Volume 91 — Connecticut Reports

Action upon the so-called common counts, accompanied by a bill of particulars, to recover the agreed price of an automobile, and money had and received, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $180, and appeal by the defendant. In November, 1914, the defendant was engaged in the business of repairing automobiles in the city of New Haven.

Information charging the defendant with unlawfully neglecting and refusing to support his wife, brought to the Borough Court of Naugatuck and thence by appeal of the defendant to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Reeves, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Appeals by the respective plaintiffs from a decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Haven ordering certain real estate, formerly belonging to Mabel Ives Stevens of New Haven, deceased, to be distributed as ancestral estate to the defendants, taken to and tried together by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, ./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants in each case, from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Petition for a new trial upon the alleged ground of newly-discovered evidence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; the court sustained a demurrer to the amended complaint, refused to allow a further amendment, and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract to deliver a certain automobile to the plaintiff, or to recover damages for the defendant’s wrongful refusal to return to the plaintiff $400 of the purchase price paid by him therefor, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $412, and appeal by the defendant.

Action for the specific performance of an agreement to purchase real estate and for damages for a breach of the agreement, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $300, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages arising from an error in a telegraphic message alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in its transmission, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Wolfe, J.; facts found and Judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $125, and appeal by the defendant. The complaint alleges, and the trial court has found, that in August, 1912,. Messrs.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of the Court ¡of Probate for the district of Branford approving and admitting to probate a written instrument as the last will and testament of Sophia M. Rogers of Branford, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, sustaining the will, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

Appeal by the defendants from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Haven requiring the executors of the will of Maurice Welch of New Haven, deceased, to amend their administration account by allowing the claim of the plaintiff, a legatee under the will, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, affirming the action of the Court of Probate, and appeal by the…

<p>Appeal from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district adverse to the plaintiff, taken by her to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Tuttle, J., upon the findings of the commissioner, for the advice of this court.</p>

<p>Intervening application in receivership proceedings pending in the Superior Court in Hartford County, by an alleged creditor of the defendant company, praying for the allowance of a claim of $28,750, and referred to a committee who found and reported the facts; the court, Gager, J., accepted the report of the committee and allowed the claim to the amount of $15,386, and from this judgment both parties appealed.</p>

Information for selling milk in a store in Waterbury without having it “contained in bottles tightly sealed, in violation of a rule or regulation of the board of health of the City of Waterbury, brought to and tried by the City Court of Waterbury, Larkin, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint; the court overruled the demurrer, and, upon the refusal of the accused to plead over, adjudged him guilty and imposed a fine of $1 and costs, from which he appealed.

Action to recover the price of two ice-cream machines alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Wilder, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $759, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Haven making an allowance of $50 per month for the support of the surviving husband of a deceased wife during the settlement of her estate, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the Court of Probate, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendants’ negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the defendant city’s demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Webb, J.), the plaintiff’s motion for permission to amend the complaint denied, and judgment rendered dismissing the complaint as against the city, from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Although courts of this State are powerless to decree the dissolution of a foreign corporation, they do have jurisdiction over its local business, and therefore may appoint a receiver, either primary or ancillary, for the purpose of liquidating such business.</p> <p>The wisdom or propriety of appointing a receiver here for such purpose before one has been appointed at the domicil of the foreign corporation, may be questionable, but that does not affect the jurisdiction of our court to make the appointment: for its powers in the premises must emanate from the sovereignty which created the court and not from the foreign State in which the corporation may happen to be located.</p> <p>For jurisdictional purposes, no distinction can be drawn between the power to appoint a so-called ancillary receiver and the power to appoint an original receiver.</p> <p>In an action to have receivership proceedings declared null and void, upon the sole ground that all orders made therein were wholly void for want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, defects of form in the complaint, and in some of the prayers for relief upon which no action was taken, are of no consequence.</p>

Suit to secure the annulment of an assessment of special benefits against the plaintiff, an abutting landowner, for the construction of a sewer in front of his land, upon the alleged ground that the order of the board of aldermen directing the construction of the sewer, and all subsequent action relating thereto, were ultra vires and void, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Burpee, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the…

), a demurrer to the return was sustained {Burpee, J.), and judgment was afterward rendered {Tuttle, J.) for the petitioner, •from which the respondent appealed. The defendant, as probate judge for the district of Clinton, passed a decree removing the plaintiff as natural guardian of his minor son.

Action of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective defendants in and to a death-benefit fund of SI,000 in the hands of the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Tuttle, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of Mary Frances Curran, from which the other defendants appealed.

Action to secure the return of a note for $3,500 made by the plaintiff to one of the defendants, and the release or annulment of a mortgage given to secure its payment,—both of which were alleged to have been obtained by the fraudulent representations of the defendants,—and also for the recovery of damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Tuttle, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff awarding the equitable relief prayed for…

<p>Action to recover the amount of a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff against a third person, payment of which the defendant had guaranteed by its bond, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $6,474, and from the judgment thereon the defendant appealed.</p> <p>The plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of New York. The defendant is an accident and liability company in Hartford, in this State.</p> <p>It appears from the finding that on the 11th day of June, 1914, the plaintiff brought suit against Alice M. Durkin and Charles F. Laas, in the Superior Court in Fairfield County, claiming $9,500 damages, which suit was returnable on the first Tuesday of September, 1914. After the writ had been duly and properly served, the defendant, on the 15th day of July, 1914, entered into a bond as surety for Alice M. Durkin and Charles F. Laas in favor of the plaintiff company, a copy of which is as follows:—</p> <p>“Robertson & Govanne Con-</p> <p>tracting Co., Inc., Plaintiff</p> <p>and Appellant</p> <p> vs. </p> <p>Durkin & Laas,</p> <p>Defendant and Respondent.</p> <p>UNDERTAKING TO RELEASE ATTACHMENT</p> <p>“Whereas, on the 11th day of June, A. D. 1914, attachment was issued in the above entitled action to the Sheriff of the County of Fairfield, his Deputy or either Sheriff of the City.of Bridgeport, within said County, and the said defendant, Durkin & Laas, of New York City, having appeared in said action and being about to apply to the said Court for an order to discharge an attachment on the money due said defendant, Durkin & Laas, now in the hands of the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut, being due and payable to said defendant, Durkin & Laas, for work already performed on the Bridgeport High School Building, Bridgeport, Connecticut.</p> <p>“Now, Therefore, the Aetna Accident & Liability Company of Hartford, Connecticut, does hereby pursuant to the statute, in such cases, made and provided, undertake that the defendant, Durkin & Laas, will on demand pay to the plaintiff the amount of any judgment which may be recovered in the action against the defendant, Durkin & Laas, not exceeding the sum of Eighty Five Hundred ($8,500) and No/100 Dollars.</p> <p>“Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 15th day of July, A. D. 1914.</p> <p>“The Aetna Accident & Liability Company, (Signed) By: Edward F. Pike, Resident Vice President.</p> <p>Attest: Charles F. Vielle,</p> <p> Resident Assistant Secretary. </p> <p>(seal).”</p> <p>On the 8th day of October, 1915, judgment was rendered in said suit against Alice M. Durkin and Charles F. Laas, in favor of the Robertson and Govanne Contracting Company for $6,214.26 damages and $81.79 costs. No part of this judgment has been paid, although demand has been made upon Alice M. Durkin and Charles F. Laas, the defendants in the former action, and upon the Accident and Liability Company.</p> <p>The defendant now claims that at the time this attachment was levied there was no money due Durkin and Laas from the city of Bridgeport, and that at that time, as well as at the time of the giving of the bond, there was no property of Durkin and Laas under attachment, and no property belonging to Durkin and Laas was released by the plaintiff as a consideration for the execution of said bond.</p> <p>After the evidence was closed the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff to recover the amount of the judgment rendered against Durkin and Laas. The defendant now contends that it was clear from the evidence that the intention of the parties was to substitute such a bond as the statute requires upon the dissolution of an attachment; that the liability of the defendant in this case was to be limited to the actual value of the interest of the principal in the property attached; and that the trial judge ignored the plain intention of the parties to the bond, as disclosed by the evidence submitted, and construed this instrument as a common-law bond, which made the defendant liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the judgment which the plaintiff obtained against Durkin and Laas.</p>

Appeal by the respondent from an order of the Public Utilities Commission granting an application of the petitioners for an extended gas service in the town of Newington, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County (Case, J.), which found that the Commission had exceeded its powers in passing the order in question and rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, from which the petitioners appealed.

Amicable suit to determine the rights of the respective parties in and to a spring of water upon land owned by the plaintiff, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

<p>Writ of error to reverse an alleged erroneous judgment of the City Court of Hartford, Markham, Acting-Judge, rendered in an action of summary process.</p>

<p>Compensation is not awarded, under our Workmen’s Compensation Act, for death or incapacity due to disease, unless the disease be the direct result or natural consequence of an accidental bodily injury; in other words, a “ personal injury” within the Act, must involve both an accident and bodily injury as distinguished from disease.</p> <p>In the present case an employee, by working over time and by exposure to the weather, became exhausted, and on the following day took a severe cold which five days later developed into pneumonia, from which he shortly thereafter died. Held that inasmuch as exhaustion was not in and of itself a bodily injury, and the decedent suffered from nothing of that nature as distinguished from disease, the claimant was not entitled to compensation.</p> <p>An accidental bodily injury may be defined as a localized abnormal condition of the living body directly and contemporaneously caused by accident; and an accident may be defined as an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event, or an unexpected condition.</p>

Suit to foreclose a mechanic’s lien on three separate pieces of land, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Hall, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The controversy in this court is between the plaintiff and the defendant Montowese Brick Company, only.

Appeal by the defendant Frank Catalano, an alleged lienor, from an order and decree of the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J., in foreclosure proceedings, adjudging the claimed lien of the appellant to be void and refusing to award to him any portion of the proceeds of a sále of the mortgaged premises remaining after the satisfaction of prior incumbrances.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Tuttle, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,800, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J., upon demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to plead further, rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover a payment of $150 made by tbe plaintiff upon tbe purchase price of a second-hand automobile which the defendant had failed to put in running order, pursuant to his alleged agreement, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the receiver of the defendant company, and by others, from an order of the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., in receivership proceedings, allowing in full a claim of Albert Widman for $2,500 as a commission for securing a purchaser of the real estate and plant of the defendant company in the hands of the receiver.

<p>Intervening application in receivership proceedings by the plaintiff, an alleged creditor of the defendant-company, praying for the allowance of its claim of $10,000, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and referred to a committee who found and reported the facts; the court, Greene, J., accepted the report and disallowed the claim, and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>January 7th, 1911, the Superior Court in Hartford County appointed a receiver for the Aetna Indemnity Company, then insolvent. In the course of the settlement of its affairs the City of Bridgeport presented to the receiver its claim for $10,000, which sum it alleged was due to it from the insolvent company by reason of its execution as surety of a bond in that amount, given to the city to secure the faithful performance of a contract entered into between it and the Bridgeport ByProducts Company. The receiver having disallowed the claim, the city appealed to the court for its allowance. A committee was thereupon appointed to hear and report upon the facts. Upon that report, which was accepted without remonstrance, the court disallowed the claim.</p> <p>The somewhat lengthy report of the committee finds the following salient facts:—</p> <p>The contract of the By-Products Company, whose performance the bond was given to secure, was one entered into May 27th, 1904, between one Winton and the City of Bridgeport for the reduction of the city’s garbage, offal and dead animals, for a period of ten years from date. In it the city agreed to collect and deliver to Winton’s reduction plant for said period, “all garbage, offal and the bodies of such dead animals and similar waste matter accumulated in said City of Bridgeport (as it legally can) and that the same shall be unloaded at such reduction plant at a point designated by Winton.” Winton agreed to reduce the same, or under certain temporary conditions bury it, for fifty cents per ton. One paragraph of the contract was as follows: “It is hereby further agreed that the words ‘garbage and offal’ shall mean as a general definition, such refuse matter as accumulates in the preparation of food for the table and also all matter arising from the slaughter, preparation, sale of offering for sale of animal, bird and fish food substances that is rejected, unclaimed or abandoned by the owner, or that is tainted, decayed, unwholesome, diseased or offensive.”</p> <p>By the terms of the contract Winton was permitted to form a corporation to be known as “The Bridgeport By-Products Company” to take over the contract, and be substituted for him therein. This was done, and the organization of the company completed on January 5th, 1905. January 9th, 1905, the company delivered to the city its bond in the penal sum of $10,000 signed by the Aetna Indemnity Company as surety, conditioned that the By-Products Company should well and truly keep and perform all the terms and conditions of said contract on its part to be kept and performed, and indemnify and save harmless the city thereunder.</p> <p>Thereafter the Byproducts Company entered upon the execution of its contract, and received the garbage and other waste matter delivered to it by the city, and reduced the same at its plant, and continued to do so until May 11th, 1910, when, pursuant to notice given a few days prior, it ceased operations and refused to receive any more garbage.</p> <p>From the date of the execution of the contract certain foreign matter was contained in the garbage collected and delivered by the city. This foreign matter was of a character which interfered with the process of reduction, was injurious to the machinery of reduction, and produced no valuable by-product. It at no time amounted in weight to more than five per cent of the total garbage delivered. It was physically impossible to gather the garbage of the city without including such proportion of foreign matter with it, and five per cent is a fair and reasonable amount to be found in any municipal garbage, and as little as could be expected to be present in such garbage. The city acted in good faith in the performance of its obligations under the contract, and used all reasonable efforts to keep the quantity of foreign matter at a minimum.</p> <p>Upon various occasions during the operation of the plant, its manager complained to the members of the Board of Health of the city that the foreign substance was causing it trouble and annoyance, and that the machinery of the plant was being broken in consequence of its presence in the garbage. But neither he nor any officer or agent of the By-Products Company made any formal complaint, either written or oral, to the city authorities, until May 6th, 1910, when a letter was sent to the Board of Health making such complaint, and notifying it that on and after May 11th, 1910, the By-Products Company would cease operations and refuse to receive any more garbage. This course it pursued.</p> <p>The city, upon receipt of this letter, to wit, on May 9th, wrote the Indemnity Company notifying it of the By-Products Company’s threatened action, and forwarded a copy of the letter of May 6th. Upon the By-Products Company’s suspension of operations and refusal to receive further garbage, another letter, dated May 11th, was written to the Indemnity Company by the attorney of the city advising it of that action, and that the city would look to it for indemnification for all damages suffered by it in the premises. On the same day the city’s attorney also wrote to one Livingston, the president and general manager of the By-Products Company, notifying him that the city expected the Company to continue its contract, and that if it did not resume work at once suit would be brought for breach of contract, and against the Indemnity Company on its bond. To this letter Livingston replied at length, charging the city therein with unfair treatment and violation of the contract.</p> <p>Resumption by the By-Products Company not following, a temporary arrangement was made by the city for the disposition of the garbage. Under this arrangement it was disposed of from May 11th, 1910, to January 7th, 1911, at a cost of fifty cents per ton. At about the same time the city advertised for bids for the disposal of its garbage for a period of three, five, or twenty years. These bids were opened on June 1st, 1910, and the proposal of the American Extractor Company was ultimately accepted and the contract awarded to it September 26th, 1910. This company, however, failed to file the required bond, and forfeited its certified check for $1,000 deposited with its bid. Subsequently, to wit, on December 1st, 1910, the contract was awarded to one Fischer, whose bid for the reduction and disposal of the garbage was, in the judgment of the Board of Health, next best for the city’s interests after that of the Extractor Company. This contract covered a period of ten years and was at the rate of $1 per ton. It contained a provision permitting the presence of ten per cent of foreign matter, and certain other provisions not contained in the Winton contract.</p> <p>July 14th, 1910, the By-Products Company, with knowledge of the city’s action; wrote a letter to the Board of Health stating that it was ready and willing to receive and dispose of the city’s garbage in accordance with its contract, “provided you cause to be delivered to us garbage which is garbage as defined by its terms.” The letter stated that notwithstanding the breaches of the contract by the city it regarded the contract as still in force, and that in case the city declined to carry it out it would proceed to get redress at law. On July 29th, 1910, this was followed by another letter written by the By-Products Company’s attorney and addressed to the city clerk, in which it gave notice that it was and had been at all times ready to receive all the garbage collected in the city, that its plant was then open and ready to receive such garbage, that it was ready to carry out all the terms of its contract, that the city was failing and refusing to deliver its garbage with the purpose of breaking its contract, and that, unless the city carried out the same and delivered all its garbage to the Company, the Company would hold the city for all damage it might thereby sustain.</p> <p>The By-Products Company was not justified in rescinding its contract with the city on account of the presence of foreign matter in the garbage or otherwise, and broke its contract when, on May 11th, it suspended operations and refused to receive further garbage.</p>

Action by a minor to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $900, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit for the cancellation of a deed which was alleged to have been obtained by the defendant through fraud and undue influence from the plaintiff’s intestate, and also for damages, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the equitable issues were, upon an order of court, Williams, J., tried to the court, Shumway, J., and judgment rendered for the defendant, after which the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial of the legal issues to the jury before Gager, J.,…

<p>Suit to secure the alteration of a judgment of divorce rendered in January, 1903, by increasing the amount of alimony awarded therein to the plaintiff, upon the alleged ground that such amount was procured through the fraudulent representations and concealment of the respondent in that case, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the court, Wébb, J., and from the court’s refusal to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The plaintiff and Nathan H. Heft, now deceased, intermarried February 22d, 1873. Tn 1902 the plaintiff began proceedings to procure a divorce from her husband and an allowance out of his estate by way of alimony. The defendant having appeared, the cause was referred to a committee to report the facts. The committee reported that the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce, that the defendant was the owner of estate to the value of $100,000, and that a reasonable portion thereof to assign to the plaintiff was $20,000. The report was accepted and judgment entered in accordance therewith on the 16th day of January, 1903.</p> <p>The present proceeding seeks a modification of that judgment in so far as the allowance is concerned, and a substantial increase of its amount. It alleges that in the divorce proceedings Mr. Heft fraudulently concealed the true value of his estate, and fraudulently produced such evidence as induced the court to find that he was possessed of estate to the value of $100,000 and to make an allowance to the plaintiff of $20,000, whereas his estate was in fact of the value of upward of $600,000 and the plaintiff was entitled to an allowance of at least $150,000. It also alleges that she was ignorant of the true value of his estate until on or about July 27th, 1915, when, he having died, the inventory of his estate was filed in the Court of Probate.</p> <p>The defendant makes answer denying all the essential allegations of the complaint and setting up three special defenses, to wit, (1) that the right of action for the cause stated in the complaint did not accrue within six years next before the commencement of the action, (2) that the plaintiff was guilty of laches in not commencing her action at an earlier date, and (3) one of estoppel arising out of conduct subsequent to the divorce judgment, the details of which are not here involved.</p> <p>At the time of the hearing counsel for each of the parties in the divorce proceeding was dead, and no evidence was offered as to how or upon what testimony, if any, the committee in those proceedings arrived at his valuation of the defendant’s estate, or his finding in the matter of the allowance. It did not appear that Mr. Heft testified before the committee, or that either he or his counsel made any statements or representations in respect to his property. The claim of the plaintiff in respect to this feature of the case was that such evidence was unnecessary since the relation of Mr. Heft to his wife, as respects his property, which the wife testified was all accumulated during the existence of their marriage relation, was substantially that of a trustee to cestui que trust, and therefore such that any failure on his part to disclose its amount, when the question of the allowance to be made to her was under adjudication, was in law a fraudulent concealment.</p> <p>During the trial the facts relied upon by the defend-. ants, in support of their defense of estoppel, were brought out upon cross-examination of the plaintiff. As that evidence had no bearing upon the action of the court in granting the nonsuit, and can have none upon the question presented in this court, it need not be stated. The court based its action entirely upon the plaintiff’s failure to present a prima facie case by reason of her failure to produce substantial evidence in support of her allegations that the respondent’s estate, at the time that the divorce judgment was entered, was of the alleged value of $600,000, or of any other value substantially in excess of $100,000. The evidence bearing upon that subject is fully summarized in the opinion.</p>

Appeal by the claimant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district, acting in this case as the commissioner for the fourth district, adjudging that the claimant was not a dependent of her father, the injured and deceased employee, taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where an oral motion to return the cause to the Compensation Commissioner with a direction to reverse the decision reached by him, was denied (Case, J.), and…

Information for using and driving a so-called jitney in the city of Norwalk without having obtained a license therefor as required by an ordinance of said city entitled “An Ordinance for the Regulation and Licensing of Certain Public Conveyances,” brought to the City Court of Norwalk and thence, by the defendant’s appeal, to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in Fair-field County where a demurrer to the information was sustained and judgment rendered for the accused (Scott,…

<p>Suit to determine the respective rights of the defendants in and to certain real and personal property-under the will of William Strattman and the subsequent will of his wifé, Catherine A. Strattman, both of Litchfield, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Greene, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.</p> <p>William Strattman of Litchfield died May 17th, 1903, leaving real and personal property and a will thereafter admitted to probate. He left surviving him a widow, Catherine A. Strattman, and eleven children. The plaintiff, one of these children, was duly appointed administrator with the will annexed, and immediately proceeded to administer the estate. His administration account was accepted December 15th, 1903, and showed as on hand certain real estate, to wit, a dwelling-house and land belonging therewith on South Plains in the town of Litchfield and $1,960 in cash. This sum of money has remained undistributed. By the will the testator gave to his wife, Catherine A. Strattman, one third of all his property for her life. Following this provision the will proceeds as follows:—-</p> <p>“I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife all the rest, residue and remainder of my property so long as she shall live and remain my widow.</p> <p>“In the event that my wife should marry again after my decease, then I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, excepting the one third first above given to her, to my son Robert Strattman, to my daughter Katie Strattman, to my son Dwight M. Strattman, to my son Herman Strattman and to my son Edward Strattman to be divided equally between them.</p> <p>“But I give my wife power to will all of my property of which she retains the fife estate up to the time of her death to such of my children as she may see fit and to divide the same in such proportion among such of them as she thinks best having full confidence that she will do what is right and just—bearing in mind that I have hitherto made advancements to and aided my children not herein specially named more than I have the five above named.”</p> <p>His widow never remarried. She resided in the dwelling-house referred to and occupied said real estate during her fife. In 1906 her daughter, Frances E. Gillett, now Mrs. Schazman, at the request of her mother, came to five with her and remained with and cared for her up to the time of the latter’s death, which occurred August 30th, 1915. June 3d, 1912, the mother executed and delivered to Mrs. Schazman a quitclaim deed of her interest in the real estate. Mrs. Strattman left a will, made in 1907, duly probated and of which the defendant Catlin was named executor and qualified as such. The disposing portion of this will is as follows:—</p> <p>“I give and bequeath to my daughter, Frances E. Gillett, my household furniture of every kind except one bedroom set, my horse, harness, robes, and carriage, my wearing apparel, watch, chain and jewelry.</p> <p>“I also give and devise to my said daughter Frances E. Gillett the dwelling-house and land where I now reside on South Plains, so-called in said town of Litchfield.</p> <p>“I give and bequeath to my son Edward N. Strattman one cherry chamber set of furniture.</p> <p>"I direct that all the rest, residue and remainder of my property and all of the property in which I hold a fife estate and which belonged to my deceased husband William Strattman, be converted into money and divided into nine equal parts, and I give one of said parts to each one of my following named nine children to wit:—To Frances E. Gillett, Edward N. Strattman, John S. Strattman, Henry N. Strattman, Frederick R. Strattman, Herman B. Strattman,Dwight C. Strattman, Robert A. Strattman and Catherine A. Strattman.”</p> <p>Mrs. Strattman had no property save such as she derived through her husband’s will.</p> <p>The advice of the Superior Court is sought in answer to eighteen questions many of them substantially repetitious. In so far as they call for answer their substance is sufficiently indicated in the opinion.</p>

Action to recover for services as real-estate brokers in effecting a sale of the defendant’s property, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,580, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action to recover the amount of a judgment which the plaintiff city had been compelled to pay for personal injuries to a pedestrian caused by an open sewer-box in the sidewalk in front of the defendant’s property, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p>

Action by the indorsee against the maker and indorser of a promissory note, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the amended counterclaim of the Fairfield Auto Company was sustained (Burpee, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,754, and appeal by the defendants.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Stamford approving and admitting to probate a written instrument, purporting to have been executed in 1860, as the last will and testament of Alexander Mackey, then living in New York City, who died April 1st, 1900, a resident of Darien in this State,—taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Gager, Jverdict and judgment sustaining the will, and…

Action to recover damages, for an alleged wrongful sale and conversion of certain metal moulds and designs, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Bennett, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to foreclose a builder’s lien upon real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found, including an indebtedness of $20,384, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant Hotel Company.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Ordinarily there is no reason why, in the interest of time and simplicity, all the issues in an action of replevin should not be tried together.</p> <p>A former judgment concludes not only those of record in that action, but also those who were in privity with the record parties, provided they had knowledge of the pendency of the suit and an opportunity to appear and protect their interests. Accordingly, the bailor of an automobile who knows that his bailee is sued in relation to its title or ownership, is bound either to become a party to the action or to defend it through his bailee. With such knowledge and an opportunity to appear and defend, he becomes a party in interest, whether he appears or not, and is bound by the judgment rendered therein.</p> <p>A vendee must be held to have defended an action, if the defense therein was in fact made by his vendor to protect the title and interest of the vendee in the property, and with the vendee’s knowledge, acquiescence and approval; and in this situation an allusion in the charge to the vendor as the vendee’s “agent,” cannot be said to be legally inaccurate or prejudicial.</p> <p>An appellant cannot complain of an instruction which was more favorable to him than he was entitled to receive.</p> <p>In stating to the jury the nature of a special defense, the charge as a whole is to be considered and not detached sentences or expressions therein.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of the trial judge to comment on the refusal of a witness to answer a proper question, and to point out to the jury such inferences as may be legitimately drawn therefrom.</p> <p>An appellant cannot complain of a harmless error.</p> <p>A statement in a charge which, standing alone, is inaccurate, is to be read in connection with its context, and if, when so read, it correctly states the situation or the law applicable thereto, it is sufficient.</p>

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; by direction of the trial judge the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a contract to sell and convey certain real estate, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, Associate-Judge; facts, found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $450, and appeal by the defendant.

Action upon a joint and several attachment bond, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract in discharging the plaintiff as a traveling salesman for the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Action by the payee against the maker of a bank check to recover its amount, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried to the jury before Reed, Jthe trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and from the judgment thereon the defendant appealed.</p> <p>In this action to recover the agreed price of a carload of shingles, the defendant pleaded payment, and the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The material facts were not disputed.</p> <p>Plaintiff is a corporation located in Seattle, Washington, where it is engaged in the sale of lumber products. The defendant is a retail lumber merchant in Pomfret. Plaintiff employed one Phillips as a local salesman on commission, and in February, 1914, the defendant, as the result of a telephone conversation with Phillips, bought a carload of shingles from the plaintiff at the agreed price of $435.50, payable sixty days from receipt of the shingles. They were received in due course, and on May 22d the defendant mailed to the plaintiff a check for the agreed price, drawn upon the Windham County National Bank. On June 3d the check was returned and presented for payment, and was protested for lack of funds; and the plaintiff, on receiving notice of the protest, telegraphed the defendant asking whether, and in what manner, the defendant had arranged to protect his check. Defendant telegraphed back under date of June 8th asking that the check be returned to the bank, and received the following telegraphic reply, dated June 10th: “Make new draft or check and deliver Phillips to-day. Will mail protested check direct on receipt.” At the same time the plaintiff directed Phillips to see the defendant and get the check. On June 12th Phillips called on the defendant at his home and demanded another check for the original debt plus protest fees, and the defendant, believing that he was acting under the plaintiff’s instructions, delivered to Phillips a check for $437.79 payable to Phillips’ order. Up to that time the defendant had never seen Phillips. Phillips had the check certified, appropriated the proceeds to his own use, and the plaintiff has never received any part of the same.</p>

Action to recover a balance alleged to be due from the defendant for shares of stock held by him in an insolvent corporation of which the plaintiff was the trustee in bankruptcy, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J., in receivership proceedings, to extend the time within which to file her claim against the defendant company.

Petition alleging that the plaintiff had been elected first selectman of the town of Berlin on October 2d, 1916, but had not been so declared, and praying for a recount of the ballots cast at said election and a judicial declaration of his election, brought to and heard by the Hon. Joseph P. Tuttle, a judge of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover money paid to the defendant which was alleged to have been obtained by its agent while conducting a prize contest in its behalf, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Smith, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $350, and appeal by the defendant.

Action for work and labor and material- furnished, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $298, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the respondents from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the claimant, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, J., which affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, from which judgment the respondents appealed.

Plea in abatement to an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court in New Haven County, upon the ground that notice of appeal was not seasonably filed; the defendant filed a demurrer, and also an answer to this plea. The record shows the following situation: A verdict for the plaintiff was rendered and accepted November 23d, 1916. A motion to set it aside, as being against the evidence, was filed the same day.

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Stratford approving and admitting to probate a certain written instrument as the last will of Ella Keppy of Stratford, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, setting aside the will, and appeal by the defendant executor.</p>

Action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate by gas asphyxiation, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Webb, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500, and appeal by the defendant. This action was brought under the provisions of § 4 of Chapter 193 of the Public Acts of 1903, to recover for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate.

Action to recover damages for inducing the plaintiff by fraud and deceit to part with her real estate for less than its value, brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $750, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover an excess premium alleged to be due on a policy of insurance, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the policy sued upon was reformed pursuant to a prayer for such relief in the defendant’s cross-complaint, and judgment rendered (Webb, J.) in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff, on April 1st, 1911, was a corporation duly organized under the laws of New York.

<p>Action to foreclose a judgment lien and for possession of the premises, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Scott, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for an alleged libelous publication, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; at the direction of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which the court refused to set aside on motion of the plaintiff, and from the judgment thereafter rendered he appealed.

Action in the nature of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective parties to a fund in the possession of the plaintiff administrator, for an injunction, and for certain equitable relief, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where the defendant Donovan’s demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained (Simpson, J.) and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for the alleged malicious prosecution of the plaintiff, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $175 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A verdict should be set aside only when its manifest injustice is so plain as to clearly indicate that the jury have disregarded the rules of law applicable to the case or were influenced by prejudice, corruption, or partiality in reaching their conclusion.</p> <p>In passing upon this question the trial judge exercises a legal discretion, and his action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that such discretion was abused.</p> <p>One obviously immovable limitation upon the exercise of this discretion is the constitutional right of trial by jury, which, in a proper case, includes the right to have issues of fact, as to which fair-minded men may reasonably differ, passed upon by the jury and not by the court.</p> <p>The evidence in the present case reviewed, and the action of the trial court in setting aside a verdict for the defendant held to have been erroneous.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Court of Probate of the district of Berlin to authorize and empower the trustee on the estate of N. Albert Hooker, late of Berlin, to pay over to the plaintiff, a life tenant, $1,000 from the principal of said estate, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, setting aside the decree of the Court of Probate, from which the defendant…

Action to recover one third of the cost of making certain alleged highway changes by the plaintiff, pursuant to an order of the railroad commissioners, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Tuttle, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $8,091, and appeal by the defendant.

Actions of replevin for quantities of flour, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried together to the jury before Williams, ./.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in each case, and appeal by the defendant. These two cases were, by agreement, tried together in the court below and argued as one case in this court.

<p>Action to recover damages for a dog bite, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff, who was in the employ of the New Haven Gas Light Company, was instructed by it to call at the defendant’s house to examine a gas-range, concerning which it was supposed that a complaint had been made. He opened the front gate and entered the premises, following a path which led to the rear door. While on the path he was attacked and bitten by the defendant’s dog, without provocation on the plaintiff’s part. It afterward appeared that the Gas Company had made a mistake in sending the plaintiff to the defendant’s house, and that the complaint, in response to which he was sent there, came from another customer. Section 5 of Chapter 121 of the Public Acts of 1911 (p. 1379) provides, in substance, that the owner or keeper of a dog shall be liable for any injury done by it to person or property, except where the injured person is, at the time of the injury, committing a trespass or other tort; and the only question on this appeal is whether the plaintiff was committing a trespass when he was bitten by the defendant’s dog.</p>

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by two of the defendants holding a subsequent mortgage, for alleged error of the trial court in fixing the order or precedence in which they were required to redeem.

Suit to secure a construction of the will of Theodore J. Ackerman of New Haven, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where demurrers to the complaint were sustained (Curtis, J.) and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed. A former action between the same parties in the same relations to each other and to the subject-matter of the suit, has been adjudicated here and reported.

Action against the sheriff of Hartford County for wrongfully permitting a prisoner, confined in jail on civil process, to escape, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J., upon a demurrer to the reply; the court sustained the demurrer, and, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to plead over, rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of his prospective inheritance, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Tuttle, J., upon demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and, upon failure of the plaintiff to plead over, rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the respondent Champlin from a finding and award of compensation to the claimant Douthwright for an injury sustained by him, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J.; the court adjudged that the Compensation Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the premises, and remanded the case to him with direction to dismiss the proceeding, and from this judgment the claimant appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff, individually and as executor, from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the District of Hartford requiring the estate, on which the plaintiff was executor and in which he was interested as a devisee, to be reappraised upon the application of the defendant, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J., upon a demurrer to the reasons of appeal; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the…

Petition for the dissolution of the defendant, for the winding up of its affairs and the distribution of its net assets among the petitioners, who alleged that they were all the surviving members of the Society, brought to the Hon. William H. Williams who ordered a dissolution and a distribution of the assets of the Society after the payment of its debts.

Action to recover damages for injuries to personal property due to an alleged defective highway, brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County and transferred, by agreement of the parties, for the trial of issues only, to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for S633, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Actioií by the indorsee against the maker to recover the amount of three promissory notes of $1,000 each, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Tuttle, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $3,417, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant in setting fire to and burning down the plaintiff’s factory or mill, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was non-suited in a trial to the jury before Shumway, J., and from the refusal of the trial court to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Suit to foreclose a judgment-lien and for possession of the premises, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

<p>The bona fide owner and assignee of a mortgage who acquired the same for value has a right to rely upon, and to foreclose, the apparent record title of the mortgagor, which cannot be questioned by the latter or one claiming under him, nor by any equitable owners of the land for whom the mortgagor was in fact a trustee.</p>

<p>The plaintiff alleged an agreement between himself and the defendant whereby the latter promised to sell his saloon business for a stated amount within a reasonable time, and to pay the plaintiff, as compensation for his services in finding a customer, all that might be obtained in excess of that amount; that a customer was duly secured by the plaintiff who was able and willing to pay $500 more than the sum named, but that the defendant refused to sell. The answer was a general denial, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Hold:—</p> <p>1. That if the defendant’s offer to sell was conditioned upon securing the consent of his partner, the burden of proving such consent was upon the plaintiff, as the jury were instructed.</p> <p>2. That having correctly instructed the jury as to what one must do to earn a commission as a broker, the trial court committed no error in saying to the jury that it was for them to determine whether these requisites were fulfilled in the ease before them.</p> <p>3. That had the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $500, it would not necessarily have followed, as matter of law, that they should have added interest.</p> <p>Alleged errors of the trial court in its charge respecting damages become of no importance if the jury return a verdict for the defendant.</p> <p>Evidence that one had money enough to buy certain promises in December, is not in itself evidence that ho had enough in the preceding October.</p> <p>A partnership agreement is admissible in evidence to prove the existence of- the partnership.</p>

Action in the nature of debt on judgment, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $395, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover taxes on three pieces of land owned by the defendant and located in the plaintiff town, brought originally to the Town Court of Hamden and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff with respect to the taxes laid upon one of the pieces of land, and for the defendant with respect to the other two, from which each party appealed.

' Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $150, which the trial court set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action by the indorsee against the maker and indorser of a promissory note, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $392, and appeal by the defendants.

<p>Action to obtain certain rights alleged to have accrued to the plaintiff under a written contract, brought to.and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Tuttle, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Action by the payee against the maker and indorsers of a promissory note for $5,000, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Reeves, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,200, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A written agreement between husband and wife, after reciting that she had left him and had resolved not to live with him again, provided that the wife, in consideration of $800 received from her husband, should support their child during its tender years, for which purpose she was to be allowed to have its exclusive custody, without further expense to him, and that she should not pledge his credit for her own support or that of the child so long as she refused to live with him and retained the child; that upon reaching suitable age the child was to elect whether to live with its father or mother; and that nothing in the agreement should be construed as a con-donation by the husband of the wilful desertion of the wife. At the same time and as part of the same transaction, she quitclaimed to him all interest which she as wife or widow might have in his property. Held that upon its face, at least, this contract did not express any assent or agreement upon the husband’s part that the wife might live separate and apart from him, but merely recognized the unfortunate situation already existing and sought to ameliorate its consequences.</p> <p>A decree of judicial separation, formerly known as a divorce a mensa et thoro, when granted by a court having jurisdiction in personam over both spouses, is entitled to full faith and. credit in every other State, and so long as it remains in force will operate there as a bar to a subsequent action for a divorce on the ground of desertion.</p> <p>Such a judgment or decree, however, merely prescribes certain duties . and obligations which are to be observed by the parties during the existence of an abnormal relation terminable at their will, and does not affect the underlying marital status; and therefore has no resemblance to a judgment in rem. It is purely personal, and hence as against a nonresident, nonappearing defendant not served with process, a foreign decree of judicial separation is entitled to no extraterritorial effect either by way of comity, public policy, or otherwise.</p>

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Charles F. A. Mack, of Stamford, deceased, and the rights of the respective parties thereunder, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fair-field County, Gager, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. Charles F. A. Mack died in Stamford in 1892, leaving personal estate, and a single piece of real estate located on Franklin Street in that city.

, upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. Samuel R. Hotchkiss, of New Haven, died October 30th, 1844, without issue. He was survived by his widow, Sarah Hotchkiss, and his next of kin and heirs-at-law were his brother Horace R. Hotchkiss, now deceased, and Harriet E. H. Keep, daughter of a deceased sister.

<p>Plea in abatement and motion to dismiss an appeal to this court by the defendants from the action of the Superior Court in New Haven County, Greene, J., in overruling their remonstrance to the report of a committee appointed to assess damages for the taking of the defendants’ lands and in accepting said report.</p>

<p>A lease provided that the lessee, upon a written notice of sixty days, should vacate the premises if the lessor “has an opportunity to effect a sale” of the property. Held:—</p> <p>1. That a written notice to quit, given by the lessor, was not legally insufficient merely because the agreement of sale was made orally instead of in writing; nor because the notice was not signed by the lessor, inasmuch as its contents could have left no doubt of the identity of its author and of the purpose of the notice.</p> <p>2. That a present, absolute opportunity to sell was not required in order to justify the lessor in giving the written notice to quit, but only a good-faith belief upon his part that he had such a chance or opportunity to sell.</p>

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County,' Wilder, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The following facts were found by the trial court: In December, 1911, the defendant was the owner of certain real estate, upon which was a mortgage given to secure his note for $1,000 to the Mechanics and Farmers Savings Bank.

Action to recover damages for breach of covenant against incumbrances, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in'Fairfield County, Walsh, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $459, and appeal by the defendants. The plaintiff sues as assignee of a claim for damages alleged to have been sustained by one Edna A. Bibbins, on account of a breach of warranty in a deed given to her by the defendants.

Action to recover for work and labor and material furnished, brought to and tried by the City Court of Danbury, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover $38 upon his counterclaim, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Mary E. Baker of Goshen, deceased, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered adverse to the claims of Ethel G. Baker Palmer, from which she appeals.

Writ of error to reverse the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of summary process, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, Waller, J., which affirmed the judgment complained of, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. The original summary process proceeding was brought by John E. Hart, as trustee under the will of Elijah A. Morgan, against the plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the defendant.

<p>Action by an indorsee against the maker and indorsers of a promissory note for $1,000, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff against certain of the defendants, from which they appealed.</p> <p>On February 15th, 1915, the plaintiff became the owner of the note in suit in part payment for the sale to the defendant Baldwin of an automobile. The note was drawn by the defendant the State of Maine Lumber Company, to the order of the defendant Atwater and was made payable at the Connecticut Trust and Safe Deposit Company of Hartford. It bore the indorsements of the five individuals who were made defendants, including Atwater and Baldwin, against whom the judgment was rendered. The plaintiff still owns the note which remains unpaid. The date of maturity was March 2d, 1915.</p> <p>February 26th, 1915, the plaintiff deposited it for collection with the First Bridgeport National Bank of Bridgeport. That bank forwarded it in due course of business to their agent, the State Bank of Albany, for collection. The State Bank of Albany, in like manner, forwarded it for collection to its agent, the Hartford National Bank of Hartford. On or before the morning of March 2d, 1915, the last named bank delivered it to the Connecticut Trust and Safe Deposit Company, the place of payment. Payment riot having been made at the close of business upon' that day, it was handed by the discount clerk of the Trust Company to its teller, who demanded payment, and no payment having been made, wrote across the face of the note “Protested for nonpayment Mar. 2, 1915, Harvey W. Corbin, Notary Public.” He then made a certificate of protest and ten notices of protest, one addressed to each of the banks and each party whose name appeared upon the note, pinned the certificate to the original note and placed the note and certificate thus attached, together with the ten copies of the notice of protest, in an envelope and mailed it with its enclosures, including two-cent stamps for each notice save one, to the Hartford National Bank. On the following day the last-named bank mailed the note, certificate of protest and notices, save only the notice to itself, to the State Bank of Albany. On March 5th the First Bridgeport National Bank received from that bank in the first mail the same enclosures, less the notice to the State Bank of Albany. The Bridgeport Bank immediately thereafter remailed them, less the notice to it, to the plaintiff, who received them during the forenoon of the same day. Upon that day Baldwin was notified by the plaintiff’s treasurer by telephone of the dishonor. On the following day Atwater, who resided in New Haven, was visited by the plaintiff’s agent and orally notified. No attempt was made by the plaintiff to notify the other indorsers.</p>

Action to secure the cancellation of a deed procured by the defendant from an alleged incapable person over whom the plaintiff was subsequently appointed conservator, and for other equitable relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and erased from the docket (Tuttle, J.), upon motion of the defendant, for want of a party plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Webb, J., for $5,200 in favor of the defendants, pursuant to an award of arbitrators appointed by agreement of the parties under a rule of court.

Petition for a reduction in the rates of fare charged by the respondent between certain points on one of its lines running from Stamford to Norwalk, alleged to be unreasonable, brought to the Public Utilities Commission who heard and denied the petition, and thence by appeal to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the Public Utilities Commission, from which the petitioner Turner appealed.

<p>It is error to render judgment in favor of a defendant who in open court admits his liability and consents to a judgment against himself for the full amount claimed by the plaintiff in the ad damnum clause.</p> <p>While an attorney has no general authority, by virtue of his retainer, to employ counsel or associate attorneys at his client’s expense, yet the client cannot take the benefit of the services of an associate or substitute attorney, knowing of his employment as counsel and by his conduct assenting thereto, without becoming liable for the reasonable worth of the services rendered.</p> <p>In the present case the defendant R employed the defendant H, a New York attorney, to collect a judgment, knowing that H had npt been in active practice of late years and believing that he might find it ' necessary to employ counsel in some other State. A few weeks after H had employed the plaintiff, a Connecticut attorney, R was informed of that fact and made no objection, and he was thereafter cognizant in a general way of the services the plaintiff was rendering, and later came to the plaintiff’s office with Et and obtained full information respecting the plaintiff’s past services and those likely to be rendered by him in the future. These services finally resulted in a judgment in R’s favor, upon which the plain-till collected $12,500. Held that under these circumstances the defendant R was responsible for the reasonable worth or value of the plaintiff’s services.</p> <p>When a case is sent back by this court to a lower court for retrial, it goes back to that docket-court or jury—upon which it previously stood.</p> <p>Our statutes make no provision for the transfer to the jury docket of a case which has once been tried to the court and sent back for a retrial, unless an issue of fact is joined after the cause is remanded, or unless the court in its discretion orders it to be tried to the jury.</p>

Appeal by an abutting landowner from a sewer assessment, taken to and tried by the Hon. Milton A. Shumway, a Judge of the Superior Court, who found that the land in question was specially benefited in the amount assessed, and rendered judgment dismissing the petition, from which the landowner appealed to this court.

<p>In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, the trial court found that the defendant had in good faith paid the full contract price for the materials used in the construction of his house before he had any knowledge that the plaintiff was furnishing material for the building. Held that the evidence upon this point was such that the conclusion reached by the trial court was reasonable.</p> <p>Proof that the owner of a building knew in a general way that the contractor was not doing the work with his own hands nor with his own material, is not enough to impugn the good faith of payments made to the contractor by the owner; it must further appear that he had definite knowledge of the names of those furnishing material ■and of their relation to the work.</p> <p>Where material for two buildings is sold to a contractor for a round sum and under one contract, the material-man cannot acquire a valid lien upon one of the buildings without showing how much of the material was used in its construction; for in the absence of that knowledge it becomes impossible to ascertain the amount of his claim.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s certificate of lien stated that he had furnished materials and rendered services in the construction of “a certain building,” and that he claimed a lien “on said building and land on which it stands.” In an action to foreclose this lien, it appeared that the property above referred to consisted of two separate buildings owned by different individuals and located upon separate tracts of land. Held that such a certificate did not comply with the requirements (§ 4136) of our statute.</p>

Appeal by a taxpayer of the town of Winchester from the action of the County Commissioners of Litchfield County in granting the transfer of a liquor license to one James H. Davis, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Bennett, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover the amount of a policy of insurance upon the life of the plaintiff’s intestate, whose death was caused by accident, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $600, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover the price of an automobile alleged to have been sold to the defendant, brought to the Town Court of Stonington and tried to a jury before Fairbrother, J.; verdict for the defendant, which the trial judge set aside as against the evidence, from which the defendant appealed.

Actions to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; by direction of the court the jury rendered a verdict for the defendant in each case, and from the judgment thereon the respective plaintiffs appealed.