United States v. Benson

¶5CYR, Circuit Judge.

¶6Following a bench trial, appellant, Gregory Wayne Benson, was convicted of robbing the Coastal Savings Bank in Portland, Maine, and of putting the life of a bank teller in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d).1725 F.Supp. 69. Since Benson stipulated that he robbed the bank through “force, violence or intimidation,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),2 the sole issue for trial was whether he would be subject to an enhancement of sentence under subsection 2113(d).3 On appeal, Benson asserts that the district court erroneously found that he (1) used a “dangerous weapon” during the robbery and (2) put the bank teller’s life in jeopardy. As neither contention is sound, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

¶7Appellant admitted at trial that he entered the Coastal Savings Bank, approached a teller and told her: “This is a hold up.” He informed the teller that he had a gun and then moved his left hand inside his jacket pocket, creating the impression that it contained a gun. The movement of Benson’s hand inside his jacket pocket exposed a metallic object which the teller believed to be a gun. Benson denied that he either possessed or used a gun during the robbery but admitted that the object in his jacket pocket during the robbery was an army knife. Benson denied that he was carrying the army knife for use in the robbery or that he had intentionally revealed it to the teller.

¶8The district court found that the army knife was an inherently dangerous device and that its use as a “mock gun” during the course of a bank robbery exacerbated its dangerousness. The district court further found that Benson put the teller’s life in jeopardy by virtue of the fact that he possessed both the actual and the apparent ability to inflict bodily harm.

¶9I

¶10Appellant contends that there was an insufficient showing that he used a dangerous device during the robbery. Although he concedes that he attempted to create the impression that he possessed a gun in order to facilitate the robbery, Benson ar*3gues that a bank robber’s mere assertion that he possesses a gun, even when accompanied by efforts to feign one, is insufficient to render a “mock gun” a dangerous device. We disagree.

¶11A bank robber is vulnerable to a sentence enhancement under subsection 2113(d) if he uses “a dangerous weapon or device” in attempting or committing the crime. In other words, the instrumentality used need not be a “firearm.”4 The dangerousness of an instrumentality used in a bank robbery is not necessarily determined simply by its inherent capacity to inflict harm, but by the dangerousness of the response it may reasonably be expected to provoke on the part of persons who perceive that the instrumentality is dangerous.5See McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986); United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 854-55 (1st Cir.1990).

¶12The Supreme Court held in McLaughlin that an unloaded handgun was a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute. Id.Among the grounds the Court considered “independently sufficient” to support its holding was its assessment that “the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen [and thus] creates an immediate danger that a violent response will ensue.” Id. at 17-18, 106 S.Ct. at 1678.6 Following McLaughlin ’s lead, we recently held that a toy gun similarly constitutes a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of subsection 2113(d) because, among other reasons, “ ‘the robber creates a likelihood that the reasonable response of police.and guards will include the use of deadly force. The increased chance of an armed response creates a greater risk to the physical security of victims, bystanders, and even the perpetrators.’ ” United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 854-55 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Martinez-Jiminez, 864 F.2d at 666-667).

¶13Appellant attempts to distinguish the present case on the ground that the dangerousness discussed in McLaughlin and Cannon arose from the perpetrators’ open display of weapons, which was much more likely to provoke a violent response; whereas the device used by Benson was hidden and therefore less likely to create a dangerous situation. We are unpersuaded by appellant’s fine distinction between a peek and a display.

¶14Subsection 2113(d) is not concerned with the manner in which the dangerous weapon or device is displayed, see Martinez-Jiminez, 864 F.2d at 667, but with whether its use jeopardizes human life. Benson announced to the teller that he had a gun and then placed his hand in his pocket in a menacing manner, revealing a metallic object which the teller, who was familiar with weapons, reasonably believed to be a gun. The verbal announcement and peek preview were sufficient to create an “immediate danger that a violent response [would] ensue,” McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at 18, 106 S.Ct. at 1678, as, for example, from the use of deadly force by guards or police, Cannon, 903 F.2d at 855. There was a sufficient showing that Benson used a “dangerous device” during the bank robbery.

¶15II

¶16Appellant’s second contention is that the district court erroneously found that he put the teller’s life in jeopardy. Benson argues that a mere showing that a person was placed in fear is insufficient to establish *4“jeopardy” within the meaning of subsection 2113(d); there must be a showing that the person’s life was placed in actual danger. The Eighth Circuit has concluded that, “[ujnless placing in jeopardy can be said to mean more than placing in fear, then nothing has been added to § 2113(d) over § 2113(a) to explain or justify the enhanced punishment which subdivision (d) permits.” United States v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 76, 81 (8th Cir.1975). See also United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir.1970) (same); United States v. Roach, 321 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir.1963); United States v. Burger, 419 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir.1969); United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir.1972); Morrow v. United States, 408 F.2d 1390, 1391 (8th Cir.1969); United States v. Coulter, 474 F.2d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir.1973) (all holding that § 2113(d) requires that a person’s life be placed in an objective state of danger); but see United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir.1972) (“puts in jeopardy” provision requires proof only of apparent, not actual, danger); United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 710 (10th Cir.1990) (§ 2113(d) requires that robber place person “in reasonable expectation of death or serious bodily injury”).

¶17We have yet to address the meaning of the “jeopardy” provision in subsection 2113(d), nor need we define its scope today. By its express language, subsection 2113(d) applies whenever a person’s life is placed in actual danger by the use of a dangerous device. During the robbery, appellant used an army knife as a dangerous weapon by informing the teller that he had a gun and, at the same time, moving his hand inside his pocket, revealing a metallic object which the teller reasonably believed to be a gun; “a dangerous weapon or device.” The fact that the object in Benson’s pocket was a knife, perhaps itself a dangerous instrumentality, though an independently sufficient predicate for a sentence enhancement under subsection 2113(d), is not a necessary one. Benson’s use of the “mock gun” during the bank robbery was calculated and could reasonably be expected to instill fear in the teller, creating an immediate danger that a violent response would be forthcoming, see McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at 18, 106 S.Ct. at 1678; Cannon, 903 F.2d at 854-55, which would put in jeopardy the lives of the teller and other persons at the robbery scene, even including appellant.7

¶18Affirmed.