Volume 92 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover moneys paid by certain fire insurance companies to the defendant as a fire loss, to which the plaintiff claimed to be equitably entitled, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Scott, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $819, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the statute laws of Connecticut.

Suit to vacate an alleged attachment of personal property and to restrain the defendants from taking and selling the property on execution, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Suit for a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to repair and rebuild a stone wall supporting her land adjoining and above that of the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, Waller, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant upon her counterclaim, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p> <p>The parties own adjoining city house lots on a street in Norwich running north and south. Both lots were originally in one tract, and in its natural condition the land sloped unbrokenly and at a steep pitch from the north. Long before either of the present owners acquired title to her lot, the then owner of the lower lot— who had purchased from the original owner of the tract — leveled a part of his land for building upon it, and in so doing excavated and removed the soil from this portion up to and along a section of his northern boundary line. This destroyed for a corresponding distance the natural lateral support of the adjoining land of the north lot, and to replace it he built into the bank a retaining wall ten feet high along this portion of the east and west line. This wall was set wholly upon the upper, or what is now the Walsh lot, and the dividing line of the two properties lies along its exposed southern face.</p> <p>Some years afterward, in 1895, and after the defendant had become the owner of the north lot, a later owner of the south lot made another excavation in preparation for further building, and removed more soil up to the line as extended from the eastern end of the wall. This operation removed the lateral support of the Walsh land along the continued line, and in substitution for this support he extended the wall at the same height of ten feet still further along the line— continuing it wholly on the Walsh land so that the dividing line of the two lots follows the southern face of the wall throughout its length. The height of the wall measures the depth of the excavations at the line, and no additional burden requiring more than the natural lateral support of the soil has ever been added to the Walsh lot.</p> <p>The parties are ignorant of the circumstances under which the first section of the wall was placed on the Walsh lot, save that its purpose and the person erecting it were as already stated, and although the remaining part of the wall was built after the defendant had acquired her present ownership, the record is silent as to why this part of the wall was also placed wholly upon her land. No deed dealing with any of the property involved mentions the wall.</p> <p>The plaintiff bought the south lot in 1913, and through neglect and the work of the elements, the wall has been disintegrating for several years, there being no evidence of any effort by any one to maintain it or keep it in repair. It is now out of plumb in parts, and stones from it have become loosened and dislodged, and have fallen upon the plaintiff’s land. Damage to the plaintiff from this cause during the two years next before this action was brought amounts to $25. More trouble of this character is likely to occur, and the wall is in danger of further collapse unless it is strengthened or restored.</p> <p>There was apparently no dispute between the parties as to these essential facts, and upon them the plaintiff claimed, by way of equitable relief, a mandatory injunction directing the proper’ repair or rebuilding of the wall by the defendant, and legal relief in damages for the injury already incurred.</p> <p>The defendant, in pursuance of a counterclaim which rehearsed the more important of the facts and supplemented them with further allegations in the nature of assumed legal deductions from them, claimed a mandatory injunction compelling the restoration of the wall by the plaintiff to a condition of efficiency, or the furnishing of other adequate support for the defendant’s land.</p> <p>The trial court rendered judgment for the. defendant for a mandatory injunction as prayed for, and for nominal damages, and the plaintiff’s claim of error, alternatively stated in its several assignments upon the appeal, is based upon the court’s holding that the duty of maintaining the wall rested upon the plaintiff, and in not holding that it rested upon the defendant.</p>

<p>In this State the jurisdiction of Courts of Probate is entirely statutory; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction they possess only such powers as are necessary to the performance of the duties imposed upon them by law.</p> <p>Under General Statutes, §203, authorizing probate courts to modify or revoke ex parle orders or decrees before appeal, a Court of Probate is powerless to revoke an order of distribution made by it upon notice to the parties and after an appeal therefrom has been taken. Such a decree can be reversed or modified only upon appeal.</p>

Action to recover damages for negligently killing the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where demurrers to the complaint, filed by the City of New Haven and by the Connecticut Company, were sustained (Curtis, J.), and the cause, as against the Adams Express Company, the remaining defendant, was tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by the defendant Express Company.

Appeal by certain of the respondents from a judgment of the Superior Court in New Haven County 0Greene, J.) overruling a remonstrance to the report of a committee appointed to assess damages in condemnation proceedings, and accepting the committee’s report.

Application to determine the amount of tax due the State from the respondent, and for an order for its payment, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, J.; facts found and order passed requiring the payment of a tax of $19.50, from which the respondent appealed. Mad River is a small tributary of the Naugatuck River.

<p>In an action to recover damages for false representations as to the financial condition of a corporation whose worthless stock the plaintiff was thereby induced to purchase, the trial judge in his charge referred to one of the defendants as a director and secretary of the company, when as matter of fact he was its secretary but not a director. Held that this reference was clearly an inadvertence which could not have misled the jury or worked any harm to the defendants.</p> <p>The defendants contended that inasmuch as the plaintiff had an opportunity to examine the books of the company and failed to do so, he could not recover for their false representations as to its financial condition. Held that the principle thus invoked, if accepted as the law of this State, was nevertheless subject to the qualification that the person deceived must have stood upon an equal footing with those making the false representations, — a condition which did not exist in the present case, as the defendants were stockholders and, either as officers or directors, had full knowledge of the extent of the company’s business and of its financial status, while the plaintiff had no information whatever upon that subject.</p>

<p>The law implies that a vendor shall deliver the goods sold within a reasonable time, in the absence of any agreement as to the time of delivery.</p> <p>What constitutes a reasonable time in a given case is ordinarily a question of fact dependent upon the terms of the sale and all the other attendant circumstances. ,</p> <p>In the present case the defendant bought fifteen barrels of whiskey in bond, for which he gave $109 in cash and eighteen notes of $30 each, payable to the plaintiff at intervals of thirty days. The plaintiff agreed to send the defendant certain advertisements of this particular brand of whiskey, including six watches, but none of this had been received when the first note became due, and thereupon, and for this alleged reason, the defendant returned the certificates for the whiskey in bond, none of which had been withdrawn, and demanded a return of the cash and notes he had given. Held that upon the facts disclosed by the record the trial court was warranted in finding that the plaintiff’s delay in shipping the advertising matter was not unreasonable, and in its conclusion that such delay did not justify the defendant’s attempt to cancel or rescind the agreement.</p>

<p>Upon a prosecution for a conspiracy to commit rape, and for an assault with intent to commit rape, the State claimed that the accused, a New York lawyer, desiring to secure evidence against the wife of his brother in order to defeat her suit in New York for a separation from her husband for his cruelty and nonsupport, entered into a conspiracy with others to lure her to New Haven on a pretended business errand, and to have one of-the conspirators ravish her there forcibly and against her will, while the others were suddenly to break into the room and discover her in that situation. No evidence was offered that the accused personally assaulted the woman, and his guilt, if any, was that of an accessory. Upon an appeal from a conviction upon each of these charges, it was held that however much the accused might merit severe punishment for the part he had taken in the conspiracy, the State had palpably failed to prove that the essential element of an intent to rape was involved in any combination of the parties, or that the accused aided or abetted in any act which had that design in view.</p>

Action to recover an alleged balance of a book account for groceries and other merchandise, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Wilder, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued March 9th, 1892, against Charles G. Lyon, then of Bridgeport, and this action was not brought against his executrix until December, 1915.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which each of the accused appealed. The defendants were jointly indicted for the murder of Annie, the wife of Castelli, who was found in a bedroom at 260 Crown Street, New Haven, on Easter Sunday, April 23d,. 1916, suffering from severe fractures of the skull, of which she died on the following day.

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner for the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J.; award confirmed and appeal dismissed, from which the defendants appealed.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for 1800, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the defendants from the 'finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to the Superior Court in Tolland County, from which the cause was transferred by agreement of the parties to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and reserved by that court, Gager, J., upon the finding of the Commissioner and the evidence before him, for the-advice of this court.

<p>Appeal by the defendants from the finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to the Superior Court in Tolland County, from which the cause was transferred by agreement of the parties to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and reserved by that court, Gager, J., upon the finding of the Commissioner and the evidence before him, for the advice of this court.</p>

Action for assault and battery, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Reeves, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $300, and appeal by the defendants. The plaintiff had a writ directing him to attach the property of Rocco Martone, a son of the defendants.

Application by Maurice E. Davis, the alleged owner of personal property in the hands of the receiver of the Pierson Engineering and Construction Company, for leave to bring an action against said receiver for the recovery of such property, brought to and heard by the Superior Court in Hartford County in which the receivership proceedings were pending; the court, Shumway, J., denied the application, and the applicant appealed.

Appeals from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the District of New Haven determining the amount of the inheritance and succession tax due the State from the estate of Justus S. Hotchkiss of New Haven, deceased, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J., upon the demurrers filed by the Tax Commissioner to the answer to- the reasons of appeal in the first case, and to the reasons of appeal in the second, for the advice of this…

Action to recover money alleged to be due under a contract between the parties, brought to the City Court of Bridgeport and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $62 and double costs, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover an alleged balance due for merchandise sold, brought to and tried by the City Court of Danbury, Davis, Associate-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $65.50, from which she appealed.

Action upon an officer’s receipt for property attached, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $60 damages and costs, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking out execution upon, or from proceeding further with, a judgment in its favor in an action of summary process, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p> <p>The finding shows: On the 17th day of October, 1911, the defendant leased to the plaintiff, in writing, certain space in the Hotel Taft, in New Haven, to be used as a barbering establishment, for a period of five years from the first day of September, 1912, at an annual rental of $2,700, and with an option for a renewal thereof for a further period of five years at the same rental, the rentals being payable monthly in advance. This lease, among other stipulations, provided that there was to be a forfeiture in the event of nonpayment of rent. The forfeiture clause was in the following language: “Provided, however, and it is further agreed, that if the rent shall become due and payable as aforesaid, or if the said Fort Orange Barbering Company . . . shall not perform and fulfill each and every of the covenants and stipulations herein contained to be performed by said Fort Orange Barbering Company, then this lease shall thereupon by virtue of this express stipulation therein at the option of said managers expire and terminate, and said managers may at any time thereafter re-enter said premises and the same have and possess as of their former estate, and without such reentry may recover possession thereof in the manner prescribed by the statute relating to summary process; it being understood that no demand for rent and no re-entry for condition broken as at common law shall be necessary to enable the lessor to recover such possession pursuant to said statute relating to summary process, but that all right to any such demand or any such re-entry is- hereby expressly waived by the said Fort Orange Barbering Company.”</p> <p>On or before April 1st, 1912, the plaintiff entered into the leased premises and has ever since continued to occupy the same, claiming the right to do so under the lease. The plaintiff, except upon two instances, neglected to pay the monthly rental on the first day of each month in advance. In a majority of instances these payments of rent were made after the middle of the month, and on two different occasions one payment was accepted for two months rent. All of the payments were made by check, mailed by the plaintiff from the city of New York to the defendant at New Haven. These checks were accepted by the defendant as and for the payment of rent then due and owing by the plaintiff. On September 14th, 1916, the plaintiff’s rent was two months in arrears, and on this day the defendant served notice upon the plaintiff to quit possession of the premises. It was admitted upon the trial that a check for some instalment of rent was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant on September 14th, 1916, which the defendant refused to accept and returned to the plaintiff.</p> <p>No evidence was offered by the plaintiff as to the amount of this check, nor as to what instalment of rent it should be applied, nor any evidence whatever concerning it. No evidence was offered by the plaintiff to show whether or not prior to September 14th, 1916, the defendant had ever in any manner notified the plaintiff that it would claim a forfeiture of the lease upon the failure of the plaintiff to pay the monthly instalments of rent at the time they became due and payable under the terms of the lease. On September 23d, 1916, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a sum of money that would be in full of all rent to October 1st, 1916, which the defendant refused to accept.</p> <p>On September 30th, 1916, the defendant brought an action of summary process against the plaintiff, returnable before James E. Wheeler, Esq., a Justice of the Peace for New Haven County, on the 6th day of October, 1916, claiming that this lease had been forfeited by the nonpayment of rent. The parties appeared before the justice and were duly heard, and on October 7th,, 1916, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant (The New Haven Hotel Company), that the Company recover possession of the premises. Thereupon this plaintiff (The Fort Orange Barbering Company) sued out a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County, which writ wTas subsequently withdrawn by the plaintiff.</p> <p>During the year 1912, the plaintiff carried on the business of a barbering establishment at a loss of $434.15, but thereafter carried on this business at an annual profit. Upon the opening of this business, supplies were purchased to the amount of $1,703.50. These supplies, consisting of hat racks, cuspidors, bottles, shaving mugs, massage machines, vases, and so forth, are still for the most part on hand, and together with towels and linen of the value of $150, are of value to the plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that it ever made any other tender to the defendant of the monthly rentals past due, except the offer of payment made on September 23d, 1916, herein mentioned. The plaintiff at the trial declared its willingness to pay to the defendant all instalments of rent in arrears with interest thereon, but made no tender thereof, nor offered evidence of any offer or tender other than that just mentioned. None of the irremovable fixtures in said barbering establishment, such as barber chairs, mirrors, wash stands, and so forth, were installed by, or belong to, the plaintiff. They were installed by and are the property of the owner of the Hotel Taft. Since the year 1912 the plaintiff has carried on its business on the premises in question at an annual profit, and it is reasonable to expect that this business will continue to be profitable to the plaintiff should it decide to avail itself of the option to extend said lease for a further period of five years from August 31st, 1917, and be permitted to remain in possession of the same.</p> <p>The plaintiff in its complaint alleged that “by reason of the defendant’s acquiescence in the delayed payments for a period of more than four years, the defendant induced the plaintiff to believe and the plaintiff did believe that a strict performance of the covenants in the lease in reference to the time of payment of the rent on the first of each month would not be required”; that “the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay the defendant all the rents that may be due or become due, with such interest as may be due thereon”; that “the defendant has suffered no loss or inconvenience by reason of the delayed payments”; and that the issuance of an execution of summary process would work irreparable loss to the plaintiff. These allegations were denied by the defendant in its answer. The judgment-file finds the issues for the defendant Hotel Company.</p>

Action to recover damages for alleged fraud in obtaining real estate owned by the plaintiff, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Booth, Acting-Judge; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit for an injunction to restrain 'the defendants from intimidating by strikes, threats of strikes, boycotts or otherwise, any property-owner, builder, or contractor, for the purpose of inducing the latter to cancel contracts with the plaintiff, which conducted an open-shop, or for the purpose of inducing them to refrain from thereafter employing, or from entering into contracts with, the plaintiff, — brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway,…

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Oscar St. John of Norwalk, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J., upon an agreed finding of facts, for the advice of this court. Oscar St. John, late of Norwalk, died September 4th, 1912, possessed of both real and personal estate. He left a will which was duly probated, in which the plaintiff was named as executor and trustee.

Suit for the specific performance of a contract to buy the plaintiff’s real estate, or for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. In October, 1915, the defendant approached the plaintiff, who was the owner of certain real estate in Simsbury, and concluded negotiations for its purchase. The purchase price agreed upon was $10,000.

<p>Action for the alleged conversion of certain acids, raw material and machinery owned by the plaintiff and used upon premises leased by him for the manufacture of picric acid, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p> <p>On October 15th, 1915, the plaintiff entered into a contract with Gillespie Bros. & Company to manufacture picric acid, it being provided in the contract that the latter should supply the plaintiff with phenol, a necessary ingredient, and that the plaintiff should procure the other ingredients and make the acid. After the execution of this contract the plaintiff secured a lease of a plant in Melrose, Connecticut, for use in the conduct of the business, and entered into a contract with the Cochrane Chemical Company to supply him sulphuric and nitric acids, important ingredients used with phenol in the manufacture of picric, and purchased a large amount of machinery and supplies to equip the plant which had been leased. The contract with the Cochrane Chemical Company obligated that company to furnish a stipulated amount of sulphuric and nitric acids, to be delivered in installments approximately as provided, and obligated the plaintiff to buy and pay for such acids within thirty days from date of invoices at specified prices.</p> <p>. When the plant was fully equipped, and the plaintiff was ready to begin to manufacture, Gillespie Bros. & Company was unable to furnish the phenol as agreed, and notified the plaintiff that it would be unable to perform its contract in that respect.</p> <p>In the preparation and equipment of the plant the plaintiff had expended $14,562.30, had become obligated to pay the rent specified in the lease of the plant, and had made the contract with the Cochrane Chemical Company, as already stated. At the time that Gillespie Bros. & Company advised the plaintiff of its inability to furnish phenol, a portion of the sulphuric and nitric acids contracted for with the Cochrane Chemical Company had been delivered, and was at the plant unpaid for.</p> <p>In this condition of affairs the plaintiff; by his letter of January 19th, 1916, made a proposition to Gillespie Bros. & Company, which was thereafter accepted by them, by which he agreed to sell and transfer all his interest in the plant and appurtenances at Melrose, including acids, machinery, and stores thereat, upon their agreement to pay all unpaid bills as shown on list and invoices handed them, and reimburse him for all moneys already expended as shown by receipted bills also handed them. The bill of sale therefor was to be drawn immediately upon the performance by Gillespie Bros. & Company of their undertaking. For the purpose of carrying out the terms of this agreement, the plaintiff caused to be prepared a bill of sale of all his property at Melrose, an assignment of his lease of the premises, and an assignment of his contract with the Cochrane Chemical Company, and offered to execute and deliver the same upon performance on Gillespie Bros. & Company’s part. Gillespie Bros. & Company thereupon advised the plaintiff that it was not then ready to make the payment called for, and upon its request completion of the transaction was postponed from time to time. Later, Gillespie Bros. & Company paid to the plaintiff, upon three occasions, the sum of $11,400, leaving a balance due of $6,800.</p> <p>On or about February 15th, 1916, Gillespie Bros. & Company, together with Steiner & Son, on the one part, and the defendant on the other, entered into a contract wherein the former represented that they were the owners of the plant and property at Melrose. This contract provided for the use by the defendant of the plant for the manufacture of picric acid and the sale to the defendant of the raw materials there on hand. The defendant agreed to do, without delay, whatever was necessary to properly equip the plant and prepare it for the manufacture of picric acid, and to proceed without delay to manufacture the raw materials- on hand into picric.</p> <p>At about the same time Gillespie Bros. & Company’s representative wrote to the plaintiff advising him that the defendant corporation had been organized, and had proposed to take over the Melrose plant, spending about $3,000 or $4,000 in putting it into condition to manufacture picric acid, and to purchase all the sulphuric and nitric acids at the plant. This letter stated that the writer figured that they would thus be enabled to realize the amount owing the plaintiff, and leave a balance in Gillespie Bros. & Company’s favor. The writer stated that they had given representatives of the defendant a letter of introduction to the plaintiff, and that it would be two weeks at least before they could start manufacturing operations. These representatives were Messrs. Carpenter and Read, who subsequently called upon the plaintiff in Hartford with the letter of introduction signed by the writer of the aforementioned letter, in which it was stated that they were the representatives of the Lansing Chemical Company, of whom he had written, and confidence expressed that the plaintiff would give them any assistance in his power.</p> <p>Upon the presentation of this letter the plaintiff, on February 16th, 1916, took Carpenter and Read to the plant at Melrose and tinned over to them the keys to it, delivered to them full and complete possession of the property, and recommended for employment the men about the place and stated the compensation they were receiving. At this time Carpenter and Read informed the plaintiff that the defendant had closed a contract with Gillespie Bros. & Company, representing themselves to be the sole owners of the plant, and that they had come on behalf of the defendant to take possession of it and remodel it for the purpose of manufacturing picric acid, and that they had purchased the property in the plant, including the nitric and sulphuric acids. It was with full knowledge of these statements that the plaintiff delivered the keys and property to the defendant, who continued in the uninterrupted possession of both plant and property and in the manufacture of picric acid at the plant, until the institution of the suit at bar. The delivery to Carpenter and Read by the plaintiff was intended to be one of the personal property contained in the buildings at Melrose, as well as a transfer of possession of the real estate in carrying out the plaintiff’s agreement to sell and transfer the same to Gillespie Bros. & Company.</p> <p>The defendant made no contract, express or implied, with the plaintiff to purchase of the latter, and had no dealings with him looking to such purchase.</p> <p>One of the objects which Carpenter and Read had in their visit to the plant was to ascertain the amount of sulphuric and nitric acids on hand, for which the Lansing Chemical Company, in its contract with Gillespie Bros. & Company, had obligated itself to make payment. Upon their arrival it was found that the stock of acid was so located that it could not be readily inventoried, and it was agreed that it should be taken out and rearranged under the direction of Carpenter and Read, so that the quantity could be -determined. This was subsequently done, and an inventory taken by them showing its cost at the factory of the Cochrane Chemical Company, to have been $4,464.75 and its then value to be $7,243.38. This acid was subsequently, and prior to the beginning of this action, used by the defendant in the operation of the plant.</p> <p>The defendant in its answer admitted its use of the acid and its obligation to pay for the same, and expressed its willingness to pay therefor to the party entitled to such payment, but alleged that Gillespie Bros. & Company, and Steiner & Son demanded it of them.</p>

<p>It is not within the province of a committee to whom a cause is referred to find and report the facts, to pass upon a demurrer, that being an interlocutory matter which should be disposed of by the court before the reference is made.</p> <p>Under the provisions of the charter of the city of Hartford (6 Special Laws, p. 743, § 5, 7 Special Laws, p. 527, §§ 1, 5,7), the judge of the Court of Common Pleas, upon an appeal to him from an assessment of benefits and damages for a public improvement, has no jurisdiction to determine any other question than that raised by the appeal, that is, whether the assessment complained of is inequitable and unjust to the appellant; and therefore he has no power to decide whether or not the original assessing board in its proceedings complied in all respects with the charter requirements.</p> <p>The language of city charters differs so greatly, that cases involving the construction of one charter are not authoritative in interpreting others.</p> <p>The facts relied upon to show the relevancy and materiality of questions excluded by a committee, and the harmful nature of the rulings, should be stated in the committee’s report; otherwise the remonstrant should ask to have the report recommitted to include them. He cannot accomplish this end by stating them himself in his remonstrance.</p>

Action to recover the amount of a tax laid under Part IV of the Act of 1915, alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff under protest and to escape irreparable injury to its property, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the prayers for relief was sustained (Burpee, J.) and judgment rendered (Gager, J.) for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence in driving his automobile against the wagon in which the plaintiff was riding, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $800, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff was driving his horse, hitched to a wagon, over a road in New Britain.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s servant, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,096, which the trial court set aside as against the evidence, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $200, which the trial court, upon motion, set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

, upon a demurrer to the answer of the Glastonbury Power Company; the court sustained the demurrer and subsequently appointed a committee as prayed for, and from this judgment the Glastonbury Power Company appealed.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract in preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of a certain store theretofore leased to him by the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $374, and appeal by the defendant.

Action upon the so-called common counts to recover for merchandise alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, Waller, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $150, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $2,000, which the trial court, upon motion, set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s automobile through a collision with a trolley-car alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant’s motorman, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Simpson, J., and from the refusal to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for alleged slander, with a count for libel, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Pope of Derby, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Tuttle, J.; the court directed a verdict for the defendants, sustaining the will, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed. This typewritten will has no attestation clause.

<p>One may be the “owner” of a motor-vehicle, within the meaning of that word in § 2 of Chapter 231 of the Public Acts of 1915, requiring the registration of such vehicles, although another has the strict legal title.</p> <p>In the present case evidence was offered that the automobile was bought by and for the plaintiff with money advanced to him therefor by one M, who took a conditional bill of sale directly from the vendor to secure him, M, for his loan, and that the plaintiff had been in the exclusive use and possession of the car and received its earnings from the date of its purchase until its injury by the defendant in a collision. Held that this evidence entitled the plaintiff to go to the jury upon the question of his ownership of the automobile.</p> <p>A trial judge has jurisdiction to set aside a verdict, although directed by him, if he afterward becomes satisfied that his instruction was erroneous and that the verdict is against the evidence.</p> <p>Where the question of the propriety of a directed verdict which is afterward set aside as against the evidence, is raised by the appellee upon a bill of exceptions, it is open to this court to grant a new trial for error in such instruction.</p>

Action to recover the reasonable worth of services rendered by a broker in effecting a sale of real estate, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Booth, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,652, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover an alleged balance for merchandise sold and delivered to the defendants, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $771, and appeal by the defendants. ° The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of selling oils, gasoline, and the like.

Action to recover the par value of shares of the plaintiff’s capital stock issued to the defendant, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner for the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J.; the court confirmed the action of the Compensation Commissioner and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendants appealed.

Action to recover for labor and material furnished in doing electrical work on buildings which were alleged to have been owned by the defendant, and for which he was also a guarantor, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the amended complaint was overruled {Gager, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Tuttle, J verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs for $959, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport removing him as trustee under the will of Lucinda J. Ward of Bridgeport, deceased, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County,' Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered setting aside the order and decree of the Court of Probate, and appeal by the defendant Brownlee R. Ward.</p> <p>Lucinda J. Ward died in Bridgeport on April 14th, 1901, leaving a will and codicil, which were duly admitted to probate, in which the bulk of her estate was left in- trust for the benefit of her three designated sons, and upon the death of the last survivor of these three the trustees were required to pay over the trust estate to “the heirs at law of my said three sons according to the laws of distribution of intestate estates in the State of Connecticut.”</p> <p>The plaintiff, Morse, was one of the trustees named under this trust, and duly quálified, and continued as such trustee until removed as hereinafter set forth.</p> <p>The last surviving son died on March 16th, 1916, and on May 18th, 1916, Brownlee R. Ward brought his application to the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport, and upon hearing thereon the court ordered that the trustee make his final accounting on or before June 10th, 1916, and turn over and distribute the trust fund to the applicant.</p> <p>Morse did not file any account of his trust, and on June 17th, 1916, the Court of Probate ordered Morse to appear on June 22d, 1916, and show cause why he should not be removed. Morse filed a response to the order to show cause, setting up that he had been advised by counsel that he could not distribute the estate or pay over the corpus thereof to any person without having had the advice of the Superior Court as to the construction of the will and a determination to whom the estate should pass; and, further, that he proposed to procure such adjudication, and, within the time limited by statute, to appeal from the order determining to whom the estate should be distributed and requiring him to distribute and pay over the entire corpus of the trust to Brownlee R. Ward. The trustee further alleged that the Court of Probate was without legal authority to order an accounting by him, in addition to those already filed, until the time fixed by statute for the annual accounting.</p> <p>Morse had been so advised by counsel; and prior to June 3d, 1916, and on this day, the trustee stated to the court the ambiguity of the will and the divergent claims made by Brownlee R. Ward and Harriet M. Ward, and his purpose, by advice of counsel, to seek a construction of the paragraph in dispute.</p> <p>On July 3d, 1916, Morse filed, under protest, an account of all his doings as trustee between the date of his last account, approved of by the court, and up to March 16th, 1916, the date of the death of the last surviving beneficiary under the will. In his response Morse reserved the right to question the power of the court to order such accounting.</p> <p>On the third day of July, Morse appeared before the Court of Probate and admitted that as such trustee he had subsequent to March 16th, 1916, received and disbursed assets of the trust estate, but declined to render, and has not since rendered, any account thereof.</p> <p>On July 10th, 1916, the Court of Probate, after hearing had, found that the trustee had disobeyed its order to file his final account as trustee, in that he had submitted an account which was not final and did not show the entire debit and credit items of the trust fund subsequent to February 7th, 1916, and thereupon passed an order removing Morse as trustee, and appointed a trustee in his stead.</p> <p>Morse believed the orders of June 3d were indivisible orders, and in what he did acted under advice of counsel and in good faith. On July 3d, 1916, Morse, trustee, appealed, and the widow of the last survivor, Harriet M. Ward, appealed from the decree ordering the trustee to turn over to Brownlee R. Ward the entire trust estate.</p>

Action to recover for professional services as an attorney at law under an alleged agreement with the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the plaintiff’s demurrer to the answer “by way of further defense” was overruled (Webb, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court and judgment rendered (Reed, J.) for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Suit to restrain the defendants from interfering with the business of the plaintiff by patrolling, picketing or loitering upon, or near the streets or paths leading to its manufacturing plant, for the purpose of preventing by threats, intimidation or otherwise, persons from entering into its employment or from continuing therein, and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a temporary injunction was granted {Gager, J.) and later, by agreement, a…

Appeal by an heir at law from the allowance by commissioners upon the intestate estate of Patrick Burke of Danbury, deceased, of a claim presented against his estate by the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered disallowing the claim, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Actions by a married woman and her husband, to recover damages suffered by reason of personal injuries to the former, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried together to the jury before Gager, Jverdicts and judgments thereon in favor of the plaintiffs — for the wife for $4,000, and for the husband for $675, — and appeals by the defendant.

Application in the nature of an appeal from the action of the board of relief of the city of Bridgeport in assessing and valuing the personal property of the plaintiff for taxation, taken by the plaintiff to, and reserved by, the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis > J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Williams, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000 as against the defendant Standard Oil Company and, by direction of the court, in favor of the defendant Railroad Company, from which the Standard Oil Company and also the plaintiff appealed.

Action for libel, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for SI,000, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff was superintendent of the Brookside Home, an institution for the care of indigent persons in the city of Waterbury. This home was under the charge and direction of the board of charities of the city.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for the neglect and refusal of the defendant to carry out an alleged written agreement to employ the plaintiff and to pay him the salary prescribed therein after a certain date, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,030, and appeal by the defendant. The action was brought to recover damages for the breach of a contract of employment.

Suit to remove an attachment of real estate constituting an alleged cloud upon the plaintiff’s title, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to certain paragraphs of a plea in abatement was sustained and an issue of fact upon the remaining paragraph was found for the plaintiff (Case, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to restrain the defendants from constructing a platform or wharf in New London harbor upon land alleged to belong' to the plaintiff, and for an order requiring them to remove certain piling and piers already built, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Shumway, J.; facts found and judgment, rendered partly in favor of each party, but denying the relief asked for, from which each party appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in maintaining a defective sidewalk, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict for the plaintiff, which was set aside as against the evidence, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fifth district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J.; the court affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendants appealed. The defendant employer is a Massachusetts corporation having an office in New York City.

Action to recover for merchandise alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The defendant, a resident of Greenwich, was, for a period of time prior to July 29th, 1915, the owner of a grocery store in that town, which, until sometime in May, 1915, he personally conducted.

Action to recover for services as a real-estate broker in procuring a purchaser of the defendant’s property, brought to and tried, by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $725, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fifth district in favor of the plaintiffs, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Maltbie, J.; the court confirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendant appealed. The Commissioner found the following facts: The Turner and Seymour Manufacturing Company is engaged in making iron castings.

Action to recover damages for an alleged trespass and assault, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the jury before Tuttle, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. On the 13th day of March, 1915, a writ of replevin was placed in the defendant’s hands for service upon Arthur P. Fourette and in favor of one Fdward C. Noxon, for certain articles of household furniture.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of the defendant’s obligation to supply the plaintiff with milk, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $119, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover for the support of a pauper alleged to belong to the defendant town, brought before a justice of the peace and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried to the court, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $40, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a finding of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the defendant, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, J.; the court affirmed the action of the Commissioner and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district (acting for and in behalf of the Commissioner of the fourth district) in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; the court refused to amend the Commissioner’s finding, but affirmed his action and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendants appealed.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Lucinda J. Ward of Bridgeport, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fair-field County, Curtis, J., upon an agreed statement of .facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover for a chemical hose and pumping engine alleged to have been sold to and purchased by the defendant town, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the court, Case, J., and from its refusal to set aside said judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action, to recover damages for an alleged breach of an oral contract relating to real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>The plaintiff sued to recover the value of an alleged deficiency of nearly 40,000 pounds in three carloads of brass turnings or chips, bought by its assignor of the defendant in Pennsylvania at the rate of 15 cents per pound. It appeared from uncontradicted testimony that there was a considerable shortage in the metal upon its arrival in New Haven, and the material question was whether the loss should fall upon the plaintiff or upon the defendant. The transaction was an oral one, followed by a letter from the defendant to the buyer “to confirm our verbal sale to you this day of . . . our accumulation of brass turnings (not less than 200 tons) at 15)4 0 per lb. . . .f. o. b. cars Wilmerding, Pa, Terms sight draft on arrival at destination.” Held:—</p> <p>1. That whether the letter embodied all the terms of the antecedent contract, obviously could not be determined until it was known what those terms were, and therefore the objection that parol evidence to vary the terms of the letter was inadmissible, was not well taken and should not have been sustained.</p> <p>2. That testimony was properly admitted to show that the accumulation of brass turnings, in a pile by itself on the floor, was pointed out to the buyer at or before the making of the contract; and thati evidence of the seller’s agent as to the entire transaction was admissible, including the custom of the trade respecting the sale of scrap metal to persons without established credit, and also the real reason for using the expression “sight draft on arrival at destination.”</p> <p>3. That in view of the evidence before the trial court it did not err in admitting testimony as to the fact and amount of the shortage in the weight of the turnings upon their arrival in New Haven, as compared with the weight called for by the bills of lading and sight drafts; though assuming that such evidence tends to prove only a loss in transit and not a deficiency in shipment, it might or might not be admissible upon a new trial, depending upon the conclusiveness of the evidence then received as to the time the parties intended the title to the goods to pass.</p> <p>Where there is a present sale or an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable condition, at an agreed price per pound, the title passes at once (Sales Act, § 19, Rule 1; § 22), and the risk of loss during transportation falls upon the buyer. Under such circumstances the drawing of a bill of lading to the seller’s own order reserves to himself the jus disponendi.</p> <p>A delivery to a carrier in accordance with § 46 of the Sales Act is a delivery to the buyer within § 22, notwithstanding the fact that because of the seller’s reservation of the jus disponendi, a right also contemplated by the Act, the buyer cannot have possession of the goods until the seller is paid.</p> <p>The expression f. o. b. in a letter confirming an oral contract of sale indicates an agreement of the buyer to pay the freight from the place named.</p> <p>In the present case the bills of lading, with sight drafts attached, were drawn to the defendant’s own order, were indorsed by the defendant . in blank and forwarded by mail to the defendant’s agent. Held that an instruction which placed the risk of loss during transportation upon the defendant seller, because of the form of the bills of lading, was erroneous and harmful.</p>

Action to recover damages for the defendant’s refusal to permit the plaintiff builder to carry out .his agreement for the construction of a garage, pursuant to a contract between the parties, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Booth, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for 8495, and appeal by the defendant.

Application in the nature of an appeal by the plaintiff landowner from the action of the authorities of the defendant city in attempting to extend and widen Cannon Street in said city, and from an assessment of benefits and damages on account thereof, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered vacating and setting aside the city’s action, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Augusta M. Curtis of Meriden, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court. Augusta M. Curtis died April 1st, 1914, possessed of real and personal property and leaving a will executed April 15th, 1908, with a codicil thereto, possessing no present importance, dated October 9th, 1911.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J.; the court confirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.

Suit to obtain an order for the sale of church property, or for the appointment of new trustees to carry out the trust created by a deed of the property in 1862, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the complaint and a motion to expunge were overruled (Shumway, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered appointing trustees as prayed for, and appeal by the defendants.

<p>In apportioning, among lienors, the balance due from the owner of a building to the original contractor, all mechanics or materialmen who have given notice of their intention to claim liens and have seasonably filed their certificates, stand upon the same footing and share in the fund pro rata (§ 4138), notwithstanding one of them may be entitled, because of .a payment made to the original contractor by the owner after having received notice of such claim, to enforce his lien for such further sum, not exceeding the amount of such payment, as may be necessary to satisfy his claim in full.</p> <p>Lienors are in no true sense creditors of the owner of the building; their contract relations are with the contractor, whose earnings, in the hands of the owner, constitute the fund to which they are entitled by statute to look for the satisfaction of their claims.</p> <p>As a general rule a court of equity will not marshal securities between two creditors unless it appear that they are creditors of the same debtor, that there are two funds belonging to that debtor, and that but one of them has the right to resort to both funds.</p> <p>Where the contested issues involve not only the rights of the parties respondent in a fund which the plaintiff brings into court, but also the personal liability of the plaintiff in addition, it is error to allow him counsel fees upon the theory that the case is one of interpleader.</p>

Action in the nature of interpleader to determine the respective rights of several claimants in and to the amount due under a policy of life insurance, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Greene, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant Catherine Neary, wife of the insured, from which the plaintiff, the insured’s mother, appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Haven' determining the amount of the inheritance or succession tax due the State from the estate of Mary H. Townshend of New Haven, deceased, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., upon a demurrer to the reasons of appeal, for the advice of this court.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Edwin M. Tyrrel of New Hartford, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Malibie, ./., upon the facts alleged in the complaint and admitted in the respective answers, for the advice of this court. Edwin M. Tyrrel died February 2d, 1915, leaving no widow, personal estate only, and a last will and testament with two codicils thereto.

<p>Where two statutes are clearly antagonistic, the later one must be taken to egress the final legislative intent.</p> <p>Chapter 263 of the Public Acts of 1917, approved May 10th, 1917, permits the county commissioners to grant a renewal license to sell liquor, for a period not later than the first Monday of the second month after a town shall have voted no license; while Chapter 322, approved May 16th, 1917, declares that the license vote of a town “shall become operative” on the first Monday of the month next succeeding that in which it was had. Held that the two Acts were plainly irreconcilable, and that the county commissioners had no authority to renew a license to sell beyond the date when the no-license vote became “operative” under the terms of the later Act.</p>

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract to keep premises occupied by the plaintiff insured against fire for its benefit, in which the Long Hill Quarries Company, one of the defendants, filed a cross-complaint against Beach, the other defendant, for damages and for an adjudication of their respective rights in and to the premises; also an action by the Quarries Company against the Tungsten Company to recover possession of the leased premises, for a…

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Greene, Jverdict and judgment of guilty as charged, and appeal by the accused. The accused in one indictment was charged in separate counts with five separate murders in the first degree by means of poison.

, under a warrant of extradition issued by the Governor of this State upon the demand of the Governor of New York, made to the Hon. Edward L. Smith, judge of the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County; writ issued and a hearing had as to the sufficiency of the defendant’s return; facts found and judgment rendered discharging the said Schumann from custody, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to secure the removal of alleged encroachr ments made by the defendant upon the plaintiffs' adjoining property, brought to and tried by the City Court of Hartford, Bullard, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. In this court the plaintiffs filed a motion to expunge the oral evidence from the record. Motion denied.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective highway, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the complaint because of the insufficiency of the notice was sustained (Burpee, J.), and judgment was afterward rendered for the defendant (Gager, J.), from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action by a chauffeur against his employer to recover expenses incurred by the plaintiff in defending himself against a criminal charge of reckless driving and of injuring a pedestrian in the highway, a result alleged to be due to the insufficient and defective brakes upon the car, a fact alleged to be known to the defendant but not to the plaintiff, and for damages for the humiliation caused by the plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution upon said charges, — brought to the Court…

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; the trial judge, upon motion of the defendant, directed a verdict in its favor, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Action to quiet the title to real estate and to remove an alleged cloud upon the plaintiff’s title, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The trial court has found these facts.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, J., erasing from the docket for want of jurisdiction an appeal to that court by the defendant from an adverse judgment of the City Court of Bridgeport.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract to deliver an automobile, brought to and tried by the District Court of Waterbury, Makepeace, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $419, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>The duty which one personally injured through the negligence of another, owes to the latter, is not merely to act in good faith in procuring medical advice and treatment — as the jury were instructed in the present case — , but the exercise of ordinary care in efforts to effect a cure. Such an instruction is harmless, however, if it appears that the plaintiff did all that careful and prudent conduct required in consulting a physician of good standing and in following his advice as to treatment.</p> <p>The trial court excluded a question as to whether the street at the place of the accident was unlighted on other nights than the one on which the plaintiff was injured. Held that so far as appeared from the record this ruling was correct, the condition of the highway as to lights on other evenings not being material; and that a similar inquiry was properly excluded with respect to the conditions of lights between the date of the injury and the time of the trial.</p> <p>Rulings upon questions of evidence resting in the discretion of the trial court, even if erroneous, cannot be made the ground for a new trial.</p>

Action by a tenant against her landlord to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by his negligence in failing to repair a decayed and defective common stairway, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Information for a violation of the motor-vehicle law, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the defendant. The evidence in this case was confined to that given on behalf of tfie State by a deputy automobile inspector.

Action to recover for merchandise sold, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $211, and appeal by the defendant. The substituted complaint contains two counts, and the following facts appear in the record.

Action by the indorsee against the indorsers of a promissory note, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $631, and appeal by the defendants.

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, ibrought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>At the time the plaintiff received his injuries, an automobile truck, owned by L. Armstead & Son and driven by one of the members of that partnership, was proceeding northerly from New Haven between Mt. Carmel and Cheshire. It was traveling upon the main highway known as Whitney Avenue. The plaintiff, an employee of Armstead & Son, was going with the truck and riding upon the tailboard or rack with his feet hanging over behind. The accident, out of which the present action arose, occurred in the immediate vicinity of a bridge known as Willow Bridge, which spans a stream crossed by the highway. The ordinary traveled part of the highway lies upon its east side. Upon its west side and within its limits is laid the single track of the defendant. This track is raised a foot or more above the traveled path and is separated from that path by a shoulder of earth. The highway at this point is straight for a considerable distance on each side of the stream, so that there is no physical obstruction to a clear view of vehicles or cars upon the highway or tracks to or from any point within a distance of five hundred feet southerly of the stream and fifteen hundred or more northerly of it. The highway to the north of the stream descends toward it at an easy grade. Across the stream is a bridge designed for ordinary highway travel. Close beside it is another bridge, built and designed for the exclusive use of the defendant’s cars.</p> <p>The plaintiff offered evidence to prove the following additional facts: On the day in question the ordinary traveled path of the highway was rendered practically impassable for automobile travel, through accumulations upon it of snow which had fallen a week or more previously. By reason of these accumulations motor-vehicles were accustomed, as they had been at all times when fallen snow impeded travel along the ordinary traveled way, to make use of the raised trolley-tracks from which the snow had been cleared. Upon either side of these tracks on the day in question, the snow, which had been removed therefrom, was banked up so that passage between the tracks and the ordinary traveled roadway was rendered difficult, save at points where users of the tracks had cleared away turnouts to enable trolley-cars and other vehicles using the tracks to pass each other. At the time of the accident the general course of travel, other than that in sleighs, was, and for several days had been, along the trolley-tracks and across the trolley-bridge. This was not invariably so, however. In some cases vehicles approaching the bridge along the tracks turned back upon the main traveled way just before reaching the bridge, crossed the highway bridge, and then returned to the tracks.</p> <p>The truck in which the plaintiff was riding followed the former course. It approached the stream along the trolley-tracks and crossed on the trolley-bridge. As it neared the bridge the plaintiff jumped from the truck and walked over the bridge behind it. After the bridge was crossed he looked up and saw a southbound trolley-car coming into view as it rounded the curve at the top of the hill some fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred feet distant. He continued walking behind the truck as it proceeded along the tracks to the north. He paid no further attention to the car, and shortly started to climb back to his former position on the truck when, at a point some fifty to seventy-five feet beyond the bridge, the car and truck collided and he received his injuries.</p> <p>After the truck had passed the bridge it followed the tracks for the purpose, as its driver testified, of reaching a turnout some three hundred feet ahead. Before reaching that point he saw, as he said, that the car was not going to stop, and thereupon started to swing out to the right to avoid a collision.</p> <p>The collision occurred at some time between 6:30 and 7:10 o’clock on the evening of March 13th, 1916. The plaintiff and driver of the truck testified that the lights of the truck were lighted before the stream was reached. The latter also testified, in answer to a question as to the condition of light, that it was plain, the ground all white with snow, and if he remembered • aright, that the moon was nearly full.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the trolley-car was going at a high rate of speed; the defendants, that it was running from twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour, a rate neither unusual nor improper considering the time and place.</p>

Action to recover the balance of an account alleged to be due for pruning, spraying and treating trees on the defendant’s premises, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $360, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>In an action to recover damages for injury to plate glass through its negligent transportation, the evidence of both parties was to the effect that the breakage was caused by “improper loading” which the exercise of merely ordinary care would have prevented; and the main issue was whether the defendant had undertaken to do the whole job, as the plaintiff claimed, or only to furnish the horses, truck and driver, as the defendant insisted. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Held that under these circumstances it was not material whether the defendant contracted as a common carrier or as a private carrier, since he would have been obliged to exercise ordinary care at least in either capacity, and therefore was’ responsible for the injury due to his failure to observe such care; and that for this reason the trial court was not bound to distinguish between the degree of care to be observed by public and by private carriers, especially as such instructions would have tended only to confuse the jury in deciding the case before them.</p> <p>The sufficiency of a charge is to be determined with reference to the claims actually made by the parties and passed upon by the jury, as they appear in the finding, and not upon those which theoretically might have arisen on the pleadings.</p> <p>While statements made in a charge with reference to testimony before the jury do not import verity, they may, unless questioned, be assumed to be correct for the purpose of aiding this court to understand the claims as set forth in the finding and the issues of fact actually litigated.</p>

Action to recover a commission as a real estate broker, brought to the City Court of Bridgeport and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield- County and tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $225, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have- been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $6,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for a breach, of contract, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the third defense was overruled (Scott, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff by a collision on the highway, which was alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $656, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for maintaining and operating a telephone system in the highway in front of the adjoining premises of the plaintiff, without his consent, brought to the City Court of New Britain and thence by the plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in Hertford County, where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Smith, J.), and upon the refusal of the plaintiff to amend his complaint judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff…

Action to recover damages for the refusal of the defendants to deliver fifty barrels of flour alleged to have been sold by them to the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a retail grocer and the defendants are wholesale grocers, both of Hartford.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from violating his contract with the plaintiff not to engage in a certain kind of business within the town of Southington for the period of three years, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Smith, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action upon a written guaranty for the prompt pay ment at maturity of promissory notes, to an amount not exceeding $10,000, of a certain corporation when indorsed by its president and discounted at the plaintiff bank, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the special defenses of the answer was sustained {Gager, J.) and the cause was afterward tried upon the other issues to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the…

Suit by an alleged creditor of the beneficiary of a testamentary trust to secure the appropriation of the income accruing upon the trust property to the payment of the creditor’s claim, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the cause, upon motion of one of the defendants, was erased from the docket by the court, Case, J., for the lack of jurisdiction, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Information for perjury, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

. Action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff’s intestate alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,200 as against the defendant city of Waterbury, and in favor of the other defendants, from which said city appealed.

Action to recover money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff William O’Neil to the defendant through mistake, brought to the City Court of Waterbury whence it was transferred, upon motion of the defendant, to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court, Makepeace, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff William O’Neil for $156, and appeal by the defendant.

Application in the nature of an appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the board of relief for the defendant district to reduce the valuation ($79,000) placed by the assessors upon the plaintiff’s property alleged to be taxable in said district, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Máltbie, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by the defendants.

Application under § 857 of the General Statutes, by the defendants in an action pending in the Superior Court in Fairfield County, to secure the reduction or dissolution of an attachment made therein of the real estate owned by each of them respectively, brought to and heard by the Hon. William M. Maltbie, a judge of the Superior Court, who granted the application in so far as the realty of the defendant Silverman was concerned, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Bennett, J., and from the refusal of the trial court to set aside said judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to secure a conveyance of land from the defendant, under a contract made with her, or for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action by a tenant against his landlord to recover damages for personal injuries due to a fall upon the cellar stairs used in common by the occupants of the building, which were alleged to be unsafe and out of repair and known to be so by the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,358, and appeal by the defendant.

Achon to recover damages for an alleged breach of duty as bailee of the plaintiff’s motorcycle, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $150, which the trial judge set aside as against the evidence, and from this action the plaintiff appealed.

Action by the indorsee against the maker and indorsers of a promissory note, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County wheré demurrers to the answers of three of the defendants were sustained (Warner, J.) and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for $15,350 against all the defendants, from which the defendant Sisk appealed.