¶1concurring.
¶2I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Accordingly, with the following comments, I concur.
¶3In appellant’s first and second point of error, he contends that the state was improperly allowed to introduce extraneous offense evidence. The majority holds that appellant waived any error because he did not timely object to the prosecutor’s questions. In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present a timely, specific objection to the trial court. Tex.R.App.P. 52. In order for an objection to be timely, it must be raised “at the earliest opportunity,” or “as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent.” Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89, 100 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), vacated on other grounds, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (plurality op.) (quoting Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 291 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). A timely, specific objection is required to allow the trial court an opportunity to rule on the complaint and correct any error that may have occurred. This allows the trial to proceed under the proper procedural and substantive rules. Janecka v. State, 823 S.W.2d 232, 243-44 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (op. on reh’g); Meyers v. State, 865 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. refd). When confronted with a waiver question, the Court of Criminal Appeals has warned courts of appeals to not “split hairs.” Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Accordingly, we are to reach the merits of a complaint “without requiring that the parties read some special script to make their wishes known.” Id.
¶4In the current case, it is clear from the portion of the statement of facts included in the majority’s opinion, that the trial court was afforded an opportunity to rule on appellant’s objection. See Zimmerman, 860 S.W.2d at 103,104 (Baird J., concurring). It is also difficult to discern how appellant’s trial counsel could have objected any earlier. However, recently, in Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), the Court of Criminal Appeals determined in a factually similar case that Dinkins failed to timely object. In that case, Dinkins complained of *219allegedly speculative questioning by the prosecutor. The court determined that his objection was not timely because he did not object until after the witness answered the state’s questions. In addition, Dinkins failed to offer an explanation of why he did not object before the witness answered the questions. The court stated:
An objection should be made as soon as the ground for objection becomes apparent. In general, this occurs when the evidence is admitted. Therefore, if a question clearly calls for an objectionable response, a defendant should make an objection before the witness responds. If he fails to object until after an objectionable question has been asked and answered, and he can show no legitimate reason to justify the delay, his objection is untimely and error is waived.
¶5Id. at 355 (emphasis added). The court determined it was apparent when the questions were asked that they called for a speculative answer. Thus, because Dinkins did not object before the witness answered the questions and he did not offer an explanation why he did not timely object, the court determined he had waived any error and overruled his points of error.
¶6Appellant similarly complains of questions that were objectionable when asked. He also did not object until after the questions were answered or offer an explanation why he did not object earlier. While I believe that the issue was sufficiently placed before the trial court, we are bound by the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Dinkinsis indistinguishable from our current case. Accordingly, appellant waived any error by failing to object until after he answered the prosecutor’s questions.
¶7In addition, I am skeptical that the majority is correct that if the error had been preserved, the questioning was proper. The credibility of a witness may be attacked with evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude if the trial court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 609; Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex.Crim. App.1993), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 481, 126 L.Ed.2d 432 (1993). As with any other witness, generally an accused cannot be impeached with a charged offense unless the charges resulted in a final conviction which would be admissible under rule 609. Prescott v. State, 744 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Hammett v. State, 713 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). An exception to this rule applies when a witness makes statements suggesting that he has never been arrested, charged or convicted of any offense. Delk, 855 S.W.2d at 704; Prescott, 744 S.W.2d at 131; Hammett, 713 S.W.2d at 105. “Where the witness creates a false impression of law abiding behavior, he ‘opens the door’ on his otherwise irrelevant past criminal history and opposing counsel may expose the falsehood.” Delk, 855 S.W.2d at 704.
¶8The state contends that appellant’s statements on direct examination “opened the door” to this limited exception so that it could impeach him with allegations of extraneous offenses. I disagree. The exception is intended for those instances where the accused incorrectly testifies that he has never been “in trouble.” In those circumstances, the state is justified in dispelling the false impression. Thus, the law allows the state to delve into an area that is otherwise irrelevant, collateral and, therefore, inadmissible. See Prescott, 744 S.W.2d at 131.
¶9In the current case, appellant testified during direct examination that he had no idea why Miles would want to destroy his business. The statement does not leave a false impression with the jury (or even suggest) that he has been a law abiding citizen. See Hammett, 713 S.W.2d at 105. Rather, appellant’s testimony only indicates that he was not aware of any reason why Miles would arrange the destruction of his business. Because appellant’s statement was not a statement “concerning his past conduct that suggested[ed] he ha[d] never been arrested, charged or convicted of any offense,” it is my belief that the prosecutor’s question does not fall within the limited exception relied upon by the state. See Delk, 855 S.W.2d at 704.
¶10*220Furthermore, the state argues that the questions were proper because it was attempting to “impeach and rebut” appellant’s testimony that he did not know why Miles would want to destroy his business. Implicit in the majority’s holding is an assumption that appellant and Miles being “in the cocaine business” necessarily gave Miles a motive to destroy appellant’s business. The questions asked by the prosecutor do not indicate or suggest any animosity between Miles and appellant. The questions in no way “impeach or rebut” appellant’s testimony. Rather, I believe, the questions were irrelevant and an impermissible attempt by the prosecutor to present other bad acts. See Tex.R.CRIm.Evid. 404; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.CrimApp.1990) (op. on reh’g).
¶11With these comments, I concur that appellant’s first and second points of error should be overruled.