which the charge of perjury is predicated was material. It is sufficient if the express averment is made that said testimony was material to the question in issue.</p> <p>2. SAME — Materiality of Testimony — Degrees. Upon a trial for perjury, the degree of the materiality of the testimony upon which it is based is of no importance. Any false statement made by a witness which detracts from or adds weight and force to the testimony of any witness upon matters that are directly material thereby becomes material itself and constitutes “perjury.”</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Marsllall County Court; J. W. Fallcner, Judge. </p> <p>0. 0. Gobin and R. W. Freeman were convicted of violating the medical practices act, and they appeal.</p>

McMillan, Judge. Ben Williams was found guilty in the district court of Gar-vin county of the offense of manslaughter in the first degree, and his punishment was fixed by the jury at confinement in the penitentiary for the period of four years.

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Time of Offense — Language. (a) The precise time at which an offense was committed need not be stated in an indictment, but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time prior to the filing of such indictment, except in cases where time is a material ingredient of the offense.</p> <p>(b) An indictment is sufficient if the offense charged therein is clearly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended thereby.</p> <p>2. NEW TRIAL — Affidavit and Testimony of Juror. The affidavits or the testimony of the jurors cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching their verdict, but may be considered for the purpose of sustaining it.</p> <p>3.' TRIAL — Accusation—Indorsement of Names of Witnesses — Discretion — Continuance, (a) In felony cases the court in its discretion may permit the names of additional witnesses to be indorsed upon an indictment or information after the trial has begun, and such action will not be subject to review upon appeal unless it be made to appear that there was an abuse of this discretion to the injury of the defendant.</p> <p>(b) If, after announcing- ready for trial, the court permits the names of additional witnesses to be indorsed upon an indictment or information, and if the defendant is surprised thereat, and if the indorsement of the names of the additional witnesses requires the production of further testimony upon the part of the defendant, the defendant should withdraw his announcement of ready for trial and file a motion for a continuance, in which he should set up the facts constituting such surprise andi what evidence, if any, he could produce if the case were continue^, to rebut the testimony of such additional witnesses for the state.</p> <p>(c) The statute with reference to indorsing the names of additional witnesses upon an indictment or information in misdemeanor cases has no application to felony cases.</p> <p>4. TRIAL — Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence — Necessity—Sufficiency. (a) An instruction upon the subject of circumstantial evidence should never be given unless the testimony for the prosecution is wholly circumstantial.</p> <p>(b) Where an instruction on circumstantial evidence is necessary, it is a mistake for the court to give lengthy explanations of circumstantial evidence; but it is sufficient for the court to instruct the jury that the circumstances proven must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but they must also be inconsistent with his innocence and incapable of any other reasonable explanation, except that of his guilt.</p> <p>5. APPEAL — Objection Below- — Sufficiency—instruction- General exceptions to instructions of the court to the jury will' not be considered on appeal. The attention of the court should be directly called to the instruction objected to, in order that the court may have an opportunity to correct any error which it may contain.</p> <p>6. TRIAL — Argument of Counsel — Appeal and Error — Record, (a) Counsel for appellant cannot be heard to complain if the county attorney in his closing argument to the jury is permitted to go out of the record in his reply to arguments made by counsel for the defendant, which were also out of the record.</p> <p>(b) Where an appellant desires to present a question to this court, it is his duty to bring up enough of the proceedings of the lower court to enable this court to pass intelligently and safely upon the question presented.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. LARCENY — Persons Liable — Principal and Accessory. The law of Oklahoma (Comp Laws. 1909, sec. 2045, Penal Code, and section 6715, Procedure Criminal) abolishes the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, and provides that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether they directly commit the act constituting- the offense, or aid and abet in its' commission, though not present, are principals, and must be charged, tried,’ and punished as such. And also that no other facts need be alleged in any indictment or information against such an accessory than are required in an indictment or information against a principal.</p> <p>2. ACCOMPLICES — Testimony of Accomplice — Probative Effect. When a defendant is convicted on accomplice testimony, and the evidence is clear and direct, this court will not reverse the judgment of the lower court, unless it is able to say that the record does not contain .any evidence, independent of the testimony of the accomplice, which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.</p> <p>3. LARCENY — Sufficiency of Evidence- In a prosecution for larceny-of live stock, the evidence is held to support the verdict, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Blaine County Court; George W. Ferguson, Judge. Paris Rupert was convicted in two cases of the violation of the game laws, and he appeals. These cases arising upon like facts and involving the same principles of law will be considered together.

<p>APPEAL — Escape—Dismissal of Appeal. Where a defendant has been convicted and sentenced and perfects an appeal, this court will not consider his appeal, unless defendant is where he can be made to respond to any judgment or order which may be rendered in . the case; and where a defendant makes his escape from the custody of the law and becomes a fugitive from justice the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Bailey, Judge. William Maggard- was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and he appeals.

<p> Error from District Court, Greer County; G. A. Brown, Judge. </p> <p>& R. B. ■ L. Morris was convicted of statutory rape, and brings error.</p>

<p>1. WITNESSES — Expert Evidence — Admissibility—“Experts”—“Art or Trade” — Questions of Law and Fact, (a) As a general rule, ■ expert or opinion evidence is not admissible as to matters which are within the common knowledge and understanding of mankind generally, and which the jury are as competent to understand and determine as the witnesses could be.</p> <p>(b) Experts are persons who are professionally acquainted with some science or are skilled in some art or trade, or who have experience or knowledge in relation to matters which are not generally known to the people.</p> <p>(c) Every business or employment which requires peculiar knowledge or experience and which has a class of persons devoted to its pursuit is included in the term "art or trade,” and any person, who by study or experience, has acquired this peculiar knowledge or practical skill may be allowed to give in evidence his opinions upon matters of technical knowledge and skill.</p> <p>(d) In prosecutions fqr murder, medical' experts may be allowed to testify to their opinion as to the cause and manner ot the death of, the deceased.</p> <p>(e) The admissibility of the testimony of expert witnesses is a question of law for the determination of the court. The weight and credibility to be given to such opinions is a question for the jury alone to determine. . '</p> <p>(f) As a general rule expert evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving that a wound was or was not self-inflicted; but, where a wound is of an extraordinary nature and Is upon a portion of the body of which men have little or no knowledge, then expert evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that such wound was or was not self-inflicted.</p> <p>2. HOMICIDE — Evidence — Admissibility — Motive — Othér Offenses. (a) Where a defendant is upon trial charged with the murder of a girl, for the purpose of proving motive it is competent for the state to show all of the relations existing between the deceased and the defendant, and that the defendant had entertained illicit sexual relations with the deceased by which the deceased had become pregnant, and that the defendant attempted to have an abortion performed upon the deceased, and that the defendant, being .a married man, had beqome estranged from his wife.</p> <p>(b) Any evidence is admissible upon a trial in a criminal case which tends to prove the defendant guilty of the crime with which he is charged, although it may also prove, or tend to. prove, another separate and distinct crime.</p> <p>3. TRIAL — Instructions—Weight of Evidence — Testimony of Experts, (a) Where expert evidence is introduced in the trial of a cause, it is improper for the court to give argumentative instructions thereon or to attempt to instruct the jury as to what weight and credibility should be given to the testimony of experts.</p> <p>(b) Por an approved instruction with reference to the testimony of experts, see opinion.</p> <p>4. HOMICIDE — Evidence—Sufficiency. See opinion for evidence held to establish the guilt of a defendant of murder upon circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>5. APPEAL — Presentation for Review — Remarks of Counsel — Grounds-for Reversal, (a) Improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury must be incorporated in the case^ made and certified to by the trial judge before they can be considered upon appeal. Such remarks cannot be presented by affidavit or in any other manner, unless it appears from the record that counsel for the defendant requested the trial judge to have such remarks taken down by the stenographer in order that they might be incorporated in the record and that the court refused to have this done.</p> <p>(b) When counsel for a defendant request the trial court to have a stenographer take down in shorthand any statement made by a prosecuting attorney during his argument, to he made a part of the -record upon appeal, and the court refuses to comply with such request, then the fact of such request and refusal may be shown by affidavits or any other competent evidence, and such refusal upon the part of the court constitutes ground for reversal without regard to the merits of the ease.</p> <p>6. H'OM I'dDE — Punishment—Seduction. The protection of female, purity requires that men who seduce young and inexperienced girls and then murder them to cover up their own infamy should receive the most severe possible punishment.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Error from Atoka Gounty Court; Baxter Taylor, Judge. </p> <p>Leola Marston was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and brings error.</p>

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Harmless Error. The admission) or exclusion, of testimony which, in the light of subsequent developments during the trial, indicates conclusively that no injury did or could have resulted is not ground for reversal of a judgment.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Admission of Evidence-Cure of Error. The admission of testimony which is of doubtful competency, and which, is after-wards by the court excluded out of an abundance of caution, is not error sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal.</p> <p>3. TRIAL — Severance—Right—Joint Trial — Evidence—Admissibility, (a) When two persons are jointly charged with the commission of an offense against the laws of this state, if such offense 'is a felony, they are entitled to separate trials if they so demand, as provided by statute.</p> <p>(b) When persons who are jointly charged with a felony are jointly tried, testimony which is admissible as to one and inadmissible as to the other is properly admitted, when limited in its effect by instructions from the court to the jury confining it to the particular defendant against whom it is admissible; and this is the rule even though the testimony introduced is such that, were the complaining accused on separate trial, it would have been reversible error to admit the same as against him.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

McMillan, Judge. C. F. Edwards was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals. The material testimony in the case may be substantially stated as follows: The homicide occurred on the 15th day of April, 1911, in Garvin county, Okla., at the home of appellant, who resided four or five miles west from Pauls Yalley. -The deceased lived about half a mile from appellant.

<p>CONTEMPT — Appeal—Jurisdiction. The -Criminal Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review civil contempt proceedings wherein defendant is adjudged guilty of contempt for failure to pay attorney fees and alimony.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Pontotoc Countyj Tom D. McKeówn, Judge. </p> <p>G. A. Steward was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Le Flore County; W. II. Brown, Judge. </p> <p>Everett Brooks was convicted of statutory rape, and he appeals.</p>

Tolbert, Judge. Walter Howard was convicted of larceny of a horse, and he appeals. It was proven that on the night of the. 14th day of January, 1910, there were stolen from the ranch of W. E. Tandy in Roberts county, Tex., two horses and a saddle, the property of said Tandy. The animals were traced from Texas into Oklahoma. About 60 days after the theft some officers of Wash-ita county, Okla., went to the house of Gus Howard in said county about 9 o’clock at night.

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Illegal Sale — Prima Facie Evidence. The payment of the special tax required of liquor dealers by the United States by a defendant constitutes prima facie evidence of an intention tjieneeforth, during the term of the license, to violate the prohibition law.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Time of Taking. Where an appeal is not taken within the time prescribed by the statute, this court is without jurisdiction to review the judgment.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. RAPE — Assault to Commit — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a female child under the age of consent, the evidence is held to support the verdict and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>2. SAME — Defense. Since, by statute, a female child under the age of consent is legally incapable of consenting to carnal knowl-' edge of her person, she is incapable of consenting to an assault upon her with intent to commit rape, and every act done in furtherance of a purpose and intent to know her carnally is unlawful and felonious; and, if such acts would constitute an assault if done without her consent, then no act of hers can waive the assault.</p> <p>3. SAME — Assault to Commit Rape — Res Gestae — Complaint Made. Where it appears, in a- prosecution for assault to commit rape upon a child of tender years, that immediately after the alleged assault she was crying and met an older sister and then and there made complaint, not only the fact that such complaint was made, but the complaint as made, is admissible as part of the res gestae.</p> <p>4. TRIAL — Argument of Counsel. The prosecuting attorney has the right and privilege in his argument to the jury to refer to ■ the evidence and state his deduction therefrom and urge upon the jury the truth or falsity of any testimony given in the case.</p> <p>5. APPEAL — Argument of Counsel — Presentation for Review. Misstatements of the prosecuting attorney in his address to the jury cannot be reviewed on appeal, where the only evidence thereof contained in the record is recitals in the motion for new trial.</p> <p>6. APPEAL — Refusal of Change of Venue. Since Comp. Laws T909, sec. 6766 (Rev. Laws, 5811), leaves an application for a change of venue to the sound discretion of the trial court, a refusal to grant such change will not he disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion to defendant’s prejudice..</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Pottawatomie County; Q. C. Abernathy, Judge. </p> <p>Claud Gorman was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from McClain County Court; W. E. Woods, Judge. </p> <p>Tom Head. was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

D. Brewer, Judge. J. W. Price was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals.

<p>Application of Theo. Sizemore for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p> Appeal from Choctaw County Court; W. T. Glenn, Judge. </p> <p>Wirt Cox was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and brings error.</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court of Logan JCountyj S. S. Lawrence, Judge. </p> <p>E. E. Mater was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Washington County; John J. Shea, Judge.</p> <p>Nettie Y. Brown was convicted of murder, and sbe appeals..</p>

<p>Appeal from District ‘Court, Washington County; B. H. Hudson, Judge.</p> <p>Paul Collegenia was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>Error from Superior Qourtj Logajn County • S. S. Lawrence, Judge. '</p> <p>Sherman Wortnian was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and brings error.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Johnston County; Robert M. Rainey, Judge. </p> <p>W. B. White was convicted of larceny, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge. </p> <p>Bud Tempy was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Tulsa County Court; N. c1. Cub ser, Judge. </p> <p>W. E. De Byram was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>1. CONTEMPT — Criminal Contempt — Appeal—Jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff in error was prosecuted in the name of the state, on an information signed and presented by its prosecuting officer for an alleged criminal contempt, and upon his trial found guilty, and .the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed was not for the purpose of enforcing an order of the court allowing alimony to the end that the plaintiff in error should be compelled to comply with such order, but as punishment for criminal contempt, the proceeding was not remedial, but was criminal in character. Therefore the proceeding is reviewable on appeal to this court.</p> <p>CONTEMPT — Imprisonment. A person imprisoned as punishment for a criminal contempt is imprisoned in execution .under a sentence for crime. ro</p> <p>SAME — Information—Demurrer. When the facts alleged in the information do not constitute an offense, and are insufficient to charge a criminal contempt, it was error for the court to overrule a general demurrer thereto. w *</p> <p>4. DIVORCE — “Criminal ’Contempt” — Refusal to Pay Alimony. Willful disobedience to an order of the district court, or judge thereof, to pay alimony in a divorce action is not a criminal contempt.</p> <p>5. SAME — Prosecution. In a contest between private litigants the state has no interest, and in this case the county attorney was without authority to file an information, and the district court had no jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction and sentence,</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Error from District Court, Grady Countyj Frank M. Bailey, Judge. </p> <p>Carl Howey was convicted of murder, and he brings error.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Death of Accused — Abatement. In a criminal action, the purpose of the proceeding being to punish the defendant in person, the action must necessarily abate upon his death.,</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from, District Gourl, Pontotoc County; Robert M. Bainey, Judge. </p> <p>Andy Scribner was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Walt Cook was convicted of violating the liquor law, and appeals.</p>

Bert Files was convicted of violating the prohibitory liquor-law, and he appeals. Appellant, was found guilty in the county court of Garfield county for violating the prohibitory liquor law, and his punishment wa-s assessed at 120 days’ confinement in the county jail and a fine of $420. And it was ordered by tbe court that if such fine be not paid, the defendant be confined in the county jail of Garfield county until such fine should be paid at the rate of $2 per day.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; A. H. Ferguson, Judge.</p> <p>Will Hess was convicted of murder, and be appeals.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Amendment. By leave of court, an information may be amended, as to matters of substance or form, after a plea of not guilty has been entered, and before the trial is begun.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Amendment—Matters of Form. By leave of court, an information may be amended, as to matters of form, after the jury has been impaneled, when the same can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W. Dayson, Judge. </p> <p>W. A. High was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Pottawatomie County Courtj Boss F. Loclcridge, Judge. </p> <p>F. L. Thompson was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Murray County; Harry W. Fielding, Judge. </p> <p>Mark Tracy was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.</p>

Mrs. B. Putman was convicted of maintaining a bawdy-house, and she appeals. John F. Burford testified for the state that he, in company with Id. L. Reynolds, visited the house kept by appellant in the city of Enid on the 2d day of July, 1911, about a quarter 'after 9 o’clock at night. Witness then testified as follows : “A. Well, we walked up the stairway into this building and at the head of the stairs this lady came and met us. She met us at the head of the stairs.

<p>1. APPEAL — Costs—Dismissal, (a) Wlien an appeal is taken to this court, the person appealing is required to pay the costs incurred thereby, and a failure to do so amounts to an abandonment of the appeal, and the same will be dismissed on proper motion.</p> <p>(b) A poor person, one who is without means with which to pay costs, and who is unable to procure the means from friends or relatives, by filing a proper affidavit and making a satisfactory showing 'is permitted to appeal without the payment of costs.</p> <p>2. SAME — Right of Appeal — Statutory Regulation — Costs. The right to appeal is subject to reasonable statutory regulations. Such right does not contemplate an appeal for delay or at the expense of the people,, except in the case of paupers.</p> <p>3. SAME — Costs. It is the duty of persons appealing criminal cases to this court to see that proper arrangements are made for the payment of costs. It is not the duty of the court or clerk to be constantly advising them in this connection.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Prosecution—Evidence—'License. (a) Where a defendant is prosecuted for having in his possession intoxicating liquors with intent to sell the same and the state offers evidence that the defendant had paid for and obtained a United States revenue license as a liquor dealer, such license will not be admissible in evidence unless it covers the period of time within which it was proven that the defendant was in possession of such liquors.</p> <p>(b) The fact that a defendant may have paid for and obtained a United States license as a liquor dealer is prima facie evidence of the intention on the part of the defendant to sell liquors within the period of time covered by said license, and does not create any presumption against the defendant as to any other time.-</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Prosecution—Evidence—Ground for Reversal, (a) Where a defendant is upon trial charged with having possession of intoxicating- liquors with intent to sell the same, it is not competent for the state to prove that intoxicating liquors were delivered to other persons without first producing some evidence showing that such other persons were connected with the defendant.</p> <p>(b) If courts permit incompetent evidence to be introduced against a defendant upon the promise of the prosecuting attorney to subsequently show that such evidence is admissible, and the admissibility of such evidence fs not afterward shown, and it appears from the whole record that such evidence was of a material and injurious character, the error of the court in admitting such testimony will not be cured by the subsequent action of the court in striking such testimony out, and in instructing the jury not to consider the same in their deliberations, and in such a case a new trial should be granted to the defendant.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Brief—'Citations. In preparing briefs, where counsel cite the decisions of this court or of the Supreme Court, they should also give the volume and page of the Oklahoma report upon which such decision will be found.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>APPEAL — Former Jeopardy. Thd* plea of former jeopardy cannot be considered by the appellate court, unless it is presented in the lower court in the'manner prescribed by statute.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

The petitioner, II. II. Sherrill, being confined in the .county jail of Pittsburg county, charged with the murder ■of Dan Beats, -alleged to have been.'committed in the town of Kiowa on the 29th day of April, 1913, has applied' for :a-! writ''of habeas corpus in order that he might be allowed bail pending his final trial.

<p>Appeal from, County Court, Jachson County j E. E. Gore, Special Judge.</p> <p>D. L. Patterson was convicted of keeping a bawdyhonse, and appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.</p>

<p> Appeal from, County Court, Caddo County; </p> <p> C. Boss Hume, Judge. </p> <p>Will Bacon- was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from. District Court, Garvin County; B. McMillan, Judge. </p> <p>Alex JefEries was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p>APPEAL — Objection Below — Necessity — Presence of Defendant. Where the record shows that a defendant participated in the trial ■and after conviction filed a motion for a new trial in which he did not claim that any portion of the trial took place in his absence, and where the record also shows that the defendant was present when judgment was pronounced against him and was asked by the' court what, if anything, he had to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and the defendant said nothing, this court will presume that the defendant was present during his entire trial, and the question of his absence during such trial cannot he raised for the first time upon appeal.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Le Flore Countyj Malcolm F. Rosser, Judge.</p> <p>Sterling Cluck was found guilty in the district court of Le Flore county of the crime of seduction, and 'his punishment was assessed at confinement in the penitentiary at MeAlester for 18 months, and he appeals.</p> <p>Lola Bali testified that she was 18 years of age and lived ■at Cowlington; that she had known appellant for about four years; that her mother was dead; that her mother died when she was seven years of age; that appellant had been going with witness 2% years; that a year after appellant began going with witness they became engaged to be married; that when .appellant first -asked witness to marry him she declined t-o do so, upon the ground that slie was too- young, but that she would marry him as -soon as she got old enough; that appellant frequently called at witness’ house to see her, .and frequently took her t-o church and -singing; that the father of witness objected to her going with appellant; that appellant frequently met witness at her aunt’s house, and had seen her at singing and church and at parties; that after appellant had been engaged to witness for some time be aslted ber to have intercourse with him; that witness declined. Witness then testified as follows:</p> <p>“He asked me why, and I said it was wrong. He said that there was no harm in it, and I said that there was. I said he would not think as much of me if I did, .and he said, Wes;’ he would think three times as much of me if I did. He said that other girls did that, and I said I did not care; I did not want to do that way. The Court: Go on. A. He said that I was going to be his wife, -and I told him that I did not want to do that way. He kept on begging, and said: ‘I’ll do the right thing; I’ll hold up my right hand and swear that I’ll marry you.’ Q. Did he swear it? A. Yes, sir; he knelt down on his knees and swore it. Q. Then you consented? A. Yes, sir. Q. Where were you when he had intercourse with you? A, I was lying down on the carpet. Q. Did you lay down yourself? A. No, sir; he laid me down. Q. Who unfastened your clothes, Lola? A. He did. Q. Did he hurt you or not? A. Yes, sir; he did. Q. Did you tell him that he was hurting you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did he have intercourse with you after that? A. Yes. Q. How long after? A. It was-a. night or two. Q. What -did he say to you about it then? A. He said for me to 'do like other men’s wives, and I s-aid I did not want to, and he said that other girls -did that way. Q. Did he tell you that the second time? A. Yes; he told me that every time. Q. Was anything said about marrying these -other times? A. Yes, sir; he- gave me his hand each time and s-aid that we would marry. Q. What did he do? A. He gave me his right hand and knelt down on the floor. Q. You say he would give you his right hand and kneel down on the floor? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that right? A. Yes; he would give me his right hand and swear that we would marry. Q. What was it he would say when he would swear? A. He said, ‘I’ll swear before God that we will marry.’ Q. Would he do -that every time he had intercourse with you? Defendant: We object to leading the witness in this manner; we do not think it is fair to the defendant. The Court: She has -already stated that; but, it is not proper to repeat what the witness has stated, and it is a waste of time. Q. How many times did he have intercourse with you? A. Four times. Q. Four times? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were there, or not, any resulte from these acts of intercourse? A. Yes, sir. Q. Anything that followed it? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was it? A. I don’t know what it was. .Defendant: We object. Q. Wa.s there .a child horn? A. Yes, sir. Defendant: We object. The Court: I think it is competent for her to show whether she became pregnant, and that a child was born. Defendant: We except. Q. When was the last time he had intercourse with you? A. On Wednesday night before he married Thursday. Q. Was anything said about marriage at that time? A. Yes, sir; he gave me his hand and swore that he would marry me.”</p> <p>She also testified that she had never had sexual intercourse-with -any other person than the defendant.</p> <p>James Ball testified that he was the father of Lola Ball; that her mother died in 1902; that the appellant frequently waited on his daughter; that appellant was with his daughter so often that witness requested him to quit keeping company with her; that during the last week of December, 1910, Lola Ball gave birth to a child.</p> <p>Mrs. Martha Ball testified that she was the stepmother of Lola Ball; that in the latter part of December, 1910, Lola Ball gave birth to a child; that appellant had been going with Lola Ball for about two years before this.</p> <p>Mrs. Mary Ball testified that she was a sister-in-law of Lola Ball; that she was acquainted with appellant; that -appellant kept company with Lola Ball; witness once heard appellant call Lola Ball his freckled-faced wife.</p> <p>Mrs. J. F. Bridges testified that she was acquainted with Lola Ball, and was -also -acquainted with -appellant; that appellant frequently came to her house for the purpose of meeting Lola Ball; that they acted just like young people sparking.</p> <p>West Sumner testified that Lola Ball was a niece of his wife; -that he was acquainted with appellant; that appellant visited Lola Ball at the house of witness; he heard appellant talking about marrying Lola Ball, and in this conversation appellant said he would have her if it took him 10 years to get her.</p> <p>Mrs. J. F. Husband testified that she was acquainted with appellant and also Lola Ball; appellant once came to the house of witness and wanted her to make some clothes for Lola Ball; witness had heard appellant say he would not deny that he had been engaged to Lola Ball.</p> <p>Mrs. Maud Person testified that appellant had been visiting Lola Ball- about two years; that at the request of appellant witness had made a waist; that before making the waist she took ■the measurement of Lola Ball to make it by.</p> <p>Appellant introduced his wife, Mrs. Gertie Cluck.- She did not testify to any material facts or offer any further evidence.</p>

<p>1. INDICTMENT AND I NFORMATION — Preliminary Examination-Necessity — Variance Between Information and Preliminary Complaint. Section 1Y, Bill of Rights, prescribes: “No person shall be prosecuted for a felony by information without having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, or having waived such preliminary examination.” Held that, under the constitutional provision, the precedent fact that a preliminary examination has been had or waived constitutes the jurisdictional basis for a prosecution on information in the superior court. It is the fact that there was a preliminary examination, or a waiver thereof, and a judicial determination thereon by the examining magistrate that a felony has been committed, and that there is probable cause to believe that defendant is guilty thereof that confers jurisdiction on the superior’court and authorizes the county attorney to file an information in said court charging the crime complained of in the preliminary complaint when such examination has been waived by the defendant. And further held, that if the defendant on being brought before the examining magistrate waives his right to a preliminary examination, and it appears that the charge in the preliminary complaint is substantially the same as that set forth in the information filed by the county attorney in the superior court, a plea of want of a preliminary examination, or a variance between the preliminary complaint and the information, is unavailable.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Continuance—Discretion—Appeal. An application for a continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing the refusal of a continuance asked on account of an absent witness the evidence adduced at the trial will be considered by this court for the purpose of determining whether the alleged testimony was probably true, as well as whether it was material, if true, and this court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court upon its action' in a matter of discretion, unless there appears a plain abuse of such discretion.</p> <p>3. APPEAL — Exceptions—Remarks of Counsel — Preservation in .Record. Exceptions must be saved to alleged improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury, and such remarks must be preserved by being incorporated in the case-made, or by bill of exceptions, duly allowed, to render them available on appeal; and, when not so preserved in the record, such remarks cannot be shown by affidavit or mere recitals in a motion for new trial.</p> <p>4. RAPE — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for rape, the evidence is held sufficient to support the verdict, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>('Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from County -Court; Woods County; W. M. Bicleel, Judge. </p> <p>Pete Stites was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Woods County; W. M. Biokel, Judge. </p> <p>John Hobbs was convicted of violating the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

F. Winfrey, Judge. Virgil Landrum was convicted of violating the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals. The case was tried upon the following agreed statement of facts: “That on the 15th day of June, 1911, Ed Smith approached the defendant, Virgil Landrum, in the city of Ard-more, and requested him, Landrum, to order for him, Smith, one gallon of whisky; that he wrote a letter at Smith’s request, and signed Smith’s name to said letter, same being addressed to II.

<p>1. EVIDENCE — Character. As a general rule, evidence as to the had character of a defendant is not admissible unless he first otters evidence as to his good character; hut this rule does not apply to cases in which character is an element of the offense upon trial.</p> <p>2. APPEAL — Ground for Reversal. Courts are established for the sole purpose of enforcing justice, punishing criminals, and suppressing vice, and, when the guilt of a defendant is clearly established, a conviction should not be reversed, except for fundamental errors.</p> <p>3. PROSTITUTION — Pandering—Sufficiency of Evidence. Por facts sustaining a conviction for pandering, as defined by section 2425, Rev. Laws 1910, see evidence and opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>CASE FOLLOWED. Edmons v. State, ante, 132 Pac. 923, followed and approved.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Major County; Jas. B. Cullison, Judge.</p> <p>Eoy Jones was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, and appeals.</p>

Appeal■ from District Court, Muskogee County; R. P. De Graff enreid, Judge. Link Moutry was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. The essential facts in this case are not 'disputed, and may be stated in condensed form as follows: In 1896 the appellant, Link Moutry, was married in Texas, to his wife Birdie. They subsequently moved to Oklahoma. Their matrimonial experiences were anything but pleasant, and in June, 1911, Birdie Moutry secured a divorce from appellant.

<p>1. LARCENY — Evidence—Sufficiency. In a prosecution for larceny of live stock, the evidence is held sufficient to support the verdict, and that no prejudicial error was committed on the trial.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — Credibility of Witnesses — Question for Jury. The credibility of the witnesses testifying in behalf of the defendant is the exclusive province of the jury to determine, and although such testimony may be uncontradicted, and not directly impeached, when there are facts and circumstances admitted and proven, tending to lessen the probability that such testimony is true, the jury may give it such weight as they deem proper, even to the extent of wholly disregarding the same.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

C. Allen, Judge. Josephine Hill pleaded guilty to forgery, and 'appeals.

<p>1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Ex Post Facto — Punishment. The act of the Legislature providing that upon a second conviction for a violation of the prohibitory liquor law a higher punishment shall be inflicted is a reasonable classification which the Legislature had the power to make, and it is not ex post facto, although by its terms it máy be enforced against one whose former conviction occurred before its passage.</p> <p>2. WITNESSES — Hearsay Evidence — Impeachment—Supporting Testimony. When the credibility of a witness is attacked, it may be supported by evidence that the witness had made similar statements about the time of the occurrence testified to; but, in the absence of any attack upon the credibility of a witness, his statements made out of court cannot be introduced against a defendant, and when so introduced upon a material question in a close case constitutes reversible error.</p> <p>3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — “Ex Post Facto Law.” An “ex post facto law” is one which renders an act punishable in a mann'er in which it was not punishable when it was committed.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

Will Harris was convicted of violating tbe -prohibitory liquor law, and his punishment was assessed at a fine of $500 •and six months’ confinement in the county jail, and he appeals.

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Prosecution—Sufficiency of Evidence. For evidence held to be totally insufficient to support a verdict of guilty of selling whisky, see opinion.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

H. Admire, Judge. J. L. Wilkerson was convicted of having intoxicating liquor in his possession with intent to sell, and appeals.

Original proceedings by J. 0. Sparks for a writ of habeas corpus. This case is correctly stated in the brief of counsel for petitioner as follows : “The petitioner, J. 0. Sparks, was convicted of tbe crime of murder on the - day of January, 1913, at an adjourned term of the district court of Choctaw county, Okla.

<p> Appeal from Oounty Oourt, Pontotoc County; Conway 0. Barton, Judge. </p> <p>Knox Greer was convicted of violating the prohibitory-law, and appeals.</p>

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Criminal Law — Verdict—Sufficiency of Evidence. To justify or sustain a conviction of having possession of intoxicating- liquor with intent to violate any of the provisions of the prohibitory law, there must be evidence sufficient to prove possession, and also evidence of the criminal intent. When a verdict is manifestly contrary to the evidence, this court i has no discretion, but must reverse the judgment. (See opinion for evidence held insufficient to sustain such a conviction.)</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

A. Keller, Judge. Sam Huff was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals. E. M. Eskew testified for the state that he was at the depot when defendant Huff got off the train about 11:30 p. m. about 60 feet south of the depot. He had a package under his arm and started on up, passed the depot, with Green White and Sam Huff, when they were stopped and the whisky was taken from them. Said they had the whisky for club. A good many people were present.

<p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Illegal Sale — Evidence. See the opinion for evidence held insufficient to sustain a verdict and judgment of conviction for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Love Countyj S. II. Bussell, Judge. </p> <p>Will Bussell was convicted of felonious assault, and appeals.</p>

B. A. Robertson, Judge. Ben Bond was convicted of bribery of officers of the law, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for five years, and he appeals.

<p>Application for babeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Seminole County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge.</p> <p>Prince Carolina- was informed against for the crime of murder and convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>Application for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Wagoner County; R. C. Allen, Judge.</p> <p>Claud H. Weldon and Sidney Littrell, were convicted of contempt and appeal.</p>

<p>Petition for the writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tulsa County Court; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Okfuskee County Court; W. A. ITuser, Judge.</p> <p>W. F. Jones was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Murray County Court; Harry W. Fielding, Judge.</p> <p>Homer Wilson was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Canadian County; John J. Carney, Judge.</p>

<p>In each of the above numbered and entitled causes the appellants were convicted for violations of the prohibitory liquor law and appealed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Jess Tomerlin was convicted ,of operating a gambling game, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Kingfisher County Court; Jno. W. Graham, Judge.</p> <p>R. G. Hill was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Kingfisher, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Greer County Court; Jarret Todd, Judge.</p> <p>Fred Finley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Geo. W. Clark, Judge.</p> <p>T. J. Basham was convicted for obtaining property under false pretenses, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Ben Johnson was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Seminole County Court; T. S. Cobb, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Pittsburg County; W. C. Liedke, Judge.</p>

<p>Petition for habeas corpus from Grady County.</p>

<p>Appeal from Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p> <p>Walt Cook was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Logan County. S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>-Charles Kyle was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Dan Mater and E. L. Brown were convicted of violating- the prohibitory law, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Sam Kyle was convicted of violating the prohibitory law and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Orson L. Earley was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from McCurtain County Court; E. E. Cochran, Judge.</p> <p>Harry Sanders was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cotton County Court; Austin Akins, Judge.</p> <p>Slim Aday was convicted of violating the prohibitory' law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from 'Superior Court, Logan County; S. S. Lawrence, Judge.</p> <p>Lucius Garrett was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Coal County Court; R. H. Wells, Judge. '</p> <p>Mose Hunter was convicted of violating the prohibitory lav/, ana appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Pottawatomie County Court; Ross F. Lockridge, Judge.</p> <p>Walter Standifer was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Canadian County Court; W. A. Maurer, Judge.</p> <p>Carl Oelke was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, in two cases, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tulsa County Court; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Pittsburg County Court; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>Alex McIntyre was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W. Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Logan Billingsley was convicted of conducting a gambling game, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Kay County Court; Claud Duval, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Pittsburg County Court; B. P. Hammond, Judge.</p> <p>John Wooliver was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of McAlester, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Beaver County; R. H. Loofbourrow, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Love County Court; R. A. Keller, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Carter County Court; M. P. Winfrey, Judge.</p> <p>B. P. Smith was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tulsa County Court; N. J. Gubser, Judge.</p> <p>T. C. ITusted, was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Murray County Court; Harry W. Fielding, Judge.</p> <p>Horace Lindsey was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Blaine County Court; George W. Ferguson, Judge.</p> <p>S. E. Peck was convicted of assault, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Murray County Court; Harry W. Fielding, Judge.</p> <p>John Marrs was convicted! of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Blaine County Court; Geo. W. Ferguson, Judge.</p> <p>George Osborne was convicted of violating the prohibitiory Taw, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Craig County Court; S. P. PARKS, Judge.</p> <p>T. W. Pritchett was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Caddo County Court; C. R. Hume, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Oklahoma County Court; John W, Hayson, Judge.</p> <p>Logan Billingsley was convicted of violating the gambling law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Ottawa County Court; W. Y. Quigley, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Ottawa County Court; W. Y. Quigley, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Craig County Court; S. F. Parks, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cherokee County Court; S. P. Parks, Judge.</p> <p>Henry Ballard was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeal's.</p>

<p>Appeal from Love County Court; R. A. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Brant Jones was convicted of unlawfully selling whisky, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Washington County Court; James T. Shipman, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Woods County Court; W. M. Bickel, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Washington County Court; James T. Shipman, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Garfield County Court; Winfield Scott, Judge..</p> <p>Sam Hogan and Walt Cook were convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Cherokee County Court; J. T. Parks, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tulsa County Court; N. J. Gubser, Judge. ,</p>

<p>Appeal from Osage County Court; C. T. Bennett, Judg-e.</p> <p>Dave Curtis was convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and appeals</p>

<p>Appeal from Ottawa County Court; W. Y. Quigley, Judge.</p> <p>Everett Austin was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Stephens County Court; W. H. Admire, Judge.</p>